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Abstract 
 
There has been limited empirical focus on the activities of the penal reform network in England 
and Wales, and less still concerned ǁith those ĐaŵpaigŶiŶg to ƌefoƌŵ ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ. 
Investigating the under-ƌeseaƌĐhed iŶteƌƌelatioŶship ďetǁeeŶ the ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal ƌefoƌŵ 
network, journalists, and policymakers at the crime-media nexus, this interdisciplinary study 
examines campaign strategies for women and how they have developed and augmented under 
changing governments and the media spotlight. While penal reform campaigners are able to 
rely on the discourse of vulnerability in relation to women offenders, this remains in the face 
of eŶtƌeŶĐhed soĐial ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶs of the ͚ideal ǁoŵaŶ͛ aŶd a politiĐal Đliŵate that ĐoŶtiŶues 
to talk tough on crime. Uncovering a number of inhibitors to their campaigning efforts, this 
study reveals that such actors operate on the periphery of both the media and policy agendas 
aŶd ĐaŵpaigŶ foƌ a ͚ lesseƌ soĐial pƌoďleŵ͛. DƌaǁiŶg oŶ the ǁoƌk of Best ;ϮϬϭϯͿ aŶd his ƌeseaƌĐh 
on social problems, claimsmakers and the policy agenda, this study also explores the agenda-
setting models developed in the political sciences and media and communications. With 
unprecedented access to over thirty policy elites (including the Chief Executives of the major 
campaign organisations, former Prison Ministers, ex-civil servants from the Ministry of Justice, 
Members of the House of Lords and Commons, journalists, and a former Chief Inspector of 
Prisons) it integrates the viewpoints of key actors operating in this niche policy network for the 
very first time. With an explicit policy-focused orientation, it also provides a number of 
pragmatic and practical tips for those wishing to think more strategically about their ability to 
influence politicians, the media and the public.  
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͚The pƌoďleŵ of ǁoŵeŶ iŶ ouƌ peŶal sǇsteŵ is a disgƌaĐe that 
does not belong to any one government; it is a disgrace for 
ouƌ soĐietǇ͛1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Former Justice Minister Rt Hon Lord Tom McNally. Hansard 25 March 2013 col. 916. 
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1. Introduction 
 
i. Aim and Background 
 
This study in contemporary criminal justice policymaking is a contribution to social problems 
scholarship, which seeks to explore how issues find themselves on the policy agenda and are 
consequently dealt with, or ignored, by government. Examining the interrelationship between 
the ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal ƌefoƌŵ Ŷetǁoƌk, the Ŷeǁs ŵedia aŶd poliĐǇŵakeƌs at the Đƌiŵe-media 
nexus, it will focus on penal reform strategies for women and how they have developed and 
augmented under changing governments and the news media spotlight. Approached from a 
social constructionist standpoint, it will analyse theories of policymaking and agenda-setting 
from their distinct research traditions of the political sciences and media and communications, 
and will amalgamate them to provide a more holistic account of the policy process. Viewing 
the organisational collection of those political actors advocating reform of the penal system as 
a ͚Ŷetǁoƌk͛ ;‘hodes, ϭϵϵϳ, ϮϬϬϳ, ϮϬϭϭͿ, it ǁill ĐoŶsideƌ the disĐuƌsiǀe aĐtioŶs of suĐh aĐtoƌs as 
political aŶd ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatiǀe ͚Đlaiŵsŵakeƌs͛ ;Best, ϮϬϭϯͿ. Those eŶgaged iŶ ͚ĐlaiŵsŵakiŶg 
ǁoƌk͛ haǀe the eǆpliĐit aiŵ of ĐoŶǀiŶĐiŶg otheƌs ͚that X is a pƌoďleŵ, aŶd that Y is the solutioŶ͛ 
;Best, ϭϵϴϳͿ. A soĐial pƌoďleŵ, defiŶed as ͚a putatiǀe ĐoŶditioŶ oƌ situatioŶ that is labelled a 
pƌoďleŵ iŶ the aƌeŶas of puďliĐ disĐouƌse aŶd aĐtioŶ͛ ;HilgaƌtŶeƌ aŶd Bosk, ϭϵϴϴ: ϱϱͿ, 
consequently exists in public consciousness primarily in terms of how it is defined and 
conceived (Blumer, 1971). While individual mission statements, ideologies and preferred 
strategies may differ, it is broadly agreed that, as well as highlighting issues relating to 
conditions and humane containment, penal reform campaigners are seeking to reduce what 
they view as the unnecessary overuse of imprisonment for women, and in particular its 
continued use for non-violent offenders. In advocating a greater use of non-custodial disposals, 
they seek to achieve both political and public support for their policies. Claimsmaking is a 
competitive process, and it is the task of those engaged in lobbying to win support for their 
strategies. 
Studies of the policymaking process are not abundant in criminological literature (for a 
critique see John, 2012; Ismaili, 2006; Jones and Newburn, 2002; Barton and Johns, 2013), yet 
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there are substantial contributions (see for example Fairchild and Webb, 1985; Rock, 1995; 
Stolz, 2002; Ryan, Savage and Wall, 2001; Silverman, 2012). That is because criminologists have 
tended to focus their empirical research on the effects of successive policies rather than their 
origins while political science has largely neglected the field of crime control (Ismaili, 2006: 
255, emphasis added). As a result, there remains a fundamental lack of understanding or an 
empiƌiĐal ͚ďliŶd spot͛ suƌƌouŶdiŶg the ĐoŶstƌaiŶts that ĐƌiŵiŶal justiĐe poliĐǇŵakeƌs opeƌate 
under. Because relatively little attention has been devoted to understanding the policymaking 
environment in which claims, counterclaims, and policy preferences are negotiated, the 
͚ŵessiŶess of ƌeal-world decision-ŵakiŶg ƌeŵaiŶs laƌgelǇ uŶkŶoǁŶ͛ ;Isŵaili, ϮϬϬϲ: ϮϱϳͿ. Yet 
awareness of this omission is not new. Over thirty years ago, Solomon (1981) argued that it 
was important for researchers to study the criminal justice policymaking process: 
 
- To explore the constraints the process places on the translation of ideas and analysis 
into action; 
- To describe the degree to which various actors influence the movement of criminal 
justice proposals through the policy process; and 
- To provide insight into how politics determines what is and can be implemented (1981: 
5, emphasis added). 
 
The above points remain of crucial consideration for this investigation into the contemporary 
strategies of woŵeŶ͛s peŶal ƌefoƌŵ ĐaŵpaigŶeƌs and the changing ideological climate within 
which they operate. 
There is limited documentation about the activities and relationships within the penal 
reform network in England and Wales (Wilson, 2001: 123; although see Ryan 1978, 1983), and 
less still, if any, about those specifically concerned with women. This study aims to fill that 
empirical gap by uncovering the previously unpublished experiences of those actors working 
in and around this niche area of government policy. In discussing their experiences, as well as 
those of their predecessors, this study adopts a pluralist standpoint and draws on the work of 
network analysts who view policymaking as a complex interplay between governments and 
officials, professional associations, pressure groups, think tanks and other specialists. Like 
networks operating in other policy spheres, making arguments perceived as having purchase 
with the political elite is a key part of penal reform campaigneƌs͛ ǁoƌk ;Mills aŶd ‘oďeƌts, ϮϬϭϮ: 
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8), and such actors do so through variously undertaking a combination of lobbying, media 
work, research and campaigning on criminal justice issues (Mills and Roberts, 2012: 8). Penal 
reform campaigners opeƌate iŶ a Đliŵate ǁhiĐh has, siŶĐe the ϭϵϴϬ͛s, oǀeƌseeŶ ͚the eǀolutioŶ 
of a right-ǁiŶg poliĐǇ ageŶda ǁhiĐh sǁept aǁaǇ the ƌehaďilitatioŶist appƌoaĐhes… [togetheƌ 
ǁith] a ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt to the ďelief that ͚pƌisoŶ ǁoƌks͛ ;WilsoŶ, ϮϬϬϭ: ϭϮϰͿ. While it is true that 
recent years have signalled the return of the rehabilitation agenda, from the Coalition 
goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s eaƌlǇ atteŵpts iŶ the Rehabilitation Revolution to the Transforming 
Rehabilitation agenda and the recently enshrined Offender Rehabilitation Act 2014, the subject 
of penal reform is ĐoŶsideƌed as haǀiŶg little ƌeadeƌship appeal ďǇ jouƌŶalists aŶd ͚does not 
iŶstiŶĐtiǀelǇ stƌike a sǇŵpathetiĐ Đhoƌd ǁith laƌge Ŷuŵďeƌs of the puďliĐ͛ (Blom Cooper 1977: 
7). Furthermore, while penal reform campaigners are able to rely on a discourse of vulnerability 
in relation to women offenders (one rarely available for men), this remains in the face of 
entrenched social constructioŶs of the ͚ideal ǁoŵaŶ͛. Hoǁ those ĐaŵpaigŶiŶg to ƌefoƌŵ peŶal 
policy for women have negotiated Post-War developments in penal policy, and what strategies 
they pursue to respond to the increasing use of imprisonment for women is therefore a major 
research concern. In addition to its focus on network politics, this study is therefore also a 
contribution to interpretive political science, examining the beliefs of political actors (Rhodes, 
2011: 4) and their understanding of the social world within which they operate. 
Joining a growing area of scholarship (for early contributions see for example Smart, 
1976; Gelsthorpe, 1989; Gelsthorpe and Morris, 1990; Heidensohn, 1985; Carlen et al., 1985; 
Carlen, 1998; Carlen and Worrall, 1987; Worrall, 1990), there is a fairly limited pool of research 
that eǆpliĐitlǇ foĐuses oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇŵakiŶg. Fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, theƌe is little, if aŶǇ, 
research on the political and communicative strategies employed by those lobbying to reform 
penal policy for women. Consistent with its feminist commitment, this study will therefore take 
the opportunity to shine a renewed spotlight on the experiences of women offenders. While 
there now exists a growing number of campaigners (working in larger organisations or as 
individuals) dedicated to the pursuit of reform, the reality is that women make up just five per 
cent of the overall prison population. That the issue of female offending remains a low priority 
is well documented in criminological literature (see for example Carlen, 1998; Gelsthorpe, 
2004; Kennedy, 2005; Corcoran, 2011; Hedderman, 2012), with successive government 
administrations not viewing it as a sufficient policy problem to warrant substantial public 
ƌesouƌĐes. This studǇ ǁill aƌgue that ǁheŶ ĐoŶsideƌed as a ͚lesseƌ soĐial pƌoďleŵ͛ ;Hilgartner 
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and Bosk, 1988), it becomes easy to see why, despite decades of debate between campaigners 
aŶd goǀeƌŶŵeŶts, the suďjeĐt of ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ ƌefoƌŵ has ƌeŵaiŶed stuďďoƌŶlǇ loǁ 
on the political agenda. It is, however, important to state at the outset that there does exist a 
general consensus (in academia and in politics) that the overuse of prison for non-violent 
women offenders is wasteful and expensive. Acknowledging that many of crucial battles have 
been won (in official discourse at least), this study does not aim to add to arguments already 
well-rehearsed. What it does aim to do, however, is to progress the debate, and shed new light 
on how penal reformers work to bring about policy change. Understanding that they operate 
in a highly politicised and multi-mediated environment, it will seek to uncover what strategies 
they find most effective.  
In addition to its analysis of political strategies, this study simultaneously focuses on 
the communicative strategies employed by penal reform campaigners. Understanding that we 
liǀe iŶ a ͚ŵass-ŵediated ƌealitǇ͛ ;Niŵŵo aŶd Coŵďs, ϭϵϴϯͿ, it is ĐƌuĐiallǇ iŵpoƌtaŶt to eǆploƌe 
the role of the news media in the policy process and the effect that news media portrayals of 
women offenders have on claimsmaking strategies. Like those researching the criminal justice 
policymaking process, those criminologists studying the media-policy nexus are faced with a 
field that is ͚dispaƌate aŶd uŶdeƌ-theoƌized͛ ;Walgƌaǀe aŶd VaŶ Aelst, ϮϬϬϲ: ϴϵ iŶ “ilǀeƌŵaŶ, 
2012: 5), bearing ͚ ƌelatiǀelǇ feǁ aĐadeŵiĐ footpƌiŶts͛ ;“ilǀeƌŵaŶ, ϮϬϭϮ: ϱͿ. With a speĐifiĐ foĐus 
oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ, this studǇ ǁill adopt the appƌoaĐh takeŶ ďǇ “ilǀeƌŵaŶ, aŶd ǁill aiŵ 
to uŶƌaǀel ͚ the iŶteƌliŶkiŶg ƌelatioŶships ďetǁeeŶ the ŵedia aŶd poliĐǇŵakeƌs aŶd shapers and 
the iŵpaĐt oŶ ĐƌiŵiŶal justiĐe͛ ;ϮϬϭϮ: ϭͿ. AŶalysing penal reform campaigners as news sources, 
this study therefore joins that body of research (Schlesinger, Tumber and Murdock, 1991; 
Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994; Miller, 2010) that aims to provide a more holistic account of 
the news production process. Taking into account the changing media landscape, the sociology 
of news production and the news packaging techniques of journalists, it will draw on the work 
of McCombs (2014) to examine how penal reformers attempt to influence the media agenda. 
Mirroring growing interest in the news framing behaviour of journalists (see Entman, 1993), 
there has been a lesser, but corresponding interest (particularly in the American political 
sciences) in the activities of lobbying organisations and how their framing activities have 
developed (Johnson-Cartee, 2005: 243). Using framing theory to explore the concept of the 
Ŷeǁs ŵedia as a ͚ŶoŶ-ĐoŵpliaŶt paƌtŶeƌ͛ ;HiltoŶ et al., 2013) in the process of policy reform, 
it will investigate the particular difficulties encountered by those seeking to have sensible 
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͚puďliĐ ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶs͛ aďout ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ. Framing theory will also be used to explore 
the array of communicative efforts employed by penal reform campaigners. Considering 
stƌategies iŶ ƌelatioŶ to ‘utheƌfoƌd͛s ;ϭϵϵϯͿ tǇpologǇ of peŶal ideologies, this studǇ ǁill also 
draw on the frame alignment processes developed in the political sciences by Snow et al. 
(1986).  
A final initial consideration is the aimed contribution to public criminology and penal 
policymaking. For many social scientists, engagement with the policymaking elite is not, and 
never will be, a professional ambition. Yet debate persists about the contribution of academic 
criminology to the policy process and its relevance in contemporary policy debates. 
CƌiŵiŶologǇ has ďeeŶ Đalled ͚ a suĐĐessful failuƌe͛ ;Loadeƌ aŶd “paƌks, ϮϬϬϴ: ϭϴͿ, aŶd it is iŶdeed 
true that there are serious political limits to the expert role of policy-oriented criminologists 
(Chancer and McLaughlin, 2007: 158). Zajac (2002: 252), for example, has observed that 
academics, policymakers and practitioners largely operate in their own distinct spheres, and 
draw on their own research in the process. This has had the regretful consequence of the 
further erosion of criminology in the policy process (in Ismaili 2006: 256). While there may be 
a teŶdeŶĐǇ foƌ ĐƌiŵiŶologists to speĐialise iŶ ͚Ŷaƌƌoǁ, iƌƌeleǀaŶt ƌeseaƌĐh aƌeas aŶd addƌess 
their work to a primary audience of their peers aŶd studeŶts͛ ;ChaŶĐeƌ aŶd MĐLaughliŶ, ϮϬϬϳ: 
ϭϲϭͿ, theƌe aƌe, hoǁeǀeƌ, diffeƌeŶt ǁaǇs that aĐadeŵiĐs ĐaŶ ͚do͛ puďliĐ ĐƌiŵiŶologǇ aŶd 
connect with multiple audiences (Chancer and McLaughlin, 2007: 168). With an explicit policy 
focus and a practical intention, this research will provide pragmatic information for those 
engaged in penal reform campaigning as well as the wider network of actors working on 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ. Faulkner and Burnett have argued that criminology should not be 
isolated from wider reflections on social and economic policy, public administration and 
politics (2012: 7). This study follows their approach and aims to provide an informative and 
unbiased contribution to current penological debate. 
 
 
ii. Scope 
 
There are very few studies of this kind, and certainly none within the field of criminology. 
Looking, as a consequence, to research conducted in the political sciences, this study takes 
inspiration from WhiteleǇ aŶd WiŶǇaƌd͛s studǇ of the UK poǀeƌtǇ loďďǇ in the 1980s which 
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aiŵed to ͚fill a gap iŶ ďoth the politiĐal sĐieŶĐe aŶd soĐial poliĐǇ liteƌatuƌes͛ ;ϭϵϴϳ: ϮͿ. While 
this research has a different empirical focus, it does however aim to follow Whiteley and 
WiŶǇaƌd͛s lead ďǇ liŶkiŶg eŵpiƌiĐal aŶalǇsis ǁith theoretical discussion to form what Merton 
(1949) described as middle-ƌaŶge theoƌǇ. “iŶĐe WhiteleǇ aŶd WiŶǇaƌd͛s studǇ of the aĐtiǀities 
of the poverty lobby in the 1980s, it is universally acknowledged that the public sphere has 
experienced a paradigm shift. This study into contemporary policymaking must therefore 
consider the role and impact of the news media in far greater detail. Critically considering how 
penal reformers seek to influence the policy process, what strategies and tactics they use, and 
the importance they place on the news media as a policy tool, it will examine the complex 
nature of contact between campaigners, journalists and policymakers at the crime-media 
nexus.  
It is also important at this stage to outline the scope of the study, and to underline its 
empirical boundaries. It is important to highlight that the news media analysis relates solely to 
the national print media. It was not possible, and neither was it the aim of this research, to 
analyse news channels or news broadcasts. While undoubtedly threatened by developments 
in media technology, the national print media continue to exert agenda-setting dominance, 
evidenced by a total daily readership of ten million. Of this figure, Sun readers account for 
nearly three million and Daily Mail two million (McNair, 2009: 3). With a substantially larger 
readership than the left-leaning newspapers, it is the right-leaning newspapers that are able 
to exert the greatest political pressure on governments and are better positioned to influence 
policy decisions. In terms of the subject matter, while a great deal of data and analysis is 
generalizable to the penal reform network as a whole, the research specifically focuses on 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐy, and the previously uncovered territory of relations between 
campaigners, journalists and policymakers operating in this area. One final consideration is that 
of the timeframe. While the studǇ tƌaĐks deǀelopŵeŶts iŶ the ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal ƌefoƌŵ Ŷetǁoƌk 
from the early 20th century onwards, this documentation has already been skilfully completed 
by Logan (2008). The main timeframe for this study, the fifteen year period between 1997 and 
2012, is theƌefoƌe laƌgelǇ ĐoŶĐeƌŶed ǁith the ͚poliĐǇ ǁiŶdoǁ͛ ;KiŶgdoŶ, ϭϵϴϰͿ that eŵeƌged 
during the New Labour government, the formulation of the Corston agenda and the 
consequent policy developments under the Conservative-led Coalition.  
This is an interesting tiŵe iŶ the histoƌǇ of ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal reform. After decades of 
unrewarding campaigning, and following the watershed Corston Report of 2007, government 
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attention was firmly focused on this area of penal policy. The research was conceived the year 
of the 2010 election, amidst the fears of those penal reformers who had worked hard to secure 
vital policy wins. Campaigners articulated widespread concern that an issue deemed of 
importance to New Labour would not be viewed in the same light by its Coalition predecessor. 
Theiƌ feaƌs ǁeƌe justified. As this studǇ ǁill highlight, ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ iŵŵediatelǇ fell off 
the government agenda, and it was not until September 2012, among the furore of a highly 
critical House of Commons Justice Select Committee Report, that a Coalition strategy for 
women offenders was forthcoming. By early 2015, four Coalition Ministers had assumed 
responsibility for this brief, each to a greater or lesser extent interested in the problem of 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s offeŶdiŶg. At the tiŵe of fieldǁoƌk ;Ϯ011-2012), interviews with campaigners and 
policymakers exposed a policy sphere in flux, yet the latter half of the Coalition government 
did herald encouraging signs. Although the specialist policy unit in the Ministry of Justice was 
disbanded, there did exist a determination (among the very few officials operating in this area) 
to make progress on this area of policy. An official strategy was published, and although 
criticised for providing broad targets, the renewed focus was clear. The Transforming 
Rehabilitation agenda, which came into force in early 2015, legally requires the newly-formed 
Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) to provide gender-specific activities for women 
offenders in the community. Penal reform campaigners, policymakers and academics alike will 
monitor these developments with interest.  
 
 
iii. Overview of Study 
 
Chapter two will provide the theoretical context for this interdisciplinary study. Approached, 
perhaps unusually for an investigation into policymaking, from a sociological standpoint, it will 
incorporate agenda-setting and framing theories developed in media and communications and 
the political sciences under the overarching framework of social problems research (Best, 
2013) to provide a holistic account of contemporary penal policymaking. Initially viewing the 
policy process as one that operates through networks (see Rhodes, 1997), it will consider the 
changing role of organised interests in the policy process and the extent to which penal reform 
campaigners can be considered government insiders (Grant, 1989, 2004). Introducing the 
competing penal philosophies that will be debated throughout the study, it will highlight the 
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crucial importance of rhetoric in the process of policy reform. Chapter two will simultaneously 
focus on the status of penal reform campaigners as news sources, and drawing on the work of 
McCombs (2014), it will consider the extent to which they are able to influence the news media 
agenda. The final section will examine the changing nature of penal policymaking and will 
doĐuŵeŶt the politiĐisatioŶ of laǁ aŶd oƌdeƌ, fƌoŵ the heǇdaǇ of the ͚platoŶiĐ guaƌdiaŶs͛ 
;Loadeƌ, ϮϬϬϲͿ to the ͚Đultuƌe of iŵpatieŶĐe͛ ;Loadeƌ, ϮϬϬϲͿ. While recent years have signalled 
a return of the rehabilitation agenda (manifested in the goveƌŶŵeŶt͛s Transforming 
Rehabilitation policy), such developments sit uncomfortably with the punitive rhetoric 
espoused by key government figures.  
Chapter three ǁill foĐus oŶ the speĐifiĐ poliĐǇ pƌoďleŵ of ǁoŵeŶ͛s offeŶdiŶg aŶd 
imprisonment. Initially discussiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s offeŶdiŶg as a social phenomenon, it will explore 
issues and fears surrounding women, independence and deviancy. Required to conform to 
strict gender-role expectations, those women whose lives were less respectable were 
traditionally viewed as soĐial deǀiaŶts iŶ Ŷeed of ͚ƌefoƌŵ͛. It is of Đouƌse the Đase that ǁoŵeŶ 
offeŶdeƌs aƌe still ǀieǁed as ͚douďlǇ deǀiaŶt͛, ĐƌossiŶg the laǁs of feŵiŶiŶitǇ as ǁell as the laǁ 
of the laŶd. AŶalǇsiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s offeŶdiŶg as a ŵedia pheŶoŵeŶoŶ, it ǁill ĐoŶsideƌ the impact 
of sensationalised portrayals of high-profile women offenders on penal reform campaigning. 
The amount of news coverage dedicated to women offenders is not new, and it is possible to 
trace mediated distortions from the Post-War period onwards. Crime journalists continue to 
draw on the most high-pƌofile Đases as ŵedia ͚teŵplates͛ ;KitziŶgeƌ, ϮϬϬϬͿ, aŶd Đhapteƌ thee 
will use framing theory to highlight hoǁ this ƌeŵaiŶs the Đase iŶ teƌŵs of ǁoŵeŶ͛s offeŶdiŶg. 
CoŶsideƌiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s offeŶdiŶg as a political phenomenon, it will document the development 
of the woŵeŶ͛s peŶal ƌefoƌŵ Ŷetǁoƌk, highlighting the struggles faced by those campaigning 
foƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal ƌefoƌŵ since the late Victorian period. Documenting the actions of the early 
penal reformers to those of the present day, it will pay particular attention to policy 
developments during the fifteen year period between 1997 and 2012. Demonstrating how 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal policy has been caught up in the political momentum, it will highlight the crucial 
importance of political ideology in this policy domain.  
Providing a clear methodological contribution to social research literature, chapter four 
combines both elite and geŶdeƌ studies to uŶĐoǀeƌ the dǇŶaŵiĐs of the ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal ƌefoƌŵ 
Ŷetǁoƌk. Elite ƌeseaƌĐh ƌaises ͚a paƌtiĐulaƌ set of issues aŶd dileŵŵas ǁhiĐh haǀe iŵpoƌtaŶt 
implications for the methodology, mode of interviewing and the process of analysis and 
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interpretatioŶ͛ ;Ball ϭϵϵϰ: ϵϳͿ. ‘eseaƌĐhiŶg politiĐal aĐtoƌs, those ĐƌiŵiŶal justiĐe pƌofessioŶals 
in government, Whitehall and beyond, introduces specific power dynamics between the 
researcher and the researched, particularly if political partisanship or personal agendas are at 
plaǇ. TakiŶg a ĐƌitiĐal appƌoaĐh to tƌaditioŶal ĐoŶĐeptioŶs of elite poǁeƌ, it ǁill dƌaǁ oŶ “ŵith͛s 
(2006) post-structural conception in discussions of the interview setting. Providing a reflexive 
account of the fieldwork process it will also ƌeǀeal the ͚uŶtidǇ aŶd eŵotioŶal͛ ;Neal aŶd 
McLaughlin, 2009: 703) encounters that may occur when interviewing those who are 
simultaneously a female and an elite (Puwar, 1997: 4.2). In documenting issues of access and 
self-censorship, it will further highlight the highly politicised nature of conducting empirical 
research on political and policy elites.  
Chapter five, the first empirical chapter, will explore the process of claimsmaking, 
investigating how penal reform campaigners seek to achieve their political and communicative 
stƌategies foƌ ǁoŵeŶ. EǆaŵiŶiŶg the ǀaƌious ďaƌƌieƌs to ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal ƌefoƌŵ, iŶĐludiŶg 
government resistance and media disinterest, it will discuss the difficulties faced by 
campaigners as news sources, and the various media strategies, both proactive and reactive, 
that they seek to employ. Revealing the spectrum of insider actors, from those with national 
profiles to those working to push for policy change within the private confines of Westminster 
and Whitehall, it will document the different struggles encountered by those seeking a greater 
public voice. DƌaǁiŶg oŶ KiŶgdoŶ͛s ;ϭϵϴϰͿ ŵodel of poliĐǇ stƌeaŵs, aŶd eǆploƌiŶg Best͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ 
model of ͚iŶsideƌ ĐlaiŵsŵakiŶg͛, it ǁill deďate whether their strategies can be more closely 
aligned to those of the Post-Waƌ ͚platoŶiĐ guaƌdiaŶs͛ ;Loadeƌ, ϮϬϬϲͿ ǁho opeƌated iŶ the 
corridors of power over half a century ago.  
Chapter six will focus on the role of the news media, examining the extent to which 
journalists seek to influence the policy process in this domain. It is clear that developments in 
media ownership, the proliferation of news outlets and the politicisation of law and order 
mean that journalists now operate in a fast-developing, and increasingly competitive, 
landscape. Such changes have implications for the production of crime news stories. Drawing 
on understandings of the news production process (see Chibnall, 1977), it will highlight the 
opposing standpoints of journalists working in this area, and examine the different news 
framing techniques that they adopt. With certain individuals (often working for agenda-setting 
papeƌsͿ Ŷot ǀieǁiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal ƌefoƌŵ as eitheƌ iŶteƌestiŶg oƌ iŵpoƌtaŶt, it ǁill also 
highlight the struggles of other journalists to insert their more progressive ideas into their own 
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newspapers. Considering penal reform campaigners in their role as news sources, it will 
examine the aďilitǇ of suĐh aĐtoƌs to iŶflueŶĐe the ŵetaphoƌiĐal ͚oŶioŶ͛ of the ŵedia ageŶda 
(McCombs, 2014). Chapter six will reveal that access to the media for campaigners, although 
limited, is largely dependent on resources, politics and strategies. While campaigners have no 
control over the political climate within which they operate, those that make the right framing 
decisions stand the greatest chances of news coverage.  
In examining the institutional channels of penal policymaking, chapter seven will shine 
a spotlight on those actors operating in the Ministry of Justice, and will discuss the different 
roles of Ministers and civil servants in the process of penal policy reform. In considerations of 
political ideology and the policy agenda, the importance of Ministerial leadership for policy 
ĐhaŶge aŶd goǀeƌŶŵeŶt use of the Ŷeǁs ŵedia as a poliĐǇ ͚tool͛, it ǁill siŵultaŶeouslǇ assess 
the agenda-setting role of campaigners from the perspective of policymakers, and the extent 
to which campaign strategies have adapted in a changing political climate. Exploring the links 
between political ideology and policymaking, it will discuss the changing nature of relations 
between policymakers and campaigners from the mid-ϮϬϬϬ͛s to the afteƌŵath of the ϮϬϭϬ 
election. Considering the importance that policymakers place on news coverage in the process 
of reform, it will investigate the framing strategies employed by politicians and officials when 
undertaking such work. In investigating the lobbying tactics that policymakers consider to be 
the most effective, chapter seven will also uncover the private nature of policymaking and what 
goes oŶ ͚ďehiŶd Đlosed dooƌs͛. Highlighting areas of collaboration and the existence of blurred 
boundaries, it provides an important contribution to developing understandings of penal 
policymaking.  
Synthesising the empirical findings with existing theoretical understandings, chapter 
eight will provide a summary of the complex interrelations between campaigners, journalists 
and policymakers at the contemporary crime-media-policy nexus. In so doing, it will add weight 
to the importance of recognising the number of complexities to contemporary penal 
policymaking: the dominant political culture, the limited capacity of the government agenda, 
the competitive framing of criminal justice solutions and the ever-present threat of punitive 
public opinion. Adding a gendered perspective to the dominant penal philosophies outlined by 
Rutherford (1993; see also Mills and Roberts (2011, 2102)), it will argue that penal reformers 
hoping to improve their agenda-setting influence may wish to consider framing their messages 
to better align with the views of their target recipients (be it left-leaning supporters of penal 
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ƌefoƌŵ oƌ, as data ĐolleĐted foƌ this studǇ aƌgues, the ǀieǁs of ŵoƌe ĐoŶseƌǀatiǀe ͚ŵiddle 
EŶglaŶd͛Ϳ. ‘eƋuiƌiŶg a fuŶdaŵeŶtal ƌethiŶk of theiƌ puďliĐ faĐe, ĐaŵpaigŶeƌs adoptiŶg suĐh 
strategies could be better positioned to influence policymakers, journalists and the public. 
Chapter eight will also look foƌǁaƌd, aŶd ǁill ĐoŶsideƌ futuƌe pƌospeĐts foƌ the ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal 
ƌefoƌŵ Ŷetǁoƌk. That ƌefoƌŵ of ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ has ďeeŶ Đaught up iŶ the punitive 
momentum is widely acknowledged. How campaigners successfully negotiate the political and 
economic challenges ahead remains an ongoing concern, even more so as we enter the 
Transforming Rehabilitation era.  
Chapter nine, the final chapter of this study, will review the contribution to empirical, 
theoretical and methodological understandings of contemporary penal policymaking. Casting 
a critical eye over accepted understandings of the policy process, it will simultaneously 
consider the role of the media in this process. With limited influence in the corridors of power, 
this research will also highlight the limitations of media work for penal reformers. Although 
uncomfortable reading, reflecting on this situation will enable progressive reformers to 
consider their future campaigning strategies. Outlining contributions to the field of social 
problems, penal policy and feminist criminology, chapter nine will also highlight the 
methodological contributions to elite and gender studies. The study will conclude by 
highlighting several pertinent areas for future research. 
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2. Theory and Context 
 
i. Introduction 
 
This study is, perhaps unusually, approached from a sociological standpoint, and while 
incorporating key theories from media and communications and the political sciences, will use 
social problems research as a key theoretical glue to provide a holistic account of the 
policymaking process (predominantly, although not exclusively, from the perspective of penal 
reform campaigners). Providing not only the structure for this chapter but the thesis as a 
ǁhole, Best͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ Ŷatuƌal histoƌǇ ŵodel of the soĐial pƌoblems process is utilised to provide 
a series of general building blocks to help synthesise the dispaƌate ƌeseaƌĐh tƌaditioŶs. Best͛s 
desĐƌiptioŶ of the soĐial pƌoďleŵs pƌoĐess deliŶeates ǀaƌious ͚stages͛ aloŶg the pathǁaǇ to 
policy change; from initial claimsmaking, to newsmaking, to the policymaking process itself. 
Adopting the above stages as distinct areas of inquiry, this research will simultaneously draw 
oŶ ƌeleǀaŶt liteƌatuƌes assoĐiated ǁith ĐlaiŵsŵakiŶg aŶd ͚ideas͛ iŶ the poliĐǇ pƌoĐess, the ƌole 
of the media and the relations between journalists and news sources, and theories of 
policymaking. Part two will provide an overview of the social problems research tradition, 
outlining Best͛s theoƌetiĐal ŵodel of the soĐial pƌoďleŵs pƌocess and summarising the concept 
of ͚ĐlaiŵsŵakiŶg͛. IŶtƌoduĐiŶg ŵedia aŶd communications theory, part three will consider the 
social production of the news and the news framing techniques of journalists, before focusing 
on the agenda-setting function of the news media, together with the changing nature of 
͚souƌĐe͛ aĐĐess. Paƌt four will explore accounts of the policymaking process developed in the 
political sciences, including contemporary understandings of agenda-setting theory and the 
ĐhaŶgiŶg ƌole of poliĐǇ aĐtoƌs as ͚oƌgaŶised iŶteƌests͛. IŶ doĐuŵeŶtiŶg hoǁ the politiĐisatioŶ of 
law and order has affected the very nature of criminal justice policymaking (from the heyday 
of the ͚platoŶiĐ guaƌdiaŶs͛ ;Loadeƌ, ϮϬϬϲͿ to the ͚Đultuƌe of iŵpatieŶĐe͛ ;Loadeƌ, ϮϬϬϲͿͿ, paƌt 
five will briefly highlight the growing importance of public opinion in this policy domain. The 
overarching aim of this chapter, therefore, is to introduce the key literatures that will bind the 
interdisciplinary roots of this study together, with part six providing a tentative framework for 
aŶalǇsis that ǁill lead iŶto aŶ eǆaŵiŶatioŶ of the speĐifiĐ poliĐǇ pƌoďleŵ of ǁoŵeŶ͛s offending 
and imprisonment in chapter two.  
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ii. The Social Problems Process 
 
Supplemented by works from political science, media and communications and feminist 
sociology, this study is heavily inspired by the work of Joel Best (1987, 2013) and his research 
on social problems, claimsmakers and the policy agenda. In their now famous quote, Hilgartner 
aŶd Bosk defiŶe a soĐial pƌoďleŵ as ͚a putatiǀe ĐoŶditioŶ oƌ situatioŶ that is laďelled a pƌoďleŵ 
iŶ the aƌeŶas of puďliĐ disĐouƌse aŶd aĐtioŶ͛ ;ϭϵϴϴ: ϱϱͿ. A soĐial pƌoďleŵ eǆists, theƌefoƌe, 
͚pƌiŵaƌilǇ iŶ teƌŵs of hoǁ it is defined and conceived iŶ soĐietǇ͛ ;Bluŵeƌ, ϭϵϳϭ: ϯϬϬ, eŵphasis 
added). To Best, it is not the objective quality of a social condition, but rather the subjective 
reactions to that condition, that make something a social problem (2013: 9), and not all 
͚pƌoďleŵs͛ Đoŵe to ďe defiŶed as suĐh. Thƌough the Đoŵpetitiǀe pƌaĐtiĐe of ͚pƌoďleŵ 
defiŶitioŶ͛ ͚ĐoŶĐeptioŶs, disĐouƌse, ďeliefs aŶd Ŷoƌŵs… defiŶe the pƌoĐess of poliĐǇŵakiŶg͛ 
(Best, 2013: 176) and how a problem is constructed plays a role in determining what is, or is 
not, viewed as warranting a clear policy response (Dorey, 2005: 8). As will be discussed 
throughout this study, some issues might not be defined as problems because they conflict 
with the dominant attitudes (or political ideology) in society at any given juncture (Dorey, 2005: 
11), or because they do not affect a large number of people. This study will argue that although 
ĐleaƌlǇ a soĐial pƌoďleŵ foƌ soĐietǇ, the issue of ǁoŵeŶ͛s offeŶdiŶg aŶd iŵpƌisoŶŵeŶt has Ŷot 
received widespread articulation in politics, the media and public discourse, and has 
deǀeloped, theƌefoƌe, iŶto ǁhat ĐaŶ ďe Đlassed as a ͚lesseƌ soĐial pƌoďleŵ͛ ;HilgaƌtŶeƌ aŶd 
Bosk, 1988). Political actors working in this area (in whatever guise) must therefore work 
extremely hard to keep the issue alive on the margins of public debate (Hilgartner and Bosk, 
1988: 57).  
Since the term social problem encompasses a vast array of issues from crime to health 
to ǁelfaƌe, Best ĐoŶstƌuĐted a ƌetƌospeĐtiǀe ͚geŶeƌal fƌaŵeǁoƌk͛ oƌ ͚Ŷatuƌal histoƌǇ ŵodel͛ 
(2013: ϭϴͿ to guide those iŶǀestigatiŶg the soĐial pƌoďleŵs pƌoĐess. The teƌŵ ͚Ŷatuƌal histoƌǇ͛ 
ǁas iŶĐluded ďǇ Best to ͚ƌefeƌ to a seƋueŶĐe of stages that teŶds to appeaƌ iŶ lots of diffeƌeŶt 
Đases͛ ;ϮϬϭϯ: ϭϴͿ, aŶd ǁhile aĐkŶoǁledgiŶg that Ŷot eǀeƌǇ eŵpiƌiĐal Đase study will fit the 
model, it is outlined here to provide an initial level of theoretical structure to the complexity 
of the policy process.  
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Figure 1. The Basic Natural History Model of the Social Problems Process (Best, 2013: 19) 
 
Best͛s siŵplistiĐ ŵodel depiĐts ĐlaiŵsŵakiŶg ƌuŶŶiŶg aloŶg a liŶeaƌ pƌoĐess, thƌough ŵedia 
coverage and public reaction to gain the attention of policymakers. Given the orientation of 
this study, only certain stages of the above model are of empirical interest2. Focusing on the 
specific policy actors in question, Figure 2 illustrates the separate building blocks that will be 
explored. Drawing on a number of theoretical perspectives, each stage will be investigated in 
turn.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Areas of Empirical Focus 
 
                                                          
2 As the primary concern of this research is the process by which claims find themselves onto the policy agenda 
and are subsequently dealt with by policymakers, the final two stages ;those of ͚soĐial pƌoďleŵs ǁoƌk͛ aŶd ͚poliĐǇ 
outĐoŵes͛Ϳ haǀe ďeeŶ deliďeƌatelǇ oŵitted. Fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, the oƌigiŶal stage thƌee, that of ͚puďliĐ ƌeaĐtioŶ͛ has 
also been excluded and does not provide a distinct point of empirical review. Initial interviews with campaigners, 
policymakers and journalists revealed that the public have limited concern when it comes to the subject of 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ, aŶd the iŶĐlusioŶ of puďliĐ ƌeaĐtioŶ as a staŶd-alone stage in the pathway to reform is 
therefore unnecessary (although clearly an area for deeper investigation in future research). Through a reflexive 
process, stage three was therefore removed and amalgamated with stage two (which still allows for an element 
of ͚puďliĐ outƌage͛Ϳ. 
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Best͛s original conception also highlights the external pressures of resources and rhetoric on 
the social problems process. Different levels of resources (not simply financial) expose the fact 
that not all claimsmakers aƌe eƋual, aŶd allude to the pƌeseŶĐe of a ͚hieƌaƌĐhǇ of ĐƌediďilitǇ͛ iŶ 
the social problems process. The pressure of rhetoric is similarly key, as possessing the 
necessary skills to develop persuasive discourse is a fundamental claimsmaking tool. Even 
those policy actors allied in a claimsmaking campaign (members of the same policy network) 
may adopt different forms of language to further their arguments or emphasise different 
elements of the same problem (Best, 2013: 25). As this research will highlight, such divergence 
can be detrimental to the campaign in question, as politicians, journalists and members of the 
public receive contradictory and sometimes competing claims.  
 
Claimsmaking and Rhetoric 
Those actors engaged in a claimsmaking campaign wish to highlight what they perceive to be 
a tƌouďliŶg ĐoŶditioŶ ;Best, ϮϬϭϯ: ϮϲͿ aŶd to ͚ĐoŶǀiŶĐe otheƌs that X is a pƌoďleŵ, that Y offeƌs 
a solution to that problem, or that a policy of Z should be adopted to bring that solution to 
ďeaƌ͛ ;Best, ϭϵϴϳ: ϭϬϮͿ. “uĐh claimsmakers work to influence the climate of opinion about an 
issue, with the ultimate hope of influencing government policymaking (John, 2012: 69, 
emphasis added). It is in this way that a great deal of claimsmaking work is focused on achieving 
interpretative ĐhaŶge; poliĐǇ aĐtoƌs ǁish to suĐĐessfullǇ aƌtiĐulate that ͚X is a pƌoďleŵ, aŶd it is 
a pƌoďleŵ of this soƌt͛ ;Best, ϭϵϴϳ: ϭϭϱͿ. ChaŶges iŶ poliĐǇ fashioŶ, ofteŶ ĐoƌƌespoŶdiŶg to 
changes in political administration, can therefore present a very serious challenge to those 
pushing for policy reform. It is argued that what the policymaking elite define as crime or 
deviance, for example, reflects not only their own ideological standpoint, but also the collective 
values of society - or at least the most mobilised sections of it (Henry, 2009). Those 
Đlaiŵsŵakeƌs adǀoĐatiŶg alteƌŶatiǀe ǀieǁpoiŶts ŵust theƌefoƌe ǁoƌk haƌd to ͚seek ĐoŶteǆts 
foƌ theiƌ ŵessages that ŵaǇ eŶaďle theŵ to shape the puďliĐ ageŶda͛ ;“ĐhlesiŶgeƌ, Tuŵďeƌ 
and Murdock, 1991: 400). This study focuses on those claimsmaking actors that can be said to 
work as part of the wider penal reform network in England and Wales. Like networks operating 
in other policy domains, creating arguments of interest to policymakers is a key part of their 
work (Mills and Roberts, 2012: 8), and they do so through undertaking a combination of 
lobbying, media work, research and campaigning on criminal justice issues (Mills and Roberts, 
2012: 8). Of course those allied in campaign work do not necessarily adopt the same mode of 
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discourse: they may adopt different rhetoric to further their personal aims, perhaps 
emphasising different elements of the same problem (Best, 2013: 25). It is important to state 
at the outset that although by no means a unified network of individuals, the main policy 
pƌoďleŵ as faƌ as those ĐaŵpaigŶiŶg foƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal ƌefoƌŵ aƌe ĐoŶĐeƌŶed is the 
unnecessary overuse of imprisonment for non-violent female offenders (who make up the 
majority of the female prison population) and the lack of gender-specific policies in a criminal 
justice system designed for and dominated by men.  
Claimsmaking is a rhetorical activity (Best, 1987: 102), and it is therefore important to 
examine not only the activities of claimsmakers but also the presentation of the claims they 
view as important (Best, 1987: 114). In attempts to influence the climate of opinion and 
promote their solutions, claimsmakers may seek to frame their messages in ways that they 
believe will best resonate with journalists, policymakers and the public. Framing theory is 
grounded within the social construction philosophy and accounts for the way in which political 
actors interpret and construct meanings within society (Johnson-Cartee, 2005: 28). Framing 
iŶǀolǀes the puƌposeful seleĐtioŶ of ͚soŵe aspects of a perceived reality to make them more 
salieŶt… iŶ suĐh a ǁaǇ as to pƌoŵote a paƌtiĐulaƌ pƌoďleŵ defiŶitioŶ… [oƌ] ŵoƌal eǀaluatioŶ͛ 
;EŶtŵaŶ, ϭϵϵϯ: ϱϮͿ, aŶd is esseŶtial to ͚defiŶe the gist of the ĐoŶtƌoǀeƌsǇ foƌ the puďliĐ, the 
media, and other key politiĐal ageŶts͛ ;TeƌkildseŶ, “ĐhŶell aŶd LiŶg, 1998: 47).  It is fundamental 
to the work of penal reform campaigners ďeĐause ͚whatever the case of popular fear and 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶ oǀeƌ Đƌiŵe, the issue͛s sigŶifiĐaŶĐe foƌ politiĐs aŶd puďliĐ poliĐǇ depeŶds oŶ how it is 
ĐoŶstƌuĐted aŶd fƌaŵed͛ ;“assoŶ, ϭϵϵϱ: ϯ, eŵphasis addedͿ. ͚“hifts͛ iŶ opiŶioŶ iŶflueŶĐed ďǇ 
Ŷeǁ Đlaiŵs haǀe the aďilitǇ to peƌŵeate offiĐial disĐouƌse like ͚ǀiƌuses͛ ;‘iĐhaƌdsoŶ, ϮϬϬϬ: 
1018), but this is clearly dependent on the level of public and media support. The most 
adaptaďle Đlaiŵsŵakeƌs iŶ the ͚soĐial pƌoďleŵs ŵaƌketplaĐe͛ ƌoutiŶelǇ eŶteƌ iŶto a pƌoĐess of 
re-framing and modify their rhetoric until they develop the most persuasive argument (Best, 
2013: 45).  
Best argued that the formation of claims (falling within the initial building block of the 
social problems process) comprised three main components: grounds include the objective 
information and evidence about the condition; warrants contain the justifications for policy 
reform and appeals to values, while conclusions outline the recommended policy changes 
(Best, 2013: 31). While penal reform campaigners generally agree on stages one and three (the 
statistiĐs suƌƌouŶdiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s offeŶding and imprisonment and the requirement for different 
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criminal justice responses, for example), they understandably diverge on their choice of 
rhetorical strategy. In analysing their different justifications, it is the formulation of warrants 
that provides the focal point for the literatures discussed below. Considering the role of social 
psychological and organisational considerations in the process of framing, Snow et al. (1986) 
aƌgued that politiĐal aĐtoƌs should ĐoŶsideƌ a ǀaƌietǇ of ͚fƌaŵe aligŶŵeŶt pƌoĐesses͛ ǁheŶ 
developing their rhetoric (in Johnson-Cartee, 2005: 246). As highlighted by Johnson-Cartee 
(2005: 246), such considerations are relevant in terms of both public support and media 
interest. Considered throughout this study, it is necessary to briefly outline Snow et al.͛s criteria 
for adaptive framing. Frame alignment, or the degree to which claimsmaking rhetoric is able 
to link to iŶdiǀiduals͛ iŶteƌests, ǀalues aŶd ďeliefs, also eŶĐoŵpasses: 
 
- Frame bridging, the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally 
unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem, at organisational or 
individual claimsmaker level (1986: 467). This may involve seeking support from those 
with similar views.  
- Frame amplification, the clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that 
bears on a particular issue or problem (1986: 469, emphasis added). This may involve 
fƌaŵiŶg issues iŶ a ŵoƌe ͚eǆĐitiŶg͛ ǁaǇ.  
- Frame extension, extending the boundaries of the original frame so as to encompass 
interests and points of view that are incidental to its primary objective but of 
considerable salience to potential adherents (1986: 472). This may involve widening 
the argument to encompass different (but connected) issues.  
- Frame transformation, where, consistent with the viewpoint of Best (2013), erroneous 
ďeliefs oƌ ͚ŵisfƌaŵiŶgs͛ ŵust ďe ƌefƌaŵed ;see GoffŵaŶ, ϭϵϳϰ: ϯϬϴͿ iŶ oƌdeƌ to gaƌŶeƌ 
support (Snow et al., 1986: 473). This may involve the adoption of a completely new or 
different angle.  
 
While Snow et al.͛s sliding scale of typologies (frame bridging posing the least risky strategy 
and frame transformation the most) relate to the American political sciences, this study will 
consider them in conjunction with the dominant penal philosophies outlined by Rutherford 
(1993). Rutherford, in his typology of penal ideology, identified three competing philosophies 
oƌ ͚ǁoƌkiŶg Đƌedos͛ foƌ peŶal poliĐǇ: puŶitiǀe, effiĐieŶĐǇ aŶd ƌefoƌŵatiǀe. Deliďeƌated 
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throughout this studǇ, ‘utheƌfoƌd͛s assessment of the punitive philosophy involves a 
͚poǁeƌfullǇ held dislike aŶd ŵoƌal ĐoŶdeŵŶatioŶ of offeŶdeƌs͛ ;ϭϵϵϯ: ϭϭͿ; the philosophǇ of 
effiĐieŶĐǇ, laďelled ďǇ Gƌiŵshaǁ as a ͚ŵediatiŶg teƌŵ͛ ;ϮϬϬϰ: ϮͿ, foĐuses oŶ ͚sŵooth 
ŵaŶageŵeŶt ƌatheƌ thaŶ… ŵoƌal ŵissioŶ͛ ;‘utheƌfoƌd, ϭϵϵϯ: ϭϯͿ; ǁheƌeas the philosophǇ of 
reform has ͚a ŵiŶiŵalist ǀieǁ of ĐƌiŵiŶal justiĐe iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶ͛ ;‘utheƌfoƌd, ϭϵϵϯ: ϭϴͿ aŶd 
locates criminal justice within the broader remit of social policy. Mills and Roberts (2011, 
2012), in more contemporary research similarly identified the above rhetoric in relation to 
penal reform strategies (which also provides a sliding scale of rhetoric):  
 
- Crime fighting, ǁheƌe it is aƌgued that the Đƌiŵe ͚pƌoďleŵ͛ ĐaŶ ďe ďetteƌ addƌessed ďǇ 
another criminal justice intervention than prison;  
- Managerialist, where dispassionate arguments about the financial wastage of prison 
are made; and 
- Humanitarian, where the human costs of the high prison population are emphasised, 
along with arguments about the vulnerability of sub-populations such as women and 
children (Mills and Roberts, 2012: 9).  
 
Drawing on Snow et al.͛s ;ϭϵϴϲͿ fƌaŵe aligŶŵeŶt pƌoĐesses, ‘utheƌfoƌd͛s ;ϭϵϵϯͿ tǇpologǇ of 
peŶal ideologies aŶd Mills aŶd ‘oďeƌts͛ ;ϮϬϭϭ, ϮϬϭϮͿ aŶalǇsis of peŶal ƌefoƌŵ disĐouƌse, this 
study will, for the first time, amalgamate the above literatures in its comprehensive analysis of 
the claimsmaking strategies employed by the ǁoŵeŶ͛s penal reform network in England and 
Wales. The following section will discuss the second area of empirical investigation, theories of 
mediatisation and their relation to the policy process. 
 
  
iii. News Media and Claimsmaking 
 
AĐĐoƌdiŶg to Best͛s (2013) natural history model of the social problems process, the ŵedia͛s 
reporting of claimsmakers is a fundamental as it enables their ideas to reach wider audiences. 
Although this study questions the importance of such exposure, a body of research has 
attempted to demonstrate its importance, particularly when it comes to agenda-setting 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; McCombs and Shaw, 1972; McCombs, 2014). Such media-
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centric analyses argue that policy problems require media exposure before they can be 
established as public issues (Dearing and Rogers, 1996: 2). As well as reporting on new events, 
media can also add salience to particular policy problems (see McCombs, 2014). This section 
will begin with a discussion of newsworthiness and the social construction of crime news, 
before considering claimsmakers as news sources. It will conclude with a more focused 
reflection on the ŵedia͛s agenda-setting role in the policy process.  
 
Newsworthiness and the Social Construction of Crime News 
In our mass-mediated reality, meaning is socially constructed through a process that is now 
dominated by the media (Nimmo and Combs, 1983). News media organisations provide the 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ fƌoŵ ǁhiĐh the puďliĐ dƌaǁ theiƌ ͚ĐogŶitiǀe ŵaps͛ of ƌealitǇ ;MĐNaiƌ, ϮϬϬϵ: ϮϮ; see 
also McCombs, 2014: 25), yet a large body of literature has demonstrated the many ways in 
ǁhiĐh jouƌŶalistiĐ Ŷoƌŵs, tƌaditioŶs aŶd ideologies ŵake the Ŷeǁs a ͚ŵaŶufaĐtuƌed pƌoduĐt͛ 
(Kennamer, 1994: 6). Like the articulation of social problems, the news is also social 
construction, produced by journalists operating under a variety of professional constraints 
(Best, 2013: 136). McNair has argued that news is never a mere recording of reporting of the 
ǁoƌld ͚out theƌe͛, ďut aŶ aƌtifiĐial, ǀalue-laden account which carries within it the dominant 
Ŷoƌŵs aŶd ideas of soĐietǇ ;ϮϬϬϵ: ϰϬͿ. While ofteŶ ďeiŶg desĐƌiďed as a ͚ǁiŶdoǁ oŶ the ǁoƌld͛, 
to Jewkes the media might be more accurately thought of as a prism, subtly bending and 
distorting the view of the world it projects (2004: 37). One of the earliest sociologists to 
consider news as a social construction was Park, who stated that; 
 
͚Out of all the eǀeŶts that happeŶed aŶd aƌe ƌeĐoƌded eǀeƌǇ daǇ ďǇ ĐoƌƌespoŶdeŶts, 
reporters, and the news agencies, the editor chooses certain items for publication 
which he regards as more important or more interesting than others. The remainder 
he condemns to oblivion and the waste basket. There is an enormous amount of news 
͚killed͛ eǀeƌǇ daǇ͛ ;ϭϵϮϮ: ϯϮϴͿ.  
 
Evidently journalists need to find a story attractive to consider it as news, and in this endeavour 
they are guided by intuitive news values. Building on earlier work by Galtung and Ruge (1965), 
Chibnall (1977), in his seminal ethnographic work Law and Order News, mapped out the 
professional imperatives or news values that shaped the reporting of crime. Chibnall described 
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news values as the value judgments that journalists and editors make about the public appeal 
of a stoƌǇ aŶd also ǁhetheƌ it is iŶ the puďliĐ iŶteƌest. OƌigiŶal ͚ǀalues͛, still ǁidelǇ ƌeferenced 
in academic literature, included novelty, simplification, dramatization, immediacy, 
personalisation and conventionalism. In an attempt to better correspond to crime reporting in 
the twenty first century, Jewkes (2004) updated this list to include values such as sex, celebrity 
and violence. Jewkes also stressed the importance of conservative ideology and the right-wing 
ĐoŶseŶsus that Đlaiŵs to eŶĐapsulate the ͚Bƌitish ǁaǇ of life͛ ;ϮϬϬϰ: ϱϴͿ. GaltuŶg aŶd ‘uge 
argued that the more events are able to satisfy news values, the more likely they will be 
registered as news; and once a news item has been selected, what makes it newsworthy will 
be emphasised (1981: 6-61). Much like the communicative strategies employed by 
Đlaiŵsŵakeƌs, ͚jouƌŶalists͛ seŶse of Ŷews values leads them to present public issues within 
ĐeƌtaiŶ fƌaŵes͛ ;PƌiĐe aŶd TeǁksďuƌǇ, ϭϵϵϳ: ϭϳϳͿ, ǁith the ĐoŶseƋueŶt ƌesult of defiŶiŶg ͚the 
fuŶd of ideas aǀailaďle to ĐitizeŶs as theǇ thiŶk aŶd talk aďout politiĐs aŶd puďliĐ affaiƌs͛ ;PƌiĐe 
and Tewksbury, 1997: 177). The investigation of news values and news frames is crucial in 
atteŵpts to uŶdeƌstaŶd ͚hoǁ Ŷeǁs ƌepoƌtiŶg of Đƌiŵe, aŶd of the paƌtiĐulaƌ tǇpes of Đƌiŵe oŶ 
ǁhiĐh jouƌŶalists dispƌopoƌtioŶatelǇ foĐus, is seleĐtiǀe aŶd uŶƌepƌeseŶtatiǀe͛ ;Greer, 2007: 21). 
Of concern for penal reformers is the fact that journalists often attempt to appeal to their 
ƌeadeƌs͛ ŵost ďasiĐ iŶstiŶĐts, aŶd stoƌies aďout ǀioleŶt iŶteƌpeƌsoŶal Đƌiŵe oƌ ͚ĐushǇ͛ pƌisoŶ 
conditions persist. For a variety of reasons (mostly commercial), some sections of the news 
media have become part of the entertainment industry instead of providing a forum for 
informed debate of crucial issues of public concern (Franklin, 1997: 4).  
 
The Sociology of News Production 
The two theoretical paradigms that have shaped news media research in the twentieth 
century, the control and liberal pluralist interpretations, have been well documented in both 
media and criminological literature (Greer, 2010; see also Jewkes, 2004). Throughout the 
1960s and ϭϵϳϬ͛s, the doŵiŶaŶt ideologǇ oƌ Maƌǆist ŵodel pƌoposed that ŵedia ǁeƌe oǁŶed 
by the ruling elite and operated in the interests of that class, denying access to alternative 
views (Jewkes, 2004: 16; see Hall et al., 1978; Herman and Chomsky, 1988). Viewed through 
this lens, a hierarchy of credibility is established, in which opinions of the powerful elite are 
pƌiǀileged, ǁhile the puďliĐ oƌ ͚passiǀe ƌeĐeiǀeƌ͛ is pƌeǀeŶted ďǇ a laĐk of Đoŵpaƌatiǀe ŵateƌial 
from engaging in critical thinking (Ericson, Baranek and Chan, 1987). In criminological terms, 
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͚this stƌuĐtuƌed ƌelatioŶship ďetǁeeŶ the ŵedia aŶd its ͚poǁeƌful͛ souƌĐes has iŵpoƌtaŶt 
consequences for the representation of crime and criminals, particularly with respect to those 
whose lifestyle or behaviour deviates from the norms established by a white, heterosexual, 
eduĐatioŶallǇ pƌiǀileged elite͛ ;Jeǁkes, ϮϬϬϰ: ϭϴͿ. The pluƌalist paƌadigŵ that eŵeƌged duƌiŶg 
the 1980s and 1990s sought to provide a more positive standpoint in media theorisation. 
According to this view, information is offered to a knowledgeable and sceptical audience, 
positioŶed aloŶgside aŶ aƌŵǇ of ͚ĐouŶteƌ defiŶeƌs͛ – individuals with views which conflict with 
those of official commentators. The media are thus consistently challenged by claimsmakers 
campaigning for policy changes in areas such as criminal justice (Jewkes, 2004: 21). While the 
pluralist standpoint has been criticised for being too idealistic, it would be fair to say that the 
expansion and proliferation of media channels has certainly made more accessible the views 
and ideas of a greater diversity of people. Disregarding the two dominant ideological 
approaches as inflexible, Schlesinger, Tumber and Murdock (1991; see also Schlesinger and 
Tumber, 1994) provided an alternative account of the news production process. Less 
ideologically deterministic (Greer, 2010: 251), it provided a source-centric analysis of the 
media strategies employed by criminal justice agencies engaged in this field. Schlesinger, 
Tumber and Murdock argued that while important to recognise the structural inequalities of 
access to the media, one should not ignore the competitive strategies for media attention 
eŵploǇed ďǇ Ŷeǁs souƌĐes ;ϭϵϵϭ: ϯϵϵͿ. Hoǁ the ͚defiŶitioŶal stƌuggle is oƌgaŶised͛ iŶ the field 
of crime and criminal justice (Schlesinger, Tumber and Murdock, 1991: 399) must therefore be 
a key focus for those analysing the strategies of claimsmaking actors.  
Finally, it is also important to document the development of other forms of journalistic 
source. The ďlogospheƌe, foƌ eǆaŵple, has ďeeŶ desĐƌiďed as a ͚Ŷeǁ ĐoŵŵeŶtaƌiat͛, a gƌoup 
of online writers who increasingly threaten the traditional gatekeeping role of the journalist 
;MĐNaiƌ, ϮϬϬϴͿ. This ŵeaŶs that ͚the aďilitǇ to pƌoduĐe iŶfoƌŵatioŶ foƌ ŵass dissemination is 
no longer restricted to those in power, nor limited to those who own the means of media 
pƌoduĐtioŶ͛ ;MaltďǇ aŶd Keeďle, ϮϬϬϳ: ϯͿ. Whateǀeƌ appƌoaĐh adopted, it is Đleaƌ that the 
traditional role of journalists as the gatekeepers of information has already started to change 
in a number of ways (Silverman, 2012: 139).  
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Claimsmakers as News Sources 
Claimsmaking is a competitive process, and those claimsmakers seeking public attention may 
find themselves competing for media attention. That the news media serve as a collective 
gatekeeper is widely acknowledged, and claims or campaigns prepared with the news 
production process in mind (media-friendly rhetoric) are more likely to receive coverage (Best, 
1978: 116). In this quest, savvy claimsmakers ŵust ͚ĐoŶstƌuĐt theiƌ paĐkages͛ ;Best, ϮϬϭϯ: ϭϰϰͿ 
in modern ways to satisfy journalists constantly eager for new claims and fresh angles (Best, 
2013: 156).  Gandy (1982) described the relationship between a newsroom and its sources as 
reciprocal, with certain actors able to fill newsmaking voids through the provision of 
͚iŶfoƌŵatioŶ suďsidies͛. Of Đouƌse Ŷot all aĐtoƌs eŶjoǇ suĐh ƌelatioŶs, due to liŵits oŶ the 
͚ĐaƌƌǇiŶg ĐapaĐitǇ of puďliĐ iŶstitutioŶs͛ ;HilgaƌtŶeƌ aŶd Bosk, ϭϵϴϴ: ϱϲͿ, aŶd the ĐoŶtiŶued 
reliaŶĐe ďǇ jouƌŶalists oŶ a ƌelatiǀelǇ sŵall Ŷuŵďeƌ of those deeŵed ŵost ͚Đƌediďle͛ ;due to 
media-related resources, investment in PR, institutional tradition etc.). There is, therefore, a 
concern that by only seeking out established sources, journalists may be ignoring voices not 
already established unless they are unusually distinctive (Danielian, 1994: 76; see also Hall et 
al. 1978; Chibnall 1977). While those wishing to engage with the news media attempt to 
construct newsworthy packages, there is no guarantee that journalists will consider their 
claims as either newsworthy or important. It is in this way that actors can become 
͚dispossessed͛ ;Best, ϮϬϭϯ: ϭϰϭͿ, fiŶdiŶg it eǆtƌeŵelǇ haƌd to ƌeĐeiǀe ŵedia Đoǀeƌage aŶd 
searching for alternative, private ways to lobby, for example. As this study will highlight, the 
issue of ͚Đlaiŵsŵakeƌ dispossessioŶ͛ is aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt ĐoŶsideƌatioŶ ǁheŶ eǆaŵiŶiŶg the 
strategies of those who campaign on the unpopular and unnewsworthy cause of penal reform. 
As section five will examine, changes in the policymaking process have had some 
serious consequences for those penal reformers seekiŶg to ͚uŶƌaǀel BƌitaiŶ͛s puŶitiǀe paƌadoǆ͛ 
(Ryan, 2004: 12), and they have had to become increasingly skilled at the techniques of selling 
themselves aŶd theiƌ poliĐies iŶ the ͚politiĐal ŵaƌket-place of contending parties and interest 
gƌoups͛ ;“ĐhlesiŶgeƌ aŶd Tuŵďeƌ, ϭϵϵϰ: ϳͿ. AŶ issue of ĐoŶtiŶued deďate, HiltoŶ et al. (2013: 
145) consider lobbying at its most effective only when it has been combined with media 
stƌategies. As it is oŶlǇ iŶsideƌs that eŶjoǇ a ͚seat at the taďle͛, aŶd ofteŶ a liŵited oŶe at that, 
Hilton et al. argue that it is only when actors bypass the traditional Westminster arena that 
they have been able to employ real influence (2013: 145). Yet while the media has become an 
increasingly important outlet for penal reform campaigners, it has not always acted as a 
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͚ĐoŵpliaŶt paƌtŶeƌ͛ ;HiltoŶ et al., 2013: 161) in the process of penal reform. Due to their own 
personal opinions, ideologies and news imperatives journalists translate and sometimes distort 
Đlaiŵsŵakeƌs͛ ŵessages iŶto ͚seĐoŶdaƌǇ Đlaiŵs͛, ofteŶ ďǇ ŵakiŶg theŵ shoƌteƌ aŶd ŵoƌe 
dƌaŵatiĐ ;Best, ϮϬϭϯ: ϭϮϴͿ. As a ĐoŶseƋueŶĐe, oŶlǇ Đlaiŵs that fit the ŵedia͛s Đƌiteƌia ;Best, 
1987: 116) will be the most successful, and journalists are far more likely to use information 
that Đoŵes as a populist ͚Ŷeǁs paĐkage͛ ;JohŶsoŶ-Cartee, 2005: 199). Furthermore, given 
increasing audience segmentation, claimsmakers must also work to tailor their messages to 
appropriate audiences and news organisations. While penal reform campaigners may augment 
their claims to communicate with their own supporters or memberships as well as the wider 
puďliĐ, “ĐhlesiŶgeƌ aŶd Tuŵďeƌ haǀe aƌgued that suĐh stƌategies ͚aƌe worked out in relation to 
quite a specific conception of the public sphere. This is strongly centred on elite media as both 
educative vehicles and as a means of communication with opinion-foƌŵeƌs͛ ;ϭϵϵϰ: ϭϬϰ, 
emphasis added). 
It is clear that rhetoric about crime and criminal justice is produced in a hierarchical 
social space in which competing political actors range from government departments through 
to pressure groups (Schlesinger, Tumber and Murdock, 1991: 399). Access to the news media 
is dependent on a host of variables, including resources (financial and personnel), institutional 
longevity and the existence of close working relations between claimsmakers and journalists. 
MĐCoŵďs' ;ϮϬϭϰ: ϭϭϯͿ ͚ŵetaphoƌiĐal oŶioŶ͛ of the media agenda (see Figure 3 below) neatly 
ĐoŶĐeptualises this issue. At the suƌfaĐe oƌ the peƌipheƌǇ of the ͚oŶioŶ͛ aƌe the host of eǆteƌŶal 
news sources (including penal reform campaigners). News norms (traditions, news values) 
suƌƌouŶd the oŶioŶ͛s Đoƌe, ǁhich defines the ground rules for the ultimate shaping of the 
media agenda (McCombs, 2014: 112). 
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Figure 3. The MetaphoƌiĐal ͚OŶioŶ͛ of the Media AgeŶda ;MĐCoŵďs, ϮϬϭϰ: ϭϭϯͿ 
 
 
The News Media and Public Policy 
Although critics such as McQuail have questioned the agenda-setting function of the media as 
͚a plausiďle ďut uŶpƌoǀeŶ idea͛ ;ϭϵϴϳ: ϮϳϲͿ, otheƌs haǀe atteŵpted to deŵoŶstƌate the 
fundamental role of the media in the policymaking process. Kennamer has argued that one of 
the most important roles for the media is to establish the areas of concern and discussion for 
the public (1994: 7; see also Best, 2013). Those concerned with media agenda-setting assert ͚a 
direct, causal relationship between the [journalistic] content of the media agenda and 
suďseƋueŶt puďliĐ peƌĐeptioŶ of ǁhat the iŵpoƌtaŶt issues of the daǇ aƌe͛ (McCombs, 1981: 
211), and it is clear that media attention can bring a social problem to public attention (Best, 
2013: 152). Agenda-settiŶg is ofteŶ iŶflueŶĐed ďǇ a ͚tƌiggeƌ eǀeŶt͛, ͚a Đue-to-action that occurs 
at a poiŶt iŶ tiŵe aŶd seƌǀes to ĐƌǇstallize atteŶtioŶ aŶd aĐtioŶ ƌegaƌdiŶg aŶ issue͛s salieŶĐe͛ 
(Dearing and Rogers, 1996: 78; see also Downs, 1972). Yet as highlighted by Dearing and 
‘ogeƌs, the ŵedia͛s ageŶda-setting effect is not the result of audiences receiving one or a few 
messages, but is often due to the cumulative impact of a very large number of messages 
(usually from a number of news organisations) all dealing with the same issue (1996: 14). The 
role of the news media in the high profile abduction and murder of Sarah Payne in 2000, can 
provide a useful example. Payne was sexually abused and murdered by convicted sex offender 
Roy Whiting, and the now defunct News of the World was instrumental in campaigning for 
parents to have more controlled access to the sex offenders register, in what has become 
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other news 
media
news norms
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kŶoǁŶ as “aƌah͛s Laǁ ;see CƌitĐheƌ, ϮϬϬϮͿ. IŶ this iŶstaŶĐe the ŵedia deŵoŶstƌated a Đleaƌ 
ĐapaĐitǇ to ĐoŶstƌuĐt the puďliĐ ageŶda, ǁhat has ďeeŶ siŵplistiĐallǇ Đalled ͚legislation by 
taďloid͛ ;FƌaŶkliŶ aŶd LaǀeƌǇ, ϭϵϴϵͿ. Despite suĐh iŶstaŶĐes of ageŶda-building, Grossman and 
Kuŵaƌ haǀe aƌgued that it is iŵpoƌtaŶt to ƌeĐogŶise that ͚Ŷeǁs oƌgaŶisatioŶs aƌe Ŷeitheƌ 
traditional political actors nor are they a fourth branch of goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛ ;ϭϵϴϭ: ϭϬϲͿ. Yet ďǇ 
laďelliŶg theŵ as ͚aƌďiteƌs of the politiĐal sǇsteŵ͛ ;GƌossŵaŶ aŶd Kuŵaƌ, ϭϵϴϭ: ϭϬϲ-7), it is 
possible to consider news organisations as a distinct type of political actor (Cook, 1998) in the 
policy process. It is clear that in recent decades growing numbers of policymakers have 
increasingly considered how news media organisations will react to policy decisions (Johnson-
Cartee, 2005: 76) prior to their implementation.  
Exploring theoretical interpretations developed in the political sciences, the following 
section will consider the third area of empirical investigation, and will discuss two highly 
influential models of public policymaking (DoǁŶs͛ (1972) ͚issue atteŶtioŶ ĐǇĐle͛ aŶd KiŶgdoŶ͛s 
(1984) model of policy streams). In documenting developing understanding of governance and 
network theory (Rhodes, 1997, 2007), it will also explore the changing role of penal reform 
campaigners as organised interests in the policy process.  
 
 
iv. Claimsmakers and the Policy Process  
 
Public Policy Concepts: Cycles, Streams and Networks 
Unlike the very visible world of the media, the policymaking stage of the social problems 
process is shrouded in secrecy, and the actions of claimsmakers operating in this domain are 
more challenging to identify. Only those claims that successfully reach the top of the political 
agenda are likely to receive consideration from policymakers. An agenda can be defined as a 
set of issues that are communicated in a hierarchy of importance at a point in time (Dearing 
aŶd ‘ogeƌs, ϭϵϵϲ: ϮͿ, aŶd it is easǇ to uŶdeƌstaŶd ǁhǇ, ͚of the thousaŶds aŶd thousaŶds of 
demands made upon government, only a small portion receive serious attention from public 
policy-ŵakeƌs͛ ;AŶdeƌsoŶ, ϭϵϳϱ: ϱϵͿ. Like those eŶgaged iŶ soĐial pƌoďlems research, political 
sĐieŶtists haǀe ďeeŶ ĐoŶĐeƌŶed ǁith the pƌoĐess ďǇ ǁhiĐh ͚pƌoďleŵs͛ aƌe ƌeĐogŶised as suĐh 
and consequently dealt with by policymakers.  
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Figure 4. The Issue Attention Cycle (Downs, 1972) 
 
 
Anthony DoǁŶs͛ ĐoŶĐept of the ͚issue atteŶtioŶ ĐǇĐle͛ sought to eǆplaiŶ hoǁ a pƌoďleŵ ͚leaps 
into prominence, remains there for a short time, and then – though still largely unresolved – 
gƌaduallǇ fades fƌoŵ the ĐeŶtƌe of puďliĐ atteŶtioŶ͛ ;DoǁŶs, ϭϵϳϮ: ϯϴͿ. AĐkŶoǁledgiŶg the ƌole 
of the media in the policymaking process, Downs argued that the cycle is rooted in the way 
that ͚ŵajoƌ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs aŶd ŵedia iŶteƌaĐt ǁith the puďliĐ͛ ;ϭϵϳϮ: ϯϵͿ. DoǁŶs ďelieǀed 
that problems and their entertainment value weƌe iŶeǆtƌiĐaďlǇ liŶked, foƌ ͚a problem must be 
dƌaŵatiĐ aŶd eǆĐitiŶg to ŵaiŶtaiŶ puďliĐ iŶteƌest ďeĐause Ŷeǁs is ͚ĐoŶsuŵed͛ ďǇ [the] puďliĐ 
laƌgelǇ as a foƌŵ of eŶteƌtaiŶŵeŶt͛ ;ϭϵϳϮ: ϰϮͿ. Hoǁeǀeƌ this ͚puďliĐ atteŶtioŶ ƌaƌelǇ ƌeŵaiŶs 
sharply focused upon any one domestic issue for very long – even if it involves a continuing 
pƌoďleŵ of ĐƌuĐial iŵpoƌtaŶĐe to soĐietǇ͛,  ƌefleĐtiŶg ͚the opeƌatioŶ of a sǇsteŵatiĐ ĐǇĐle of 
heighteŶiŶg puďliĐ iŶteƌest aŶd theŶ iŶĐƌeasiŶg ďoƌedoŵ ǁith ŵajoƌ issues͛ ;ϭϵϳϮ: ϰϮͿ. As 
issues iŶǀaƌiaďlǇ ŵoǀe ͚up͛ aŶd ͚doǁŶ͛ the poliĐǇ ageŶda oǀeƌ tiŵe, theǇ ďeĐoŵe paƌt of the 
͚issue atteŶtioŶ ĐǇĐle͛. DoǁŶs did ĐoŶĐede that the ĐǇĐle did Ŷot fit ǁith all poliĐǇ pƌoďleŵs; if 
the problem is not deemed sufficiently exciting or if people do not suffer directly from it there 
will be little appetite for change. While providing a cyclical understanding of the policy agenda 
aŶd highlightiŶg the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of the ŵedia iŶ this pƌoĐess, DoǁŶs͛ ŵodel is peƌhaps of less 
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ƌeleǀaŶĐe to the poliĐǇ pƌoďleŵ of ǁoŵeŶ͛s iŵpƌisoŶŵeŶt due to its arguable status as a 
͚lesseƌ soĐial pƌoďleŵ͛ ;HilgaƌtŶeƌ aŶd Bosk, ϭϵϴϴͿ.  
John Kingdon͛s alteƌŶatiǀe, aŶd highlǇ iŶflueŶtial ŵodel desĐƌiďed poliĐǇ ĐhaŶge as ͚aŶ 
idea whose time has Đoŵe͛. KiŶgdoŶ argued that this process included changes in public 
opinion, repeated mobilisation of people with intensely held preferences and different political 
͚ďaŶdǁagoŶs͛ ;ϮϬϬϯ: ϭͿ. To KiŶgdoŶ, the poliĐǇ ageŶda ĐoŶstituted the list of suďjeĐts oƌ 
problems to which government officials (and people outside government closely associated 
with those officials) were paying serious attention to at any given time (Kingdon, 2003: 3). 
CoŶsisteŶt ǁith soĐial pƌoďleŵs liteƌatuƌe, KiŶgdoŶ diffeƌeŶtiated ďetǁeeŶ ͚ĐoŶditioŶs͛ aŶd 
͚pƌoďleŵs͛ iŶ that ĐoŶditioŶs ďeĐoŵe defiŶed as pƌoďleŵs ǁheŶ soĐietǇ ďelieǀes that 
something needs to be done about them; the objective nature of the problem does not need 
to ĐhaŶge. IŶ iŶtƌoduĐiŶg the ĐoŶĐept of the ͚poliĐǇ soup͛, ͚iŶ ǁhiĐh speĐialists try out their 
ideas iŶ a ǀaƌietǇ of ǁaǇs… pƌoposals aƌe floated, Đoŵe iŶto ĐoŶtaĐt ǁith oŶe aŶotheƌ, aƌe 
ƌeǀised aŶd ĐoŵďiŶed ǁith oŶe aŶotheƌ, aŶd floated agaiŶ͛ ;ϭϵϴϰ: ϮϭͿ, KiŶgdoŶ highlighted the 
iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of ƌhetoƌiĐal ͚pƌoďleŵ defiŶitioŶ͛ iŶ the policy making process. Consistent with the 
arguments of Best (1987, 2013; see also Snow et al., 1986; Gramsci, 1971), Kingdon argued 
that the most successful policy entrepreneurs in this context are able to frame or re-frame 
theiƌ ƌespoŶses to ͚fit͛ theiƌ pƌoďlem to the current political climate or national mood.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The Model of Policy Streams (Kingdon, 1984)  
 
 
As demonstrated by Figure 5 above, Kingdon argued that there were three main processes by 
which problems may find themselves on the political agenda; first, the continual flow of 
Policy 
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problems pressing on the system (this may also include a crisis); second, the policy proposals 
(or claims) advocated by specialists (who frame and re-frame their issues to fit the national 
mood); and third, the political processes which may affect the agenda, including election 
results. According to Kingdon, each of these processes – problems, the generation of policy 
pƌoposals aŶd politiĐs Đould seƌǀe as aŶ eŶaďleƌ oƌ iŶhiďitoƌ to poliĐǇ ƌefoƌŵ. The ŵodel͛s 
major focus was the existence of a time-specific poliĐǇ ͚ǁiŶdoǁ͛, aĐĐessiďle ǁheŶ sepaƌate 
streams come together at critical junctures. As a consequence, ideas and solutions that waited 
for the policy window to open had limited time to act, with some ƌeƋuiƌed to ͚ piggǇďaĐk͛ otheƌ, 
ŵoƌe populaƌ oƌ pƌessiŶg issues. As oŶe poliĐǇ offiĐial Ŷoted iŶ KiŶgdoŶ͛s oƌigiŶal thesis;  
 
͚WheŶ you lobby for something, what you have to do is put together your coalition, 
you have to gear up, you have to get your political forces in line, and then you sit there 
aŶd ǁait foƌ the foƌtuitous eǀeŶt͛ ;ϭϵϴϰ: ϭϳϯͿ.  
 
Developed over thirty years ago, KingdoŶ͛s ŶotioŶ of poliĐǇ stƌeaŵs continues to provide policy 
analysts with an important conceptual tool, highlighting the crucial importance of ideas and 
politics in the policymaking process. While it is important to note the limited theoretical space 
for media involvement (plus the fact that it assuŵes that theƌe is aŶ ͚eŶd poiŶt͛ to poliĐǇ 
foƌŵulatioŶͿ, this studǇ ǁill dƌaǁ oŶ its useful ĐoŶĐept of poliĐǇ ͚stƌeaŵs͛ aŶd ͚ǁiŶdoǁs͛ ǁheŶ 
analysiŶg deǀelopŵeŶts iŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ.   
While both influential models continue to retain relevance for scholars of public policy, 
it is important to appreciate that they were formulated in the American political sciences. 
Focusing, as this study does, on the British policy context, it is important to take into 
consideration the Post-War developments in British policymaking, from the hierarchical 
Westminster model to what Rhodes (1997, 2007, 2011) has identified as the current system of 
͚goǀeƌŶaŶĐe͛. Foƌ soŵe oďseƌǀeƌs the Bƌitish goǀeƌŶŵeŶt is still ďased oŶ its tƌaditional 
Westminster-majoritarian characteristics (the classic constitutional view), with this 
understanding retaining legitimacy in the minds of politicians and the media (Jordan and 
Cairney, 2013: 234). Yet such viewpoints have come under a great deal of critique. In their 
seminal work Governing Under Pressure, Richardson and Jordan highlighted the importance of 
oƌgaŶised iŶteƌests iŶ the poliĐǇŵakiŶg pƌoĐess, aŶd ĐoŶĐluded that ͚the tƌaditional model of 
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a Cabinet and Parliamentary government is a travesty of ƌealitǇ͛ ;ϭϵϳϵ: ϵϭͿ, alongside an 
analysis of the changing role of organised interests in this domain.  
It is clear that since the 1970s there have been a growing number of political actors 
seeking to influence the policy agenda. While the consensual policy style was a clear feature of 
Post-War politics (Beer, 1956; 1965), with entrenched political actors working closely with 
suĐĐessiǀe goǀeƌŶŵeŶts to foƌŵulate poliĐǇ ĐhaŶge ;see a desĐƌiptioŶ of the ͚platoŶiĐ 
guaƌdiaŶs͛ iŶ the folloǁiŶg seĐtioŶͿ, the election of the Conservative government in 1979 had 
lasting implications for this harmony. The consequent changes in policymaking orthodoxy 
ŵeaŶt that oǀeƌ the folloǁiŶg deĐade ͚ƌelatiǀelǇ feǁ of the Ŷeǁ poliĐǇ ideas eŵaŶated fƌoŵ 
the plethora of embedded poliĐǇ ĐoŵŵuŶities… that had gƌoǁŶ up duƌiŶg the post-ǁaƌ peƌiod͛ 
(Richardson, 2000: 1010). Such changes have been described by Rhodes as a political shift to 
governance, defined as the horizontal and vertical networks that cut across Westminster and 
Whitehall (2011: 210; see also Richardson 2000). If, as Rhodes suggests, governing is now 
distributed among various private, voluntary and public actors, the role (or rolling back) of the 
state could be regarded as shifting from hands-oŶ ĐoŵŵaŶdiŶg ;oƌ ͚ƌoǁiŶg͛), to more diverse 
aŶd iŶfoƌŵal ŵodes of ͚steeƌiŶg͛ ;‘hodes, ϭϵϵϳͿ thƌough otheƌ ageŶĐies aŶd ŶoŶ-
departmental public bodies (Rhodes, 2011: 240). Governance therefore refers to governing 
with and through networks (Rhodes 2007: 1246, emphasis added). Policy networks, like the 
penal reform network under consideration in this study, are specific forms of networks within 
governance (Cope, 2001: 4), and can be used to help illustrate the relations between central 
and local government, and between government and pressure groups (Cope, 2001: 4). It is, 
however, important to note that the network approach has come under sharp focus, with 
seǀeƌal ĐoŵŵeŶtatoƌs ĐlaiŵiŶg that the ĐoŶĐept pƌoǀides oŶlǇ a ͚ŵetaphoƌ͛ ;see DoǁdiŶg, 
1995) for those seeking a sophisticated analysis of the policymaking process. Borzel has gone 
fuƌtheƌ to highlight the ĐoŶfusioŶ eŵaŶatiŶg fƌoŵ the ͚BaďǇloŶiaŶ ǀaƌietǇ of diffeƌeŶt 
understandings and applications of the policy network concept (1998: 254). While subscribing 
to this critique, this study adopts the network analogy to describe the collective actions of key 
actors operating in this policy domain, highlighting areas of union as well as divergence. 
 
Organised Interests in the Policy Process 
It is worth noting that until the late 1970s, the study of interest group participation in the policy 
process was limited (Richardson, 2000); the change in focus corresponding with developing 
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aŶalǇses of poliĐǇŵakiŶg aŶd atteŵpts to pƌoǀide a Ŷeǁ ͚ƌealitǇ͛ of goǀeƌŶiŶg ;Judge, ϭϵϵϯͿ. 
One of the first to identify the differentiated nature of access in the policy process was 
“ĐhattsĐhŶeideƌ ;ϭϵϯϱͿ. CoiŶiŶg the Ŷoǁ faŵiliaƌ teƌŵs of ͚iŶsideƌs͛ aŶd ͚outsideƌs͛ foƌ the fiƌst 
time, Schattschneider distinguished between those groups that enjoyed privileged access to 
decision makers, and others who did not (in Maloney, Jordan and McLaughlin, 1994: 18). Grant, 
who adopted this classification, has argued that the basic distinction between groups is one 
based on strategies, by which is meant the combination of modes of action used by an interest 
gƌoup to attaiŶ its goals͛ (1978: 2, emphasis added). In general terms, insider groups are 
recognised by the government as legitimate spokespersons for their particular causes, yet in 
order to gain this status they need to be in a position to deploy certain political skills. In 
paƌtiĐulaƌ theǇ Ŷeed to ͚talk the laŶguage of goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛ aŶd iŵpliĐitlǇ agƌee to aďide ďǇ ͚the 
ƌules of the gaŵe͛ ;GƌaŶt, ϮϬϬϰ: ϰϬϴͿ; ǁhat HiltoŶ et al. (2013) have since labelled the 
politicisation process.  
GƌaŶt͛s tǇpologǇ of iŶsideƌ distiŶĐtioŶs ĐoŶsists of prisoner groups who are trapped 
(and possibly gagged) by their reliance on government funding, low profile insiders who place 
great emphasis on working behind the scenes and are unlikely to utilise the media as a strategy, 
and high profile insiders who aim to persuade the government through public campaigns 
(1989: 16). A critique of the traditional insider/outsider distinction is that group strategies such 
as direct action or media work may be more constrained (by membership or finance, for 
eǆaŵpleͿ thaŶ GƌaŶt͛s oƌigiŶal ŵodel alloǁs. IŶ ŵoƌe ƌeĐeŶt ǁoƌk, GƌaŶt has ĐoŶĐeded that 
the traditional hard and fast typology of the insider/outsider distinction is diminishing. Grant 
does however continue to aƌgue that the ͚oldeƌ͛ stǇle of iŶsideƌ politiĐs has Ŷot disappeaƌed, 
and that the continued importance of traditional forms of pressure politics should not be 
understated simply because they are less visible (2004: 418, emphasis added). In direct contrast 
to the strategies advocated by Hilton et al. (2013), Miller has similarly argued that some 
political actors may prefer low profile work in Whitehall, considering this a more effective 
strategy than resulting to media coverage (2010: 127). Actors employing such strategies may 
also be considered as resource-rich, perceived as respectable and credible by policymakers 
(Miller, 2010: 127), and not resorting to contentious media tactics to draw attention to their 
claims. Consistent with the above viewpoints, Best͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ to the iŶsideƌ/outsideƌ 
debate neatly depicts the differing strategies. 
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Figure 6. Claimsmaking by Outsiders and Insiders (Best, 2013: 65) 
 
 
As highlighted by Figure 6 above, whereas outsider claimsmakers have to revert to the media 
in order to receive attention, insider claimsmakers often pursue their claims outside the glare 
of the media spotlight (Best, 2013: 65). This more direct route depicts the claimsmaking 
process as one that runs directly from claimsmakers to policymakers, and, contrary to media-
centric accounts of the policy process (see Best͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ ŵodel of the soĐial pƌoďleŵs pƌoĐess; 
also Kennamer, 1994) is a key concept explored in this study. 
Despite the fact that well-connected insider claimsmakers may be part of the polity (those 
whose interests are routinely taken into account during the policymaking process), they may 
still face tougher battles regarding access to the corridors of power when compared to larger 
more resource-rich organisations. The tactics employed by such actors are also understandably 
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varied (Hilton et al., 2013: 117). Political strategies range from providing briefings for 
parliamentary debates, giving evidence (oral or written) to Select Committees, responding to 
formal or informal consultations, forging close relations with politicians (of all persuasions) and 
civil servants, organising private meetings in Westminster and Whitehall and attending All-
Party Parliamentary Groups (APPGs) and receptions.  
 
 
v. The Changing Nature of Penal Policymaking 
 
The Post-War consensus on criminal justice policymaking has been well documented in 
criminological literature (see for example Ryan, 1983, 1999, 2003; Loader, 2006). This section 
will briefly outliŶe deǀelopŵeŶts iŶ peŶal poliĐǇ, fƌoŵ the heǇdaǇ of the ͚platoŶiĐ guaƌdiaŶs͛ 
;Loadeƌ, ϮϬϬϲͿ to the ͚Đultuƌe of iŵpatieŶĐe͛ ;Loadeƌ, ϮϬϬϲͿ, ĐoŶsidering the consequences for 
those campaigning for reform.  
 
The Heyday of the ͚PlatoŶiĐ GuardiaŶs͛ 
 
͚That law and order were relatively insulated from the realm of party politics for so long 
testifies to the strength of the belief that crime, like the weather, is beyond political 
influence; and that the operation of the law and criminal justice should be above it͛ 
(Downes and Morgan, 2007: 202).  
 
In the years following 1945, the formulation of penal policy in England and Wales was in the 
hands of a small, almost exclusively male, elite network committed to the belief that the 
government should respond to crime iŶ ǁaǇs that sought to pƌeseƌǀe ͚Điǀilised ǀalues͛ ;Loadeƌ, 
ϮϬϬϲ: ϱϲϯͿ. CoŶsisteŶt ǁith Best͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ ŵodel of ͚iŶsideƌ ĐlaiŵsŵakiŶg͛ ;see Figuƌe ϲ), this 
networked world worked privately from the public glare, moving easily around Westminster 
and Whitehall, a gƌoup that has siŶĐe ďeeŶ desĐƌiďed ďǇ Loadeƌ as the ͚platoŶiĐ guaƌdiaŶs͛ 
;ϮϬϬϲͿ. The ͚guaƌdiaŶs͛ aŵouŶted, to Loƌd WiŶdleshaŵ, to aŶ ͚uŶoďtƌusiǀe, Ǉet peƌǀasiǀe 
climate of common attitudes shared by Home Office officials, special interest groups, and a 
ƌespeĐtaďle ďodǇ of iŶfoƌŵed opiŶioŶ͛ ;Ƌuoted iŶ Loadeƌ, ϮϬϬϲ: ϭϰϬͿ. OŶe of the ŵajoƌ aiŵs 
of the platoŶiĐ guaƌdiaŶs ǁas to ͚keep Đƌiŵe aŶd puŶishŵeŶt at a safe distaŶĐe fƌoŵ eleĐtoƌal 
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politics, to retain it, so far as possible, in the realm of quiet, melioristic, unflappable 
adŵiŶistƌatioŶ͛ (Loader, 2006: 569). It was widely agreed that getting too close to the public 
(through consultation, for example) on matters of penal policy was to be avoided (Ryan, 1999: 
5), and lobbying for penal reform better kept within the corridors of power (Ryan, 1978). Such 
thoughts were typified by a comment from the Chairman of the Howard League in the 1970s 
ǁheŶ he stated that ͚theƌe is a daŶgeƌ iŶ a pƌessuƌe gƌoup iŶ the peŶal field ďƌoadeŶiŶg its 
appeal to the puďliĐ…Penal reform does not instinctively strike a sympathetic chord with large 
Ŷuŵďeƌs of the puďliĐ͛ ;Ƌuoted iŶ Bloŵ Coopeƌ, ϭϵϳϳ: ϳͿ.  
 
Reactive Innovation 
As previously highlighted, following the election of 1979 a step-change in penal policymaking 
occurred. The election consigned the liberal elite to the fringes, and like other policy networks, 
the ͚platoŶiĐ guaƌdiaŶs͛ ǁeƌe aďout to get a ͚haŶdďaggiŶg͛. To new Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher, the prison population was not falling in response to the penal reductionist, liberal-
conservative fiscal and social policies of the previous administration (Scull, 1984). Mirroring 
developments across the Atlantic, the Conservatives soon began to articulate and mobilise 
populaƌ suppoƌt aƌouŶd ͚laǁ aŶd oƌdeƌ͛ stƌategies ;Hall et al., 1978). Rather than continuing 
with the decarceration agenda, the penal net widened as the welfare net loosened (Hudson 
1993; see also Cohen, 1985; Wacquant, 2000, 2001). This strategy was confirmed in 1982 with 
the undertaking of the biggest prison building programme in the twentieth century, in which 
25 new prisons were constructed at an estimated cost of £1.3 million (Cavadino and Dignan, 
ϭϵϵϮͿ. The late ϭϵϳϬs aŶd eaƌlǇ ϭϵϴϬs ĐaŶ theƌefoƌe ďe Đategoƌised as aŶ ͚eƌa of ƌeaĐtiǀe 
iŶŶoǀatioŶ͛ ;Hudson, 1993: 30), with penal policy responding to the demands of public panics 
for the first time. The government had switched allegiance, and no longer listened to the 
platoŶiĐ guaƌdiaŶs, iŶstead; ͚the people it ǁaŶted to listeŶ to ǁeƌe diffeƌeŶt… the kiŶd of open 
discussion which had been a feature of previous times...  those sorts of networks were 
disappeaƌiŶg͛ ;ƌetiƌed Hoŵe OffiĐe Điǀil seƌǀaŶt, Ƌuoted iŶ Loadeƌ, ϮϬϬϲ: ϱϳϲͿ.  
 
Tough on Crime  
Over the following years New Labour, keen to make ground on the increasingly electorally 
significant subject of law and order, began to distance itself from established links with trade 
unions and libertarian pressure groups. It did not need to wait long to long to demonstrate this 
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tougher stance. The high-profile murder of James Bulger in 1993 only added to a more punitive 
dƌiǀe ďǇ ďoth politiĐal paƌties, just ŶiŶe daǇs afteƌ Bulgeƌ͛s death Pƌiŵe MiŶisteƌ JohŶ Majoƌ 
stated that it ǁas tiŵe to ͚ĐoŶdeŵŶ a little ŵoƌe aŶd uŶdeƌstaŶd a little less͛3. Major used 
Bulgeƌ͛s death aŶd the hoƌƌoƌ it aƌoused to lauŶĐh a Ŷeǁ ͚Đƌusade agaiŶst Đƌiŵe͛ ;FeƌgusoŶ, 
ϭϵϵϰͿ. This ͚Đƌusade͛ ĐoŶtiŶued thƌough ϭϵϵϯ aŶd ƌeaĐhed its Đliŵaǆ at the CoŶseƌǀatiǀe paƌtǇ 
conference when the newly appointed Home Secretary, Michael Howard, announced twenty 
seǀeŶ ŵeasuƌes aiŵed at taĐkliŶg Đƌiŵe. Most stƌikiŶg aďout Hoǁaƌd͛s speeĐh ǁas his 
iŶsisteŶĐe that ͚ pƌisoŶ ǁoƌks͛, iŶ diƌeĐt ĐoŶtƌast to the ǀieǁs Ŷot oŶlǇ of his seǀeŶ pƌedeĐessoƌs 
as Home Secretary, but also of Thatcher, who only a few years earlier had endorsed a White 
Papeƌ ǁhiĐh stated that pƌisoŶs ǁeƌe siŵplǇ ͚aŶ eǆpeŶsiǀe ǁaǇ of ŵakiŶg ďad people ǁoƌse͛ 
(Home Office, 1990). What ĐoŶseƋueŶtlǇ uŶfolded has ďeeŶ desĐƌiďed ďǇ Loadeƌ as a ͚politiĐal 
aƌŵs ƌaĐe iŶ the field of Đƌiŵe aŶd puŶishŵeŶt͛4. As the government continued to ratchet up 
the rhetoric, the Shadow Home Secretary Tony Blair persisted to match it. When elected as 
Prime Minister in 1997, Blair stood by his commitment to introduce more punitive measures 
in the criminal justice system. His famous Rudi Giuliani-iŶspiƌed ͚tough oŶ Đƌiŵe, tough oŶ the 
Đauses of Đƌiŵe͛ speeĐh uŶdouďtedlǇ gaǀe ďirth to what Loader has classed as a more 
͚disputatious, aŶd eŵotioŶallǇ Đhaƌged, peŶal politiĐs͛ (2006: 572).  
IŶ Laďouƌ͛s fiƌst Ǉeaƌ of goǀeƌŶŵeŶt the House of Commons Home Affairs Select 
Committee undertook an inquiry into alternatives to prison sentences. It reached the view that, 
͚the ƌapidlǇ esĐalatiŶg pƌisoŶ populatioŶ ŵakes it of paƌaŵouŶt iŵpoƌtaŶĐe to iŶǀestigate 
credible alternatives to custodǇ aŶd to use theŵ ǁheƌeǀeƌ appƌopƌiate͛ ;ϭϵϵϴ: paƌa ϭϳͿ. But 
the new government did not take heed. Like the previous Conservative government, party 
afiĐioŶados ďelieǀed that the peŶal sǇsteŵ ǁas ͚iŶfeĐted͛ ďǇ a daŶgeƌous liďeƌal elite that 
favoured the rights of the offender above the victim and public (Faulkner and Burnett, 2012: 
55). Newly appointed Home Secretary Jack Straw went public to state that the government 
would no longer simply listen to interest groups, but would in future take the views of ordinary 
people into account5 (Johnstone, 2000:162). Increasingly slave to tabloid headlines, New 
Laďouƌ gaǀe ǁaǇ to ǁhat has ďeeŶ desĐƌiďed as ͚ hǇpeƌaĐtiǀe legislatiǀe ďehaǀiouƌ͛, aŶd its eaƌlǇ 
                                                          
3 ͚Majoƌ oŶ Đƌiŵe: ͚CoŶdeŵŶ ŵoƌe, uŶdeƌstaŶd less͛ The Independent 21 February 1993 
4 Evidence to the House of Commons Justice Select Committee inquiry ͚CuttiŶg Criŵe: The Case for JustiĐe 
‘eiŶǀestŵeŶt͛ First Report of Session 2009-10 (p92: para 194) 
5 ͚Cƌiŵe aŶd Old Laďouƌ͛s punishment. Jack Straw says he listens to the people, not pressure groups͛ The Times 8 
April 1998 
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terms oversaw an unprecedented number of criminal justice Bills finding their way onto the 
statute ďook. “uĐĐessiǀe goǀeƌŶŵeŶts͛ poliĐies, ĐoŵďiŶed ǁith the Đouƌts͛ gƌeateƌ seŶsitiǀitǇ 
to criticism in the media meant that the prison population in England and Wales doubled 
between 1992 and 2010, reaching 85,000 by May of that year (Faulkner and Burnett, 2012: 
62).  
  Following the election of 2010, forward-thinking Conservative strategists were keen to 
ŵaƌk a distiŶĐt ďƌeaĐh ǁith the ͚pƌisoŶ ǁoƌks͛ philosophǇ that had so loŶg doŵiŶated the 
paƌtǇ͛s poliĐǇ. The fiƌst iŶdiĐatioŶs of the CoalitioŶ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s iŶteŶtioŶs foƌ ĐƌiŵiŶal justiĐe 
came in speeches by the first Justice Secretary, Rt Hon. Kenneth Clarke MP, who promised a 
͚ƌehaďilitatioŶ ƌeǀolutioŶ͛ aloŶgside a seƌious atteŵpt to liŵit the uŶŶeĐessaƌǇ use of 
imprisonment (Faulkner and Burnett, 2012: 5). Announcing that those with mental health or 
addiction problems would be diverted to treatment programmes, and that fewer young people 
would be sentenced to custody, Clarke stressed a focus on conciliation techniques such as 
restorative justice as well as tougher community penalties. His visions, echoing many of the 
concerns held by criminal justice professionals, were sadly not allowed the test of time. In a 
direct reaction to increasing frustrations among party members (from the grassroots to the 
front bench) Clarke and his Prisons Minister Crispin Blunt MP were shuffled from office in 2012 
and Clarke was ƌeplaĐed ďǇ ͚ attaĐk dog͛ ‘t HoŶ. Chƌis GƌaǇiŶg MP. GƌaǇliŶg, uŶashaŵedlǇ ŵoƌe 
punitive in his approach to criminal justice and crime control, was appointed to rescue a 
depaƌtŵeŶt that ǁas seeŶ as laĐkiŶg tƌaditioŶal ͚CoŶseƌǀatiǀe͛ ĐoŶǀiĐtioŶ. Unlike Clarke, 
Grayling was ŵoƌe populist iŶ his ƌhetoƌiĐ, puďliĐlǇ ĐaŵpaigŶiŶg to ƌeŵoǀe pƌisoŶeƌs͛ ƌights to 
ǀote aŶd ͚luǆuƌies͛ suĐh as teleǀisioŶ aŶd Đoŵputeƌ gaŵes. It is iŵpoƌtaŶt to Ŷote that ƌeĐeŶt 
Ǉeaƌs haǀe, hoǁeǀeƌ, sigŶalled the ƌetuƌŶ of ͚ƌehaďilitatioŶ͛; deŵoŶstƌated iŶ the CoalitioŶ͛s 
Transforming Rehabilitation agenda6 and the recently enshrined Offender Rehabilitation Act 
2014. 
 
The ͚Culture of IŵpatieŶĐe͛  
It is Đleaƌ that ͚goǀeƌŶŵeŶts [Ŷoǁ] ĐoŶsult oƌdiŶaƌǇ people… ďefoƌe foƌŵulatiŶg aŶd 
iŵpleŵeŶtiŶg poliĐies to taĐkle Đƌiŵe͛ ;JohŶstoŶe, ϮϬϬϬ: ϭϲϭͿ. The deǀelopŵeŶt has been 
desĐƌiďed as ͚the eŵeƌgeŶĐe of aŶ eŵotiǀe, populist aŶd aǀoǁedlǇ aŶti-liberal political 
                                                          
6 Transforming Rehabilitation has, amongst other things, extended supervision to offenders released from short-
term sentences and opened up probation services to new private providers. 
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disĐouƌse that deliďeƌatelǇ sets the ͚stuƌdǇ ĐoŵŵoŶ seŶse aŶd siŵple ǀiƌtue͛ ;CaŶoǀaŶ, ϭϵϴϭ: 
ϮϯϯͿ of oƌdiŶaƌǇ people agaiŶst the ͚ƌeŵote͛ liďeƌal seŶtiŵeŶts of professional or special 
interest groups, most notably those of lawyers, (some) journalists, civil libertarians, penal 
ƌefoƌŵeƌs aŶd ĐƌiŵiŶologists ;Loadeƌ, ϮϬϬϲ: ϱϳϵͿ. To Loadeƌ, ͚the Đuŵulatiǀe effeĐt… [is] … the 
advent of what one might call a culture of impatience … It is a politiĐal Đultuƌe doŵiŶated ďǇ 
actors preoccupied with being seen to react immediately and resolutely to mass-mediated, 
eŵotioŶallǇ Đhaƌged aŶd uƌgeŶtlǇ pƌessed puďliĐ ĐoŶĐeƌŶs aďout Đƌiŵe aŶd disoƌdeƌ͛ ;Loadeƌ, 
2006: 581, emphasis added).  
To ‘ǇaŶ, the upgƌadiŶg of the puďliĐ ͚ǀoiĐe͛ ;aŶd goǀeƌŶŵeŶt ƌeaĐtioŶs to itͿ ĐaŶ ďe 
seen partly as a consequence of the growth in media organisations from the late 1950s 
oŶǁaƌds, aloŶg ǁith Ŷeǁ ŵedia teĐhŶologies ;ϮϬϬϯ: ϭϯϯͿ. This ͚upgƌadiŶg͛ has ďeen of serious 
concern for criminologists and campaigners concerned with reform of the justice system. 
Instead of being positioned to hear only the views and arguments of the elite (be it politicians, 
journalists, pressure group spokesmen), changes in the public sphere have enabled the 
opinions of ordinary people to be aired more often, and in a variety of ways. For Garland this 
ŵaƌks ͚ǁhat ŵaǇ ďe the ďegiŶŶiŶg of aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt ƌeĐoŶfiguƌatioŶ of the ͚ĐƌiŵiŶal justiĐe 
state͛ aŶd its ƌelatioŶ to the ĐitizeŶ͛ (1996: 454). While it is acknowledged that the public 
possess a far more complicated belief system than is evident from a superficial reading of 
opinion polls (Johnstone, 2000: 164), successive governments have been known to use 
selective evidence to support their pet claims. It is clear that establishment insiders now have 
to share their previously exclusive role with the public, and are sometimes sidelined or ignored 
altogether (Pratt, 2007: 3). Although definitions differ, Roberts et al. have argued that such 
ĐhaŶges ĐoŶstitute the pheŶoŵeŶoŶ of peŶal populisŵ:  ͚the puƌsuit of a set of peŶal poliĐies 
to ǁiŶ ǀotes ƌatheƌ thaŶ to ƌeduĐe Đƌiŵe oƌ pƌoŵote justiĐe͛ ;ϮϬϬϯ: ϱͿ. PeŶal populisŵ thƌiǀes 
on public misunderstandings about crime and justice (Indermaur and Hough, 2002), and is by 
nature a complex of inconsistent and sometimes uneducated layers. While it is beyond the 
scope of this study to discuss the definitions or causes of penal populism in greater detail, it is 
Đleaƌ that suĐh ͚attitudes͛ ;aŶd hoǁ to effectively manage them) have become a serious 
concern for both policymakers and penal reformers alike.  
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Changes in the Public Sphere: What Consequences for Penal Reform? 
To Ryan, changes in both political culture and the public sphere have had serious consequences 
for penal reform campaigners, ǁho haǀe effeĐtiǀelǇ ďeeŶ ͚ƌe-positioŶed͛ as a ƌesult ;ϮϬϬϴ: ϮϲͿ. 
The Habermasian concept of communicative rationality, although heavily criticised (see 
Flyvbjerg, 1998; Garnham, 1990; Calhoun, 1993; Fraser, 1990) and not discussed in detail here, 
is a useful concept to briefly highlight the ĐhaŶges iŶ the puďliĐ spheƌe. Haďeƌŵas͛ utopia 
eǆplaiŶed hoǁ ͚paƌtiĐipaŶts [of the ϭϴth and 19th century coffee houses] overcame their at first 
subjectively based views iŶ faǀouƌ of ƌatioŶallǇ ŵotiǀated aƌguŵeŶt͛ ;ϭϵϴϳ: Ϯϵϰ, ϯϭϱͿ. CleaƌlǇ 
once restricted to the bourgeois and predominantly male elite, it is media that have now 
become the major component of the modern-day public sphere (Thompson, 2000; see also 
Castells, 2008). Developments in media proliferation led Norwegian penal abolitionist Thomas 
Mathiesen to argue that:  
 
͚CoŵŵuŶiĐatiǀe ƌatioŶalitǇ [Ŷoǁ] liǀes life in the secluded corners of the professional 
journals and meetings, while the public debate, flooded as it is by dire warnings by the 
police and sensational crime stories, and significantly, by opportunistic political 
initiatives in the context of buƌlesƋue teleǀisioŶ shoǁs Đalled ͚ deďates͛ is pƌedoŵiŶaŶtlǇ 
ĐhaƌaĐteƌised ďǇ the ͚ƌatioŶalitǇ͛ of the ŵaƌket plaĐe͛ ;ϭϵϵϱ: ϴͿ.  
 
Consistent with the philosophy of the Post-Waƌ ͚platoŶiĐ guaƌdiaŶs͛ ;Loadeƌ, ϮϬϬϲͿ, MathieseŶ 
Đalled foƌ the ͚ĐƌeatioŶ of aŶ alternative public space in penal policy, where argumentation and 
pƌiŶĐipled thiŶkiŶg ƌepƌeseŶt the doŵiŶaŶt ǀalues͛ ;ϮϬϬϰ: ϭϬϲͿ. “uĐh a ͚spaĐe͛ ĐoŶtaiŶs thƌee 
elements: fiƌst, ͚liďeƌatioŶ fƌoŵ the aďsoƌďeŶt poǁeƌ of the ŵass ŵedia͛; second, the 
restoration of grass roots movements; and third a restoration of the feeling of responsibility 
on the part of intellectuals (Mathiesen, 2004: 106). Mathiesen argued that such a responsibility 
should ďe paƌtlǇ diƌeĐted toǁaƌds a ƌefusal to paƌtiĐipate iŶ the ͚ŵass ŵedia shoǁ ďusiŶess͛ 
(2004: 106). Such an arena has been attempted in the formation of the Norwegian Association 
for Penal Reform, KROM. Speaking at a conference in 2003, Mathiesen praised KROM for 
atteŵptiŶg to Đƌeate a ͚Ŷetǁoƌk of opiŶioŶ aŶd iŶfoƌŵatioŶ… a public space which in the end 
ŵaǇ Đoŵpete ǁith the supeƌfiĐial puďliĐ spaĐe of the ŵass ŵedia͛. IŶ aƌguiŶg that ͚ suĐh a puďliĐ 
spaĐe ǁas theƌe iŶ the ϭϵϳϬs…It Đould ďe theƌe agaiŶ͛ (2000: 194), Mathiesen issued a direct 
recall for members of the liberal elite. IŶ theiƌ deliďeƌatioŶs of ͚puďliĐ ĐƌiŵiŶologǇ͛, Loadeƌ aŶd 
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“paƌks haǀe siŵilaƌlǇ deďated the utilitǇ of ͚ĐooliŶg deǀiĐes͛ to ĐouŶteƌ puďliĐ opiŶioŶ. OŶe 
suĐh stƌategǇ of ͚ƌe-iŶsulatioŶ͛ fƌoŵ the ŵedia Đould eŶtail ͚seekiŶg to Đƌeate iŶstitutioŶal 
spaces that iŶsulate ĐƌiŵiŶal justiĐe fƌoŵ the Ŷaked flaŵes of politiĐal ƌhetoƌiĐ͛ ;ϮϬϭϭ: ϴϮͿ. 
Otheƌ ĐoŵŵeŶtatoƌs haǀe uŶdeƌstaŶdaďlǇ ǁaƌŶed aďout the iŶteŶsifiĐatioŶ of ͚stealth͛ 
strategies in the contemporary criminal justice domain. Green, for example, has questioned 
͚the follǇ of doiŶg good ďǇ stealth͛; aŶd that iŶ atteŵpts to ͚iŶsulate͛ peŶal poliĐǇ fƌoŵ the 
public glare, there is little allowance for prevailing attitudes to be challenged, and hopefully 
improved (2009: 529). Loader, in his assessment of atteŵpts to fosteƌ ͚peŶal ŵodeƌatioŶ͛ has 
also ƋuestioŶed the use of ͚ ƌefoƌŵ ďǇ stealth͛. While suĐh ǁoƌk aiŵs to Đƌeate ͚ spaĐe aŶd Đoǀeƌ 
foƌ the adŵiŶistƌatiǀe deliǀeƌǇ of ŵoƌe ŵodeƌate poliĐǇ aŶd ǁoƌkaďle outĐoŵes͛ ;ϮϬϭϬ: ϯϲϭͿ, 
Loader has conceded it is a ƌiskǇ eŶteƌpƌise ƌiddled ǁith ͚ďeaƌ tƌaps͛ aŶd the ĐoŶstaŶt feaƌ of 
scandalous exposure (2010: 361).  
Arguing that campaigners should ͚ĐoŶĐeŶtƌate less oŶ ĐultiǀatiŶg [theiƌ] iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ less 
pƌoduĐtiǀe ĐoŶtaĐts iŶ Whitehall͛ ;ϮϬϬϴ: ϮϲͿ, ‘ǇaŶ has Đalled for those engaged in penal reform 
to ǁoƌk ͚outǁaƌds to ĐouŶteƌ ataǀistiĐ populist deŵaŶds aŶd ƌe-shape public perceptions 
aďout peŶal pƌaĐtiĐe͛ ;ϮϬϬϴ: ϮϲͿ. Garland has similarly argued that penal reformers must 
͚addƌess theŵselǀes diƌeĐtlǇ to populaƌ feeliŶgs if theǇ iŶteŶd to pƌoduĐe ƌeal ĐhaŶge͛ ;ϭϵϵϬ: 
62). Matthews has taken the opposite view, arguing that some because penal reform 
campaigners have embraced the notion of penal populism it has given them an opportunity or 
a ƌole to pƌeseŶt theŵselǀes as legitiŵate ͚ eduĐatoƌs͛ to the ŵisiŶfoƌŵed geŶeƌal puďliĐ ;ϮϬϬϱ: 
196)7. Yet providing information on crime and justice is clearly a more complex process than 
siŵplǇ settiŶg out ͚the faĐts͛ aŶd lettiŶg theŵ speak foƌ theŵselǀes ;IŶdeƌŵauƌ aŶd Hough, 
2002: 7). Indermaur and Hough have argued that reform must now depend on persuasive 
argument that is effectively conveyed in public debates (2002: 4), either through strategic issue 
fƌaŵiŶg oƌ the pƌoǀisioŶ of a ͚ƌeplaĐeŵeŶt disĐouƌse͛, foƌ eǆaŵple ;ϮϬϬϮ: ϳͿ. As highlighted 
throughout this chapter, penal reformers may work hard to produce such rhetoric, yet they 
have little control over the main conduit of information, the news media, which in its various 
forms has the ability to spread populist and emotive messages. “iŶĐe the ͚platoŶiĐ guaƌdiaŶs͛ 
operated in the corridors of power over half a century ago the public sphere has experienced 
                                                          
7 Faulkner and Burnett (2012: 3) believe that this responsibility falls squarely at the door of governments who 
must work harder to develop policies and practices that acknowledge both sides of the penal argument. 
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a paradigm shift. It is clear that in our 21st ĐeŶtuƌǇ Ϯϰ/ϳ ͚ŵass ŵediated ƌealitǇ͛ ;Niŵŵo aŶd 
Coŵďs, ϭϵϴϯͿ total seĐƌeĐǇ is Ŷo loŶgeƌ aĐhieǀaďle oƌ desiƌaďle. Laďelled ďǇ ThoŵpsoŶ as ͚the 
Ŷeǁ ǀisiďilitǇ͛, ŵedia Đoǀeƌage is ŵoƌe iŶteŶsiǀe, ŵoƌe eǆteŶsiǀe aŶd less ĐoŶtƌollaďle thaŶ 
ever (2000: 48-49). Those subscribing to the viewpoint that all arguments concerning policy 
change must now take place via the news media would argue that, for better or worse, success 
for penal reformers depeŶds oŶ theiƌ aďilitǇ to aĐĐess the ͚ŵaƌketplaĐe͛ of ideas.  
 
 
vi. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has highlighted the challenges faced by penal reformers attempting to influence 
the messy and unpredictable nature of contemporary penal policymaking. It is clear that 
understanding the evolution of public policy requires researchers to pay special attention to 
the actors involved in that process (Ismaili, 2006: 260). This study seeks to explore how the 
diverse political actors that constitute the penal reform network in England and Wales pursue 
their political and communicative strategies for women. Undertaking an interdisciplinary 
analysis of this kind is, however, challenging, not least because of the diverging models and 
theoretical interpretations of the matters discussed above.   
Although Ŷot suďjeĐt to eŵpiƌiĐal testiŶg, Best͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ adapted ŵodel of the soĐial 
problems process, neatly depicting the claimsmaking, newsmaking and policymaking stages, 
provides the theoretical building blocks for this study. Adopting the broad areas of 
investigation as distinct areas of empirical focus, this research is able to synthesise the 
disparate research traditions under the social constructionist paradigm. In investigating the 
process of penal reform claimsmaking, this research will draw on framing literature from the 
political sciences and criminology. Snow et al.͛s ;ϭϵϴϲͿ iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of the stƌategiĐ fƌaŵe 
aligŶŵeŶt pƌoĐess ǁill ďe ĐoŶsideƌed aloŶgside ‘utheƌfoƌd͛s ;ϭϵϵϯͿ tǇpologǇ of peŶal 
ideologies aŶd Mills aŶd ‘oďeƌts͛ ;ϮϬϭϭ, ϮϬϭϮͿ aŶalǇsis of peŶal ƌefoƌŵ disĐouƌse. Considering 
a variety of concepts in relatioŶ to ŵediatisatioŶ ;iŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ ChiďŶall͛s ;ϭϵϳϳͿ Ŷeǁs ǀalues, 
KitziŶgeƌ͛s ;ϮϬϬϬͿ ŵedia teŵplates aŶd MĐCoŵďs͛ ;ϮϬϭϰͿ ŵodel of media agenda-setting) 
framing theory will also be utilised to assess the factors associated with newsmaking in the 
process of penal policy reform. Finally, this study will investigate the impact of competing ideas 
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on the policymaking process iŶ ƌelatioŶ to KiŶgdoŶ͛s ;ϭϵϴϰͿ ŵodel of poliĐǇ stƌeaŵs aŶd 
‘hodes͛ ;ϮϬϬϳͿ ĐoŶĐept of goǀeƌŶaŶĐe.  
In considering such theories in unison, this study is the only research of its kind and will, 
for the first time, synthesise the above literatures in its evaluation of the claimsmaking 
stƌategies eŵploǇed ďǇ the ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal ƌefoƌŵ Ŷetǁoƌk iŶ EŶglaŶd aŶd Wales. IŶ eǆploring 
the complex web of linkages and relations between penal reformers and journalists, and 
between penal reformers and policymakers, this research will investigate whether, given the 
contemporary nature of penal policymaking, the news media constitute a distinct pathway to 
policy reform or if there are times when it is bypassed. Contributing a policy-focused dimension 
to discussions in feminist criminology, it will critically consider: 
 
- How penal reform campaigners have used strategies of information management when 
dealing with journalists. 
- How penal reform campaigners haǀe used the ŵedia iŶ atteŵpts to ͚ ŵaŶage͛ the puďliĐ 
agenda. 
- Whether traditional gender stereotypes of female offenders and high profile cases have 
inhibited such change. 
- The ƌelatiǀe ͚ǀalue͛ of the ŵedia to ĐaŵpaigŶeƌs operating in this area, and whether 
strategists seek to bring about change in private. 
 
Building on the overarching structure described above, and outlining the policy problem in 
ŵoƌe detail, the folloǁiŶg Đhapteƌ ǁill foĐus speĐifiĐallǇ oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s offeŶdiŶg aŶd 
imprisonment. In examining the various attempts of penal reformers to influence the policy 
agenda, it will also consider the impact that news media portrayals of women offenders have 
had on reform strategies. 
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ϯ. The PolitiĐisatioŶ of WoŵeŶ͛s PeŶal PoliĐǇ 
 
i. Introduction 
 
In line with the interdisciplinary nature of the study, this chapter will consider societal, media 
and political responses to the policy problem of women offending. Initially disĐussiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
offending as a social phenomenon, part two will explore issues surrounding women, 
independence and deviancy, highlighting how the changing social status of women (through 
emancipation and entry into the workplace) led to concerns about increasing levels of female 
crime (see Austin, 1981). ConsideriŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s offeŶdiŶg as a media phenomenon, part three 
will critically assess news media portrayals of women offenders and the extent to which they 
may have impacted on progressive policy reform. Paƌt fouƌ ǁill aŶalǇse ǁoŵeŶ͛s offeŶdiŶg as 
a political phenomenon, documenting the deǀelopŵeŶt of the ǁoŵeŶ͛s penal reform network 
and outlining Post-Waƌ deǀelopŵeŶts iŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ. WidelǇ ƌeĐogŶised as aŶ 
overlooked area of public policy, it will highlight the political and communicative efforts of the 
array of campaigners working to improve criminal justice solutions for women.  
 
 
ii. WoŵeŶ͛s OffeŶdiŶg as a “oĐial PheŶoŵeŶoŶ 
 
͚“o faƌ as Đƌiŵe is deteƌŵiŶed ďǇ eǆteƌŶal ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes, eǀeƌǇ step ŵade ďǇ ǁoŵaŶ 
towards her independence is a step towards that precipice at the bottom of which lies 
a pƌisoŶ͛ ;Pike, ϭϴϳϲ: ϱϮϳͿ. 
 
WƌitiŶg iŶ the ŶiŶeteeŶth ĐeŶtuƌǇ, Pike͛s ǀieǁs oŶ feŵale iŶdepeŶdeŶĐe ǁeƌe the aĐĐepted 
discourse. The gendered ideology of the family, demonstrated no better than during the 
Victorian era, underlined the ǁoŵaŶ͛s ƌole iŶ the hoŵe. WoŵeŶ ǁeƌe sǇŵďoliĐallǇ ideŶtified 
ǁith ͚hoŵe aŶd heaƌth͛ aŶd ŵotheƌhood ;“eal, ϮϬϭϭ: ϰϵϱͿ, iŶdeed ǁoŵeŶ͛s ideŶtitǇ ǁas 
constructed through the very process of having children (Seal, 2009). Women were 
traditionally (and still are) defined in terms of their sexual behaviour, and for those whose 
domestic lives proved less respectable (often due to social disadvantage), this readily 
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tƌaŶslated iŶto a geŶdeƌ tƌaŶsgƌessioŶ fƌoŵ ǁhiĐh theǇ ŵust ďe ͚ƌefoƌŵed͛ ;D͛Cƌuze aŶd 
Jackson, 2009: 142). As women were deemed to be untrustworthy outside of the patriarchal 
male gaze (Faith, 2011: 45), those in trouble with the law were sent to penal institutions to 
ƌepeŶt theiƌ siŶs aŶd ďe ƌestoƌed ďaĐk to aŶ aĐĐeptaďle feŵiŶiŶe ͚Ŷoƌŵ͛. To HahŶ ‘afteƌ, the 
ĐƌiŵiŶal justiĐe sǇsteŵ seƌǀed ͚speĐial feŵale-specific functions with regard to social class and 
soĐial ĐoŶtƌol͛ ;ϮϬϬϰ: ϭϱϴͿ aŶd theƌefoƌe ďeĐaŵe a ŵeĐhaŶisŵ foƌ puŶishiŶg ǁoŵeŶ ǁho did 
not conform to ideal notions of femininity. Houses of Correction functioned in the eighteenth 
century as places of confinement for petty offenders awaiting trial, the homeless, unmarried 
women and prostitutes (Sharpe, 1984: 117 in Faith, 2011). These institutions were soon joined 
by a growing number of semi-penal establishments such as asylums, psychiatric hospitals, 
ƌesĐue hoŵes aŶd iŶeďƌiates͛ ƌefoƌŵatoƌies all atteŵptiŶg to ƌefoƌŵ the ͚deǀiaŶt͛ ǁoŵaŶ 
;D͛Cƌuze aŶd JaĐksoŶ, ϮϬϬϵ: ϭ; see also Zedner, 1991). Mounting fears about increasing female 
independence manifested themselves into opposition to the extension of the franchise, the 
growth of female wage labour and the mixing of the sexes at the workplace (Emsley, 2010; see 
also AustiŶ, ϭϵϴϭͿ. Despite suĐh deǀelopŵeŶts, ǁoŵeŶ͛s ďehaǀiouƌs ĐoŶtiŶued to ďe ĐloselǇ 
monitored and regulated from the private world of the household to the public place of work. 
To Dobash et al. ;ϭϵϴϲ: ϲϭͿ, ͚the suƌǀeillaŶĐe aŶd ƌegulatioŶ [of ǁoŵeŶ] ǁas alǁaǇs Đloseƌ aŶd 
ŵoƌe oŵŶipƌeseŶt thaŶ usuallǇ diƌeĐted at ŵeŶ͛. “uĐh foƌŵal aŶd iŶfoƌŵal ŵodes of 
ƌegulatioŶ ǁeƌe highlighted ďǇ FouĐault ;ϭϵϳϱͿ, iŶ his eǆaŵiŶatioŶ of ͚the ďiƌth of the pƌisoŶ͛, 
not simply as an institution but also as a metaphor for other forms of power and social 
ƌegulatioŶ ;D͛Cƌuze aŶd JaĐksoŶ, ϮϬϬϵ: ϮͿ. While FouĐault ǁƌote little speĐifiĐallǇ aďout geŶdeƌ, 
his work was consistent with feminist awareness that sexuality was not merely a biological 
given; but that feminine norms and expectations had been constructed culturally over time 
ǁithiŶ a deŶse Ŷetǁoƌk of poǁeƌ ƌegulatioŶs ;D͛Cƌuze aŶd JaĐksoŶ, ϮϬϬϵ: ϴͿ. It is of Đouƌse tƌue 
that girls are traditionally socialised to be more submissive and conformist than boys, and 
throughout their lives may find themselves subject to greater informal social controls 
(Cavadino, Dignan and Mair, 2013: 296).  
In terms of criminal justice, such unwritten rules help distinguish between different 
modes of law-abiding or deviant behaviour. While male crime is almost treated as normal (after 
all, boys will be boys), female crime has been treated as an expression of masculinisation and 
a reaction to male authority (Faith, 2011: 43). Female deviancy is therefore used to refer to 
the pƌoĐess thƌough ǁhiĐh ǁoŵeŶ͛s ďehaǀiouƌs haǀe ďeeŶ ǀieǁed as outside accepted social 
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parameters ;D͛Cƌuze aŶd JaĐksoŶ, ϮϬϬϵ: ϮͿ. Of paƌtiĐulaƌ iŶteƌest to feŵiŶists is that deǀiaŶt 
men and women are represented in markedly different ways. Female crime has traditionally 
evoked especially punitive responses, and to Heidensohn, social reaction to male and female 
deǀiaŶt ďehaǀiouƌ diffeƌs as the ͚ƌespeĐtaďle feaƌs͛ attaĐhed to eaĐh geŶdeƌ aƌe distiŶĐtiǀe 
(1996: 99). To Faith, the deviant woman is therefore nothing but a product of the politics of 
patriarchal relations (2011:1), and when apprehended for crossing the boundaries of legality, 
deǀiaŶt ǁoŵeŶ aƌe puŶished as ŵuĐh foƌ theiƌ ďetƌaǇal of ͚WoŵaŶhood͛ as foƌ theiƌ failuƌe to 
suďŵit to ͚The Laǁ͛ ;ϮϬϭϭ:ϭ; see also CaƌleŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϮͿ ĐoŶĐept of ͚douďle deǀiaŶĐǇ͛Ϳ. Deviant 
acts formerly dealt with in the private sphere have now become public (Berrington and 
Honkatukia, 2002: 53), and media proliferation has had major consequences for the coverage 
of unusual and rare crimes such as those committed by women. Such crimes are seen to be 
against the passive and conformist female nature, attracting particular attention from the 
ŵedia ďeĐause theǇ aƌe deeŵed ͚uŶfeŵiŶiŶe͛ ;LaǁsoŶ aŶd Heaton, 2010: 255). It is important 
to remember that while the vast majority of women in contact with the law are property 
offenders (mainly guilty of theft and handling stolen goods), it is the very few women who 
commit violent crimes that retain the greatest Đultuƌal ǀisiďilitǇ ;D͛Cƌuze aŶd JaĐksoŶ, ϮϬϬϵͿ.  
 The above viewpoints are brought into sharp focus ǁheŶ ĐoŶsideƌiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
treatment in the courts. While some commentators argue that women offenders are more 
likelǇ to ďe ͚let off͛ ďǇ the Đouƌts oŶ aĐĐount of their sex (see Gregory, 1986), others believe 
that female offending evokes an especially punitive response from sentencers (see for example 
Worrall, 1981; Carlen, 1983; Heidensohn, 1985). Another body of research questioned this 
assumption and demonstƌated that the issue of ǁoŵeŶ͛s tƌeatŵeŶt iŶ Đouƌt ǁas Đoŵpleǆ 
(Gelsthorpe and Morris, 1988: 98; Hedderman and Gelsthorpe, 1997). Early research by Eaton 
(1986), for example, noted that men and women conforming to conventional roles were better 
treated than those such as homosexuals or single mothers. Carlen (1983) similarly found that 
“Đottish sheƌiffs ;ŵagistƌatesͿ distiŶguished ďetǁeeŶ ͚good͛ aŶd ͚ďad͛ ŵotheƌs aŶd seŶteŶĐed 
them accordingly (in Heidensohn and Gelsthorpe, 2007: 399). Evidence would therefore 
suggest that certain women (those who are mothers and married) are more likely to be treated 
with chivalry and may receive a lighter sentence than a man (Cavadino, Dignan and Mair, 2013: 
299). Research by Grabe et al. tested the so-called ͚ ĐhiǀalƌǇ hǇpothesis͛, that ǁoŵeŶ offeŶdeƌs 
receive more lenient treatment in the criminal justice system and in news coverage than their 
male counterparts (2006: 137). Consistent with earlier findings, Grabe et al. concluded that a 
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ŵoƌe ŶuaŶĐed foƌŵ of ͚patƌiaƌĐhal ĐhiǀalƌǇ͛ ǁas the ŵost appƌopƌiate teƌŵ, as ͚ĐhiǀalƌǇ͛ ǁas 
highly dependent on the crime committed.  
Somewhat perversely, chivalrous viewpoints are also cited as a driver to the female prison 
population. In believing that some women would benefit from a custodial sentence (for help 
with drug or alcohol addictions or for their own safety) suĐh aĐtioŶs ƌesult iŶ ͚up-taƌiffiŶg͛ ǁith 
more women being sent to prison (often) unnecessarily. While it is Đleaƌ that ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
treatment by sentencers is complex, it is possible to infer that there exists sexist bias in 
sentencing operating in both directions (Cavadino, Dignan and Mair, 2013: 299).  
 
 
iii. WoŵeŶ͛s OffeŶdiŶg as a Media PheŶoŵeŶoŶ 
 
It is widely acknowledged that the most unusual crimes continue to carry powerful 
assoĐiatioŶs. Theiƌ legaĐies ĐaŶ ďeĐoŵe teŵplates, seƌǀiŶg ͚as ƌhetoƌiĐal shoƌthaŶd, helpiŶg 
jouƌŶalists aŶd audieŶĐes to ŵake seŶse of fƌesh Ŷeǁs stoƌies͛ ;KitziŶgeƌ, ϮϬϬϬ: ϲϭͿ. Media 
templates are a crucial site of media power, acting to provide context for new events and 
helping to shape the ways in which people make sense of the world (Kitzinger, 2000: 81). Like 
the most persuasive forms of political campaigning, teŵplates aƌe ͚iŶstƌuŵeŶtal iŶ shapiŶg 
Ŷaƌƌatiǀes aƌouŶd paƌtiĐulaƌ soĐial pƌoďleŵs͛ ;Kitzinger, 2000: 81). The dominant template for 
representing the female offender draws on the narrative of the ͚ŵoŶsteƌ͛ ;“ŵaƌt, ϭϵϳϲ; Birch, 
1993); the archetypal manifestation remaining Myra Hindley even after her death. HiŶdleǇ͛s 
famous ͚ŵugshot͛, foƌ eǆaŵple, gained policy significance through the impact of its now-
indelible image, and, as highlighted in this section, subsequent cases in the media have drawn 
on this template8. 
It is easy to see why women who commit serious offences have immediate news value 
by virtue of their rarity (Jewkes, 2004). Feminist critics in particular believe that the media tap 
into and magnify deep-seated public fears about deviant and unruly women, while paying less 
attention to their male counterparts (Jewkes, 2004: 109). To Tuchman (1978), media 
disĐouƌses of ǁoŵeŶ aƌe guiltǇ of ͚sǇŵďoliĐ aŶŶihilatioŶ͛, iŶ that ŵedia outlets tend to ignore, 
                                                          
8 See for example: ͚͛MoŶsteƌ͛ ŵotheƌ jailed foƌ at least ϭϴ Ǉeaƌs foƌ ŵuƌdeƌiŶg heƌ tǁo-year-old sun by battering 
hiŵ to death͛ Daily Mail, Ϯϱ JuŶe ϮϬϭϯ; ͚BaďǇ P ŵoŶsteƌ TƌaĐeǇ CoŶŶellǇ: I ǁaŶt aŶotheƌ Đhild͛ Daily Mirror, 13 
October 2013 
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trivialise or condemn women, with obvious implications for the way news is reported (Marsh 
and Melville, 2009: 76). While women typically appear in the news as victims, female 
criminality clearly challenges this patriarchal ideology (Faith, 1993). A number of studies over 
the years have investigated the depiction of women offenders in the media, so often labelled 
eitheƌ ͚ŵad͛ oƌ ͚ďad͛ ;BalliŶger, 1996; Grabe et al., ϮϬϬϲ; WilĐzǇŶski, ϭϵϵϳͿ, ͚ǀiƌgiŶ͛ oƌ ͚ǀaŵp͛ 
(Benedict, 1992). In investigating this phenomenon, Marsh and Melville (2009: 76) found 
disproportionate coverage of violent women in the media, that one third of violent crime 
stories are about female offenders despite the fact that they make up just four per cent of the 
prison population in England and Wales. It is in this way that media representations are able 
to create an impression of events rather than an objective, factual record of what took place 
(Berrington and Honkatukia, 2002: 50). Because so few women engage in extremely violent 
crimes, those who do offer a particular fascination (Berrington and Honkatukia, 2002: 59). 
WoŵeŶ͛s ǀioleŶĐe iŶ this seŶse has a ͚douďle fasĐiŶatioŶ͛, simultaneously titillating and 
hoƌƌifǇiŶg, pƌoǀidiŶg ͚Ŷot oŶlǇ huŵaŶ dƌaŵa aŶd eŵotioŶ, ďut sexualised dƌaŵa aŶd eŵotioŶ͛ 
;NaǇloƌ, ϭϵϵϱ: ϴϬͿ. That is ďeĐause, ͚ǁheŶ a ǁoŵaŶ Đoŵŵits aŶ aĐt of ĐƌiŵiŶal ǀioleŶĐe heƌ 
sex is the lens through which all her actions are seen and understood; her sex is the primary 
͚eǆplaŶatioŶ͛ oƌ ŵitigatiŶg faĐtoƌ offeƌed up iŶ aŶǇ atteŵpt to uŶdeƌstaŶd heƌ Đƌiŵe͛ (Wight 
and Myers, 1996: xi-xii). One thing is for certain, whether women offenders are portrayed as 
bad, mad, wicked, or weak, they are cast outside the realm of normalcy (Grabe et al., 2006: 
140). Naylor contends that journalists or news producers treat the incidence of violent female 
criminality as the most deviant, anxiety producing, and transgressive of all crime scenarios 
(2001, in Grabe et al., 2006: 140).  
The amount of news coverage dedicated to high profile women offenders is not a new 
phenomenon, and it is possible to trace mediated distortions from the Post-War period 
onwards. In the mid-1950s crime was a constituent part of the editorial mix (Bingham, 2009), 
aŶd ‘uth Ellis͛ ghost-written life story appeared in four parts in the WoŵeŶ͛s “uŶday Mirror 
(Tweg, 2000). In 1966 Myra Hindley was convicted for her part in the infamous Moors murders. 
Eleven years afteƌ the eǆeĐutioŶ of ‘uth Ellis, she ǁas ĐhaƌaĐteƌised as ͚the ŵost eǀil ǁoŵaŶ 
iŶ BƌitaiŶ͛, the Sun faŵouslǇ saǇiŶg ͚ Let Heƌ HaŶg͛. To BiƌĐh, the Ŷoǁ iŶfaŵous poliĐe ͚ ŵugshot͛ 
of HiŶdleǇ has ĐoŶtiŶued to hold a ͚ďizaƌƌe gƌip͛ oǀeƌ puďliĐ iŵagiŶatioŶ ;ϭϵϵϯ: ϯ3), and has 
ďeĐoŵe a ͚sǇŵďoliĐ ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ͛ of the ͚hoƌƌoƌ of feŵiŶiŶitǇ peƌǀeƌted fƌoŵ its ͚Ŷatuƌal͛ 
Đouƌse͛ ;BiƌĐh, ϭϵϵϯ: ϯϰ-ϱͿ. Tǁo Ǉeaƌs afteƌ HiŶdleǇ͛s ĐoŶǀiĐtioŶ, teŶ Ǉeaƌ old MaƌǇ Bell ǁas 
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convicted of the manslaughter of two young boys. Bell was the focus of a great deal of media 
attention and became the subject of two books, one of which Prime Minister Tony Blair 
attempted to ban from publication. In 1993 nurse Beverley Allitt was characterised in the 
ŵedia as the ͚ AŶgel of Death͛, aŶd heƌ Đase dramatised by the BBC. One of the most high profile 
cases of the 20th century, that of Rose West, who along with her husband Fred was convicted 
of ten murders in 1995 (including one of her daughters), gained sustained media coverage. 
While clearly guilty of horrendous crimes, Berrington and Honkatukia have argued that the 
ŵedia ƌepoƌtiŶg of ‘ose West͛s tƌial iŶ ϭϵϵϱ pƌoǀided eǆaŵples of deeplǇ distuƌďiŶg 
sensationalised, sexualised and misogynist material (2002: 60). West was depicted as a bisexual 
prostitute ǁith aŶ appaƌeŶtlǇ iŶsatiaďle appetite foƌ ͚kiŶkǇ seǆ͛ ;BeƌƌiŶgtoŶ aŶd HoŶkatukia, 
ϮϬϬϮ: ϲϭ.Ϳ. “he ǁas told to ͚BuƌŶ iŶ Hell͛ ďǇ the Sun9 and parallels between her and Hindley 
ďeĐaŵe ĐoŵŵoŶplaĐe ;Ŷeǁspapeƌ ƌepoƌts eǀeŶ depiĐted theŵ as ͚fƌieŶds͛ aŶd ͚lesbian 
loǀeƌs͛Ϳ. PaƌtlǇ thƌough the legal pƌoĐess ďut pƌiŵaƌilǇ as a ƌesult of the toŶe, stǇle, aŶd ĐoŶteŶt 
of ŵedia ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ, West ďeĐaŵe aŶotheƌ iĐoŶ of ͚eǀil ǁoŵaŶhood͛, Ŷot just iŶ the UK 
but to a wider audience (Berrington and Honkatukia, 2002: 70). Maxine Carr, found guilty not 
of a violent offence, but for perverting the course of justice when she provided a false alibi for 
her boyfriend, the child murderer Ian Huntley, was subjected to such vitriolic coverage in some 
sections of the media and in public discourse that she was provided with a new identity (see 
Jones and Wardle, 2010). Karen Matthews, another non-violent offender, was convicted of 
Đhild ŶegleĐt aŶd peƌǀeƌtiŶg the Đouƌse of justiĐe foƌ heƌ iŶǀolǀeŵeŶt iŶ the ͚kidŶappiŶg͛ of heƌ 
own child for financial gain. Media coverage during the search for her daughter Shannon 
foĐused oŶ Mattheǁs͛ seǆual pƌoŵisĐuitǇ ;seǀeŶ ĐhildƌeŶ ďǇ fiǀe diffeƌeŶt fatheƌsͿ aŶd heƌ 
͚Đoŵpleǆ faŵilǇ tƌee͛10. AŶd AŵaŶda KŶoǆ, fƌaŵed as ͚FoǆǇ KŶoǆǇ͛ ǁas suďjeĐted to ͚tƌial ďǇ 
ŵedia͛ ;see Gƌeeƌ aŶd MĐLaughliŶ, ϮϬϭϮͿ iŶ many sections of the British press; her 
attractiveness and sexual promiscuity as interesting as the murder of British student Meredith 
Kercher for which she stood accused. The varying levels of guilt in such cases seemed of less 
importance to journalists than their newsworthy currency. Such portrayals have led Jewkes to 
suŵŵaƌise that ͚it is unlikely that there will ever be a climate of opinion which views female 
crime as mundane – even in these crime-satuƌated tiŵes͛ ;ϮϬϬϰ: ϭϯϲͿ.  
                                                          
9 23 November 1995 
10 ͚“haŶŶoŶ͛s Coŵpleǆ FaŵilǇ Tƌee͛ BBC Neǁs ϭϴ MaƌĐh ϮϬϬϴ  
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Although partly a consequence of news media pressures, the continued use of stereotypical 
representations can provide an obstacle to reform and is evidence of the news media not 
alǁaǇs aĐtiŶg as a ͚ĐoŵpliaŶt paƌtŶeƌ͛ ;HiltoŶ et al,. 2013: 161) to progressive policy actors in 
the penal sphere. Those concerned with achieving policy change for women routinely attempt 
to frame their messages in accordance with their own ideological strategy (often pursuing 
humanitarian or reformative rhetoric), but this can be at odds with the entrenched templates 
routinely utilised by some sections of the right-leaning, agenda-setting media (often relying on 
punitive rhetoric). It has been argued that both the news media and popular culture produce 
a diĐhotoŵous uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of feŵale ĐƌiŵiŶalitǇ: ǁoŵeŶ aƌe eitheƌ fƌaŵed as ͚aŶ eǀil 
ŵoŶsteƌ oƌ a pooƌ thiŶg͛ ;BeƌƌiŶgtoŶ aŶd Honkatukia: 2002), and penal reformers have 
traditionally relied on this latter depiction to receive public support for their policies. It is clear, 
however, that in the face of penal punitivism and the political nature of law and order, this 
poses a significant challenge.  
 
 
iv. WoŵeŶ͛s OffeŶdiŶg as a PolitiĐal PheŶoŵeŶoŶ 
 
In setting the policy scene for the remainder of the study, the substantive part of this chapter 
ǁill doĐuŵeŶt the eŵeƌgeŶĐe of the ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal ƌefoƌŵ ŵoǀeŵeŶt, ďefoƌe assessiŶg the 
number of framing strategies employed by reformers over the decades. Examining key political 
developments, it will highlight the emergeŶĐe of a ͚poliĐǇ ǁiŶdoǁ͛ ;KiŶgdoŶ, ϭϵϴϰͿ that led to 
goǀeƌŶŵeŶt poliĐǇ pƌogƌess iŶ the late ϮϬϬϬ͛s, concluding with an evaluation of the current 
status of ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ oŶ the politiĐal ageŶda.  
 
The EŵergeŶĐe of WoŵeŶ͛s PeŶal ‘eforŵ 
Women prisoners held in Newgate during the Victorian era were described by one 
ĐoŵŵeŶtatoƌ as ͚a deŶ of ǁild ďeasts͛: shƌiekiŶg Đuƌses, ďƌaǁliŶg, spittiŶg aŶd teaƌiŶg eaĐh 
otheƌ͛s haiƌ͛ ;‘ose, ϭϵϴϬ: ϳϵͿ. Elizaďeth FƌǇ, the fiƌst feŵale peŶal ƌefoƌŵeƌ, dediĐated ŵuĐh 
of her life to improving conditions in the London prison. Struck by the lack of provisions for 
ǁoŵeŶ, FƌǇ͛s pioŶeeƌiŶg stƌategies foƌ ƌefoƌŵ foĐused oŶ eduĐatioŶ, ƌeligious iŶstƌuĐtioŶ aŶd 
skills training, and the Association for the Improvement of the Female Prisoners in Newgate was 
dulǇ foƌŵed. FƌǇ͛s ŵodel of iŶstƌuĐtioŶ pƌoǀed eǆtƌeŵelǇ suĐĐessful aŶd iŶ ϭϴϮϭ, iŶ ǁhat Đould 
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be deemed the first organised attempt at penal reform for women, she formed the British 
Ladies͛ “oĐiety for ProŵotiŶg the Reformation of Female Prisoners, expanding her web of 
iŶflueŶĐe to ǁoŵeŶ͛s pƌisoŶs aĐƌoss the ĐouŶtƌǇ. FƌǇ͛s ǁoƌk ǁas ƌeĐogŶised iŶ PaƌliaŵeŶt, aŶd 
during a House of Commons debate in 1824, Member of Parliament John Smith declared that 
͚ďefoƌe Mƌs FƌǇ ĐoŵŵeŶĐed heƌ eǆeƌtions, women [in prison] resembled so many tigers 
confined in a cage. She, however, by kindness, by admonition, by persuasion, had soon effected 
a ƌefoƌŵ͛11. Hoŵe “eĐƌetaƌǇ ‘oďeƌt Peel͛s PƌisoŶ AĐt of the pƌeǀious Ǉeaƌ seeŵed to dƌaǁ oŶ 
FƌǇ͛s diƌeĐt eǆpeƌieŶĐe aŶd heƌ ͚Neǁgate ƌules͛, ǁhiĐh stated that ǁoŵeŶ ǁeƌe iŶ futuƌe to ďe 
confined to separate parts of the prison under the supervision of female officers (Rose, 1980: 
121). Despite this small-scale progress, the subject of women in prison received almost no 
political attention at all, and while sporadic issues focused on conditions such as use of 
͚hoďďles͛ ;iƌoŶ aŶkle stƌapsͿ aŶd the stƌaight jaĐket, ǀeƌǇ little ĐoŶĐeƌŶ foƌ aŶǇoŶe iŶ pƌisoŶ ǁas 
eǆpƌessed. FƌǇ eǆpƌessed fƌustƌatioŶ iŶ ϭϴϮϳ that ͚the ǁoƌk of ƌefoƌŵatioŶ is a sloǁ oŶe͛ 
(quoted in Halliday, 2009: 242), yet she could hardly have imagined the reality. 
The topiĐ of ǁoŵeŶ͛s iŶĐaƌĐeƌatioŶ ǁas ďƌought to ǁidespƌead puďliĐ atteŶtioŶ at the 
turn of the century during the fight for universal suffrage. In 1907 the Penal Reform League 
was established as a direct result of an account given by the suffragette Mrs Cobden Sanderson 
of her prison experiences (Logan, 2008: 13). It was to later merge in the 1920s with the older 
Howard Association to form The Howard League for Penal Reform, and its early years were 
steered by prominent female reformist Margery Fry. Notorious campaigner Emmeline 
Pankhurst famously spent time in Holloway prison for attempting to break into Parliament in 
1908. In a later speech, she recalled that while incarcerated she had heard a woman giving 
ďiƌth iŶ a ŶeaƌďǇ ďed. ͚If ǁe get the ǀote͛, she said, ͚ǁe ǁill fiŶd ŵoƌe huŵaŶe ǁaǇs of dealiŶg 
ǁith ǁoŵeŶ thaŶ that͛ ;MaƌĐus, ϭϵϴϳ iŶ “teƌŶ, ϮϬϬϵ: ϰϱϭͿ. AŶd ǁhile ǁoŵeŶ ǁould sooŶ get 
the vote, arguments about prison conditions persisted. Many of the close networks formed 
during the fight for universal suffrage did not dissipate, but instead provided the perfect 
foundation for those wanting to bring about more focused reform.  
Writing extensively in this area, Logan (2008) has identified the first ͚feŵiŶist-criminal-
justice-reform-Ŷetǁoƌk͛, estaďlished duƌiŶg the ϭϵϮϬs to oppose the speĐifiĐ disadǀaŶtages 
that applied to women in prison. Active campaigners alongside the early women magistrates 
                                                          
11 House of Commons Debate, 5 March 1824, Vol 10: c774 
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foƌŵed a dediĐated ǁoŵeŶ͛s ŵoǀeŵeŶt that aiŵed to eǆeƌt iŶflueŶĐe oŶ the ĐƌiŵiŶal justiĐe 
sǇsteŵ ;LogaŶ, ϮϬϬϴͿ. LogaŶ͛s ƌeseaƌĐh has uŶĐoǀeƌed that eǀeŶ ďefoƌe ǁoŵeŶ ǁoŶ the ǀote, 
and entered the magistracy and the legal profession, their various organisations had shown a 
profound interest in the criminal justice system and how it affected women (Logan, 2008: 15). 
The first and second women MPs to take their seats, Lady Astor and Mrs Wintringham, also 
played an important part in advancing the political agenda of ǁoŵeŶ͛s aŶd peŶal ƌefoƌŵ 
groups in the House of Commons (Logan, 2008: 41). It could therefore be argued that the early 
souƌĐe of kŶoǁledge aďout feŵale Đƌiŵe ǁas Ŷot to ďe fouŶd aŵoŶg the ͚platoŶiĐ guaƌdiaŶs͛ 
(Loader, 2006) in male-dominated academia, but among the female campaigners, politicians 
and magistrates who dedicated themselves to helping women in prison. These early penal 
reformers did not disappear during the inter-war years, but continued to push for progress 
with more low-key insider-style parliamentary lobbying (Logan, 2008: 41), and while continuing 
to query specific prison conditions, began to question the broader concept of imprisonment 
for women (Logan, 2008: 41).   
Like that of the ŵale ͚platoŶiĐ guaƌdiaŶs͛ ;Loadeƌ, ϮϬϬϲͿ, ƌefoƌŵ of the penal system, 
iŶĐludiŶg the aďolitioŶ of the death peŶaltǇ, ǁas a keǇ eaƌlǇ oďjeĐtiǀe of the ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal 
reform network. Following its re-categorisation to female-only in 1903, five women were 
hanged in the grounds of Holloway prison before the death penalty for murder was finally 
abolished in 1965. Yet it was the case of Ruth Ellis, the final woman to be hanged at the prison 
in 1955 that brought the issue to widespread public attention. Public attitudes towards capital 
punishment were changing, and Ellis͛s Đase, iŶǀolǀiŶg doŵestiĐ ǀioleŶĐe, ƌeĐeiǀed 
unprecedented media attention. A petition to the Home Office asking for her clemency was 
signed by 50,000 people, but it was rejected. Many argued that it was because Ellis was an 
attractive woman that she aƌoused suĐh leǀels of iŶteƌest ;‘ose, ϭϵϴϴ: ϱͿ; to ‘ose, she ͚ seeŵed 
to be demonstrating the power of spectacle, femininity, and violence, and their mutual 
assoĐiatioŶ, iŶ puďliĐ faŶtasǇ life͛ ;‘ose, ϭϵϴϴ: ϱͿ. Hugh Klaƌe, “eĐƌetaƌǇ of The Howard League 
for Penal Reform, was cynical of the public response, and stated in a letter to the Observer that 
͚todaǇ theƌe is aŶ eŵotioŶal outĐƌǇ, tƌiggeƌed off ďǇ the haŶgiŶg of a ǇouŶg aŶd pƌettǇ ǁoŵaŶ. 
Tomorrow, some less glamorous murderer will hit the front pages and public feeling will be 
ƌeǀeƌsed͛ ;Klaƌe, ϭϵϱϱ iŶ Seal, 2011: 500). That is because unlike Ellis, the vast majority of 
female prisoners remained invisible to the government, the prison authorities and the public 
alike.  
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Campaigners Pushing Policy 
Political concern for women in prison gained slightly more momentum from the 1960s 
onwards, due no doubt to the increasing, but still wholly insufficient, number of female MPs. 
Although far from the top of the politiĐal ageŶda, the legaĐǇ of ‘uth Ellis͛s death still struck a 
chord with those Parliamentarians with reformist sympathies. Labour MP Renee Short, a key 
ĐaŵpaigŶeƌ foƌ ƌefoƌŵ, ƌefeƌƌed iŶ the House to the ͚ judiĐial ŵuƌdeƌ͛ of Ellis as the event which 
had brought the enormity of capital punishment home to the country as a whole (Rose, 1988: 
5). In answering one of the many Parliamentary Questions tabled by Short, government 
Minister Shirley Williams MP confirmed that female campaigners working in this area had little 
or no impact on the policy process, and were certainly not considered part of the established 
network of advisors. “hoƌt ĐoŶĐluded that ǁhile ͚the AdǀisoƌǇ CouŶĐil oŶ the PeŶal “Ǉsteŵ is 
eǆploƌiŶg alteƌŶatiǀes to iŵpƌisoŶŵeŶt foƌ ďoth ŵeŶ aŶd ǁoŵeŶ offeŶdeƌs… [it]  has Ŷot had 
discussions ǁith ǁoŵeŶ͛s oƌgaŶisatioŶs͛12. Penal policy for women did however seem 
optimistic, with a 1970 Home Office publication stating that ͚as the eŶd of the ĐeŶtuƌǇ dƌaǁs 
Ŷeaƌeƌ, peŶologiĐal pƌogƌess ǁill ƌesult iŶ eǀeƌ feǁeƌ oƌ Ŷo ǁoŵeŶ at all goiŶg to pƌisoŶ͛ 
(quoted in Carlen, 1983: 23). This statement would come to haunt the establishment, with the 
female prison population set to quadruple over the following fifty years.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Female Prison Population 1970-201313  
                                                          
12 House of Commons Debate, 20 November 1969, vol 791: c333W 
13 House of Commons Library Prison Population Statistics, 2013 
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Highlighted by Seal and Phoenix, it is widely recognised that women offenders have 
traditionally been perceived as particularly suited for welfarist responses rather than solely 
puŶitiǀe saŶĐtioŶs ;ϮϬϭϯ: ϭϲϵͿ. With ͚ tƌeatŵeŶt͛ ƌeŵaiŶiŶg the ŵodel of aĐĐepted punishment, 
Holloway prison was re-categorised as a hospital during the 1970s. Many campaigners 
protested forcefully against this development, with Radical Alternatives to Prison (RAP) in 
particular arguing that the petty persistent offenders constituting the bulk of the female prison 
population did not need to be contained in a secure hospital (Carlen, 1998: 17). Submitting 
evidence to the House of Commons Expenditure Committee inquiry on ͚Women and the Penal 
“ysteŵ͛ in 1979, The Howard League for Penal Reform made a stand against what it labelled as 
͚the ŵisuse of pƌisoŶ͛ as the feŵale pƌisoŶ populatioŶ Đƌept up toǁaƌds ϭ,ϱϬϬ: ͚this ǁas a 
ƌeĐoƌd, aŶd oŶe of ǁhiĐh the ĐouŶtƌǇ should Ŷot ďe pƌoud͛ (1979: 1). Highlighting a Home 
Office statement that confiƌŵed that the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt ƌeĐogŶised that ͚ŵost of the ǁoŵeŶ iŶ 
pƌisoŶ ǁish to ĐoŶfoƌŵ ǁith soĐietǇ ďut foƌ ǀaƌious ƌeasoŶs aƌe uŶaďle to do so͛, The Howard 
League framed its campaigning in accordance with humanitarian discourse and argued that 
͚pƌisoŶ [foƌ ǁoŵeŶ] should Ŷot ďe used, saǀe iŶ the ŵost eǆĐeptioŶal ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes͛ ;ϭϵϳϵ: 
ϯͿ, aŶd that ͚ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶits should ďe sŵall aŶd… ǁithiŶ ƌeaĐh of theiƌ hoŵes͛ ;ϭϵϳϵ: ϭϱͿ.  
A number of criminal justice campaigning groups were formed in the early 1980s 
amidst developments in the public sphere and the changing (increasingly punitive) political 
climate. These included organisations such as the Prison Reform Trust and Inquest, which were 
both established in 1981. Although the Griffins Society had been established twenty years 
earlier to help certain women find accommodation on their release from prison, the first 
dedicated campaigning group Women in Prison was founded in 1983 by ex-prisoner Chris 
Tchaikovsky. Tchaikovsky had originally been asked to prepare a report on prisons for the 
WoŵeŶ͛s Coŵŵittee of the Gƌeateƌ LoŶdoŶ CouŶĐil ;Ŷoǁ Gƌeateƌ LoŶdoŶ AuthoƌitǇͿ, aŶd as 
a direct result of this work came the proposal for a support group for women prisoners (Ryan, 
2003). Women in Prison initially pursued its claims via a number of strategies including direct 
action (such as demonstrating outside Holloway prison), and more traditional forms of political 
campaigning (briefing journalists and MPs and giving media interviews, for example). The 
ŵajoƌitǇ of the gƌoup͛s ŵeŵďers were ex-pƌisoŶeƌs, ǁho ͚haǀiŶg ďeeŶ laƌgelǇ igŶoƌed ďǇ 
pƌisoŶ ĐaŵpaigŶeƌs, pƌisoŶ ǀisitoƌs aŶd ďǇ offiĐials iŶ the peŶal sǇsteŵ͛ Ŷoǁ had a ĐƌitiĐal, 
campaigning voice (Box-Grainger, 1983: 15). During the following decade the various 
campaigning organisations (also including Nacro, The Howard League, The WoŵeŶ͛s NatioŶal 
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Commission, and The Fawcett Society) operated as a network, continuing to conduct inquiries 
aŶd puďlish ƌepoƌts oŶ issues suƌƌouŶdiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s iŵpƌisoŶŵeŶt. IŶ additioŶ to suĐh 
publications, a growing body of academic literature provided an in-depth commentary on the 
way that the criminal justice system had thus far failed to properly address the problem of 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s offeŶdiŶg aŶd iŵpƌisoŶŵeŶt.  
 
Academic Attention 
The development of the feminist critique in criminology is well documented elsewhere (see for 
example Gelsthorpe, 1989, 2003, 2004; Gelsthorpe and Morris, 1988; Heidensohn, 1996; 
Heidensohn and Gelsthorpe, 2007) and will not be repeated in detail, suffice to say that early 
literature highlighted the ͚aŵŶesia͛ oƌ ŶegleĐt of ǁoŵeŶ iŶ the ĐƌiŵiŶal justiĐe sǇsteŵ aŶd the 
distortion of their criminal activities (Heidensohn and Gelsthorpe, 2007: 383). In one of the 
fiƌst keǇ feŵiŶist teǆts, Caƌol “ŵaƌt stƌessed that ͚ĐƌiŵiŶologǇ aŶd the sociology of deviance 
must become more than the study of men and crime if it is to play any significant part in the 
development of our understanding of crime, law and the criminal process and play any role in 
the tƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶ of eǆistiŶg soĐial pƌaĐtiĐes͛ (1976: 185). Her work was supplemented by 
research from other prominent academics such as Loraine Gelsthorpe, Pat Carlen (1983, 1990, 
1998, 2002), Frances Heidensohn (1985, 2000), Carol Hedderman (2004, 2012) and Anne 
Worrall (1981, 1990). While it is argued that there exists no single feminist criminology, it is 
possible to identify a body of feminist perspectives within the discipline of criminology (see 
Gelsthorpe and Morris, 1988; Burgess-Proctor, 2006). And while research focus and favoured 
methods may differ, feminist perspectives do share a common goal, which is the clear need to 
make visible those invisible women in the criminal justice system.  
Critical criminologist Pat Carlen provided the literature with an abolitionist vision for 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s pƌisoŶs, aƌguiŶg that ͚to ƌeduĐe the Ŷuŵďeƌ of pƌisoŶs ǁe ŵust fiƌst aďolish ĐeƌtaiŶ 
Đategoƌies of iŵpƌisoŶŵeŶt. WoŵeŶ͛s iŵpƌisoŶŵeŶt is, foƌ seǀeƌal ƌeasoŶs, a pƌiŵe ĐaŶdidate 
for aďolitioŶ͛ ;ϭϵϵϬ: ϭϮϭͿ. CaƌleŶ͛s ŵajoƌ aƌguŵeŶt foĐused oŶ ǁhat she desĐƌiďed as ͚ĐaƌĐeƌal 
ĐlaǁďaĐk͛, that pƌisoŶ ƌefoƌŵeƌs, iŶ hopiŶg to Đƌeate the optiŵuŵ ĐoŶditioŶs foƌ ǁoŵeŶ iŶ 
prison, simply re-legitiŵise pƌisoŶ as the ͚Ŷoƌŵal͛ iŶstitutioŶ foƌ puŶishment. Faith, in a similar 
toŶe, is also sĐeptiĐal of the stƌategies of peŶal ƌefoƌŵeƌs, ƋuestioŶiŶg the ďeŶefits of ͚ soothiŶg 
pastel͛ paiŶted ǁalls (2011:134). It is in this way that some academics and campaigners have 
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clashed, with the former believing that the latter have allowed themselves to become 
incorporated into the penal establishment.  
 
Gaining Momentum 
During the 1990s the female prison population was increasing much more rapidly than the 
numbers of male prisoners, and between 1993 and 2003 the female prison population trebled 
(Cavadino, Dignan and Mair, 2013: 304). While there are many different arguments as to why 
this occurred (see Gelsthorpe, Sharpe and Roberts, 2007), there is a general consensus that 
changes in legislation and the increase in sentence severity led to more petty offenders being 
incarcerated, and since most female crime is petty, this shift affected women 
disproportionately (Hedderman, 2004). Yet despite the increasingly outward punitive climate, 
the Home Office was already spoŶsoƌiŶg ƌeseaƌĐh pƌojeĐts oŶ the issue of ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
imprisonment. Academics such as Carol Hedderman and Loraine Gelsthorpe authored several 
government research papers on women in the criminal justice system, such as the 1994 paper 
͚Does the CriŵiŶal JustiĐe “ysteŵ Treat MeŶ aŶd WoŵeŶ DiffereŶtly?͛ (Hedderman and Hough) 
and the 1997 report ͚UŶderstaŶdiŶg the “eŶteŶĐiŶg of WoŵeŶ (Hedderman and Gelsthorpe)͛. 
It ǁasŶ͛t, hoǁeǀeƌ, uŶtil the PƌisoŶ IŶspeĐtoƌate͛s ͚TheŵatiĐ ‘eǀieǁ of WoŵeŶ͛s 
Imprisonment͛ of 1997 that serious political attention was commanded. Published following an 
unannounced visit to Holloway in 1995, Chief Inspector (now Lord) David Ramsbotham was so 
disgusted by conditions that he famously walked out. Prison conditions for women had 
received increasing media attention in the preceding years14, and the continued use of 
restraints had also garnered media attention; in 1996 Channel 4 News secretly filmed a female 
prisoner giving birth in hospital while shackled, for example. ‘aŵsďothaŵ͛s keǇ ĐƌitiƋue was 
that there existed no one individual to assume operational responsibility for women, and this 
led to a serious oversight of the needs of women prisoners. The female custodial estate was 
soon after brought under the operational control of an area manager with direct responsibility 
foƌ ǁoŵeŶ, aŶd The WoŵeŶ͛s Estate PoliĐǇ UŶit ǁas estaďlished ǁithiŶ the “eƌǀiĐe iŶ ϭϵϵϴ. 
Giving evidence to a House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee inquiry on Alternatives 
to Prison Sentences that year, Ramsbotham stated that ͚oŶlǇ ϯϬ peƌ ĐeŶt of the ǁoŵeŶ… iŶ 
                                                          
14 “ee foƌ eǆaŵple: ͚Crisis plan to put ǁoŵeŶ iŶ ŵeŶ͛s pƌisoŶs͛ Sunday Times 28 August 1994; ͚“elf-mutilation 
epideŵiĐ iŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s jails͛ Independent 7 March 1995; ͚Bƌitish ŵotheƌs iŶ shaĐkles͛ The Guardian 17 November 
1995 
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pƌisoŶ aĐtuallǇ Ŷeeded to ďe theƌe͛ ;1998: para. 220). Concluding that limited resources were 
to blame for the lack of appropriate non-custodial programmes for women, the Committee 
echoed the humanitarian and reformist calls from academics and campaigners alike for the 
deǀelopŵeŶt of a ͚Đƌediďle alteƌŶatiǀe͛ ;1998: para. 248).  
In 2000 the Prison Reform Trust published a report by its Committee on the 
Imprisonment of Women chaired by Professor Dorothy Wedderburn. Entitled ͚JustiĐe for 
WoŵeŶ: the Need for ‘eforŵ͛, the report was the first comprehensive document to argue for 
reform specifically for women, based on the shared experiences of many actors (policy 
professionals, practitioners, campaigners and academics) working in the area. Amalgamating 
the research of academics and the campaigning ǁoƌk of the ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal ƌefoƌŵ Ŷetǁoƌk 
over the previous twenty years, the report highlighted how changes in political ideology (from 
reformist to punitive) had adversely influenced the female prison population. Highlighting that 
the female custodial estate held under 1,000 women during the 1960s, it stressed that as faith 
in rehabilitation and penal welfare was replaced with a commitment to punishment and 
retributive justice, female incarceration more than doubled in just five years. In calling for a 
responsible public debate on the issue, the report made several recommendations including: 
a sepaƌate NatioŶal WoŵeŶ͛s JustiĐe Boaƌd, the estaďlishŵeŶt of a Ŷetǁoƌk of WoŵeŶ͛s 
Supervision, Rehabilitation and Support Centres and a national system of geographically 
dispersed custodial units so that women were within a closer proximity to their families. 
Despite its welcome reception, and the fact that many of its conclusions had been discussed 
over the previous decades under a variety of different names and formats, the government did 
Ŷot aĐt oŶ the ƌepoƌt͛s ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶs.  Theƌe ǁas, hoǁeǀeƌ, hope. IŶ ĐoŶtƌast ǁith the 
strong punitive trend that had resulted in the rocketing of the female prison population, there 
ǁas ƌeĐogŶitioŶ iŶ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt that ͚the paiŶs of iŵpƌisoŶŵeŶt͛ ǁeƌe eǆpeƌieŶĐed diffeƌeŶtlǇ 
by women. The Home Office published its own document entitled ͚The GoǀerŶŵeŶt͛s “trategy 
for Women Offenders: Consultation Report͛ (2000) the same year. For the very first time there 
ǁas a puďliĐ aĐkŶoǁledgŵeŶt that the faĐtoƌs leadiŶg to ǁoŵeŶ͛s offeŶdiŶg had ďeeŶ 
overlooked, along with a commitment to change (Lowthian, 2002: 157). Yet while describing 
some new initiatives across government, the report did not outline a specific action plan. 
Despite the overwhelming body of academic evidence available, the insider status of many 
penal reform campaigners and the fact that several Home Office officials were former 
practitioners themselǀes, theƌe eǆisted Ŷo ͚poliĐǇ ǁiŶdoǁ͛ ;KiŶgdoŶ, ϭϵϴϰͿ. While the 
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Holloway inspection report had generated a heightened level of media coverage on the 
experiences of imprisonment for women, this was not sufficient to warrant immediate action. 
Instead, the document stated the need for more research and announced a formal 
consultation process.  
Echoing the humanitarian claims made by Wedderburn, a report by NACRO in 2001 
entitled ͚WoŵeŶ BeyoŶd Bars: A Positiǀe AgeŶda for WoŵeŶ PrisoŶers͛ ‘esettleŵeŶt͛ further 
highlighted the laĐk of ĐoheƌeŶĐe iŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ. Although aĐkŶoǁledgiŶg the 
goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s positiǀe aŵďitioŶs, the report commented on its lack of imagination and 
ƌadiĐalisŵ. IŶ ĐƌitiĐisiŶg the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s failuƌe to ƌespoŶd to WeddeƌďuƌŶ͛s pƌoposals for a 
network of womeŶ͛s ƌehaďilitatioŶ ĐeŶtƌes, NAC‘O echoed the call for the establishment of 
͚ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ houses͛ ǁheƌe ǁoŵeŶ offeŶdeƌs Đould ďe held Đlose to theiƌ hoŵes to pƌepaƌe 
them for release. It also called for the extension of family visits, more flexible release 
arrangements and a more joined-up appƌoaĐh to the pƌoďleŵ of ǁoŵeŶ͛s iŵpƌisoŶŵeŶt. IŶ 
addition to the concerns stressed by such reports, other arguments made by campaigners and 
academics became far more critical at the turn of the century (see Gelsthorpe, 2006). 
ConsisteŶt ǁith KiŶgdoŶ͛s ;ϭϵϴϰͿ ŵodel of ͚poliĐǇ stƌeaŵs͛, ŵaŶǇ ďelieǀed that they had long 
provided the solutions to the pƌoďleŵ of ǁoŵeŶ͛s iŵpƌisoŶŵeŶt: 
 
͚VeƌǇ little has Đoŵe fƌoŵ the loŶg liŶe of iŶƋuiƌies ǁhiĐh, though they always imply 
that ͚soŵethiŶg ǁill ďe doŶe͛ aďout the state of ǁoŵeŶ͛s pƌisoŶs, peƌeŶŶiallǇ add ͚ďut 
Ŷot Ǉet͛. Not uŶtil ǁe haǀe had ͚ŵoƌe ƌeseaƌĐh͛ oƌ ͚a fuƌtheƌ iŶƋuiƌǇ͛͛. ;CaƌleŶ, ϭϵϵϴ: iǆͿ 
 
͚Afteƌ so ŵuĐh effoƌt aŶd so ŵaŶǇ pƌaĐtiĐal ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶs about what needs to be 
done, why are we publishing [aŶotheƌ ƌepoƌt] iŶ ϮϬϬϭ?͛ ;NAC‘O, 2001: 3) 
 
͚Oǀeƌ aŶd oǀeƌ agaiŶ, ƌeleŶtlesslǇ, the saŵe aŶalǇsis of issues leadiŶg to the saŵe Đƌies 
foƌ ƌefoƌŵ haǀe eĐhoed thƌough the deĐade͛. ;LoǁthiaŶ, ϮϬϬϮ: ϭϱϴͿ 
 
The GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s ͚“trategy for WoŵeŶ OffeŶders͛ was finally published in 2001. In its 
foƌeǁoƌd Hoŵe “eĐƌetaƌǇ Daǀid BluŶkett MP pƌoŵised ͚a Đƌoss-government, comprehensive, 
taƌgeted aŶd ŵeasuƌaďle WoŵeŶ͛s OffeŶdiŶg ‘eduĐtioŶ Pƌogƌaŵŵe͛ ;ϮϬϬϭ: ϭͿ. The keǇ 
findings of the consultation fed into the development of the first strategic government 
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programme specifically targeted at female offenders, the WoŵeŶ͛s OffeŶdiŶg ‘eduĐtioŶ PlaŶ 
(WORP), although this would not be implemented until 2004. Despite the overarching punitive 
climate, WORP had explicit humanitarian aims: to support projects aimed at diverting women 
from custody, aiding resettlement after release from prison and providing community-based 
non-custodial supervision (Corcoran, 2011).  
Although by no means a new phenomenon given the prevalence of self-harm on the 
female estate, the period 2002-03 saw a series of suicides at HMP Styal, with six women taking 
their lives in little over a year.  The suicides were to provide those advocating reform their big 
͚ǁaǀe͛ iŶ the foƌŵ of a ͚ poliĐǇ ǁiŶdoǁ͛; fƌesh iŵpetus for penal reform campaigners and action 
within the Home Office. In 2003 The Fawcett Society (with financial support and endorsement 
from the Home Office) established a Commission on Women and the Criminal Justice System, 
highlighting once again the status of women offenders as an over-looked group. Publishing 
several mid-term updates, the Commission repeatedly reiterated the need for gender to be 
integrated into policy and practice throughout the criminal justice system. In line with the 
humanitarian discourse adopted by the Wedderburn Report, the NACRO report and many 
other reports and articles by academics and campaigners, the Commission called for the 
establishment of local support and rehabilitation centres and an assessment of the viability of 
local custodial units.  
The year ϮϬϬϰ saǁ a juǆtapositioŶ iŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ. While the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt gaǀe 
a commitment in the Spending Review to pilot new initiatives addressed to meet the specific 
needs of feŵale offeŶdeƌs, the ǁoŵeŶ͛s estate ĐoŶtiŶued to gƌoǁ, ǁith the iŶtƌoduĐtioŶ of 
the fiƌst pƌiǀatelǇ ƌuŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s pƌisoŶ, HMP BƌoŶzefield. AŶd ǁhile the WO‘P pƌioƌitised aƌeas 
for action, this remained in the face of a political momentum which talked increasingly tough 
on crime. As argued by Corcoran, the creation of the WORP was a milestone in mainstreaming 
gender in criminal justice policy within Whitehall (2011: 26), yet this had little discernible effect 
on conditions. The 2004 Prison Inspectorate report of Holloway echoed many of the issues 
from the 1997 review, highlighting the absence of procedures needed to care for vulnerable 
women, the on-going risk of suicide and prevalence of self-harm (2004). Despite the stated 
ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt to ͚geŶdeƌ ŵaiŶstƌeaŵiŶg͛ in the criminal justice system, it was clear that many 
women in prison were still being failed. In 2006-2007, the government launched Together 
Women, a programme of holistic provision for women who had offended (or were at risk of 
offending) across five demonstrator sites in northern England (Seal and Phoenix, 2013: 170; 
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see Gelsthorpe, Sharpe and Roberts, 2007; Hedderman, Palmer and Hollin, 2008). Together 
Women had a ƌehaďilitatiǀe aŶd ƌefoƌŵist theŵe aŶd iŶĐoƌpoƌated a ǀaƌietǇ of ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
ĐeŶtƌes that pƌoǀided ͚ oŶe-stop-shop͛ seƌǀiĐes, desigŶed to help pƌeǀeŶt ǁoŵeŶ fƌoŵ eŶteƌiŶg 
the criminal justice system or to help with their post-custodial resettlement (Seal and Phoenix, 
2013: 170). The need for criminal justice policy to respond to gender differences and 
inequalities was finally enshrined in section 84 of the Equality Act, which in 2006 established a 
gender duty in equality legislation (Jones, 2011). In this legislation, the government had 
publicly acknowledged that the principle of equal treatment should not necessarily lead to 
identical treatment (Cavadino, Dignan and Mair, 2013: 302). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Female Imprisonment Statistics 
 
 
 
Most women serve very short sentences. In the year ending March 2014, 60 per 
cent of women entering prison under sentence were to serve six months or less 
(Ministry of Justice 2014a) 
 
In the 12 months ending March 2013, 81 per cent of women entering prison under 
sentence had committed a non-violent offence, compared with 71 per cent of 
men (Ministry of Justice 2013a) 
 
Women are less likely to receive a custodial sentence than men (14 per cent, 
compared with 26.5 per cent in 2009), however they are more likely to be 
imprisoned for their first offence (Cavadino, Dignan and Mair, 2012: 299) 
 
The most common offence for imprisoning women is theft and handling (35%)  
(Ministry of Justice 2014b) 
 
It is estimated that more than 17,000 children were separated from their mother 
by imprisonment in 2010 (Wilks-Wiffen, 2011) 
 
There were 94 self-inflicted deaths of women prisoners between 1990 and 2012 
(Ministry of Justice 2013b) 
 
Over half the women in prison say they have suffered domestic violence and one 
in three has experienced sexual abuse (Social Exclusion Unit, 2002) 
 
Women offenders have a broad range of needs including problems with education 
and employment, drug and alcohol addictions, together with financial and 
accommodation problems 
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The Corston Agenda  
It ǁasŶ͛t uŶtil BaƌoŶess JeaŶ CoƌstoŶ͛s goǀeƌŶŵeŶt-commissioned 2007 ͚‘eǀieǁ of WoŵeŶ 
ǁith PartiĐular VulŶeraďilities iŶ the CriŵiŶal JustiĐe “ysteŵ͛ that the government publicly 
stated its commitment to reducing the female prison population and a substantive plan for 
aĐtioŶ ǁas pƌoǀided. The ƌesult of aĐtioŶ takeŶ duƌiŶg the ͚poliĐǇ ǁiŶdoǁ͛ (Kingdon, 1984), the 
Corston Review echoed many of the recommendations of the PrisoŶ ‘eforŵ Trust͛s 
Wedderburn Report (and indeed the plethora of other reports) published a full seven years 
earlier. Referencing the work of penal reform campaigners and academics alike, and providing 
the high poiŶt to the ͚loŶg͛ ĐaŵpaigŶ, it aĐkŶoǁledged that the suďjeĐt had ďeeŶ ͚exhaustively 
ƌeseaƌĐhed͛ ;Hoŵe OffiĐe, 2007:16). Corston called for a fundamental re-think about the way 
in which services for female offenders were provided and assessed. The long list of 
recommendations called on the government to announce within six months: a clear strategy 
to ƌeplaĐe eǆistiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s pƌisoŶs ǁith suitable, small, multi-functional custodial centres 
within 10 years; the immediate establishment of an Inter-Departmental Ministerial Group to 
drive forward the agenda; greater visible direction in respect of women in custody and a much 
higher profile; and that there should be strong consistent message right from the top of 
government, with full reasons given, in support of its stated policy that prison is not the right 
place for women offenders who pose no risk to the public (2007: 5-16). 
Although not a policy agenda pursued in response to public outcry, Corston admitted 
that its futuƌe suĐĐess ǁas iŶ soŵe paƌt depeŶdeŶt oŶ ͚eduĐatiŶg the puďliĐ [aŶd that this] 
ŵust ďe aŶ iŶtegƌal paƌt of the stƌategǇ ƌelatiŶg to ǁoŵeŶ͛ ;ϮϬϬϳ: ϭϭͿ. CalliŶg oŶ the 
governŵeŶt to assuŵe this ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ, CoƌstoŶ hoped that ͚this ŵaǇ go soŵe ǁaǇ to 
heighten the awareness of the general public and encourage a reasoned and enlightened 
deďate͛ ;ϮϬϬϳ: 11). Unsurprisingly, the Labour government reacted swiftly, and published its 
response to the Corston Report in 2008. In outlining the areas that it had already improved 
(such as publishing a National Service Framework for Women Offenders, implementing the 
Ministry of Justice Gender Equality Scheme, stopping routine strip-searching for women 
deeŵed Ŷot to ďe ͚ƌiskǇ͛, aŶd estaďlishiŶg a Đƌoss-depaƌtŵeŶtal CƌiŵiŶal JustiĐe WoŵeŶ͛s 
UŶitͿ, JustiĐe MiŶisteƌ Maƌia Eagle MP stated ͚this is just the staƌt of a loŶg-term and 
sustainable strategy to deliver a more sophisticated and better co-ordinated approach to 
addƌess ǁoŵeŶ͛s Ŷeeds͛ ;ϮϬϬϴ: ϯͿ. The WoŵeŶ͛s DiǀersioŶary FuŶd of £15 million, 
implemented in 2009, provided start-up Đosts foƌ the Ŷetǁoƌk of ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐeŶtƌes outliŶed iŶ 
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the Corston Report (as well as previous publications). Supplemented by a grant from the 
CorstoŶ IŶdepeŶdeŶt FuŶders͛ CoalitioŶ, a ĐoŶsoƌtiuŵ of Đhaƌities set up to ͚ sustaiŶ a shift fƌoŵ 
iŵpƌisoŶŵeŶt to ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ seŶteŶĐiŶg foƌ ǀulŶeƌaďle ǁoŵeŶ offeŶdeƌs͛ ;iŶ CoƌĐoƌaŶ, ϮϬϭϭ: 
ϮϳͿ, the ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐeŶtƌes ǁeƌe estaďlished as ͚oŶe-stop-shops͛ ǁheƌe ǁoŵeŶ at ƌisk of 
offending could access a wide range of services. While the initial cash injection provided the 
much-needed resources to kick-start the Corston agenda, the WoŵeŶ͛s DiǀersioŶary FuŶd was 
time-specific and the future of the centres (some operated in partnership with the third sector 
and some now under the control of the private sector under the new Transforming 
Rehabilitation arrangements) remains of on-going concern.  
Acceptance (in most part) of the Corston agenda alongside changes in legislation led 
Corcoran to conclude that ͚iŶ the ĐlosiŶg ŵoŶths of its thiƌd teƌŵ, the Laďouƌ paƌtǇ͛s peŶal 
record seemed to be advancing towards a feminist-iŶspiƌed, peŶal ƌeduĐtioŶist ageŶda͛ ;ϮϬϭϬ: 
234). The reality, however, was that the female prison population did not substantially reduce 
as Corston advocated, and there have been a number of suicides or unclassified deaths on the 
female estate since 2007. While it is clear that progress under New Labour was not without 
critique, campaigners feared that following the election of the Conservative-led Coalition in 
2010 any policy gains for women would be lost. 
 
Coalition Policy 
IŶ the CoalitioŶ͛s fiƌst foƌaǇ iŶto peŶal poliĐǇŵakiŶg, the ϮϬϭϬ ͚BreakiŶg the CyĐle: EffeĐtiǀe 
PuŶishŵeŶt, ‘ehaďilitatioŶ aŶd “eŶteŶĐiŶg of OffeŶders͛ Green Paper, Justice Secretary Rt. Hon 
KeŶ Claƌke MP pƌoŵised a ͚ƌehaďilitatioŶ ƌeǀolutioŶ͛, aŶd highlighted the ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐeŶtƌes as 
aƌeas of ͚good pƌaĐtiĐe͛. Reformist Clarke, however, was not permitted to oversee his vision, 
and was soon replaced by the more right-leaning Chris Grayling MP at the first Cabinet 
reshuffle. In spite of its supposed commitment to the Corston agenda, official documentation 
relating specifically to women offenders was a long time coming. Although there was no 
dediĐated MiŶisteƌial ͚ĐhaŵpioŶ͛ foƌ ǁoŵeŶ offeŶdeƌs duƌiŶg the fiƌst half of the CoalitioŶ͛s 
term (2010-2012), Conservative MP Helen Grant was awarded the role in September 2012. 
Such a move did little to allay the concerns of the House of Commons Justice Select Committee 
which, recognising the growing anxiety among many in the sector, announced that autumn 
that it was to hold an inquiry into Women Offenders. The iŶƋuiƌǇ͛s oǀeƌaƌĐhiŶg ƌeŵit was to 
assess penal progress for women five years after the publication of the Corston Report and 
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explore the nature and effectiveness of government strategy. Despite over two years of 
reticence, the government was quick to publish its much-aǁaited ͚Strategic Objectives for 
Feŵale OffeŶders͛ ;ƌeseŵďliŶg ŵoƌe of a siǆ page ͚holdiŶg͛ stƌategǇͿ, aloŶgside the 
establishment of another independent Female Offenders Advisory Board. The government 
stated in the Strategy that it ǁould take a ͚ǁhole sǇsteŵ appƌoaĐh͛ iŶ ƌeduĐiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
offending and imprisonment, working with partners within and outside the criminal justice 
system (2013c: 5-6). Acknowledging the Ministerial silence on this matter, the document 
adŵitted that the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt ͚ ƌeĐogŶise[d] the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of keeping people informed about 
ǁhat ǁe aƌe doiŶg foƌ feŵale offeŶdeƌs͛ ;ϮϬϭϯc: 6). Yet this was too little, too late for the Select 
Coŵŵittee, aŶd it͛s ChaiƌŵaŶ “iƌ AlaŶ Beith MP ǁho ǁas paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ sĐathiŶg of GƌaŶt. The 
ensuing report did not hold back in its criticism of the government and outlined many areas of 
disappoiŶtŵeŶt. IŶ highlightiŶg the ͚ƌegƌettaďle…liŵited external iŶput iŶto the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s 
deǀelopŵeŶt of its stƌategiĐ pƌioƌities͛, the Coŵŵittee ĐoŶĐluded that this ͚adds to the 
appearaŶĐe that the pƌioƌities ǁeƌe pƌoduĐed iŶ haste aŶd ǁith iŶsuffiĐieŶt thought͛ ;ϮϬϭϯ: Ϯϯ, 
emphasis added). In one particularly striking paragraph, the Committee stated; 
 
͚It is Đleaƌ that the ŵatteƌ of feŵale offeŶdiŶg too easilǇ fails to get pƌioƌitǇ iŶ the face 
of other competing issues. The lack of central drive has resulted in outsiders having 
difficulty determining Ministry of Justice policy and direction, and insiders detecting a 
dampening in mood and enthusiasm, leaving an impression that for this Government it 
ǁas Ŷot a suffiĐieŶtlǇ high pƌioƌitǇ… Cleaƌ leadeƌship aŶd a high leǀel of suppoƌt fƌoŵ 
otheƌ MiŶisteƌs ǁill ďe esseŶtial iŶ ƌestoƌiŶg lost ŵoŵeŶtuŵ͛ ;ϮϬϭϯ: ϭϵͿ. 
 
Confirming that its work would, in part, be informed by the recommendations of the 
Coŵŵittee, the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s ƌespoŶse to ͚WoŵeŶ OffeŶders͛ re-stated its commitment to 
women and clarified several of the areas of the Strategy. Grant was, however, not given the 
luxury of time to implement this work. Following her shuffle from office, Lord Tom McNally 
assumed responsibility for women in autumn 2013. His move to the Youth Justice Board in 
January 2014 paved the way for fellow Liberal Democrat Simon Hughes MP to assume this 
responsibility. IŶ MaƌĐh ϮϬϭϰ the DepaƌtŵeŶt puďlished its ͚Update on Delivery of the 
GoǀerŶŵeŶt͛s “trategiĐ OďjeĐtiǀes for Feŵale OffeŶders͛. OutliŶiŶg keǇ ͚aĐhieǀeŵeŶts͛ of the 
pƌeǀious tǁelǀe ŵoŶths, iŶĐludiŶg ǁoƌk to ďetteƌ tailoƌ the ǁoŵeŶ͛s Đustodial estate to 
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ǁoŵeŶ͛s Ŷeeds, aŶd highlightiŶg deǀelopŵeŶts iŶ Đƌoss-government collaboration, it 
ƌeiteƌated the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt to iŵpƌoǀiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ ;ϮϬϭϰĐͿ. 
 
Post-Corston Campaigning 
Despite its fluctuating status on the policy agenda, it is possible to say that there exists a broad 
political commitment to reducing the number of women in prison. Yet one persistent issue, 
highlighted by Seal and Phoenix, is that the dominant punitive rhetoric works directly against 
the gender-responsive, humanitarian trend which acknowledges the particularly harmful 
effects of imprisonment for women (2013: 176). While penal reform campaigners are able to 
pursue a rhetoric of vulnerability in relation to women (one that is often unavailable for men), 
this ƌeŵaiŶs iŶ the faĐe of a ͚tough oŶ Đƌiŵe͛ ageŶda.  
Following the election of the Coalition government and the subsequent Ministerial silence, 
many campaigners puďliĐlǇ ͚ƌeŶeǁed͛ theiƌ ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt to ƌeduĐing the number of women in 
custody. The Prison Reform Trust established the WoŵeŶ͛s JustiĐe Taskforce to push forward 
an agenda that it believed was receiving little or no attention from government. The Taskforce 
included members from civil society, politics and the media, and building on this work, the 
Prison Reform Trust launched its ͚Three Year “trategy to ‘eduĐe WoŵeŶ͛s IŵprisoŶŵeŶt͛ 
(2012). Funded by the Pilgrim Trust, the Strategy adopts a humanitarian discourse and sets out 
clear steps to achieve a comprehensive reduction in the female prison population. Its latest 
report, ͚Brighter Futures͛ (2014), the Prison Reform Trust calls for the development of more 
coordinated services in the community to help women offenders (or those at risk of offending) 
to turn their lives around. As well as producing research publications, the Prison Reform Trust 
also coordinates a variety of other women-focused strategies, including the Mail oŶ “uŶday͛s 
Financial Freedom supplement and an awareness campaign for female foreign national 
prisoners. Its SmartJustice campaign has also been re-launched, seeking to re-publicise the 
opinion poll from 2007 that indicated public support for the increased use of alternatives to 
prison for certain female offenders. 
The Howard League has also continued to coordinate regular meetings of the All-Party 
Parliamentary Group (APPG) for Women in the Penal System, formed in 2009 and chaired by 
Baroness Corston as an avenue for raising awareness among politicians. On the fifth 
anniversary of the Corston Report, Women in Prison puďlished a ͚tƌaffiĐ light͛ pƌogƌess 
pamphlet, highlighting areas where the government had failed to implement its commitments 
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to women in the criminal justice system. Like other organisations (including WoŵeŶ͛s 
Breakout, Hibiscus and NACRO) it has continued to publish briefings and documents on 
government consultations, legislation and policy. While campaigners tentatively welcomed the 
Coalition goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s Transforming Rehabilitation agenda and its promise that the newly-
formed Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) would be legally required to provide 
gender-specific provision for women offenders in the community, they like many others 
operating in this policy domain, are still ǁaitiŶg iŶ aŶtiĐipatioŶ to see hoǁ ͚geŶdeƌ speĐifiĐ 
pƌoǀisioŶ͛ deliǀeƌed ďǇ pƌofit-making companies will manifest itself in practice.  
 
 
v. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has highlighted the array of social, media and politiĐal ďaƌƌieƌs to ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal 
reform. In documenting historical attitudes towards female deviance and tracing the origins of 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal ƌefoƌŵ ĐaŵpaigŶeƌs (in academia, politics and practice), it has also chronicled 
contemporary deǀelopŵeŶts iŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ. While debate continues about the 
causes of current prison numbers, there is no doubt that women offenders have been caught 
up in the punitive trend. What has made campaigning efforts all the more frustrating is that 
the reasons behind female offending have remained more or less the same throughout history: 
women are predominantly petty, non-violent offenders and a large proportion could be 
diverted from custody if there were the political will to do so. Strategies for reform have not 
been helped, and are even inhibited, by sensational media accounts of women offenders and 
jouƌŶalists͛ ĐoŶtinued use of stereotypical templates (certainly in the case of the tabloid press).  
In highlighting the various efforts of campaigners to force the pƌoďleŵ of ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
imprisonment onto the political agenda, this chapter has reiterated that in continuing to rely, 
for the most part, on humanitarian or reformative rhetoric (see Rutherford (1993); Mills and 
Roberts (2011, 2012)), their efforts have, along with other policy problems, been affected by 
changing political ideologies. While theƌe is Ŷoǁ a ƌeĐogŶitioŶ iŶ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt that ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
offending is somewhat different from that committed by men, the dominant punitive trend 
shows no signs of abating. Penal reform campaigners, as a consequence, find themselves on 
the fringes of the policy agenda. In examining the complex interrelationship between 
campaigners, journalists and policymakers, the remainder of this study will seek to explain 
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exactly how they seek to influence penal policy for women in the face of penal punitivism, 
media proliferation and the politicisation of law and order. 
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4. Methodology 
  
i. Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a methodological and reflexive account of the key processes and 
concerns involved in the study. The fieldwork process combined both elite and gender studies 
iŶ aŶ atteŵpt to eǆploƌe poliĐǇ deǀelopŵeŶt thƌough the ͚pƌisŵ of the poliĐǇ Ŷetǁoƌk͛ ;Duke, 
ϮϬϬϮ: ϰϭͿ. The pauĐitǇ of liteƌatuƌe desigŶed to help those ƌeseaƌĐhiŶg ͚up͛ iŶ the ĐƌiŵiŶal 
justice arena means there is less guidance than for those working with the vulnerable or 
͚deǀiaŶt͛ iŶ this field ;Duke, ϮϬϬϮ; PuŶĐh, ϭϵϴϲ; Yeageƌ and Kram, 1995). Elite research raises 
͚a paƌtiĐulaƌ set of issues aŶd dileŵŵas ǁhiĐh haǀe iŵpoƌtaŶt iŵpliĐatioŶs foƌ the 
ŵethodologǇ, ŵode of iŶteƌǀieǁiŶg aŶd the pƌoĐess of aŶalǇsis aŶd iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ͛ ;Ball, ϭϵϵϰ: 
97). Researching political actors, those criminal justice professionals in the United Kingdom 
government, Whitehall and beyond, introduces specific power dynamics between the 
researcher and the researched, particularly if political partisanship or personal agendas are at 
play. Providing a reflexive account of the research process this chapter will critically reflect on 
matters of gendered power15 and partisanship. In addressing such issues, it will also consider 
some of the ethical difficulties encountered when disseminating political research findings of 
this kind. It is clear that cautious balance needs to be afforded to the interests of competing 
political groups and individuals; an issue better addressed by other disciplines and one which 
criminology has remained largely silent on.  
Part two will provide a brief critique of the literature on studying policy elites and the 
concept of power in the interview setting. Part three will outline and justify the chosen 
methodological approach, briefly outlining the constituent elements of feminist research 
practice. Part four will discuss issues related to sampling and access. Part five will provide some 
ƌefleĐtioŶs oŶ the iŶteƌǀieǁ pƌoĐess, ƋuestioŶiŶg the eǆisteŶĐe of ͚a sisteƌlǇ eǆĐhaŶge of 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ͛ ǁheŶ iŶteƌǀieǁiŶg feŵale poliĐǇ elites. Part six will focus on data analysis and 
interpretation, and in particular the issue of self-censorship. Part seven will argue that only by 
eŶgagiŶg iŶ a pƌoĐess of ƌefleǆiǀitǇ oƌ ͚ŵethodologiĐal self-ĐoŶsĐiousŶess͛ ;FiŶlaǇ, ϮϬϬϮaͿ, aƌe 
                                                          
15 While not all participants were female, the majority were, and such encounters provide the main focus of this 
chapter.  
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criminologists well positioned to uncover and report on the nature of power dynamics in 
research encounters involving elites. 
 
 
ii. Studying Policy Elites, Power and Networks 
 
Researching Elites 
PuŶĐh stated iŶ ϭϵϴϲ that soĐial ƌeseaƌĐheƌs haǀe ͚ƌaƌelǇ peŶetƌated the teƌƌitoƌǇ of the 
poǁeƌful͛ (1986: 25), with field studies traditionally focused on the deviant or marginalised. 
This is certainly true in the field of criminology, yet in the last few decades social scientists have 
increasingly turned their research endeavours to the actions of the elite members of society 
and the power that they yield. Such developments have led to a small but growing body of 
literature that exposes the specific challenges of investigating this group. While expanding 
scholarship has led to a wide recognitioŶ that theƌe is Ŷo uŶiǀeƌsal defiŶitioŶ of the teƌŵ ͚elite͛, 
suĐh aĐtoƌs haǀe ǀaƌiouslǇ ďeeŶ desĐƌiďed as ͚those ǁith Đlose pƌoǆiŵitǇ to poǁeƌ͛ ;“lote 
Morris, 2009: 209), or with particular expertise (Burnham et al., 2004). Some have expressed 
unease with the teƌŵ aŶd its ͚ĐoŶŶotatioŶs of supeƌioƌitǇ͛; ‘eisŵaŶ ;ϭϵϲϰ: ϱϮϴ, Đited iŶ “ŵith, 
ϮϬϬϲ: ϲϰϱͿ iŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ dissatisfied that he had fouŶd ͚Ŷo otheƌ teƌŵ that is shoƌthaŶd foƌ the 
point I want to make, namely that people in important or exposed positions may require VIP 
iŶteƌǀieǁiŶg tƌeatŵeŶt oŶ the topiĐs ǁhiĐh ƌelate to theiƌ iŵpoƌtaŶĐe oƌ eǆposuƌe͛. 
‘eĐogŶisiŶg atteŵpts to pƌoďleŵatize the ĐlassifiĐatioŶ, the ƌeseaƌĐh adopted “lote Moƌƌis͛ 
(2009) distinction to include those in positions of [or close proximity to] power; including Lords, 
former Ministers, MPs, former civil servants, chief executives, high profile academics and 
journalists. Burnham et al. ;ϮϬϬϰ: ϮϬϱͿ ĐhaƌaĐteƌised elite iŶteƌǀieǁiŶg as ͚a situatioŶ iŶ ǁhiĐh 
the balance is in favour of the ƌespoŶdeŶt͛ aŶd this ĐaŶ lead to additioŶal ĐhalleŶges iŶ the 
paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ Ŷatuƌal teŶdeŶĐǇ to take ĐoŶtƌol of the ageŶda ;BuƌŶhaŵ et al., 2004: 205).  
It is of Ŷo suƌpƌise that those ƌeseaƌĐhiŶg this field haǀe deteƌŵiŶed that ͚politiĐal 
interviews are theŵselǀes highlǇ politiĐal͛ ;Ball, ϭϵϵϰ: ϵϳͿ aŶd that suĐh ƌeseaƌĐh ƌaises ͚a 
particular set of issues and dilemmas which have important implications for the methodology, 
ŵode of iŶteƌǀieǁiŶg aŶd the pƌoĐess of aŶalǇsis aŶd iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ͛ ;Ball, ϭϵϵϰ: ϵ7). As will be 
deliďeƌated thƌoughout this Đhapteƌ, ͚elite iŶteƌǀieǁiŶg is ĐhaƌaĐteƌised ďǇ a situatioŶ iŶ ǁhiĐh 
the ďalaŶĐe is iŶ faǀouƌ of the ƌespoŶdeŶt͛ ;BuƌŶhaŵ et al., 2004: 205) and this can lead to 
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additional challenges in gaining access and the respoŶdeŶts͛ teŶdeŶĐǇ to seek to control the 
agenda (Burnham et al., 2004; Bygnes, 2008 in Slote Morris, 2009, emphasis added). 
Researchers working in this field must also appreciate that they may never get to the bottom 
line, because some lines of enquiry with elites are simply off limits. Instead of the bottom line, 
researchers may have to tolerate the official or party line, and must also prepare themselves 
to ďe lied to ;of siŵilaƌ issue ǁheŶ iŶteƌǀieǁiŶg those deeŵed as ͚ŶoŶ elites͛Ϳ. ‘eĐalliŶg theiƌ 
investigatioŶ of elites iŶ the DepaƌtŵeŶt of EduĐatioŶ, Fitz aŶd HalpiŶ ǀieǁed the ͚iŵposed 
ƌealitǇ͛ as ͚iŶeǀitaďlǇ highlǇ ĐoŶstƌaiŶed͛, aŶd theǇ ͚gliŵpsed aŶ uŶfaŵiliaƌ ǁoƌld that ǁas oŶlǇ 
eǀeƌ paƌtiallǇ ƌeǀealed͛ ;ϭϵϵϰ: ϰϬͿ. “uĐh issues haǀe Đleaƌ iŵpliĐations for the validity and 
integrity of qualitative research findings. 
It is clear, therefore, that handling an elite interview can be a very complex business 
(Lilleker, 2003: 210), and it is easy to see why there is a defeatism among social scientists in 
their dealings with the powerful (Mungham and Thomas, 1981 in Williams, 1989: 254). Those 
engaged in research of this kind may fear that elites will not want to cooperate, and will wish 
to protect their privileged position. One key issue is the fact that few researchers have been 
pƌepaƌed to disĐuss the issues aŶd dileŵŵas that aƌe faĐed ǁheŶ ƌeseaƌĐhiŶg elites, ͚ǁheŶ 
locating individuals one feels are imperative for a project, when attempting to obtain answers 
to the questions one has set, and when dealing with the data gatheƌed fƌoŵ iŶteƌǀieǁs͛ 
(Lilleker, 2003: 207), and there is a growing need for more accounts of such studies. Despite 
ample commentary on the constraints of elite studies, it is clear that such research is able to 
provide insights or glimpses iŶto ǁoƌlds of ǁhiĐh ǁe kŶoǁ ĐoŵpaƌatiǀelǇ little: ͚the aĐtiǀities 
that take plaĐe out of the puďliĐ oƌ ŵedia gaze, ďehiŶd Đlosed dooƌs… iŶfoƌŵatioŶ that Đould 
Ŷot ďe gleaŶed fƌoŵ offiĐial puďliĐ doĐuŵeŶts oƌ ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ ŵedia aĐĐouŶts͛ ;Lillekeƌ, 
2003: 208). 
 
Power in the Research Setting 
TƌaditioŶal elite ƌeseaƌĐh has teŶded to ĐoŶĐeŶtƌate oŶ a ͚liŶeaƌ oƌieŶtated ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of 
poǁeƌ͛ ;Neal aŶd MĐLaughliŶ, ϮϬϬϵ: ϲϵϱͿ, ǁheƌe authoƌitǇ is statiĐallǇ defiŶed as ͚ƌesidiŶg iŶ 
the explicit structural positions of eitheƌ the ƌeseaƌĐheƌ oƌ the ƌeseaƌĐh paƌtiĐipaŶt͛. “uĐh 
structural accounts often assume that the power associated with people through their 
professional positions will transfer directly onto the interview space (Smith, 2006: 645). 
Despite the undoubted frequency of such accounts, some have critiqued traditional 
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interpretations of power as inflexible to the reality of social inquiry, and have instead 
adǀoĐated the appliĐatioŶ of a ͚poststƌuĐtuƌalist filteƌ͛ to the aŶalǇsis of elite power. Smith in 
particular stressed: 
 
͚The idea that elites ĐaŶ ďe ŶeatlǇ defiŶed aŶd tƌeated as ĐoŶsisteŶtlǇ poǁeƌful is a ǀieǁ 
which relies on a rather simplistic idea that there is a dichotomy between powerful 
elites aŶd poǁeƌless otheƌs͛, aƌguiŶg that ͚suĐh aŶ outlook ignores the preposition that 
power exists in a variety of modalities... that these modalities of power can be 
negotiated and... that elites may change oǀeƌ tiŵe͛ ;ϮϬϬϲ: ϲϰϱͿ. 
 
While feminist versions of reflexivity (see Wilkinson, 1998; Reinharz, 1992) have sought to 
address concerns about unexamined power balances between participants and researchers 
(Finlay, 2003), this has often focused on the researcher as the powerful one in the relationship. 
It is clear, however, that feminists researching female public figures require different skills to 
negotiate the dynamics of this particular research space. Attempting to understand the power 
dynamic between researcher and elite informant is crucial, because it not only shapes the 
interview process, but also defines hoǁ kŶoǁledge is Đƌeated ;CoŶti aŶd O͛Neil, ϮϬϬϳ: ϲϳͿ. 
EĐhoiŶg the Đase pƌeseŶted ďǇ “ŵith, Neal aŶd MĐLaughliŶ ;ϮϬϬϵ: ϳϬϯͿ desĐƌiďed the ͚uŶtidǇ 
and emotional research encounters in which power moved in mobile ways across interview 
laŶdsĐapes͛ duƌiŶg their fieldwork with elite participants. It may therefore be simplistic to 
conceptualise the research relationship between elite and researcher as a one-dimensional 
hierarchy (Duke, 2002: 52) and it is important to scrutinise the sometimes unsettled nature of 
such power dynamics (Duke, 2002: 703; Smith, 2006). Based on my own research experiences, 
this study adopted a poststructural perception of power between researcher and researched; 
and while it is acknowledged that it may not be possible to ever fully understand the true 
nature of power relations within an interview, it is possible to think and write about these 
relations in a more open manner than has traditionally been undertaken (Smith, 2006: 647; 
also Rose, 1997; England, 1994; Bondi, 2003).  
 
Researching Policy Networks  
Although the analysis of policy networks has become one of the dominant approaches for the 
study of policymaking (Rhodes, 1997, 2007; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992; Dowding, 1995), there 
76 
 
is a paucity of methodological and reflexive accounts which explore how they are researched 
;Duke, ϮϬϬϮ: ϰϭ, eŵphasis addedͿ. Duke is Đleaƌ that ͚iŶ oƌdeƌ to uŶdeƌstaŶd the iŶteƌaĐtioŶs 
ǁithiŶ the poliĐǇ pƌoĐess… the qualitative appƌoaĐh offeƌs distiŶĐt adǀaŶtages͛, Ǉet as alƌeadǇ 
highlighted, ͚ƌeseaƌĐhiŶg poǁerful individuals within such networks generates a unique set of 
dileŵŵas aŶd Đoŵpleǆities foƌ the ƌeseaƌĐheƌ͛ ;Duke, ϮϬϬϮ: ϯϵͿ. 
Reflecting on their own experiences, Fitz and Halpin were clear that those studying elites 
ƌeƋuiƌe ͚suffiĐieŶt Đultuƌal aŶd soĐial awareness to know how to play the game well enough to 
ƌeŵaiŶ iŶ the field͛ ;ϭϵϵϰ: ϰϴͿ. ‘eseaƌĐheƌs ŵust leaƌŶ to Ŷegotiate the ŵiĐƌopolitiĐs, 
iŶdiǀiduals aŶd peƌsoŶalities ǁithiŶ theiƌ ĐhoseŶ poliĐǇ Ŷetǁoƌk. LeaƌŶiŶg to ͚tƌead ĐaƌefullǇ͛ 
when researching Ŷetǁoƌks is theƌefoƌe highlǇ sigŶifiĐaŶt, as ͚iŶdiǀiduals… ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate ǁith 
each other, and about you and your research. Staying in is often dependent upon not making 
ŵistakes͛ ;Fitz aŶd HalpiŶ, ϭϵϵϰ: ϯϵͿ. OŶe oǀeƌaƌĐhiŶg ƌeseaƌĐh pƌeoĐĐupatioŶ is the desire to 
uŶĐoǀeƌ ͚ǁho paƌtiĐipates aŶd ǁho ǁields poǁeƌ͛ ;AtkiŶson and Coleman, 1992). Some 
political actors or organisations are located at the core of the policy system while others occupy 
a position on the margins or periphery (Duke, 2002: 46; see also Grant, 1978; Marsh and 
Rhodes, 1992). It is for the researcher to attempt to uncover such positions while adhering to 
the Đautious adǀiĐe aďout ͚staǇiŶg iŶ͛. 
 
 
iii. Methodological Approach  
 
Feminist Research Practice  
Although this study was conducted from a liberal feminist standpoint, it is important to 
remember that feminist methodology is not simply distinguished by female researchers 
studying women (Ramazanoglu and Holland, 2002: 15). In a now classic statement, Harding 
(1987) argued that feminist methodology is a theory of research rather than a specific method 
oƌ teĐhŶiƋue foƌ gatheƌiŶg iŶfoƌŵatioŶ ;CoŶti aŶd O͛Neil, ϮϬϬϳ: ϲϱͿ. DisĐussiŶg oǀeƌaƌĐhiŶg 
feminist commitments, Ramazanoglu and Holland have argued that all feminist research is a 
social and political process; that it makes assumptions about the nature and meanings of ideas, 
experience and social reality; and that there is accountability for the political and ethical 
implications of knowledge production (2002: 10-11). This study follows such commitments. 
Although feminist literature accepts that some numerical data can be used in qualitative 
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studies foƌ ͚diƌeĐtioŶal oƌieŶtatioŶ͛, feŵiŶists haǀe tƌaditioŶallǇ aƌgued that statistical 
techniques can only serve to obscure qualitative meaning, and are consequently not part of 
the practices of a feminist social science (Leininger, 1994: 103 in Oakley, 1998). While there 
have been welcome signs of a recognition within feminist research of the usefulness of 
quantitative methods (Gorelick, 1991 in Oakley, 1992), it would be fair to say that feminist 
research remains strongly founded on qualitative principles. Adopting a qualitative approach, 
this study remains faithful to the underlying pƌiŶĐiple that the ƌeseaƌĐheƌ ͚ŵust ďe plaĐed 
ǁithiŶ the fƌaŵe of the piĐtuƌe that she atteŵpts to paiŶt͛ (Harding, 1987: 9).  
Consistent with the arguments forwarded by Ramazanoglu and Holland (2002), Conti 
aŶd O͛Neil aƌe Đleaƌ that paƌt of the feŵiŶist ƌesearch agenda must include a serious 
aĐkŶoǁledgeŵeŶt aŶd aŶalǇsis of the ͚ŵiĐƌopolitiĐs͛ of ƌeseaƌĐh pƌojeĐts. This fiŶal eleŵeŶt is 
not an afterthought, but must be central to the documentation and dissemination of the 
research (2007). As highlighted by Duke (2002: 44), there is consequently a strong tradition 
amongst feminist researchers of providing analyses on the nature and practice of conducting 
research (for example Roberts, 1981; Stanley and Wise, 1983) and a growing body of work 
emerging in criminology (King and Wincup, 2008; Davies, Francis and Jupp, 2000). Such work 
has undoubtedly helped to highlight and politicise the debates around the conduct of research 
(Duke, 2002: 44), yet the majority of documentation and guidance remains firmly focused on 
researching the vulnerable. It is clear, therefore, that more work needs to be published on the 
research experiences of those feminists studying up. One crucial methodological concern is 
that while a fundamental principle of feminist research is to minimize the power disparity in 
research settings, working with political elites who also happen to be women can result in 
ĐoŶsideƌaďle aŶǆieties: ͚oŶ the oŶe haŶd, politiĐal aĐtoƌs aƌe ǁell kŶoǁŶ foƌ tƌǇiŶg to ĐoŶtƌol 
discussion and manage the topic schedule, at the same time, a feminist researcher working 
ǁith feŵale suďjeĐts should ďe tƌǇiŶg to giǀe soŵe ĐoŶtƌol to heƌ iŶteƌǀieǁees͛ ;‘oss, ϮϬϬϭ: 
164).  
 
Methodology   
IŶ ǁideƌ aĐadeŵia theƌe aƌe iŶteŶse disagƌeeŵeŶts oǀeƌ ͚ǁhetheƌ soĐial ƌealitǇ ĐaŶ eǆist 
iŶdepeŶdeŶtlǇ of people͛s ideas aďout it… ǁheƌe ideas Đoŵe fƌoŵ, aŶd ǁhetheƌ/hoǁ theǇ aƌe 
poǁeƌful͛ ;‘aŵazaŶoglu aŶd HollaŶd, ϮϬϬϮ: ϭϬͿ. AdoptiŶg a ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶist peƌspeĐtiǀe, this 
study views meaning as coming into existence out of engagement with the social world (King 
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aŶd HoƌƌoĐks, ϮϬϭϬ: ϮϮͿ, agƌeeiŶg ǁith the stateŵeŶt that ͚Ŷo huŵaŶ ďeiŶg ĐaŶ step outside 
of their humanity and view the world from no position at all, which is what the idea of 
oďjeĐtiǀitǇ suggests͛ ;Buƌƌ, ϭϵϵϱ: ϭϱϮͿ. IŶ additioŶ, the interpretivist rationale focuses on 
understanding how different actors experience the social world and what it means for them. 
This study is therefore concerned with interpretivism in the policymaking process, seeking to 
investigate how political actors interpret their own social world and the methods they use to 
persuade others.  In pursuing such information, semi-structured interviews are viewed as the 
paƌaŵouŶt ŵethod as theǇ ͚ Ǉield ƌiĐh iŶsights iŶto people͛s ďiogƌaphies, eǆpeƌieŶĐes, opiŶioŶs, 
values, aspiƌatioŶs, attitudes aŶd feeliŶgs͛ ;MaǇ, ϮϬϬϭ: ϭϮϬͿ.  
Participants comprised of various political and policy elites from across the spectrum, 
the majority of whom were public figures. In total 35 interviews with 34 participants were 
conducted: ten interviews with Chief Executives, Directors or staff from penal reform or 
criminal justice organisations, three interviews with former senior civil servants from the 
WoŵeŶ͛s CƌiŵiŶal JustiĐe PoliĐǇ UŶit at the MiŶistƌǇ of JustiĐe, three interviews with former 
Prisons Ministers, one interview with a former Attorney General, four interviews with members 
of the House of Lords (including keǇ figuƌes iŶ the field of ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ), ten interviews 
with crime, home affairs or social affairs journalists (or former journalists), two interviews with 
high profile campaigning academics, one interview with a female Crown Court judge and one 
interview with the former Governor of the second largest female prison, HMP Styal. Central to 
the research process was the analysis of Hansard, ministerial speeches, government 
publications, select committee evidence, policy reports from the campaign groups and prison 
population statistics in order to develop a greater understanding of the policy problem in 
question. 
It is clear that researching policy actors can be a complex undertaking as much of what 
oĐĐuƌs iŶ politiĐs is ͚off-stage͛ aŶd uŶƌeĐoƌded ;Lillekeƌ, ϮϬϬϯ: ϮϭϯͿ. Duke has aƌgued that it is 
only through employing qualitative methods that researchers can hope to understand 
meanings and choices in the policy process (2002: 42). It is, however, important to note that 
an interpretivist collection of qualitative interview data is rooted in a subjective paradigm that 
is not value-free (Watts, 2008: 440-441). It is inextricably linked to the experiences and 
viewpoints of the researcher who may not be emotionally detached from the topic of inquiry 
(Watts, 2008: 440-441). In this sense qualitative research may not profess to be neutral or 
objective. Furthermore (and discussed in more detail towards the end of this chapter), 
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Ƌualitatiǀe ƌesults ƌelǇ oŶ paƌtiĐipaŶt iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of the ͚faĐts͛ togetheƌ ǁith a ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt 
to honesty. Critics of the qualitative interview are therefore fair in their assertions that it can 
produce accounts which are self-serving and unreliable (Williams, 1989: 269). It is also 
important to underline that single case studies of this nature are not generalizable to other 
policy fields or arenas. 
 
 
iv. Sampling, Access and Ethical Consent 
 
Sampling  
If the aim of qualitative research is to gain a deeper understanding of the nature and form of 
social phenomena and to unpack meanings (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003: 82), then samples must 
include relevant participants who are able to illuminate and inform (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003: 
82). If, like this research, the inquiry involves a single case study, important decisions still need 
to be made about people, settings or actions (Burgess, 1982). Purposive sampling is often used 
in research of this nature, yet there is still a requirement for clear objectivity so that it is able 
to withstand independent scrutiny. Due to the specialised nature of the policy network and the 
limited participant pool available, it was not a complicated task to target potential participants 
with relevant knowledge and expertise. The selection of participants for this research was 
therefore criterion based or purposive. On a few occasions sampling adopted a snowball 
method, with participants providing details of others who they thought might be relevant to 
the research. On two occasions I acted more spontaneously, and approached individuals at 
public events.   
 
My PositioŶ: AŶ ͚IŶforŵed Outsider?͛ 
It is important at this stage to make explicit my position in the research process. During my 
previous professional experience as a researcher in the House of Commons I became 
interested in penal policy formulation and development, and in the key players involved in this 
process. While working in Parliament I had the opportunity to visit several prisons, visit a 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s ͚oŶe-stop-shop͛ aŶd atteŶd ǀaƌious All-Party Parliamentary Groups (APPGs) and 
Westminster receptions. This experience provided the backdrop to my specific research 
interests in the run up to my doctoral research.  
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Academics have long debated the benefits and pitfalls of being regarded as an outsider or 
insider when conducting research. Being an insider has traditionally been regarded as 
ďeŶefiĐial, ǁith the ƌeseaƌĐheƌ aďle to feel a seŶse of ͚ďeloŶgiŶg͛ ǁith participants (Hill-Collins, 
1990), yet others have argued that outsiders have the benefit of objectivity (Fonow and Cook, 
1991). Mullings blurred this distinction to suggest that it is possible for researchers to be both 
insiders and outsiders (1999). Despite my position, it would be erroneous to label myself as an 
insider. I had not worked in the criminal justice policy sphere at the time of fieldwork, and nor 
did I have any direct contacts. My advantage however, was that I had operated in the same 
͚WestŵiŶsteƌ ǀillage͛ as ŵaŶǇ of the paƌtiĐipaŶts. As aŶ ͚iŶfoƌŵed outsideƌ͛ ǁith a 
Parliamentary pass I was able to watch live debates, attended events, read documents 
(sometimes restricted to Members of Parliament) and follow the work of key individuals with 
great interest. I retained my pass for the majority of the fieldwork process to enable me to 
attend events in Parliament, such as relevant meetings, APPGs and select committees.  
Operating in a similar position, Mullings (1999) recalled the ethical dilemmas of 
pƌeseŶtiŶg heƌself to paƌtiĐipaŶts. CoŶsideƌiŶg that ǁhilst she did Ŷot ͚falsifǇ aŶǇ of the 
attƌiďutes͛ that ĐoŶstituted heƌ iŶsideƌ positioŶ, she fouŶd it diffiĐult to assess ǁhetheƌ she 
should have been more explicit about all the dimensions of her positionality (Mullings, 1999: 
347). I similarly felt such dilemmas, and while I had no specific policy, in general I did not tell 
participants about my Parliamentary connections unless they asked me. In calling for the 
abandonment of the arbitrary insideƌ/outsideƌ distiŶĐtioŶ, Heƌod has aƌgued that ͚it is peƌhaps 
more appropriate to consider the relationship between the researcher and the elite s/he is 
ƌeseaƌĐhiŶg as oŶe iŶǀolǀiŶg a slidiŶg sĐale of iŶtiŵaĐǇ͛ ;ϭϵϵϵ: ϯϮϲͿ. IŶ fiŶdiŶg it diffiĐult to 
define my own position in the research process, this concept may prove helpful when 
describing those whose position is not clear cut.  
 
Access 
Alongside issues of power, access is a major preoccupation for those researching up. 
Researchers are dependent on the cooperation of a relatively small number of people with 
specialised knowledge and without their assistance the study cannot progress. Access can be 
pƌoďleŵatiĐ ďeĐause elites haǀe ͚the poǁeƌ to Đƌeate ďaƌƌieƌs, shield theŵselǀes fƌoŵ sĐƌutiŶǇ 
aŶd ƌesist the iŶtƌusiǀeŶess of soĐial ƌeseaƌĐh͛ ;Duke, ϮϬϬϮ: ϰϱͿ, aŶd it is theƌefoƌe ĐoŶtiŶgeŶt 
upoŶ ͚eǆteŶsiǀe pƌepaƌatioŶ, hoŵeǁoƌk aŶd ĐƌeatiǀitǇ oŶ the paƌt of the ƌeseaƌĐheƌ͛ 
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(Odendahl and Shaw, 2002: 306). One way of pursuing access is by exploiting any pre-existing 
links with those in power (see also Ostrander, 1995; Odendahl and Shaw, 2002). Cassell (1988: 
95) argued that the researcher of the powerful needs many of the characteristics of the social 
Đliŵďeƌ: ͚eǀeƌǇoŶe ǁho ŵight possiďlǇ kŶoǁ soŵeoŶe, ŵust ďe ĐoŶtaĐted aŶd asked if theǇ 
ǁill giǀe iŶtƌoduĐtioŶs, ǀouĐh foƌ oŶe, aŶd otheƌǁise help oŶe͛s eŶteƌpƌise͛ ;iŶ Walfoƌd, ϮϬϭϭ: 
2). While this may be a viable strategy it was not the approach that I adopted; I had plenty of 
contacts in former colleagues, but I did not call upon anyone to assist with the research. Only 
oŶ oŶe oĐĐasioŶ did I ͚ Ŷaŵe dƌop͛ a pƌeǀious eŵploǇeƌ to help gaiŶ aĐĐess to a former Minister. 
I do, hoǁeǀeƌ, aĐĐept Duke͛s pƌeŵise that aĐĐess ŵaǇ ǁell ďe easieƌ foƌ those ǁho haǀe 
existing links with those in power, such as contacts from previous employment (2002). Gewirtz 
and Ozga (1994) have argued that access is more likely to be granted if the interviewer seems 
͚peƌfeĐtlǇ haƌŵless͛. AŶd ǁhile otheƌ ƌeseaƌĐheƌs haǀe siŵilaƌlǇ Ŷoted that ďeiŶg feŵale is a 
great advantage in presenting a non-threatening image (Klatch, 1988), Neal (1995) has argued 
that being a female may also lead to not being taken as seriously as a male researcher (in 
Walford, 2011: 2).  
My initial concerns about access were, on the whole, unjustified. I did manage to speak 
to the majority of those that I had initially targeted, although the fieldwork was a drawn-out 
process. I had initially estimated one year, but the fieldwork eventually took double that 
(between April 2011 and April 2013). This timescale was far from ideal, but it does highlight 
the extent to which the power was held by my participants (many of the public figures were 
not able to commit to an interview for several months; journalists, on the other hand would 
change the date at very short notice). The process of confirming an interview could span 
several months, and I would routinely need to resort to chasing offices before a date was 
agreed. Of major regret was that I was unable to interview the then Minister with responsibility 
for women in the criminal justice system, Helen Grant MP. Having mentioned this to several 
participants, I was reassured that she was not prepared to meet anyone. One reason for this 
was because she had not long been in post and the promised ͚“trategy͛ document for women 
was yet to transpire. 
Despite several refusals, it was certainly much easier to speak to those in the policy 
world than to journalists. Ideally, I would have interviewed at least one journalist from every 
national newspaper, but this proved to be an impossible task; my success rate with journalists 
was approximately one response in every four or five requests sent out. Most journalists would 
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simply ignore emails and I had to satisfy myself with ten (including two former journalists). This 
is understandable given the nature of my research: reform of the penal system is viewed as 
having little audience or readership appeal (Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994: 149) and very few 
journalists are engaged in such issues. The major lack of cooperation came from the right-
leaning tabloid press; however journalists from right-leaning quality newspapers such as The 
Daily Telegraph and The Times were also reticent to speak. In my experience at least, the media 
ǁoƌld ƌeŵaiŶs ŵuĐh haƌdeƌ to peŶetƌate thaŶ the ͚Đoƌƌidoƌs of poǁeƌ͛.  
 
Ethics 
EthiĐal pƌoďleŵs iŶ iŶteƌǀieǁ ƌeseaƌĐh aƌise due to the Đoŵpleǆities of ͚ƌeseaƌĐhiŶg pƌiǀate 
liǀes aŶd plaĐiŶg aĐĐouŶts iŶ the puďliĐ aƌeŶa͛ ;Milleƌ et al., 2002: 1). While ethical 
considerations focus mainly on studies involving disadvantaged participants, they are equally 
important when researching elites. Major issues relate to informed consent and 
confidentiality. All participants consented to the research and were given the option of 
receiving the transcripts prior to publication. As the majority of participants operated in the 
puďliĐ eǇe, ŵost ǁeƌe happǇ to speak ͚oŶ ƌeĐoƌd͛, hoǁeǀeƌ tǁo ǁished to remain anonymous. 
As the fieldwork progressed, my own views on anonymity changed, and I made the later 
decision to anonymise all of my research participants, enabling me to write more frankly whilst 
protecting their public reputations (see section vi).  
 
The study adhered to the ESRC Research Ethics Framework16, that:  
 
- Research should be designed, reviewed and undertaken to ensure integrity and quality 
- Research staff and subjects must be informed fully about the purpose, methods and 
intended possible uses of research, what their participation in the research entails and 
what risks, if any, are involved 
- The confidentiality of information supplied by research subjects and the anonymity of 
respondents must be respected 
- Research participants must participate in a voluntary way, free from any coercion  
- Harm to research participants must be avoided 
                                                          
16 Available at: http://www.esrc.ac.uk/about-esrc/information/research-ethics.aspx  
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- The independence of research must be clear, and any conflicts of interest or partiality 
must be explicit  
 
Furthermore, the study also adhered to the British SocietǇ of CƌiŵiŶologǇ͛s ;B“CͿ ethiĐal 
guidelines17. BSC guidelines state that research must be taken to the highest possible 
methodological standard in order that the maximum possible knowledge and benefits accrue 
to society (in Davies, Francis and Jupp, 2011: 294). With a responsibility towards the discipline 
of criminology, participants and colleagues, this study adhered to the above requirements.  
 
 
v. Reflections on the Interview Process 
 
As in many studies of a qualitative or feminist nature, the interview process was flexible, leaving 
space for emerging issues and concepts. I had prepared an interview guide with a list of fairly 
specific questions to be covered, but my line of questioning did not always follow a set order, 
and interesting points were followed up if possiďle. Guided ďǇ Kǀale͛s ;ϭϵϵϲͿ Đƌiteƌia of 
successful interviewing, I attempted to be clear, gentle and sensitive, while steering the topic 
of conversations and interpreting the responses. As I grew in confidence I was able to adopt 
more of a conversational manner, and later interviews became far more unstructured. While 
some participants asked to see the questions beforehand, very few had actually taken a look 
when it came to the interview date. The majority did not ask, and when I arrived to interview 
them, questioned me on what I was researching (despite all the information I had sent), 
perhaps an indication that they did not take my work seriously. It is accepted wisdom that PhD 
students occupy a unique position within the academic hierarchy; they work alone and have 
low status with few credentials (Duke, 2002: 52). Discussing her experience of doctoral 
fieldǁoƌk, Duke ǀieǁed heƌself as a ͚loŶe ǁolf͛, aŶd felt that as a ĐoŶseƋueŶĐe she ǁas 
perceived as harmless, non-threatening and without power (Duke, 2002: 52). Consistent with 
Duke͛s eǆpeƌieŶĐe, this seĐtioŶ ǁill outliŶe ŵǇ oǁŶ ƌeseaƌĐh eŶĐouŶteƌs iŶ ŵoƌe detail. While 
the interview process constituted an array of issues, major themes related to location and time, 
the difficulties in asking pƌoďiŶg ƋuestioŶs, the ͚ďƌought self͛ aŶd iŶteƌǀieǁiŶg feŵale elites. 
                                                          
17 Available at: www.britsoccrim.org/ethical.thm  
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 Location and time 
Instructional guidance on interview techniques places great stress on the importance of the 
physical environment (see Lofland and Lofland, 1995). Researchers should endeavour to find 
comfortable, private settings where their participants will not feel intimidated. Such literature 
is, however, of lesser use to those studying up, since researchers-of-elites often have little or 
no control over interview locations. Elwood and Martin have argued that researchers have 
teŶded to igŶoƌe ͚the poǁeƌ dǇŶaŵiĐ ĐoŶstituted ďǇ the iŶteƌaĐtioŶs aŵoŶg iŶteƌǀieǁeƌ [aŶd] 
participant in particular interview sites͛ ;ϮϬϬϬ: ϲϱϭ, eŵphasis addedͿ; aŶ issue of paƌtiĐulaƌ 
relevance to this study.  
All interview locations were decided by the participants. Whether in their sitting room 
or kitchen, a cloakroom, a hotel lobby, a café or bar, an open plan office, a government 
department, a busy House of Commons office or a noisy bench on the House of Lords terrace, 
I ǁas eǆpeĐted to ͚fiƌe aǁaǇ͛, ƌegaƌdless of ǁho ǁas iŶ eaƌshot. MaŶǇ of these ǀeŶues ǁeƌe 
clearly unsuitable, but I quickly learnt to become adaptable. Consistent with the experiences 
of Elwood and Martin, I would argue that where the interviews took place clearly had an effect 
on the length and tone of conversation (including power dynamics) and the nature of 
ƋuestioŶiŶg; iŶ soŵe ďusǇ puďliĐ ďaƌs oƌ Đafes it siŵplǇ ǁasŶ͛t appƌopƌiate to ask politiĐallǇ 
sensitive questions. Harvey has warned that if researchers are conducting interviews in neutral 
venues (such as cafes or bars), they should avoid a location that is neither too quiet nor too 
noisy (2010: 202). That is no easy task. Such venues often filled me with anxiety, as I knew it 
would not be easy to conduct a proper interview or for my Dictaphone to adequately record 
the conversation. Such experiences were pushed to the limit by one journalist who told me 
that he would give the interview over an alcoholic drink. I was certain that a busy London bar 
on a Friday night was not a suitable place, but having worked so hard to secure the interview I 
didŶ͛t feel that I ǁas iŶ a positioŶ to disagƌee. NoisǇ opeŶ plaŶ offiĐes ǁeƌe aŶotheƌ loĐatioŶ 
that I had to quickly master. One participant repeatedly stopped the interview to take phone 
calls and check emails. The process of repeatedly turning his back meant that the interview 
never really got off the ground. The conversation was incredibly disjointed, and more than 
oŶĐe he asked ͚ǁheƌe ǁas I?͛, oƌ ͚ǁhat ǁas I saǇiŶg?͛ I then had to quickly summarise what I 
thought he had said before we were in a position to continue.  
OŶe paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ diffiĐult ƌeseaƌĐh eŶĐouŶteƌ took plaĐe afteƌ a paƌtiĐipaŶt͛s speakiŶg 
engagement. Despite asking for an alternative, I was told to attend the event in order to speak 
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to them during the evening reception. After the talk I duly approached the participant and 
reminded them of our correspondence. I am certain that they had forgotten who I was and 
why I was there, despite the fact that I had sent an email the day before reminding them that 
I would be attending. We went into a side room that was being used as a cloakroom, and it 
became clear that I had approximately five minutes to ask my questions. I realised that I needed 
to act like a journalist, quickly scanning the most important questions and prioritising about 
three. Visiting the homes of public figures was another interesting element of my research 
endeavours. Dexter has warned against conducting interviews in homes ͚ďeĐause soŵe 
interviewees will let their families come in and out freely, and generally will tolerate 
iŶteƌƌuptioŶs ǁhiĐh theǇ ǁould Ŷot iŶ theiƌ offiĐes͛ ;ϮϬϬϲ: ϰϴͿ. While these iŶteƌǀieǁs iŶǀolǀed 
interruptions from family members, many of the interviews were interrupted wherever they 
took place. 
As well as the location, most participants also controlled the interview length. Fitz and 
HalpiŶ ƌeĐalled that ͚oŶe attƌiďute of the poǁeƌful is that theǇ aƌe aďle to ŵake Ǉou ǁait aŶd 
thus determine the organisatioŶ aŶd the paĐe of the ƌeseaƌĐh͛ ;ϭϵϵϰ: ϯϰͿ. Like Fitz aŶd HalpiŶ, 
I leaƌŶt to ͚ƋuiĐklǇ pƌioƌitise ƋuestioŶs at the saŵe tiŵe as askiŶg theŵ, editiŶg the sĐhedule 
as the iŶteƌǀieǁ pƌoĐeeded͛ ;ϭϵϵϰ: ϰϳͿ. BodǇ laŶguage ǁould deŵoŶstƌate ǁheŶ paƌtiĐipaŶts 
ǁeƌe aŶǆious to get aǁaǇ. DuƌiŶg ŵost iŶteƌǀieǁs I felt the Ŷeed to saǇ ͚oŶlǇ tǁo ŵoƌe͛ oƌ ͚just 
oŶe last ƋuestioŶ͛, as I ǁas aĐutelǇ aǁaƌe of tiŵe ĐoŶstƌaiŶts oƌ eǀeŶ ďoƌedoŵ – however long 
the interview lasted.  
 
Probing Questions  
Marshall believed that ƌeseaƌĐheƌs iŶ poliĐǇ settiŶgs eŶĐouŶteƌed eitheƌ ͚ostƌiĐhes͛, people 
ǁho oďfusĐate oƌ aǀoid theŵ, oƌ ͚pussǇĐats͛ ǁho aƌe delighted to ƌelate ͚seĐƌets͛, pƌoǀide 
access, and generally be useful in the research (1984: 236). While some participants were very 
open and honest, others were less happy to provide information that was not already out 
there. In such cases it became clear that asking difficult or probing questions was out of the 
question. Many elites operate in the public eye and are interviewed regularly, and they do not 
͚suffeƌ fools gladlǇ͛ ;‘iĐhaƌds, ϭϵϵϲͿ. TheǇ do Ŷot eǆpeĐt to ďe ĐoŶtƌadiĐted ǁheŶ theǇ aƌe 
giving their time altruistically.   
Some participants preferred to keep the interview as a conversation, expecting me to 
know when they had answered my question implicitly. Others were keen to explain their side 
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of things and would revert to talking in long monologues. Walford has warned that a familiarity 
ǁith ďeiŶg ͚listeŶed to͛ ŵaǇ ŵeaŶ that elite paƌtiĐipaŶts ŵaǇ ͚just talk͛ aŶd Ŷot aŶsǁeƌ the 
specific questions asked (2011: 3). As Ostrander (1995) has argued, this may not simply be self-
centredness, but rather an accurate reflection of their position in power. As participants were 
giving their time free of charge, I was keen to be seen as gracious and non-confrontational, and 
as such I had a tendency towards acquiescence. Lilleker has warned academic researchers 
͚Ŷeǀeƌ to adopt the ŵethods suĐĐessful foƌ JeƌeŵǇ PaǆŵaŶ… [as] these ǁoƌk oŶlǇ iŶ the 
exceptional circumstances of the television oƌ ƌadio studio͛ ;ϮϬϬϯ: ϮϭϬͿ. IŶ ĐoŶtƌast, MiĐkelsoŶ 
(1994; see also Walford, 2011) has argued for a more confrontational approach, where evasive 
answers are challenged and blunt questions are asked. Given my previous experience working 
with public figures, I would argue that such an approach is only possible in certain situations, 
and it is certainly very difficult for (female) PhD researchers to master in elite interviews. I do 
however acknowledge that if I had probed more in some areas, my results may have been 
slightly different.  
 
The ͚Brought “elf͛ 
During the interviews, a key issue was how much of my own knowledge to disclose (Adler and 
Adler, 1987). McDowell recalled her shifting positionalities when interviewing elite 
paƌtiĐipaŶts: ͚plaǇiŶg duŵď͛ ǁith oldeƌ patƌiaƌĐhal figuƌes, ͚ďƌusƋuelǇ effiĐieŶt͛ ǁith fieƌĐe 
oldeƌ ǁoŵeŶ, ͚sisteƌlǇ͛ ǁith ǁoŵeŶ of the saŵe age aŶd ͚supeƌfast aŶd ǁell-iŶfoƌŵed͛ ǁith 
young men (1993: 2138). Duke similarly recalled that she tended to switch between 
kŶoǁledgeaďle aŶd ͚Ŷaiǀe͛ depeŶdiŶg oŶ the ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes of the iŶteƌǀieǁ ;ϮϬϬϮ: ϰϴͿ aŶd 
that is how I would describe my own experience. During the initial interviews with certain key 
players, I felt (perhaps erroneously) that it was important to show myself as legitimate, 
recalliŶg past eǀeŶts that ǁe ďoth ŵight haǀe atteŶded aŶd peƌhaps ͚Ŷaŵe dƌoppiŶg͛ 
important people that I knew. Towards the end I spoke much less as I became more confident 
in my own knowledge, and I believe this made for better interviews. One issue that I had not 
prepared myself for was how I would react to statements that I disagreed with, or found 
ƌepulsiǀe. Willott ƌeĐalled that she ͚eŶteƌ[ed] sǇŵpathetiĐallǇ iŶto the alieŶ aŶd possiďlǇ 
ƌepugŶaŶt peƌspeĐtiǀes of ƌiǀal thiŶkeƌs͛ ;ϭϵϵϴ: ϭϴϯͿ duƌiŶg heƌ fieldwork experience. I too 
adopted this positioŶ, ďut it did Ŷot stop ŵe ĐƌitiĐallǇ ƌefleĐtiŶg oŶ ŵǇ ͚ďƌought self͛. DuƌiŶg 
one interview I had to disguise my shock when a participant (a journalist) described in great 
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detail theiƌ ideal ͚ŵuƌdeƌ͛, aŶd eǆplaiŶed that ͚ďoƌiŶg͛ Đases iŶǀolǀiŶg ͚husďaŶd ďeats ǁife͛ 
siŵplǇ ǁouldŶ͛t ŵake the papeƌ. AŶotheƌ paƌtiĐipaŶt ǁas eǆtƌeŵelǇ ǀoĐal aďout theiƌ 
ideological values throughout the interview, and I found myself nodding in agreement, 
although I strongly disagreed with what they were saying.  
I became much more conscious of my gender when interviewing male participants. I 
found some of the male participants easier to talk to, and on reflection this is perhaps because 
I had professional experience of working for high profile males, and found it easy to slip back 
iŶto ŵǇ ͚eŵploǇee͛ positioŶ. It ǁas ŵǇ eǆpeƌieŶĐe that, oŶ the ǁhole, the ŵale paƌtiĐipaŶts 
disclosed much more damaging information than the female participants, whether they were 
aware of this at the time. One major factor may have been due to my sex, and that I, as a 
twenty-something female researcher, was perceived as unthreatening. Some of the older male 
participants were quite paternal towards me, walking me to taxis or train stations or asking me 
questions about my journey. One participant became a little iŶappƌopƌiate, aŶd I͛ŵ Ŷot suƌe 
this would have happened if I had been a male researcher.  
 
Interviewing Female Elites: A Sisterly Interaction?  
The age, ethnicity and social status of women being interviewed has been shown to be 
influential in the power relations between women in the interview setting (Broom, Hand and 
Tovey, 2009: 53; see also Cotterill, 1992; Reinharz and Chase, 2001; Riessman, 1987). Feminists 
usuallǇ faǀouƌ the ƌeseaƌĐheƌ ďeiŶg a ͚suppliĐaŶt͛ ;MĐDoǁell, ϭϵϵϮ, ϭϵϵϯ). This approach has 
ďeeŶ ƌeĐoŵŵeŶded foƌ ǁoŵeŶ iŶteƌǀieǁiŶg ǁoŵeŶ so as Ŷot to ͚oďjeĐtifǇ ouƌ sisteƌs͛ ;FiŶĐh, 
1993: 167 in Desmond, 2004: 265). While such guidance is rightly aimed at those researching 
vulnerable populations aŶd giǀiŶg ǀoiĐe to the ͚poǁeƌless͛, little ĐoŵŵeŶtaƌǇ eǆists foƌ those 
interviewing female elites. Furthermore, whereas a great deal of literature exists on both 
interviewing and gaining access to elites, a relatively small amount concentrates specifically on 
women. One reason for this may be because the term elite is more widely associated with 
males, or simply because there are substantially fewer females in positions of power. As such, 
very little consideration has been given to feminist research situations where the researcher 
lacks control over the interview (Puwar, 1997: 2.4). There is consequently a paucity of 
commentary on the negotiation of space whilst conducting interviews with female political 
elites, those who are simultaneously an elite and a woman (Puwar, 1997: 4.2).  
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IŶ the ĐlassiĐ teǆt oŶ feŵiŶist iŶteƌǀieǁiŶg, AŶŶ OakleǇ aƌgued that ͚a feŵiŶist iŶteƌǀieǁiŶg 
ǁoŵeŶ is ďǇ defiŶitioŶ ďoth ͚ iŶside͛ the Đultuƌe aŶd paƌtiĐipatiŶg iŶ that ǁhiĐh she is oďseƌǀiŶg͛ 
(1981: 57). Oakley painted a picture of ͚ sisteƌlǇ iŶteƌaĐtioŶ͛, Ǉet the feŵale ƌeseaƌĐheƌ studǇiŶg 
female elites may not always enjoy such a rosy experience. In highlighting the difficulties she 
encountered when interviewing female MPs, Puwar was clear that interviewing females in 
positions of poǁeƌ ǁas ͚Ŷot alǁaǇs a ĐosǇ, fƌieŶdlǇ eǆĐhaŶge of iŶfoƌŵatioŶ͛ ;ϭϵϵϳ:ϭϭ.ϭͿ. 
IŶdeed to Puǁaƌ, ͚the ǁhole poǁeƌ asǇŵŵetƌǇ is ƌeǀeƌsed ǁheŶ ƌeseaƌĐhiŶg ǁoŵeŶ elites͛ 
;ϭϵϵϳ: ϭϭ.ϭͿ. DesŵoŶd siŵilaƌlǇ fouŶd feŵale paƌtiĐipaŶts to ďe ͚tough, ďƌusƋue aŶd offiĐial͛, 
aŶd ĐoŶĐluded that ͚ it is a ŵistake foƌ feŵale ƌeseaƌĐheƌs to assuŵe a feŵiŶist solidaƌitǇ eǆists͛ 
;ϮϬϬϰ: ϮϲϱͿ. Both aĐĐouŶts ĐoƌƌespoŶd ǁith “taĐeǇ͛s asseƌtioŶ that feŵiŶists ĐaŶ suffeƌ a 
͚delusioŶ of alliaŶĐe͛ ;ϭϵϵϭ: ϭϭϲͿ if theǇ assuŵe ĐoŵŵoŶ iŶteƌests in woman-to-woman 
research (in Ramazanoglu and Holland, 2002: 106). It would be fair to say that a muddy mixed 
picture of power and solidarity emerged during the course of my research encounters.  
Issues of power were present in several memorable interviews. One high profile 
participant sent her young male researcher to lead me to a grand room where we were to 
meet in Westminster. She arrived after about five minutes and extended her hand for me to 
shake. I had been informed by other participants that she ͚took Ŷo pƌisoŶeƌs͛ aŶd, despite 
working in the Commons for several years, I was particularly nervous. Without a Parliamentary 
pass hanging around my neck, I felt that I had lost whatever status I previously had, even if this 
meant nothing in reality. She sat the other side of a very large table and I felt that this clear 
distance acted as a barrier between us. It was clear that she was not interested in building 
rapport. Her researcher sat by her side throughout, and when she answered, it was to both of 
us as heƌ audieŶĐe ;a situatioŶ ͚iŶ ǁhiĐh aŶ iŵage of the ͚self͛ had to ďe pƌeseŶted͛ ;Puǁaƌ 
1997: 7.4)). Her power and status was ever-present during our conversation, and although she 
was generous with her time, it was clear who had controlled the interview.  
I quickly learnt that some participants had limited interest in the research. One 
participant, who I had felt that I had developed a slight rapport with, informed me in a 
somewhat short manner at the end of our interview that her personal assistant, (an 
aĐƋuaiŶtaŶĐeͿ, had ͚ďegged ŵe to see Ǉou͛. AŶotheƌ paƌtiĐipaŶt kept ŵe ǁaitiŶg foƌ half aŶ 
hour in an open plan office before providing me with very official, party line answers to my 
ƋuestioŶs. Toǁaƌds the eŶd of ouƌ iŶteƌǀieǁ she asked ͚aƌe ǁe ŶeaƌlǇ doŶe?͛, aŶd ǁhile I ǁas 
very grateful for her time, I realised that our encounter meant much more to me than it did to 
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her. I came across several participants at public events during the fieldwork process. One 
paƌtiĐipaŶt gaǀe ŵe the staŶdaƌd ͚ŶiĐe to ŵeet Ǉou͛, eǀeŶ though I had speŶt aŶ houƌ ǁith heƌ 
about nine months previously. I did not expect anyone to remember me, but it was 
uncomfortable nonetheless. I quickly realised that attempts to create a flatter relationship 
were simply not appropriate for those participants that operated in the public eye. 
While those interviews that I thought would be enjoyable were often the opposite, 
those that I dreaded were often very surprising. I had been trying unsuccessfully to contact 
one participant for a period of eighteen months when I was eventually put in touch with her 
ďǇ aŶotheƌ paƌtiĐipaŶt. HaǀiŶg ďeeŶ stoŶeǁalled foƌ so loŶg, I ǁasŶ͛t suƌe ǁhat to eǆpeĐt fƌoŵ 
the interview. The participant turned out to be a model interviewee. As I felt the issue of trust 
was one of the reasons why she had previously ignored my requests, I was keen to emphasise 
from the outset my position as a supportive academic researcher and not a journalist. During 
the interview I realised that all the preconceived ideas I had about her and the organisation 
were wrong. Perhaps the biggest shock of all came from my research experience with a female 
Crown Court judge. On arrival at the Crown Court I was told that her trial was running late, but 
that she had asked me to sit and wait for her in the public gallery. After sentencing the 
defendant, I heard her tell the court clerk to escort me to her office and I was led across the 
courtroom to her private quarters behind the Bench. I hovered by the door as she took off her 
wig, not knowing what to expect, but she turned out to be extremely warm and engaged. 
During the course of the short interview, she paced around the room and occasionally leaned 
over the table where I was positioned, yet despite this assertive stance she remained friendly 
and helpful throughout. During one tricky interview, the shifting power was acute. One 
participant, who I was extremely keen to meet, was annoyed that I had waited for her in the 
wrong place. While I was certain that I was in location that we agreed, it was not appropriate 
to challenge this. We set off to the interview location (which turned out to be inappropriate 
for a proper conversation) aŶd it ǁas Đleaƌ that she ǁasŶ͛t iŶteƌested iŶ sŵall talk. DuƌiŶg the 
interview she was fairly brusque, but at points emotional. Such an experience concurs with 
Neal aŶd MĐLaughliŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϵͿ eǆpeƌieŶĐe of ͚ŵessǇ aŶd eŵotioŶal͛ ƌeseaƌĐh eŶĐouŶteƌs ǁith 
elites.  
Despite such experiences, it would be erroneous to describe all the female elite 
participants as difficult interviewees. While I have described some memorable interviews, I had 
some extremely positive experiences and most participants were polite and straightforward. It 
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is, however, too simplistic to conceptualise the research relationship between elites and 
researchers as a one-dimensional hierarchy (Duke, 2002: 52). Adopting a poststructuralist 
conception of power, my experiences complement those of Puwar (1997); that at times 
ƌeseaƌĐh eĐhoed AŶŶ OakleǇ͛s desĐƌiptioŶ of iŶteƌǀieǁiŶg ǁoŵeŶ as a ĐosǇ, fƌieŶdlǇ eǆĐhaŶge 
of sisteƌlǇ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ ;ϭϵϴϮ: ϱϱͿ, ǁhilst at otheƌ tiŵes it ƌelated ŵoƌe to Ball͛s desĐƌiptioŶ of 
iŶteƌǀieǁs ǁith MPs as ͚eǀeŶts of stƌuggle͛ ;ϭϵϵϰ: ϭϭϯͿ. Whateǀeƌ the eǆpeƌieŶĐe of 
interviewing female elites, it is clear that accounts must endeavour to be ͚just as diǀeƌse aŶd 
rich as the wide range of accounts to be found when the researcher is the privileged one in the 
ƌelatioŶship͛ ;Puǁaƌ, ϭϵϵϳ: ϭϭ.ϭͿ. On reflection I had inadvertently taken to adopting what Rice 
;ϮϬϭϬ: ϳϬͿ ƌefeƌƌed to as the ͚elastiĐitǇ of positioŶalitǇ͛ as a ͚field stƌategǇ͛ to help Ŷegotiate 
the often unpredictable and unequal power relations that I encountered (see also McDowell, 
1993; Duke, 2002). 
 
 
vi. Data Analysis and Self-Censorship 
 
Data Analysis 
All conversations were recorded and transcribed as soon as possible after the interview. 
‘itĐhie, “peŶĐeƌ aŶd O͛CoŶŶoƌ ;ϮϬϬϯ: ϮϬϮͿ haǀe Ŷoted that Ƌualitatiǀe data is usuallǇ 
ǀoluŵiŶous, ŵessǇ, uŶǁieldǇ aŶd disĐuƌsiǀe, siŵilaƌlǇ laďelled ďǇ Miles as ͚aŶ attractive 
ŶuisaŶĐe͛ ;ϭϵϳϵͿ. Data aŶalǇsis ĐaŶ ďe ĐoŵpliĐated aŶd ĐoŶfusiŶg, as ͚ideŶtifǇiŶg ǁhat theŵes 
to include involves the researcher making choices about what to include, what to discard and 
hoǁ to iŶteƌpƌet paƌtiĐipaŶts ǁoƌds͛ ;KiŶg aŶd HoƌƌoĐks, ϮϬϭ2: 149). The eventual published 
aĐĐouŶt, theƌefoƌe, ͚is Ŷot aŶ oďjeĐtiǀe ƌeŶdeƌiŶg of ͚ƌealitǇ͛ ďut it is the ƌeseaƌĐheƌ͛s 
iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of the faĐts that is puďlished foƌ puďliĐ ǀieǁ͛ ;“lote Moƌƌis, ϮϬϬϵ: ϮϭϰͿ.  
Although there is often a distinct stage dedicated to data analysis, the study was 
iterative in nature, whereby initial key themes were refined and adapted throughout the 
fieldwork process before being assigned to wider theories. Employing a version of template 
analysis, (which is especially suited to projects with a sample of up to 25 hour long interviews), 
a coding structure was applied to the transcribed data and revised as necessary until it 
Đaptuƌed as full a piĐtuƌe of uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg as possiďle. IŶitiallǇ adoptiŶg a ͚Đut aŶd paste͛ 
technique, data was cut up and collated with broadly similar subject areas, and within these 
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broader areas, more specific or sub-levels became apparent (the lower-level themes 
representing distinct instances or manifestations of the concept identified by the higher-level 
theme (King and Horrocks, 2012: 168)). For each empirical chapter an initial template was 
constructed on approximately six scripts and this was then used against all subsequent 
tƌaŶsĐƌipts aŶd ƌeǀised as ŶeĐessaƌǇ. This ͚iteƌatioŶ of applǇiŶg, ƌeǀising, and then reapplying 
the teŵplate͛ ;KiŶg aŶd HoƌƌoĐks, ϮϬϭϮ: ϭϲϲͿ ĐoŶtiŶued uŶtil I ǁas satisfied that it Đould seƌǀe 
as an adequate representation of my findings.  
 
The Integrity of Interview Data  
It has been purported that elite respondents agree to be interviewed as they have something 
to saǇ ;BeƌƌǇ, ϮϬϬϮͿ, aŶd ǁill use aŶ iŶteƌǀieǁ to ͚pƌeseŶt theŵselǀes iŶ a good light, Ŷot ďe 
indiscreet, to convey a particular version of events, to get arguments and points of view across, 
to deride or displace otheƌ iŶteƌpƌetatioŶs aŶd poiŶts of ǀieǁ͛ ;Ball, ϭϵϵϰ: ϵϳ-98). It is possible 
that participants may therefore exaggerate their roles and contribution (Berry, 2002) in a 
particular process, or emphasise some things whilst neglecting others (Berry, 2002; Lilleker, 
2003; Richards, 1996). However it is also perfectly natural for individuals to have differing 
perspectives of events (Lilleker, 2002: 211). Lilleker stressed that qualitative researchers must 
accept that it is not possible to accept black and white analyses of events or people, and that 
ƌeseaƌĐheƌs ŵust iŶstead ͚aĐĐept that theƌe ǁeƌe at least diffeƌeŶt peƌspeĐtiǀes, if Ŷot also 
diffeƌeŶt Ǉet ǀalid ǀeƌsioŶs of a stoƌǇ͛ ;ϮϬϬϮ: ϮϭϰͿ. It is also ǁoƌth ŵeŶtioŶiŶg the ͚aĐĐideŶtal 
deĐeptioŶ͛ that ŵaǇ oĐĐuƌ iŶ interviews when participants are recounting events from 
memory.  
When it comes to qualitative data analysis such personal interpretations can prove 
problematic, particularly in terms of reliability. Reliability pertains to the consistency and 
trustworthiness of research findings (Kvale, 2007), and one main safeguard for researchers is 
to pƌoĐess a ͚tƌiaŶgulatioŶ of souƌĐes͛ ;‘itĐhie aŶd Leǁis ϮϬϬϯ: ϮϳϲͿ. I eŶsuƌed that ďǇ Đƌoss-
checking and corroborating facts with the other primary and secondary sources mentioned 
earlier in this chapter (such as official policy reports, Hansard and newspaper articles), the 
instances recalled in interviews were validated wherever possible.  
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Publishing Political Findings and Self-Censorship 
My experiences add weight to the claim that qualitative research can be uncomfortable and 
challenging (Finlay, 2002b). Yet many qualitative researchers continue to refrain from 
reporting on the host of influences in the data collection process (Broom, Hand and Tovey, 
2009). For some, telliŶg ͚the ǁhole stoƌǇ͛ is of lesseƌ iŵpoƌtaŶĐe, ǁhilst foƌ otheƌs ;ŵǇself 
included) it is a crucial element of the research process. Reflexivity can be understood as a 
͚ĐoŶfessioŶal aĐĐouŶt of ŵethodologǇ͛ ;FiŶlaǇ, ϮϬϬϮaͿ aŶd ƌeǀealiŶg its iŶteƌsuďjeĐtiǀe 
elements can only serve to improve the integrity of qualitative data, while providing others 
with further insight into the environment within which the information emerged (Broom, Hand 
and Tovey, 2009: 63). That does not mean, however, that reflexivity comes without its own 
myriad dilemmas and decisions, mainly focused around the extent to which researchers should 
͚Đoŵe ĐleaŶ͛ ;Duke, ϮϬϬϮͿ. As FiŶlaǇ has ǁaƌŶed, eŶgagiŶg iŶ ƌefleǆiǀitǇ ĐaŶ ďe akiŶ to 
͚ŶegotiatiŶg the sǁaŵp͛ ;ϮϬϬϮaͿ aŶd ǁhile, as famously advocated by Park, social scientists 
should eǆpeĐt to get ͚the seats of theiƌ paŶts diƌtǇ ďǇ ƌeal ƌeseaƌĐh͛ ;in Burgess, 1982: 6), those 
engaged in political investigations must appreciate the real possibility of dirtying their own 
reputation in the process.  
Those walking the tightrope of political research routinely face a series of dilemmas 
ǁheŶ deĐidiŶg oŶ ǁhat iŶfoƌŵatioŶ to put ͚ out theƌe͛. While a gƌeat deal of liteƌatuƌe disĐusses 
the ethics and importance of protecting the vulnerable when publishing research findings 
(Liamputtong, 2007; Davies, Francis and Jupp, 2000), there can be a similar tendency to protect 
the elite, albeit for different reasons. Notwithstanding their ability to instruct legal 
proceedings, the fact that participants are powerful (and my case public figures) can lead to 
self-censorship (Walford, 2011: 4). Woliver (2002) described the dilemma of being told things 
in an interview that would be damaging to the respondent were they published, and this was 
certainly my experience. While it is undoubtedly more rewarding to feel the thrill of uncovering 
something new (as opposed to being fed the official line), decisions about the subsequent use 
of this data can be difficult for researchers. I left several interviews having learned a great deal 
of inside information, knowing full well that I could not use it for ethical reasons. Josselson 
neatly summarised the writing-up pƌoĐess ďǇ eǆplaiŶiŶg that she had: ͚takeŶ ŵǇself out of a 
relationship with my participants... to be in a relationship with my readers. I have, in a sense, 
ďeeŶ talkiŶg aďout theŵ ďehiŶd theiƌ ďaĐks aŶd doiŶg so puďliĐlǇ͛ ;ϭϵϵϲ: ϳϬͿ. While suĐh 
reflections may routinely relate to vulnerable participants, researchers studying elites have 
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similar moral dilemmas when deciding what politically sensitive information to include or expel 
in their publications, the stakes perhaps even higher when publishing accounts of public 
figures.  
My own research developed into a publication that is heavily self-censored, despite the 
fact that ŵǇ paƌtiĐipaŶts talked to ŵe ͚oŶ the ƌeĐoƌd͛. This oǀeƌ-censorship could perhaps be 
viewed as a method of self-protection, but as a feminist researcher my overriding loyalty has 
been to my participants. Ultimately, I do not wish to be obstructive, yet neither do I wish to 
publish a wholly sanitised account of my research encounters. It would be erroneous to assume 
that my gender, past experience and political stance did not have an impact on the finished 
result, indeed feminist research aims to be both contextual and emotional. It is therefore 
iŵpoƌtaŶt to ĐƌitiĐallǇ ƌefleĐt oŶ aŶd ͚aĐĐept ouƌ suďjeĐtiǀitǇ, ouƌ eŵotioŶs aŶd ouƌ soĐiallǇ 
gƌouŶded positioŶs [ƌatheƌ] thaŶ to assuŵe soŵe of us ĐaŶ ƌise aďoǀe theŵ͛ ;‘aŵazaŶoglu 
1992: 211, cited in Westmarland, 2001). 
 
 
vii. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that through engaging in reflexive practice criminologists are 
better positioned to scrutinise the sometimes unsettled nature of power dynamics in research 
encounters involving criminal justice policy elites. Oakley oŶĐe stated that ͚iŶteƌǀieǁiŶg is 
rather like marriage: everybody knows what it is, an awful lot of people do it, and behind each 
Đlosed fƌoŶt dooƌ theƌe is a ǁoƌld of seĐƌets͛ (2005: 217). Reflexive stories show that it is 
possible for criminologists to open a window on areas that in other research contexts would 
remain concealed from awareness (Finlay, 2002b: 541).  
Contributing to discussions of power and reflexivity, this chapter has highlighted the 
sometimes complex power symmetry that emerges when researching female elites in this field. 
It has been argued that the traditional feminist conception of power can be reversed in such 
circumstances, and it is easy to see why some argue this to be the case. While acknowledging 
the relevance of structural accounts, it may be more sensible to adopt a poststructural 
conception to the analysis of power in such settings, allowing a more flexible analysis to be 
applied to the sometimes murky emotional complexities of female elite research. As a feminist 
researcher, I believe we need more published reflections and confessional accounts from those 
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undertaking both elite and gender studies in criminology. However as a researcher of elites I 
veer towards self-censorship and continue to debate internally the extent to which I should 
͚Đoŵe ĐleaŶ͛ ;Duke, ϮϬϬϮͿ. It is theƌefoƌe easǇ to see ǁhǇ FiŶlaǇ laďelled the pƌoĐess of 
eŶgagiŶg iŶ ƌefleǆiǀitǇ as ͚peƌilous, full of ŵuddǇ aŵďiguitǇ aŶd ŵultiple tƌails͛ ;ϮϬϬϮa: ϮϭϮͿ.  
Whatever the experience of interviewing female elites, social scientists must continue 
to pƌoǀide aĐĐouŶts that aƌe ͚just as diǀeƌse aŶd ƌiĐh as the ǁide ƌaŶge of aĐĐouŶts to ďe fouŶd 
ǁheŶ the ƌeseaƌĐheƌ is the pƌiǀileged oŶe iŶ the ƌelatioŶship͛ ;Puǁaƌ, ϭϵϵϳ: ϭϭ.ϭͿ. As ǁith all 
forms of feminist reseaƌĐh, ͚ĐoŵiŶg out͛ thƌough ƌefleǆiǀe aŶalǇsis is ultiŵatelǇ a politiĐal aĐt. 
But although fraught with ambiguity and uncertainty it has the potential to spur others toward 
a more radical consciousness (Finlay, 2002b: 544). It is equally important that academics are 
not deterred from engaging with elite members of society, political or otherwise, in the quest 
for expanding criminological knowledge. Loader and Sparks (2011a: 18) have called for 
criminologists engaged in such research to develop an understandiŶg of the ͚ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes of 
politiĐs͛ ;WaldƌoŶ, ϭϵϵϵ: ϭϬϲͿ aŶd Đultiǀate a ͚Ƌualified toleƌaŶĐe͛ toǁaƌds those ǁho pƌaĐtiĐe 
politics as a vocation (Swift and White, 2008: 64). My own experiences would suggest this to 
be a judicious way forward. 
The remainder of this study is concerned with the empirical findings and advancing 
theory on that basis. Adopting the three ďuildiŶg ďloĐks of Best͛s (2013) social problems model 
as distinct areas of focus, chapter five will investigate the role of claimsmakers in their attempts 
to influence policymakers and newsmakers. Chapter six will critically assess the role of 
newsmaking iŶ the poliĐǇ pƌoĐess, aŶd ǁill disĐuss jouƌŶalists͛ opiŶioŶs on penal reformers and 
the portrayal of women offenders in crime news. Chapter seven will examine the policymaking 
process, exploring the little-known nature of relations between penal reformers and the 
policymaking elite.  
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5. Claimsmaking 
 
 
i. Introduction 
 
The aim of this study is to chart how the diverse political aĐtoƌs iŶ the ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal ƌefoƌŵ 
network pursue their political and communicative interests in the hope of achieving policy 
change. Focusing on penal reform campaigners, this chapter will explore whether, in light of 
ouƌ Ϯϰ/ϳ ͚ŵass ŵediated ƌealitǇ͛ ;Nimmo and Combs, 1983), the highly politicised nature of 
laǁ aŶd oƌdeƌ aŶd the ĐoŶseƋueŶt ͚upgƌadiŶg͛ of the puďliĐ ǀoiĐe ;‘ǇaŶ, ϮϬϬϯͿ, theiƌ task is 
ŵade haƌdeƌ iŶ the aƌeŶa of ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ, aŶ eŵotiǀe field that ƋuestioŶs tƌaditioŶal 
gender assumptions and shines a spotlight on those who have deviated from the expected 
feŵale ͚ Ŷoƌŵ͛. All penal reform campaigners ǁoƌkiŶg iŶ the field of ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ ǁeƌe 
contacted for an interview and the views of participants are incorporated into this first 
empirical chapter. Campaigners were asked to outline their thoughts on the current status of 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ, the stƌategies theǇ eŵploǇed to aĐhieǀe theiƌ ageŶda-setting goals, 
what they felt about mediated representations of women offenders and whether this affected 
their work. Evaluating the above phenomena in relation to the building blocks outlined in 
chapter two, this chapter will synthesise data and theory in relation to the overarching 
research questions. Part two will explore what campaigners perceived to be the most 
significant claimsmaking ĐhalleŶges aŶd the ǀaƌious ďaƌƌieƌs to ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal ƌefoƌŵ, 
including penal populism, government resistance and media barriers. Parts three and four will 
focus on the relations between campaigners and journalists, outlining the difficulties faced by 
former as news sources, and the various media strategies, both proactive and reactive, that 
they employ. Part five will discuss the process of policymaking, ĐoŶsideƌiŶg Best͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ 
concept of ͚insider claimsmaking͛ as ǁell as KiŶgdoŶ͛s ;ϭϵϴϰͿ ŵodel of poliĐǇ stƌeaŵs. Paƌt siǆ 
will conclude with a brief discussion of the above findings in relation to developing theoretical 
understandings. 
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ii. Campaigning Challenges 
 
Best͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ Ŷatuƌal histoƌǇ ŵodel of the social problems process argued that for claims to be 
considered seriously by policymakers they must pass along a linear process, involving a certain 
level of public support and media coverage. In considering the relevance of this concept to 
developments in ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ ƌefoƌŵ, it is iŵpoƌtaŶt to outliŶe the ǀaƌious barriers 
faced by penal reformers in this endeavour. Before discussing their individual experiences, and 
the strategies they use to mitigate potential obstacles, this section will outline what 
campaigners perceive to be the most pertinent policy challenges: penal populism, government 
resistance, developments in news media technology and news media portrayals of women 
offenders. 
 
Penal Populism 
As outlined in chapter two, Post-War penal policymaking was traditionally restricted to the 
chosen few who enjoyed insider access to the corridors of power. The overarching aim of the 
͚platoŶiĐ guaƌdiaŶs͛ ;Loadeƌ, ϮϬϬϲͿ ǁas to ͚keep Đƌiŵe aŶd puŶishŵeŶt at a safe distaŶĐe fƌoŵ 
electoral politics – to retain it, so far as possible, in the realm of quiet, melioristic, unflappable 
adŵiŶistƌatioŶ͛ ;Loadeƌ, ϮϬϬϲ: ϱϲϵͿ. Ryan identified an important change in the manner of 
penal policy making in the UK, when he documented the shift from the traditional model to a 
more political and populist style (1999, 2003; also Johnstone, 2000; Newburn, 2007; Pratt, 
2007). Many campaigners ƌeĐogŶised the pheŶoŵeŶoŶ of this ͚puŶitiǀe tuƌŶ͛ aŶd theiƌ 
requirement to work within the new paradigm of justice. Explaining the demise of the ͚platonic 
guaƌdiaŶs͛ ;Loadeƌ, ϮϬϬϲ) and their replacement with the public, Campaigner A highlighted the 
decline in government interest in elite knowledge. This had serious consequences for those 
ǁoƌkiŶg iŶ the seĐtoƌ ďeĐause; ͞ governments become much less receptive to influence by what 
I Đall ͚eǆpeƌts͛. TheǇ aƌe, I thiŶk, ŵuĐh ŵoƌe iŶteƌested iŶ the taďloids. Oǀeƌ the last tǁeŶtǇ 
years, there has been a very significant change in that the influence of elites is not so powerful 
in political things like Đƌiŵe͟. The increasingly populist nature of criminal justice policymaking 
was qualified by several other campaigners. It was agreed that while the Labour administration 
ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ did Ŷot pioŶeeƌ ͚ populist puŶitiǀeŶess͛ ;Bottoŵs, ϭϵϵϱͿ, it uŶdouďtedlǇ Đontinued the 
project with zeal. Campaigner B believed that the strategies of Tony Blair proved a watershed 
ŵoŵeŶt; ͞ǁith his tough oŶ Đƌiŵe aŶd tough oŶ the Đau
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to appeaƌ tougheƌ thaŶ eǀeƌǇoŶe else aŶd it͛s ďeĐome a paƌtǇ politiĐal toughŶess͟. Campaigner 
C siŵilaƌlǇ agƌeed that ͞it became a Dutch auction oŶ ǁho Đould ďe tougheƌ oŶ Đƌiŵe͟, aŶd 
that ͞nothing gets the tabloid readeƌship ŵoƌe eǆĐited thaŶ Đƌiŵe͟. Consistent with Franklin 
aŶd LaǀeƌǇ͛s ;ϭϵϴϵͿ ŶotioŶ of ͚legislatioŶ ďǇ taďloid͛, aŶd dƌaǁiŶg paƌallels ǁith The News of 
The World͛s campaign for Sarah͛s Laǁ, she ďelieǀed that ͞media coverage on law and order 
has ďeĐoŵe aďsolutelǇ keǇ to all of this ... I͛ŵ afƌaid too ŵuĐh policy is now made by 
Ŷeǁspapeƌs͟. Recalling the demise of Coalition Justice Secretary Rt. Hon. Ken Clarke MP for 
ďeiŶg ͞ too soft͟, Campaigneƌ C desĐƌiďed hoǁ ͞ the conversation between the government and 
the population about this is always coarsened by the fact that we have the tabloids as 
interlocutors and they rubbish aŶǇ seŶsiďle ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶs͟. Several other campaigners 
highlighted what they saw as the complex relationship between government policy, public 
opiŶioŶ aŶd the ŵedia. The ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶt foƌ politiĐiaŶs to help ͚ƌeshape͛ ŵedia agendas (Berry 
et al., 2012: 589) was considered of key importance to rectify the current situation, with 
Campaigner D ĐalliŶg foƌ ͞a [seŶsiďle] disĐussioŶ that͛s got to ďe had iŶ the eǇe of the ŵedia͟. 
Campaigner D highlighted the lack of media deliberation, with journalists routinely excluding 
the topiĐ of ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal ƌefoƌŵ ͚fƌoŵ ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ aŶd disĐussioŶ͛ ;ChiďŶall, ϭϵϴϭ: ϴϳͿ. 
As far as she was concerned, the puďliĐ aƌe pƌoǀided ǁith a ǀeƌǇ ͞shalloǁ͟ understanding of 
key issues relating to crime, aŶd ͞ uŶless it ĐaŶ ďe ŵade siŵple͟ and put into an easily digestible 
paĐkage, ͞people doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to heaƌ aďout it͟. 
 
Government Resistance: Political Will and Internal Barriers 
It is clear that the response to a policy problem is at least in part determined by the ideological 
and political values of the individuals and political parties that are engaged in finding its 
solution (Barton and Johns, 2013: 39), and policy will not be made if it is deemed politically 
dangerous or unpopular (Barton and Johns, 2013: 53). Changes in the political environment 
following the election of the Coalition government in May 2010 had serious consequences for 
the claimsmaking activities of penal reform campaigners. Most believed that the precious 
political momentum that theǇ had gaiŶed oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ duƌiŶg the CoƌstoŶ eƌa had 
ďeeŶ lost. WheŶ asked ǁhat theǇ peƌĐeiǀed to ďe the ďaƌƌieƌs to ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal ƌefoƌŵ, many 
highlighted what they viewed as the lack of clear resolve among politicians and policymakers. 
Campaigner B ďelieǀed that ͞it͛s Ŷot aďout ŵoŶeǇ, it͛s aďout leadeƌship͟, while Campaigner D 
similarly argued that ͞at the end of the day it Đoŵes doǁŶ to politiĐal ǁill͟. Campaigner E was 
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unequivocal about the need for political support, stating that reformers desperately required 
͞people like Chris Grayling. We need people iŶ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt ǁho ĐaŶ iŶflueŶĐe͟. Campaigner C 
ǁas Đleaƌ that ͞there are some areas of public life; some areas of social existence, where 
politiĐal leadeƌs haǀe to take the lead… People haǀe to ďe ďƌaǀe. AŶd I thiŶk it͛s the saŵe foƌ 
the overuse of prisons. Political leaders should be makiŶg the politiĐal ǁeatheƌ͟. Campaigner 
D also agreed that politicians Ŷeeded to ďe ďƌaǀe, aŶd that ͞the policymakers are frightened 
to death of what will come onto the papers if they are seen to take an unequal approach or a 
soft appƌoaĐh͟. She went on to descƌiďe it as a ͞fear of what might ratheƌ thaŶ ǁhat͛s alƌeadǇ 
happeŶiŶg͟. Campaigner F believed that the priority for populist politiĐiaŶs ǁas siŵplǇ ͞about 
playing to the tune of middle EŶglaŶd͟ and this meant that certain social problems, or certainly 
those considered to be less important, were ignored. 
Campaigner G, a foƌŵeƌ Điǀil seƌǀaŶt, ǁas Đleaƌ that it ǁas the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s oǁŶ 
internal barriers that stalled the agenda for change. Despite receiving funding from the 
MiŶistƌǇ of JustiĐe foƌ the estaďlishŵeŶt of the Ŷetǁoƌk of ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ ĐeŶtƌes ;the 
one-stop-shopsͿ, Điǀil seƌǀaŶts ǁeƌe ͞completely reliant on a whole host of other people. 
NOMS estate, Department of Health in terms of drugs and alcohol, mental health, treatment 
iŶ the ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ͟. He ǁeŶt oŶ to eǆplaiŶ that ͞we were constantly knocking on a closed door, 
aŶd Ŷo oŶe ǁaŶts to opeŶ. AŶd that͛s ĐƌazǇ, iŶteƌŶallǇ, Ǉou kŶoǁ, Ǉou͛ƌe all Đolleagues. You͛ƌe 
all trying to achieve the saŵe thiŶg. At least oŶ papeƌ͟. 
 
Developments in Media Technology 
As highlighted by Indermaur and Hough (2002: 11), the internet provides an important medium 
for pressure groups to communicate with the public. Considered an important tool by some, 
most campaigners viewed internet blogs (or writing for online newspapers) as a risky forum to 
articulate their viewpoints in public. Describing her experience of writing for news websites 
Campaigner A admitted that; 
 
͞The internet has unleashed and allowed people to do what they would not normally 
have done twenty years ago because of social conventions, social norms, social 
pressure. Sitting at home alone with a computer... you can also be unpleasant. If you 
talk about woŵeŶ iŶ pƌisoŶ it͛s poƌŶogƌaphiĐ, aŶd people ĐaŶ do it ďeĐause theǇ aƌe 
Ŷot ideŶtified. “o Ǉou͛ǀe got to ďe ǀeƌǇ Đaƌeful, ďeĐause ǁhilst Ǉou get a ŶiĐe little stoƌǇ 
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aďout hoǁ this pooƌ ǁoŵaŶ shouldŶ͛t ďe seŶt to pƌisoŶ, ǁhat Ǉou get as a ƌesult is a 
hornets͛ Ŷest of ĐƌaziŶess. “o it ĐaŶ ďe ĐouŶteƌpƌoduĐtiǀe. “oŵetiŵes it͛s ďetteƌ just to 
ďe Ƌuiet͟. 
 
Campaigner G siŵilaƌlǇ ďelieǀed that ͞through their anonymity [people] can say whatever they 
like with no recourse. I think people feel that that kind of blanket will allow them to say 
aŶǇthiŶg͟. He ǁeŶt oŶ to aƌgue that ͞freedom of expression is entirely right, but I guess 
Ŷeǁspapeƌ ǁeďsites haǀe soŵe kiŶd of ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ… [aŶd theǇ ŵaǇ ask theŵselǀes], if 
soŵeoŶe͛s ǁƌitiŶg soŵethiŶg iŶdeĐeŶt do ǁe ƌeallǇ ǁaŶt to host that? Is that helpful to the 
disĐussioŶ?͟ He ǁas astoŶished that ͞ďaĐklash͟ was ͞not restricted to any one newspaper 
either. You can go on more left leaning sites like perhaps The Indy or The Guardian and the 
ĐoŵŵeŶtiŶg is still atƌoĐious. It͛s ƌeallǇ shoĐkiŶg, ďeĐause it͛s alŵost like people aƌe goiŶg oŶ 
there just to be a cat amongst the pigeons͟.  
 
News Media Portrayals of Women Offenders  
As highlighted in chapter three, the rare occurrence of female crime only enhances the 
newsworthiness of the phenomenon and does little to deter sensationalised media reporting. 
Grabe et al.͛s ;ϮϬϬϲͿ testiŶg of the ͚ĐhiǀalƌǇ hǇpothesis͛, foƌ eǆaŵple, ƌeǀealed the operation 
of a ŶuaŶĐed foƌŵ of patƌiaƌĐhal ĐhiǀalƌǇ; that ǁoŵeŶ offeŶdeƌs ǁho Đoŵŵitted ͚feŵiŶiŶe͛ 
crimes were more likely to receive lenient treatment in the courts or in the media, while violent 
women offenders (or bad mothers) were likely to receive worse (for treatment in the courts 
see Carlen, 1983; Hedderman and Gelsthorpe, 1997). Campaigners were asked their views on 
news mediated portrayals of women offenders, and what affect (if any) this had on their 
strategies. Interestingly, opinion was divided. Some believed that, on the whole, news media 
representations of women offenders tended to be balanced, although the vast majority did 
not.  
Consistent with the conclusions of Grabe et al.(2006), several campaigners conceded 
that news media coverage of women offenders was on the whole, more sympathetic than that 
given to their male counterparts. Campaigner H provided examples of both, but felt that on 
ďalaŶĐe, ͞using media in relation to women on the whole [you get] quite a sympathetic 
response. Not alǁaǇs, ďut ŶeaƌlǇ alǁaǇs͟. Campaigner I believed that; 
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͞Particularly on the issue of very vulnerable, troubled, disturbed women in custody and 
issues around self-harm and suicide, [women] tend to get reasonably sensitive 
treatment. I think they may be seen as more deserving and not as undeserving as other 
pƌisoŶeƌs… AŶd ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ iŶ ŵagaziŶes oƌ ĐoŶsuŵeƌ-orientated lifestyle publications, 
there is more sympathy for the issue than there is for serious male criminals in 
ĐustodǇ͟.  
 
Despite such viewpoints (and consistent with feminist literature), the majority of campaigners 
felt that women offenders were treated far worse in the media than their male counterparts. 
Campaigner J was unequivocal iŶ heƌ ƌespoŶse, statiŶg that ͞it͛s eǆtƌeŵelǇ Ŷegatiǀe... ǁe doŶ͛t 
think theƌe is aŶǇ positiǀe Đoǀeƌage͟. TappiŶg iŶto CaƌleŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϮ; see also Faith, ϮϬϭϭͿ ĐoŶĐept 
of ͚douďle deǀiaŶĐǇ͛, CaŵpaigŶeƌ F ďelieǀed that ͞there is a sense in which women are seen 
as doubly deviant and that creates a lot of interest in the ŵedia, ďeĐause it is so uŶusual͟. 
Campaigner C believed that news media portrayals of women offenders simply boiled down to 
͞double sexual standards. We expect them to ďehaǀe ďetteƌ thaŶ ŵeŶ͟. “he ǁeŶt oŶ to aƌgue 
that ͞ǁe judge theŵ ďǇ aŶotheƌ field, ǁell out of the oƌdiŶaƌǇ oŶe. It͛s aďout Ŷot ďeiŶg deĐeŶt 
ǁoŵeŶ…“o ǁoŵeŶ aƌe ĐoŶfƌoŶted ǁith these aǁful pƌoďleŵs of ďeiŶg ĐhaƌaĐteƌised as ďeiŶg 
lesseƌ ǁoŵeŶ, ǁoŵeŶ ǁho͛ǀe failed͟. Campaigner G was undecided, yet when considering 
iŶdiǀidual Đases felt that, ͞KaƌeŶ Mattheǁs: it͛s a ŵotheƌ, it͛s a ǁoŵaŶ, aŶd people aƌe 
shoĐked. Theƌe͛s soŵethiŶg aƌouŶd heƌ ďeiŶg a ǁoŵaŶ͟. Campaigner G recalled a newspaper 
article regarding high-profile feŵale offeŶdeƌ TƌaĐie AŶdƌeǁs, ͞it was reported in the Sun18  
that she was on day release, accessing one of the services that we were actually funding. And 
that was seen as a terrible thing, rather than actually reintegrating someone back into society 
ǁheŶ she͛s ĐoŵiŶg up to the poiŶt of ƌelease͟. While some campaigners worked to challenge 
media stereotypes, there was pessimism about the likelihood of this occurring. Highlighting an 
eǆaŵple of ͞igŶoƌaŶt͟ journalism, Campaigner D recalled a stereotypical story in a local 
newspaper ͞that BlaĐkpool ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐeŶtƌe ǁas ƌunning head massage classes for prisoners... 
But that ǁas all that Ǉou saǁ, that͛s all theǇ piĐk up aŶd so it͛s a totallǇ igŶoƌaŶt ǀieǁ͟. Those 
campaigners that worked with journalists admitted that it was hard to get them to move on 
fƌoŵ the ͚saŵe old ƋuestioŶs͛ aďout ǁoŵeŶ͛s offeŶdiŶg, ǁith ŵediated disĐouƌse ƌoutiŶelǇ 
                                                          
18 ͚Eǀil AŶdƌeǁs͛ daǇs out of jail at aŶgeƌ ĐoŶtƌol ĐeŶtƌe͛ The Sun 24 September 2001 
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framed using sexist urban myths. The continued use of sensationalist and distorted 
ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶs of ǁoŵeŶ͛s offeŶdiŶg ďǇ soŵe journalists led many campaigners ͚Ŷot to 
ďotheƌ͛ ǁith ŵedia ǁork. OŶe ͚dispossessed͛ ĐaŵpaigŶeƌ simply concluded that media work 
just isŶ͛t ͞aŶ aǀeŶue that Ǉou ĐaŶ use͟.  
With some campaigners ǀieǁiŶg the ŵedia as a ͚ŶoŶ-ĐoŵpliaŶt paƌtŶeƌ͛ ;HiltoŶ et al., 
2013), others understood the landscape to be far more complicated. Despite the above 
comments, Campaigner G believed that drawing hard and fast distinctions about media 
representations was a dangerous exercise. He did, hoǁeǀeƌ, ĐoŶĐede that ͞some female 
offeŶdeƌs do [get tƌeated ǁoƌse]… ďeĐause of tƌaditioŶal geŶdeƌ stereotypes and 
assuŵptioŶs… CeƌtaiŶ assuŵptioŶs ŵaǇ Đoŵe iŶto plaǇ aďout ŵotheƌhood aŶd tƌaditioŶal 
ƌoles… [But] Ǉou haǀe to ďe Đaƌeful aďout dƌaǁiŶg ĐoŶĐlusioŶs, ďeĐause I thiŶk it͛s Đoŵpleǆ͟. 
HighlightiŶg the Ŷeǁs ŵedia͛s diĐhotoŵous uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of feŵale offeŶdeƌs as ͚aŶ eǀil 
ǁoŵaŶ oƌ a pooƌ thiŶg͛ ;BeƌƌiŶgtoŶ aŶd Honkatukia, 2002), Campaigner I viewed two 
contradicting treŶds oĐĐuƌƌiŶg siŵultaŶeouslǇ: ͞one is the very vulnerable, mother, poor, 
mental health problems and addiction and that trend runs very strong. But surprisingly perhaps 
theƌe͛s aŶotheƌ ĐuƌƌeŶt ǁhiĐh is the ǁoŵeŶ should kŶoǁ ďetteƌ ĐuƌƌeŶt… “o I thiŶk theƌe aƌe 
two tƌeŶds… eǀeŶ iŶ the saŵe ŵedia͟. She went on to desĐƌiďe ŵedia Đoǀeƌage as ͞really 
vulnerable or really terrible... and theƌe͛s Ŷot a ŵiddle of the ƌoad͟, ĐoŶĐediŶg that it ǁas 
͞maybe broadlǇ the ďƌoadsheet, taďloid split͟.  
It is clear, therefore, that some campaigners place substantial blame at the door of the 
news media for alarmist coverage that does little to further their humanitarian cause and may 
actually encourage punitive attitudes. Yet while unhelpful, it is not possible to categorically 
state the eǆteŶt to ǁhiĐh ͚igŶoƌaŶt͛ jouƌŶalisŵ aĐtuallǇ iŶhiďits peŶal ƌefoƌm. It is, however, 
clear that constituting the main channel of public information about crime (Hobbs and 
Hamerton, 2014; Marsh and Melville, 2014), some responsibility for distorted reporting must 
fall at the door of certain newspapers. Wary of this, it is easy to understand why many 
campaigners have preferred to operate out of the media spotlight, and have not actively 
sought to gaiŶ pƌess atteŶtioŶ foƌ theiƌ Đlaiŵs. MaŶǇ siŵplǇ ǁish to opeƌate ͚uŶdeƌ the ƌadaƌ͛, 
Ǉet otheƌs haǀe goŶe fuƌtheƌ aŶd Đalled foƌ gƌeateƌ ͚ƌefoƌŵ ďǇ stealth͛ ;disĐussed iŶ seĐtioŶ v.). 
Despite the negative backdrop described by some, interviews revealed that media work is 
still considered important by others. Considering the role of the media in the process of reform, 
the following two sections will discuss the different strategies employed by campaigners in 
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more detail, beginning with the difficulties they experience in attempts to influence the 
ŵetaphoƌiĐal ͚oŶioŶ͛ of the ŵedia ageŶda ;MĐCoŵďs, ϮϬϭϰͿ. 
 
 
iii. Campaigners as News Sources 
 
It is clear that claimsmakers seeking to gain publicity do so for many reasons. In focusing more 
attention on their claims they may recruit more funding, yet coverage in the media also 
improves legitimacy in the policy process, and the ability to exert greater pressure on 
policymakers (Tichenor, Donohue and OlieŶ, ϭϵϴϬ; BeƌƌǇ, ϭϵϵϵͿ. ͚“uĐĐess͛ foƌ politiĐal aĐtoƌs 
wanting such public conversations may therefore ride on their ability to penetrate the 
ŵetaphoƌiĐal ŵedia ͚oŶioŶ͛ ;MĐCoŵďs, ϮϬϭϰͿ, aŶd shape the ŶeǁsŵakiŶg pƌoĐess iŶ aŶ 
attempt to influence public opinion and policymakers (Blumenthal, 1980; Cook, 1998). One 
former journalist-turned-campaigner (Campaigner KͿ ǁas Đleaƌ that ͞ the media have to be part 
of aŶǇ stƌategǇ. I doŶ͛t thiŶk Ǉou ĐaŶ igŶoƌe the ŵedia. I thiŶk usiŶg Đleǀeƌ taĐtiĐs, plaǇiŶg the 
game with journalists, being savvy, is part of getting your message out there and part of 
achieving the momentum foƌ ĐhaŶge͟. It is clear that as campaigners have become more 
professional, many have devoted increasing resources to media work (Hilton et al., 2013: 147). 
Drawing on his past experience in journalism, Campaigner K aĐkŶoǁledged that ͞there are 
some organisations that are more media savvy. The Howard League, Prison Reform Trust, they 
certainly want to get their name in the media, they want to have conversations with journalists 
and they want to help them. It͛s a tǁo ǁaǇ pƌoĐess͟. A key issue for smaller organisations was 
the ͞greateƌ suspiĐioŶ aŶd gƌeateƌ feaƌ͟ due to ͞a lack of knowledge about how to engage and 
theǇ doŶ͛t kŶoǁ hoǁ to ďuild relatioŶships ǁith jouƌŶalists͟. Campaigner K believed that media 
Đoǀeƌage ǁas depeŶdaŶt ͞ on the nature of the organisation, the size, the resources, what their 
focus and purpose is... Some organisations have recruited... former journalists and that makes 
a big diffeƌeŶĐe͟. This section will outline some of the difficulties faced by campaigners in their 
attempts to influence the media agenda, focusing on issues of media disinterest, resources and 
moral dilemmas.  
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Lack of Media Interest 
There was a widespread recognition among campaigners that the issue of ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
imprisonment (and the need to reform it) was not considered newsworthy by the vast majority 
of journalists writing about crime and home affairs. Unsuccessful attempts to penetrate the 
ŵetaphoƌiĐal ͚oŶioŶ͛ aŶd iŶflueŶĐe the ŵedia ageŶda ;MĐCoŵďs, ϮϬϭϰͿ ǁeƌe ǁidelǇ 
articulated. Campaigner F explained that a persistent barrier to media coverage was down to 
jouƌŶalists͛ disinterest in policy stoƌies aďout pƌisoŶs, aŶd that ͞Ǉou͛ǀe ƌeallǇ got to fight as a 
penal reformer to get something of youƌ ageŶda iŶto the puďliĐ doŵaiŶ͟. Campaigner F 
explained that media stƌategies iŶǀolǀed thiŶgs like ͞using celebrities quite a lot, engaging 
younger celebrities to get them to talk about pƌisoŶs. But it is diffiĐult͟. Working against the 
dominant punitive crime-media paradigm was a difficult task for campaigners seeking to 
aƌtiĐulate theiƌ ͚ĐouŶteƌ-Đlaiŵs͛. Campaigneƌ L ǁas Đleaƌ that ͞the reality of the general 
unpopularity of the issues around prisoners presents a serious limitation to any promotional 
iŶitiatiǀe oƌ aĐtiǀitǇ, [aŶd] these aƌe fuƌtheƌ uŶdeƌŵiŶed ďǇ the peƌĐeptioŶ of ͚ĐƌiŵiŶals͛ aŶd 
ďǇ the geŶeƌal laĐk of iŶteƌest͟. RecalliŶg the ͚old ǁaǇ of doiŶg thiŶgs͛, CaŵpaigŶeƌ K (a former 
journalist) explained that: 
 
͞BaĐk iŶ the ϴϬs theǇ͛d get a pƌess ƌelease aŶd go doǁŶ Fleet “tƌeet aŶd liteƌallǇ just 
put them through the letterbox with a fair assumption that it would be in the papers 
the Ŷeǆt daǇ. Well it doesŶ͛t ǁoƌk like that aŶǇŵoƌe, theƌe͛s ďeeŶ a shift to Đoǀeƌ ŵoƌe 
lifestǇle jouƌŶalisŵ, less haƌd Ŷeǁs aŶd I thiŶk the seĐtoƌ loďďǇists, ĐaŵpaigŶeƌs doŶ͛t 
understand that as a result of that they need to work harder to build relationships with 
jouƌŶalists. “o it ďeĐoŵes ŵoƌe of a ĐhalleŶge foƌ theŵ. TheǇ ĐaŶ͛t just ǁƌite a pƌess 
ƌelease, put it oŶ aŶ eŵail aŶd hit seŶd aŶd assuŵe that theǇ͛ll get it iŶ the Ŷeǁspapeƌ. 
Most jouƌŶalists hit the delete ďuttoŶ͟.  
 
Highlighting the liŵits to the ͚ĐaƌƌǇiŶg ĐapaĐities of iŶstitutioŶs͛ ;Hilgaƌtner and Bosk, 1988), 
Campaigner K believed that achieving media Đoǀeƌage ǁas gettiŶg haƌdeƌ; ͞because papers 
Ŷoǁ doŶ͛t ƌuŶ as ŵaŶǇ stoƌies [oŶ pƌisoŶ] as theǇ used to. OK Ǉou ĐaŶ get thiŶgs oŶliŶe, but 
Ǉou ĐaŶ get satuƌatioŶ ǁith hoǁ ŵaŶǇ stoƌies theǇ͛ll take aďout pƌisoŶ, pƌisoŶ ƌefoƌŵ oƌ 
ĐƌiŵiŶal justiĐe ƌefoƌŵ. “o I thiŶk it͛s haƌd aŶd ĐaŵpaigŶiŶg oƌgaŶisatioŶs aƌe seeŶ as ƌent-a-
Ƌuote, saŵe old thiŶg͟. Questioning the effectiveness of campaign strategies in the current 
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climate, Campaigner E tapped into the concept of newsǁoƌthiŶess aŶd ĐoŶĐluded that ͞it͛s 
alŵost like the ǁaǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh ǁe͛ƌe doiŶg it, isŶ͛t the ǁaǇ to ďe doiŶg it aŶǇŵoƌe ďeĐause it͛s 
going on deaf eaƌs, it͛s Ŷot ďeiŶg heaƌd͟. Consistent with the news values described by Chibnall 
(1977) and lateƌ Jeǁkes ;ϮϬϬϰͿ, she ĐoŶĐeded; ͞it͛s Ŷot doŶkeǇs, it͛s Ŷot ĐhildƌeŶ, it͛s Ŷot 
attƌaĐtiǀe, that͛s the ďottoŵ liŶe. People doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to kŶoǁ͟. In line with such viewpoints, 
Campaigner I believed that strategies to gain media coverage needed to become more 
dynamic. Alluding to the importance of framing as an important rhetorical strategy, she 
ďelieǀed that it ǁas ͞a responsibility for us in the sector to think ͚ǁhǇ aƌe ǁe Ŷot gettiŶg 
heaƌd?͛ and actually maybe we need to write a really well-written letter to The Times rather 
thaŶ seŶd out a Ƌuote… “o I thiŶk it͛s aďout telliŶg the ƌight stoƌǇ iŶ the ƌight ǁaǇ͟.  
 
Resource Issues  
To Thrall, (2006: 417) breaking through the resource barrier to eŶtƌǇ iŶ the ͚ŵaƌketplaĐe of 
ideas͛, looŵs as the ŵost ĐƌitiĐal step foƌ Đlaiŵsŵakeƌs seekiŶg to plaǇ a ƌole iŶ puďliĐ deďates. 
News capability, or the ability to have a presence in the media, takes significant organisational 
resources, and it is clear that many penal reform campaigners simply do not have enough of 
them (Thrall, 2006: 410; see also Schlesinger, Tumber and Murdock, 1991). Larger, more 
resource-rich organisations had clearer communicative strategies and employed press officials 
to help improve their media presence, whereas smaller organisations (or lone campaigners) 
described extreme difficulty in their dealings with the press. Such campaigners demonstrated 
either a lack of knowledge about the news production process or a fear about how to interact 
with journalists. Others endeavoured to work with journalists, but were at an institutional 
disadvantage when compared to the larger organisations. Campaigner E, for example, 
explained that unlike other, larger campaigning organisations, she had no dedicated media or 
communications staff to follow up requests or ensure a continuing presence in the media; 
 
͞We aƌe Đalled a lot ďǇ jouƌŶalists, ďǇ teleǀisioŶ, ďǇ ƌadio, ǁe͛ƌe Đalled ďǇ a lot of people. 
Now what keeps happening to us is that we are called to gather information, but we 
are not used as the quote. So we are a great resource [to journalists], but because we 
doŶ͛t haǀe the ƌesouƌĐes to folloǁ it up, [ǁe aƌe Ŷot gettiŶg Ƌuoted]. BeĐause I͛ǀe got 
no PR, no media team. So consequently when someone phoŶes up aŶd saǇs ͚hoǁ͛s the 
LA“PO Bill goiŶg to iŵpaĐt oŶ ǁoŵeŶ?͛ I giǀe theŵ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ, I talk theŵ thƌough it, 
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I giǀe theŵ ouƌ staŶĐe. I Đould speŶd aŶ houƌ oŶ the phoŶe doiŶg that. AŶd theŶ that͛s 
it. And then a fantastic article will come out, and there will be no name, no quote from 
us͟. 
 
CoŶĐediŶg that ͞it could be ďeĐause ǁe͛ƌe Ŷot pushǇ eŶough͟ she highlighted the ͞key people 
that get ŵeŶtioŶed. But theǇ ĐaŶ ďe iŶ aŶ aƌtiĐle that ǁe͛ǀe aĐtuallǇ fed-in an enormous 
amount of information [into], but ǁe͛ƌe Ŷot ŵeŶtioŶed͟. Aware of such issues, she admitted 
͞we are actually looking at this. Our media, our media response, aŶd ǁhǇ ǁe aƌeŶ͛t 
ŵeŶtioŶed͟. Due to the limited number of stories that news publications are prepared to run 
on the generally un-newsworthy subject of penal reform, it is clear that a few campaigners are 
routinely quoted at the expense of others. Operating in larger, more established organisations, 
they are able to work with specialist media and communications staff to improve media 
coverage. Smaller, less established or less well-known organisations consequently struggle to 
get their voices heard in the public sphere.   
 
Moral dilemmas 
HighlightiŶg the dileŵŵas faĐed ďǇ soŵe ͚pƌisoŶeƌ gƌoups͛, those ǁho fiŶd it diffiĐult to ͚ďƌeak 
away from an insider relationship because they may be dependent on government assistance͛ 
;GƌaŶt, ϭϵϴϵ: ϭϲͿ, CaŵpaigŶeƌ D desĐƌiďed the ͞need to be seen as not too critical of 
goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͟. CaŵpaigŶeƌ K was clear, however, that such a situation meant that some 
campaigners ͞risk not giving quotes or comments in the media that are sufficiently punchy or 
that aƌe goiŶg to ŵake good ĐopǇ͟. In such cases too much publicity can be dangerous (Miller, 
2010: 128) and campaigners can find themselves effectively ͚gagged͛.  CaŵpaigŶeƌ E admitted 
that it ǁas ͞a really fine line, because if we make the decision to go right out there... we would 
still be funded by seventy per cent of our funders, but we would lose thirty per cent at least. If 
we were to be that controversial, it would possibly affect our access to prisons. And what we 
have to do is weigh up supporting the women and providing a ǀehiĐle foƌ a ǀoiĐe foƌ theŵ͟. 
  It is widely acknowledged that the representation of crime largely focuses on specific 
cases rather than wider debates around causes (Greer, 2013: 146, emphasis added; Rock, 
ϭϵϳϯ; Gƌeeƌ, ϮϬϭϮͿ. This disĐuƌsiǀe spaĐe leaǀes little oppoƌtuŶitǇ foƌ ƌeadeƌs to ͚fullǇ 
appƌeĐiate, uŶdeƌstaŶd oƌ iŶteƌpƌet the iŵpliĐatioŶs of eǀeŶts͛ ;GƌeeŶďeƌg, ϮϬϬϮ: ϭϵϰ) and 
wider social problems. It also provides a serious obstacle to campaigners who want to talk in 
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terms of policy, and not personality. Some campaigning dilemmas related to the decisions 
faced when deciding whether or not to allow journalists direct contact with their service users. 
Consistent with the key news value of ͚peƌsoŶalisatioŶ͛, CaŵpaigŶeƌ E was aware that:  
 
͞CƌappǇ ŵagaziŶes, taďloids, theǇ ǁaŶt ǁoŵeŶ. AŶd ǁe͛ƌe ƌeallǇ pƌoteĐtiǀe oǀeƌ theŵ. 
AŶd oŶe of the ƌeasoŶs ǁhǇ I thiŶk it͛s haƌd foƌ ouƌ sector to get coverage is because 
we are so protective over our clients, and they are so vulnerable. The press come to us 
wanting a woman. They want their voice, they want their picture. The general public 
will listen to a life story. Without the actual womaŶ, the ŵedia doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to kŶoǁ͟.  
 
Routinely ƌefusiŶg jouƌŶalists aĐĐess to ͞ the women͟, Campaigner D adŵitted that ͞ quite often 
ǁe͛ƌe tuƌŶiŶg theŵ aǁaǇ͟. Such a strategy meant that her organisation received less media 
coverage than may have otherwise have been the case.   
 
 
iv. Media Strategies: Proactive and Reactive 
 
Proactive Strategies 
 
A major research preoccupation of this study is to investigate how penal reform campaigners 
attempt to use the news media to influence the policy agenda. While a primary tool of 
contemporary lobbying is the use and manipulation of the media (Hobbs and Hamerton, 2014: 
72; see also Peele, 2004: 353), this is clearly dependent on the subject matter at hand. That 
the media can act as important sources to publicise the issues of pressure groups (Hobbs and 
Hamerton, 2014: 5) is widely recognised, but this is not universally operationalised.  
Interviews revealed that those campaigners that did wish to iŶflueŶĐe the ͚fuŶd of 
ideas͛ ;PƌiĐe aŶd TeǁksďuƌǇ, ϭϵϵϳ: ϭϳϳͿ atteŵpted to do so ǀia opposing strategies. Some 
campaigners were aware of the importance of having a few key messages rather than 
atteŵptiŶg to ͚do eǀeƌǇthiŶg͛, ǁhile otheƌs adopted ŵoƌe of a scatter gun approach. Some 
sought to develop better relations with journalists (which usually meant a deepening of 
ƌelatioŶs ǁith the ͚usual suspeĐts͛Ϳ, ǁhile otheƌs ;iŶ the ŵiŶoƌitǇͿ eǆplaiŶed that theǇ eǆpliĐitlǇ 
targeted those who were not considered traditionally sympathetic to the agenda. Influencing 
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public opinion was a concern for several campaigners, yet this seemed to be a secondary 
concern for most; given limits on resources, communicative strategies mainly focused on work 
to contact the elite opinion formers in politics and civil society. During discussions of such 
strategies, several major themes emerged. It became obvious that penal reformers had clear 
targets for media work; that they perceived their legitimacy would improve through increased 
media coverage; that they sometimes engaged in deliberate framing strategies; that they 
appƌeĐiated the ͚ŶeǁsǁoƌthǇ͛ Ŷeed foƌ huŵaŶ iŶteƌest stoƌies; that soŵe uŶdeƌstood the 
iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of Ŷot taƌgetiŶg the ͚usual suspeĐts͛; aŶd that soŵe ǁeƌe keeŶ to ďuild 
ƌelatioŶships ǁith jouƌŶalists͛. DƌaǁiŶg oŶ ƌeleǀaŶt theoƌetiĐal liteƌatuƌe, this suďstaŶtiǀe 
section will explore each of these themes in turn.  
 
The Targets of News Coverage 
“ĐhlesiŶgeƌ aŶd Tuŵďeƌ͛s aƌguŵeŶt that ͚ŵedia stƌategies ďǇ pƌessuƌe gƌoups aƌe… stƌoŶglǇ 
centred on elite media as both educative vehicles and as a means of communication with 
opinion-formers͛ ;ϭϵϵϰ: ϭϬϰ, eŵphasis addedͿ ǁas eǀideŶĐed thƌoughout the iŶteƌǀieǁ 
process. While some campaigners were understandably wary about divulging this strategy, 
others were more upfront. Campaigner K believed that;  
 
͞A lot of these organisations want to be able to be recognised for punching above their 
weight and the media is a vehicle to enable them to do that. I think they are primarily 
trying to get into the media to try and influence Whitehall and Westminster, so whether 
that be MPs, Peers, civil servants, SpAds [Special Advisors], Ministers and people in and 
aƌouŶd MiŶisteƌs͟.  
 
The vast majority of campaigners confirmed that the main targets of their media work were 
not the general public, but the politicians and policymakers in Westminster and Whitehall. 
Campaigner A simply stated, ͞ if you want to influence Ministers, then you want to get the front 
page of The Times͟. CaŵpaigŶeƌ D eǆplaiŶed that ͞ďeĐause ǁe doŶ͛t haǀe the ƌesouƌĐes oƌ 
ĐapaĐitǇ to ĐhaŶge puďliĐ opiŶioŶ, ǁe ǁouldŶ͛t eǀeŶ atteŵpt it... “o ǁe ǁould taƌget the ŵedia 
to influence people who can make a difference, specifically oŶ the issues ǁe͛ƌe ǁoƌkiŶg oŶ͟. 
As far as she was concerned, ŵedia ǁoƌk aiŵed to pƌoǀide ͞ a marker, or waving a flag or saying 
͚look, this is ǁhat ǁe͛ƌe doiŶg͛ aŶd ŵakiŶg suƌe that the ǁideƌ politiĐal ǁoƌld is aǁaƌe that ǁe 
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aƌe ĐoŶĐeƌŶed aďout this issue͟. Campaigner A desĐƌiďed ŵedia ǁoƌk as a ͞gaŵe͟, ďeĐause 
͞the decision-ŵakeƌs also ƌead the pƌess aŶd also soŵetiŵes Ǉou͛ƌe plaǇiŶg a gaŵe ǁhiĐh is 
about trying to expose something a policymaker Ŷeeds to ŵake a deĐisioŶ aďout͟. DesĐƌiďiŶg 
ŵedia ǁoƌk as ͞a douďle-edged sǁoƌd͟, Campaigner A went on to explain that; 
 
͞You need to get media coverage to show politicians that there is an issue, or civil 
servants, the people making decisions. So you want media coverage, not because 
Ǉou͛ƌe ŶeĐessaƌilǇ talkiŶg to the puďliĐ, ďeĐause Ƌuite hoŶestlǇ ǁe doŶ͛t have the 
ƌesouƌĐes to ĐaŵpaigŶ iŶ that ǁaǇ, aŶd fƌaŶklǇ I doŶ͛t Đaƌe ǁhat theǇ thiŶk. TheǇ͛ƌe Ŷot 
the people ŵakiŶg the deĐisioŶs͟.  
 
The news media ǁas ĐoŶseƋueŶtlǇ ǀieǁed as a ͞ĐoŶduit to otheƌ people, aŶd it͛s a pincer 
ŵoǀeŵeŶt if Ǉou like͟. Campaigner M saw ŵedia Đoǀeƌage as iŵpoƌtaŶt to ͞reflect the public 
ǀieǁs ďaĐk at MiŶisteƌs, so the oŶe thiŶg ǁe do is polliŶg…theƌe aƌe thiŶgs Ǉou ĐaŶ do ďǇ tƌǇiŶg 
to influence attitudes to ensure there is a more accurate reflection of public opinion which is 
fed into puďliĐ deďate͟.  
 
News Coverage and Political Legitimacy 
While media coverage was largely viewed as secondary to the activities that take place in 
Westminster and Whitehall, campaigners did however acknowledge that an improved media 
presence could mean improved legitimacy and improved chances of a greater stake in the 
policy process. The issue of being considered as legitimate with politicians and policymakers 
was a reoccurring one, and campaigners saǁ it as giǀiŶg theŵ a ͚seat at the taďle͛ aŶd ďiggeƌ 
stake in the policymaking process. Many found that a higher media profile certainly helped 
their lobbying power. Campaigner H eǆplaiŶed that ͞ǁe͛ǀe got iŶflueŶĐe, aŶd that is paƌtlǇ 
thƌough ŵedia… I leaƌŶed ƌeallǇ ƋuiĐklǇ that ǁheŶ Ǉou do get pƌofiled iŶ the media and your 
charity is profiled regularly, then when you want to see a Minister, a Minister agrees. You know, 
that͛s hoǁ it ǁoƌks͟. Campaigner I similaƌlǇ stated that ŵedia Đoǀeƌage ͞absolutely has that 
other benefit which is to influence, it helps if they know who you are, and a good charity with 
something interesting to say. So we definitely found that as our media has gone up, our ability 
to iŶflueŶĐe has goŶe up͟. “he ƌeĐalled ͞examples of when we put a letter into The Times on 
an issue, and a few days later got a phoŶe Đall aďout that issue͟. Campaigner K recalled an 
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iŶstaŶĐe ǁheŶ his oƌgaŶisatioŶ ͞bought out a report, and it got about five or six paragraphs in 
The Guardian. But officials came back to us and said this was bought to our attention because 
the Home Secretary at the time, David Blunkett heard that story, and wanted to know what 
was going on...  So if you make a politician ask questions then through coverage in the media 
Ǉou͛ƌe goiŶg to ďegiŶ a pƌoĐess of tƌǇiŶg to deliǀeƌ poliĐǇ ĐhaŶge͟.  
 
Strategic Issue Framing 
As highlighted in chapter two, one of the best documented methods available to claimsmakers 
is to structure their issues through a process of framing (Terkildsen, Schnell and Ling, 1998; 
Kitzinger, 2000, 2007). By framing their messages iŶ easilǇ ĐoŵpƌeheŶdiďle ͚shoƌthaŶd͛, 
claimsmakers are able to ͚ defiŶe the gist of the ĐoŶtƌoǀeƌsǇ foƌ the puďliĐ, the ŵedia, aŶd otheƌ 
keǇ politiĐal ageŶts͛ ;TeƌkildseŶ, “ĐhŶell aŶd LiŶg, ϭϵϵϴ: ϰϳͿ aŶd iŶflueŶĐe the ͚aĐĐepted tƌuths͛ 
about a social problem. Yet this is no straightforward task. Engaging in a process of strategic 
information management requires political actors to make comprehensive decisions about the 
organisation of a messaging structure, along with efforts to influence its subsequent reporting. 
Some penal reform campaigners understood the concept of framing and were aware that they 
Ŷeeded to stop saǇiŶg ͚the saŵe old thiŶg͛ aŶd foĐus oŶ telling the story in the ͚right͛ ǁaǇ. By 
no means a universal strategy, the right way for some meant framing their messages in ways 
that were more likely to resonate with those who were traditionally unsympathetic to the 
agenda (adopting more punitive frames), although the general picture that emerged was a 
haphazard one. Appreciating that they needed to be opportune when it came to coverage 
meant that many campaigners gave less thought to the strategic messages that they wanted 
to pursue. Some engaged in a confusing scatter gun approach, which acted to blur the key 
points that they worked to articulate. Interviews revealed that campaigners working in this 
aƌea puƌsued a ǀaƌietǇ of ƌhetoƌiĐal disĐouƌse aligŶed to ‘utheƌfoƌd͛s ;ϭϵϵϯͿ punitive ideology 
(Campaigner N, for example), humanitarian ideology (Campaigner E, Campaigner D and 
Campaigner J, for example), and combinations of all three (including the ideology of ͚ effiĐieŶĐy͛; 
Campaigner A, Campaigner H and Campaigner F, for example). 
Engaging in a process of strategic frame alignment (Snow et al., 1986), Campaigner F 
was keen to stress the importance of messaging for campaign success. He explained that 
͞ǁe͛ǀe tƌied to ǁoƌk out ďetteƌ ǁhat soŵe of the keǇ ŵessages ǁeƌe that ǁe ǁeƌe tƌǇiŶg to 
get aĐƌoss…. AŶd so it ǁas aďout tƌǇiŶg to fiŶd a ǁaǇ of ƌeĐoŶŶeĐtiŶg peŶal ƌefoƌŵ ǁith ǀalues 
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that people would go, aĐtuallǇ I suppoƌt that͟. Campaigner N similarly talked about the need 
foƌ soŵe ͞ǀeƌǇ, ǀeƌǇ Đleaƌ ŵessages͟ and underlined the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of Ŷot gettiŶg ͞distracted 
talking about things which you then shoot yourself in the foot [with], but you stick to what it is 
Ǉou ǁaŶt to saǇ͟.  If some sections of the news media are able to act as an impediment to 
progressive penal policy for women, campaigners operating in this area must pursue claims to 
ĐouŶteƌaĐt the ͚laŶdŵaƌk Ŷaƌƌatiǀes͛ ;Best, ϮϬϭϯ: ϭϰϰͿ that have tended to dominate 
disĐussioŶ aďout ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ. Describing the challenging task of working against such 
entrenched templates, Campaigner C believed that ͞the people who are arguing for reform 
have to become better at showing the stories of woŵeŶ ŵakiŶg good....I thiŶk ǁe͛ǀe got to do 
a better job ourselves of breaking down the steƌeotǇpes, of telliŶg the stoƌǇ͟.  
Some campaigners were critical of those who they believed over-relied on traditional 
humanitarian rhetoric. While Campaigner A believed issue framing was an important strategy, 
she ǁas ͞quite careful not always to portray women as the victim, even though that is often 
the Đase͟. Campaigner I siŵilaƌlǇ ĐautioŶed that ͞there is a danger that if you paint people as 
victims that turns off some groups ǁho doŶ͛t like that ŵessage͟. Such viewpoints are 
ĐoŶsisteŶt ǁith Altheide aŶd CoǇle͛s ;ϮϬϬϲͿ ŶotioŶ of ͚sŵaƌt oŶ Đƌiŵe͛, ǁhiĐh Đalls foƌ ͚saǀǀǇ͛ 
ĐaŵpaigŶeƌs to filteƌ oƌ fƌaŵe aĐĐouŶts thƌough a ͚tough oŶ Đƌiŵe͛ oƌ puŶitiǀe ƌhetoƌiĐ. 
Believing that such messages would be more successful with journalists and policymakers if 
framed within the dominant media-crime paradigm (see Wallack et al., (1999; Johnson-Cartee, 
2005; Gramsci, 1971), Campaigner N believed that colleagues needed to; 
 
͞Stop this ĐoŶstaŶt foĐus oŶ ǁoŵeŶ as ǀiĐtiŵs. We kŶoǁ theǇ͛ƌe ǀiĐtiŵs, ďut the 
language that some people use is very alienating and inappropriate...constantly 
foĐusiŶg oŶ the teƌƌiďle upďƌiŶgiŶg of these ǁoŵeŶ. Yes it͛s ǀeƌǇ iŵpoƌtaŶt, ďut if Ǉou 
want to bring government with you, and the media, there has to be a better balance. 
And constantly wheeling out women to tell their dreadful stoƌies doesŶ͛t alǁaǇs ǁoƌk͟.  
 
Richardson (2000: 1011) has argued that policy entrepreneurs frustrated with progress may 
seek out alteƌŶatiǀe ͚ǀeŶues͛ iŶ atteŵpts to iŶflueŶĐe the poliĐǇ ageŶda. This Đould iŶǀolǀe aŶ 
abandonment of reliance on one restricted policy community in the search for other ways to 
͚shift͛ the disĐouƌse ;‘iĐhaƌdsoŶ, ϮϬϬϬ: 1011), for example. Campaigner K described the 
pƌessiŶg Ŷeed foƌ otheƌs ͞to think more carefully about... how you frame messages, and how 
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you understand the importance of framing, how you need to have a political frame, an 
eĐoŶoŵiĐ fƌaŵe, a Đultuƌal fƌaŵe͟, aŶd hoǁ ĐaŵpaigŶeƌs Ŷeeded to ďe ͞ more intelligent about 
hoǁ theǇ eŶgage, aŶd leaƌŶ lessoŶs fƌoŵ otheƌ plaĐes ǁheƌe theǇ͛ǀe ŵaŶaged to frame things 
iŶ a diffeƌeŶt ǁaǇ͟. Describing a process of frame extension (Snow et al., 1986: 472), 
Campaigner E (in direct contrast to the discourse pursued by Campaigner N) was already 
operating in other policy domains (such as the UK Feminista loďďǇͿ, ďeĐause ͞if you take away 
the criminality it gets heaƌd, it͛s a soĐial justiĐe issue͟.  
 
͚PersoŶalisatioŶ͛ as a Key Neǁs Value 
Appreciating the journalistic news values that are a prerequisite for coverage, Campaigner A 
spoke aďout the Ŷeed foƌ ͚huŵaŶ iŶteƌest͛ ;Best, ϮϬϭϯ: ϭϯϮͿ aŶd to tƌǇ aŶd ͞ƌelate͟ stoƌies, 
ďeĐause ͞the chances of somebody knowing somebody, a womaŶ iŶ pƌisoŶ, is ǀeƌǇ sŵall͟. 
Alluding to a process of strategic frame alignment (Snow et al., 1986), she went on to explain 
that ͞one of the reasons we chose arrests of girls [as a campaign] is because actually you might 
kŶoǁ... [soŵeoŶe ǁho has ďeeŶ aƌƌested]… ǁheŶ I ǁas talkiŶg to a jouƌŶalist… and I said we 
were going to do soŵethiŶg aďout aƌƌests, he said ͚Oh my daughteƌ ǁas aƌƌested ƌeĐeŶtlǇ͛. So 
that is why [that channel] did somethiŶg aďout aƌƌests of ĐhildƌeŶ͟. “he ǁeŶt oŶ to eǆplaiŶ that 
͞everyone knows someone who has been arrested, so eveŶ if Ǉou͛ƌe talkiŶg aďout giƌls oƌ ďoǇs, 
it͛s a ǁaǇ of haǀiŶg the ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ. “o Ǉou͛ǀe got to fiŶd diffeƌeŶt ways to have the 
ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ͟. Adopting a similar strategy, Campaigner F also raised the importance of 
͚peƌsoŶalisatioŶ͛ as a keǇ fƌaŵiŶg oďjeĐtive. As far as he was concerned, successful rhetoric 
ŵeaŶt ͞humanising the people that ǁeƌe seŶt to pƌisoŶ͟; 
 
͞It ǁas aďout gettiŶg stoƌies aďout iŶdiǀiduals so people Đould saǇ; ǁell that͛s like ŵǇ 
daughteƌ, that͛s like ŵǇ soŶ, like ŵǇ ďƌotheƌ, ŵǇ husďaŶd, my father. So it was about 
tƌǇiŶg to huŵaŶise these ŵoŶsteƌs that ǁeƌe Đalled pƌisoŶeƌs. “o it͛s aďout ĐoŶstaŶtlǇ 
reminding readers or viewers that the people that we͛ƌe loĐkiŶg up aƌe just like us͟. 
 
Campaigner H agreed that personalisation was crucial, aŶd that she used aŶǇ aǀeŶue to ͞make 
people uŶdeƌstaŶd that Ǉou͛ƌe talkiŶg aďout people aŶd Ŷot aŶotheƌ speĐies. It͛s a Đlosed 
sǇsteŵ, ǀeƌǇ feǁ people see iŶside pƌisoŶs. EǀeƌǇoŶe͛s got theiƌ ǀieǁ aďout ǁhat it͛s like͟. 
Campaigner H pointed out the impoƌtaŶĐe of utilisiŶg ͞former offenders who are happy and 
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ǁilliŶg to talk to the ŵedia. That͛s iŵpoƌtaŶt iŶ teƌŵs of gettiŶg poiŶts aĐƌoss iŶ a ǁaǇ that 
people ĐaŶ ƌelate to aŶd uŶdeƌstaŶd͟. 
 
Not TargetiŶg ͚The Usual “uspeĐts͛ 
Unsurprisingly, interviews with campaigners revealed that the primary focus of media work 
was focused on the liberal broadsheets, although some did attempt to work with right-leaning 
broadsheets and tabloids. TappiŶg iŶto the doŵiŶaŶt puŶitiǀe oƌ ͚tough oŶ Đƌiŵe ƌhetoƌiĐ͛ 
(Rutherford, 1993; Mills and Roberts, 2011, 2012) was considered strategically important by 
several campaigners. Campaigner N worked hard to influence those traditionally 
unsympathetic to penal reform. She argued foƌ the Ŷeed to ͞get people who are not the usual 
suspects to ďuǇ iŶto Ǉouƌ aƌguŵeŶt. BeĐause if Ǉou doŶ͛t, theŶ Ǉou͛ƌe just talkiŶg to the saŵe 
old people aŶd ŶoďodǇ listeŶs͟. Her sentiments were reiterated by Campaigner H who similarly 
adŵitted that ͞Ǉou doŶ͛t ǁaŶt [to ǁoƌk ǁith] the usual suspeĐts͟. Campaigner M confirmed 
that his oƌgaŶisatioŶ had ͞an attitude where we try and reach out to areas where traditionally, 
peƌhaps Ǉou ǁouldŶ͛t eǆpeĐt us to. We ǁould ǁaŶt to get Đoǀeƌage iŶ the taďloid papeƌs͟. He 
went on to explaiŶ hoǁ the oƌgaŶisatioŶ had ͞worked with the Sun… ǁe lauŶĐhed a joiŶt poll 
with the Mirror…. BeĐause Ǉou ĐaŶ͛t just ǁƌite off laƌge seĐtioŶs of the ƌeadiŶg puďliĐ͟. He 
admitted that ǁhile soŵe puďliĐatioŶs ͞ŵaǇ haǀe a ĐeƌtaiŶ editoƌial ageŶda, theƌe͛s poĐkets, 
even in the tabloids, of people who get it. And you need to work with them and ensure that 
Ǉouƌ poiŶt is aĐƌoss͟. Campaigner N believed that her main challenge was to get the media to 
͞address the issue iŶ a diffeƌeŶt ǁaǇ͟. Tapping into more punitive or managerialist rhetoric she 
argued that: 
 
͞The ǁaǇ Ǉou do it is soŵetiŵes that Ǉou͛ǀe got to ďe ĐouŶteƌiŶtuitiǀe. Wheƌe ǁe͛ǀe 
doŶe this foƌ iŶstaŶĐe is that ǁe͛ǀe got a ƌight of ĐeŶtƌe jouƌŶalist to Đoŵe oŶ ďoaƌd, 
aŶd I talk to ƌight ǁiŶg MPs, ďeĐause if I doŶ͛t, theŶ I͛ŵ just talkiŶg to people who agree 
ǁith ŵe. “o the keǇ is to haǀe a ŵessagiŶg stƌuĐtuƌe that doesŶ͛t just iƌƌitate aŶd aŶŶoǇ 
the people Ǉou aƌe aĐtuallǇ tƌǇiŶg to get oŶ ďoaƌd, at least to listeŶ, Ǉou͛ƌe Ŷot goiŶg to 
get theŵ all to listeŶ͟. 
 
“he adŵitted that the ͞aim is to get as much as we can into The Telegraph and The Times. If 
eventually we can ever get anything in The Daily Mail, I͛ll ƌetiƌe!͟ CaŵpaigŶeƌ J agƌeed that ͞if 
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you can get something compassionate into The Mail that is really what you want. In one sense, 
Ǉou doŶ͛t Ŷeed to get aŶǇthiŶg iŶto The Guardian͟. Such viewpoints were echoed by 
Campaigner F when he explained how he took a conscious decision to stop writing for The 
Guardian, ͞because everybody accepted what I was saying really, and [I tried to] find a new 
way of saying those things, but in The Daily Mail…. I did ŵoǀe fƌoŵ talkiŶg aďout thiŶgs iŶ a 
kind of clubbish way... to suddenly having to find... the buttons to press that would engage 
with middle England͟. Switching messaging structure, he ǁas aĐtiǀelǇ ŵoǀiŶg aǁaǇ ͞from 
simply talking to Hampstead liberals, people with titles, and ladies with hats who ate cucumber 
saŶdǁiĐhes͟. Campaigner I adŵitted that she did Ŷot haǀe ͞such a clear strategy for targeting 
right-ǁiŶg ŵedia͟, but described how she used different news outlets for different issue 
fƌaŵes; ͞If ǁe͛ǀe got a stoƌǇ ǁe͛ll defiŶitelǇ thiŶk fiƌst, ǁho is this ďest foƌ? AŶd soŵetiŵes 
that͛s aĐtuallǇ the ƌight ǁiŶg ŵedia, soŵetiŵes it͛s The Guardian, and it just depends on the 
story aŶd ǁho Ǉou͛ƌe tƌǇiŶg to ƌeaĐh͟.  
 
Building Relationships with Journalists 
Many non-governmental organisations have long understood the importance of courting 
effective working relationships with newspaper editors and journalists (Hilton et al., 2013: 
150), and several campaigners talked about the need to maintain such friendships. Good 
relations could improve access to the media agenda (McCombs, 2014), which remains a 
challenging task for many. Yet relations of this nature are not necessarily straightforward, and 
Đoŵe ǁith aŶ iŵpliĐit ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶt to plaǇ ďǇ ͚the ƌules of the gaŵe͛ (see Charron, 1989). 
Campaigner K stressed the Ŷeed foƌ Đolleagues to ďe ͞saǀǀǇ͟ when operating in this way. 
‘aisiŶg the issue of ͞browŶ eŶǀelopes͟, he adŵitted that ͞[it] is potentially quite a dangerous 
gaŵe aŶd it͛s diffiĐult to ŵake those judgŵeŶts. AŶd it͛s diffiĐult to haǀe the ĐoŶfideŶĐe aŶd 
ďe saǀǀǇ eŶough to kŶoǁ hoǁ to opeƌate iŶ that spaĐe… it͛s a gaŵe aŶd theǇ doŶ͛t kŶoǁ hoǁ 
to play that gaŵe͟. Despite this assumption, many campaigners (albeit from larger, more 
established organisations) were clearly aware of the risks emanating from such work. 
Campaigner H recalled that a jouƌŶalist oŶĐe asked heƌ ͞ where are the brown envelopes?͟, ďut 
she ďelieǀed that ͞leakiŶg eŵails oƌ letteƌs is a ďit sillǇ aŶd it͛s ǀeƌǇ haƌd to get it ƌight, aŶd I 
doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to ďe ďotheƌed ǁith it. “o ǁe just doŶ͛t do it. We doŶ͛t ƌeǀeal ouƌ souƌĐes͟. 
Appreciating the importance of building relationships with journalists Campaigner H 
adŵitted that ͞it helps when you know the press because Ǉou ĐaŶ talk to people Ǉou kŶoǁ͟. 
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In contrast to the viewpoints of others who believed that journalists were not interested in 
penal reform, she believed that it was possible to permeate the media ͚oŶioŶ͛ ;MĐCoŵďs, 
ϮϬϭϰͿ, aŶd ͞as long as you maintain a good relationship with them [journalists], they will give 
Ǉou the oppoƌtuŶitǇ to talk oƌ ǁƌite soŵethiŶg foƌ theŵ ďeĐause theƌe͛s so much space to fill͟. 
Being helpful to jouƌŶalists aŶd assistiŶg ǁith theiƌ ͚iŶfoƌŵatioŶ suďsidies͛ ;GaŶdǇ, ϭϵϴϮͿ ǁas 
seen as a particularly effective strategy in this reciprocal relationship. Campaigner M reiterated 
the poiŶt that ͞any sensible person builds relationships and works with people who are going 
to do a good job in promoting what we want to get out theƌe͟. CaŵpaigŶeƌ G confirmed that 
͞it does Đoŵe doǁŶ to ƌelatioŶships, aŶd it͛s a ďit of giǀe aŶd take. If Ǉou͛ƌe ǁilliŶg to pƌoǀide 
comment when they need it, then when you have a report you want to launch, they may be 
ŵoƌe ǁilliŶg to ǁƌite it up. I thiŶk it͛s iŵpoƌtaŶt to ďe helpful ǁheƌe Ǉou ĐaŶ ďe͟. He believed 
that his oƌgaŶisatioŶ ǁas saǀǀǇ fƌoŵ the ͞top doǁŶ͟ aŶd that this faĐilitated ͞good 
relatioŶships ǁith keǇ jouƌŶalists͟. While jouƌŶalists͛ sǇŵpathǇ toǁaƌd aŶ oƌgaŶisatioŶ͛s Đause 
may not be a prerequisite for receiving mass coverage, Terkildsen, Schnell and Ling (1998: 49) 
haǀe aƌgued that it is a faĐtoƌ that Đoŵes iŶto plaǇ ǁheŶ poƌtƌaǇiŶg a gƌoup͛s ďeliefs oƌ 
characterising its spokespersons. One campaign group benefits from having a journalist on its 
Board of Trustees and while this is clearly an advantage, it has not resulted in increased 
coverage.  
Recalling her interactions with one journalist who was sympathetic to the reform 
agenda, Campaigner E highlighted the importance of ĐultiǀatiŶg ƌelatioŶs aŶd ͞sittiŶg ƌeallǇ 
tight͟ to them. “he ǁas, hoǁeǀeƌ, Đleaƌ that ͞Ǉou ĐaŶ Ŷeǀeƌ foƌget theǇ͛ƌe a jouƌŶalist ďeĐause 
it͛s a ƌiskǇ, daŶgeƌous, dodgǇ ǁoƌld͟. Consistent with literature documenting the importance 
of jouƌŶalists͛ peƌsoŶal ǀalues to the fiŶal ŵedia output ;GaŶs, ϭϵϳϵ), she went on to explain 
that ͞the danger about the media, [is that] you have the journalists [personal] opinions within 
it. Yes theǇ͛ƌe goiŶg to ƌuŶ the stoƌǇ that͛s goiŶg to get ŶotiĐed aŶd puďlished, ďut ǁithiŶ that 
theƌe is theiƌ oǁŶ opiŶioŶ͟. “uĐh a ǀieǁpoiŶt is ĐoŶsisteŶt ǁith Best͛s ;ϮϬϭϯ: ϭϮϴͿ ĐoŶĐept of 
͚seĐoŶdaƌǇ Đlaiŵs͛, ǁheƌe jouƌŶalists take oƌigiŶal stoƌies aŶd tƌaŶsfoƌŵ the ŵessages iŶto 
their own newsworthy packages. Campaigner B believed that a major issue boiled down to a 
general ignorance among journalists and lack of responsibility for the issues that they were 
ƌepoƌtiŶg. TakiŶg a feǁ ͞seŶsiďle͟ journalists into his confidence and briefing them directly, he 
ďelieǀed that if ͞Ǉou tƌeat theŵ as adults, theǇ͛ll tƌeat Ǉou as adults aŶd so I ǁas alǁaǇs opeŶ 
to them. And I wanted to meet them and get to theŵ aŶd theŶ eduĐate theŵ͟. 
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Reactive Strategies 
 
Successful reactive strategies require organisations to respond swiftly to items in the news, 
offering journalists an alternative take on the topic of discussion (Hilton et al., 2013: 154).  
Opinion was split on this type of work. When asked about such strategies, campaigners 
provided contrasting viewpoints, from those who routinely responded to all media requests to 
those who were much more wary about engaging. Citing exploitation as a major reason as to 
why they did not cooperate, some explained that they did not wish to be constantly recognised 
for balancing quotes in high profile cases. Having been mis-quoted during past experiences, 
many campaigners were only willing to work with those journalists that they deemed to be 
ethical or sympathetic to the reformist agenda.   
 
Responding to Media Requests 
When asked about reactive media work, Campaigner H ǁas Đleaƌ aďout the Ŷeed to ͞always 
ƌespoŶd. AlǁaǇs saǇ ǁe doŶ͛t ĐoŵŵeŶt oŶ iŶdiǀidual Đases, ďut theŶ ǁe͛ll saǇ, foƌ eǆaŵple 
Maxine Carr, [we are] able to talk about her experience of prison, resettlement, stigma... and 
to do all that just off the ďaĐk of a ƌeƋuest͟. She went on to explain that some of her media 
strategies were leaƌŶt fƌoŵ politiĐiaŶs, aŶd that ͞people like Ann Widdecombe will never say 
no to the media, will do aŶǇthiŶg, aŶd aĐtuallǇ, it͛s ƌeallǇ iŵpƌessiǀe. AŶd that pƌepaƌedŶess to 
just go for it is aĐtuallǇ a ƌeallǇ good poliĐǇ͟. Campaigner G explained that part of his role was 
to tƌǇ to ďe ͞as helpful as possiďle, ďeĐause oďǀiouslǇ it͛s a ƌeĐipƌoĐal ƌelatioŶship. If ǁe͛ƌe 
ĐoŶstaŶtlǇ tuƌŶiŶg doǁŶ ŵedia Đalls theŶ theǇ͛ƌe Ŷot goiŶg to Đall us. AŶd that ŵakes it all the 
more difficult when we want to do something a bit more proactive, a report launch or 
soŵethiŶg like that͟. It is clear that resources play a key part in the ability to respond promptly 
to jouƌŶalists͛ iŶƋuiƌies. CaŵpaigŶeƌ M ĐoŶfiƌŵed that he tƌied to ͞respond to everything if we 
can. We do get a lot of calls, and it can be quite a ĐhalleŶge to ŵeet that deŵaŶd͟.  
 
Opportunism vs. Exploitation 
Operating on the periphery of the media agenda and acknowledging that they could not 
control bad press, several campaigners talked about the need to exploit media opportunities 
ǁheŶeǀeƌ theǇ aƌose. Foƌ those stƌuggliŶg to peŶetƌate the ŵetaphoƌiĐal ŵedia ͚oŶioŶ͛ 
(McCombs, 2014), such claimsmaking opportunities were vital. Campaigner H said that she 
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tƌied to ĐoŵŵeŶt oŶ ͞aŶǇthiŶg aŶd eǀeƌǇthiŶg͟, aŶd that ͞you can catch opportunities. Come 
in on the back of a stoƌǇ, ŵake soŵe ĐoŵŵeŶt͟. Campaigner A similarly noted the need to be 
oppoƌtuŶistiĐ, ͞if theƌe͛s a Đase ǁe ĐaŶ use oƌ if theƌe͛s aŶ issue, I͛ll get it iŶ theƌe. It͛s Ŷot ǀeƌǇ 
strategic, but it͛s Ǉou kŶoǁ, oppoƌtuŶistiĐ͟. Despite serious financial constraints preventing her 
from engaging in large media campaigns, Campaigner E spoke of the various opportunities that 
she had been able to accept, one of which being consultancy work with Yorkshire Television 
(for the television series Bad GirlsͿ, ͞ďeĐause that͛s aŶotheƌ ǁaǇ of eŶsuƌiŶg that ǁheŶ 
something is going oŶ the TV, that is faĐtual͟. While others commeŶted oŶ ͚eǀeƌǇthiŶg͛, 
Campaigner I spoke of her selectivity when decidiŶg ǁhiĐh issues to ƌespoŶd to; ͞if we get 
kŶoǁŶ foƌ speakiŶg oŶ eǀeƌǇthiŶg, espeĐiallǇ iŶ the ĐƌiŵiŶal justiĐe sǇsteŵ, theŶ Ǉou͛ƌe Ŷot 
heaƌd oŶ aŶǇthiŶg, aŶd Ǉou lose Ǉouƌ distiŶĐtiǀe ǀoiĐe, so aĐtuallǇ soŵetiŵes it͛s ďetteƌ Ŷot to 
ĐoŵŵeŶt, eǀeŶ if Ǉou ďƌoadlǇ agƌee oƌ ďƌoadlǇ disagƌee ďeĐause aĐtuallǇ it͛s Ŷot soŵethiŶg 
youƌ ŵeŵďeƌs aƌe passioŶate aďout͟.  
VieǁiŶg the Ŷeǁs ŵedia as a ͚ŶoŶ-coŵpliaŶt paƌtŶeƌ͛ ;HiltoŶ et al., 2013), many 
campaigners described instances where they felt they had been or were likely to be exploited, 
ofteŶ thƌough the pƌoĐess of ͚seĐoŶdaƌǇ Đlaiŵs͛ ;Best, ϮϬϭϯ: ϭϮϴͿ. This had ŵade soŵe ǁaƌǇ 
of responding to future media requests and added complexity to their communicative 
strategies. Describing this situation, Campaigner A explained that; 
 
͞If it͛s a Đase ǁheƌe theƌe is likelǇ to ďe a lot of ŶastǇ puďliĐitǇ, theǇ ;jouƌŶalistsͿ ǁaŶt 
to ďalaŶĐe it. “o I͛ll get the shoĐk jocks or The Daily Mail saǇiŶg ͞Oh ǁe Ŷeed a Ƌuote 
to ďalaŶĐe it͟. We teŶd Ŷot to ĐoŵŵeŶt theŶ, ďeĐause Ǉou͛ƌe gettiŶg eǆploited. TheǇ͛ll 
do a ŶastǇ aƌtiĐle of ϮϬϬϬ ǁoƌds aŶd at the eŶd theǇ͛ll saǇ [X oƌgaŶisatioŶ] saǇs...͟ aŶd 
you look like an idiot because it͛s Ƌuoted out of ĐoŶteǆt aŶd it just looks sillǇ. “o ǁe 
tend not to comment on individual cases... unless we can do something more 
ĐoŶsideƌed͟. 
 
WoƌkiŶg to disassoĐiate heƌ oƌgaŶisatioŶ fƌoŵ soŵe of the ͚laŶdŵaƌk Ŷaƌƌatiǀes͛ ;Best, ϮϬϭϯ: 
144) surrounding the most high profile cases, she ǁeŶt oŶ to stƌess that ͞Ǉou doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to 
always comment when someone has doŶe soŵethiŶg hoƌƌeŶdous͟, ďeĐause ͞the organisation 
then becomes associated purely with talking about and appearing to defend the most 
horrendous actions by the most extreme cases. We try to have conversations in the media 
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about ouƌ oǁŶ issues iŶ ouƌ oǁŶ ǁaǇ͟. Comparing her media ǁoƌk to a ͞ďattle͟, CaŵpaigŶeƌ 
N ďelieǀed that ͞it͛s ǀeƌǇ good to go oŶ [teleǀisioŶ oƌ ƌadio pƌogƌaŵŵes] ďeĐause it sharpens 
Ǉou up. You͛ǀe got to put Ǉouƌself out theƌe. If Ǉou ĐoŶstaŶtlǇ sit iŶ the tƌeŶĐhes aŶd Ŷeǀeƌ put 
Ǉouƌ head aďoǀe the paƌapet theŶ Ǉou͛ƌe Ŷeǀeƌ, Ŷeǀeƌ goiŶg to faĐe the eŶeŵǇ͟. She believed 
that instead of relying on traditional penal reform messages, exposure to more punitive 
attitudes aŶd uŶdeƌtakiŶg ͞hostile͟ media ǁoƌk ǁas a good eǆeƌĐise, as ͞Ǉou͛ǀe got to get out 
there aŶd ďe pƌepaƌed to ďe shot at͟.  
The issue of trust was a major reason why some campaigners were wary about 
responding to media requests, because media access does not always guarantee favourable 
coverage (Terkildsen, Schnell and Ling, 1998: 49; see also Best, 2013). Lacking control of their 
released information was highlighted by several participants. Campaigner I explained that she 
ǁould ͞tuƌŶ doǁŶ thiŶgs that doŶ͛t seeŵ ǁell iŶteŶded, that doŶ͛t seeŵ iŶteƌested in the 
deďate oƌ a faiƌ heaƌiŶg͟. Feeling that journalists routinely distorted their original messages 
;thƌough the foƌŵatioŶ of ŵoƌe ŶeǁsǁoƌthǇ ͚seĐoŶdaƌǇ Đlaiŵs͛, foƌ example), many displayed 
teŶdeŶĐies of ǁhat Best has desĐƌiďed as Đlaiŵsŵakeƌ ͚ dispossessioŶ͛ ;ϮϬϭϯ: ϭϰϭͿ. Campaigner 
D eǆplaiŶed that ͞we would want to engage with the media, but the issue is always about you 
ĐaŶ͛t ĐoŶtƌol ǁhat theǇ do with what you give theŵ͟. Campaigner J confirmed that people in 
heƌ oƌgaŶisatioŶ ǁeƌe ͞Ƌuite guaƌded, people haǀe had ƌeallǇ ďad eǆpeƌieŶĐes… Heƌe, 
traditionally, people have not wanted to speak to the ŵedia at all͟. Tapping into the above 
concepts, she went on to explain that ͞Ǉou doŶ͛t alǁaǇs get the ŵessage across in the way 
that Ǉou ǁaŶt͟. Campaigner E siŵilaƌlǇ agƌeed that, ͞I can give a chunk of really good 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ aŶd it ǁill ďe Đhopped to ďits, aŶd it is theŶ out of ĐoŶteǆt. It͛s Ŷot soŵethiŶg that 
I͛ǀe said, theŶ. AŶd theŶ it͛s ĐoŵpletelǇ Ŷot got the iŵpaĐt oƌ the poǁeƌ͟. When asked if this 
put her off from accepting futuƌe ŵedia ƌeƋuests she adŵitted ͞Ǉes it does… To haǀe a Ƌuote 
ŵade up, that ǁasŶ͛t soŵethiŶg that I said, despite all ŵǇ effoƌt, Ǉou just think, hold on a 
ŵiŶute!͟ Campaigner D ďelieǀed theƌe ǁas ͞a general feeling that if we were working with 
people who ǁe Đould tƌust, aŶd ǁho ǁeƌe ethiĐallǇ souŶd iŶ teƌŵs of ǁhat ǁe͛ƌe talkiŶg aďout, 
theŶ ǁe thiŶk it͛s aĐtuallǇ Ƌuite a good thiŶg͟. Differentiating between news publications she 
added; 
 
͞I͛d ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ haǀe Ŷo pƌoďleŵ ǁith the Guardian, Times, Telegraph, Independent, the 
quality press. And you can be done just as easily by them as you can by anybody else, 
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but I actually feel there is a more ethical connection there. I would probably be slightly 
more concerned with the red tops, although having said that, there was something, I 
ĐaŶ͛t ƌeŵeŵďeƌ ǁhiĐh oŶe it ǁas Ŷoǁ, The Star or something, their magazine, they did 
a really good piece oŶ ǁoŵeŶ offeŶdeƌs͟. 
 
It is therefore easy to understand why, given their previous negative experiences with 
journalists and the obstacles they encounter when attempting to pursue their communicative 
strategies, most campaigners expressed defeatism about media work. While several have 
cultivated extremely good working relations with journalists (mainly working for the left-
leaning broadsheets), such journalists often have little influence over a subject that has limited 
newsworthiness. As a consequence, many campaigners have chosen to focus their efforts and 
resources on more traditional forms of private lobbying or what Best (2013) refeƌs to as ͚ iŶsideƌ 
ĐlaiŵsŵakiŶg͛.  
 
 
v. Private Strategies 
 
The empirical evidence presented in this chapter has confirmed that despite working towards 
the same overarching goal, penal reform campaigners have diverging opinions when it comes 
to media strategies. Some are keen to engage in the public sphere and clearly want to be part 
of the public conversation. Others, possibly due to resources, fail to get adequate coverage 
even when they seek it. Then there are those that, perhaps due to the vulnerable client group 
that they represent, or perhaps due to the nature of their funding streams prefer to focus their 
strategies under the radar. The final section of this chapter will discuss their work away from 
the ŵedia spotlight. CoŶsideƌiŶg Best͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ ŵodel of ͚insider claimsmaking͛, campaigners 
were asked about the nature of the relationships that they sustained in Westminster and 
Whitehall and the resources they placed on seeking to influence change through such 
channels. CoŶsisteŶt ǁith the Best͛s asseƌtions, interviews revealed that not all campaigners 
wished to court media attention, and even those that did viewed such work as secondary. 
Some went even further and called for a greater focus on stealth strategies, believing that the 
subject was of limited interest to the general public anyway. Most campaigners, however, 
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viewed such strategies with scepticism. Aware that operating such a way was risky, they 
understood the importance of publicising their claims, however limited this was in practice. 
Marsh and Rhodes (1992) argued that policy is not made in the electoral arena or in 
the gladiatoƌial ĐoŶfƌoŶtatioŶs of PaƌliaŵeŶt, ďut iŶ the ͚Ŷetheƌǁoƌld͛ of Đoŵŵittees, Điǀil 
servants, professions and interest groups. It is, however, practically impossible in reality to truly 
appreciate the personal relationships and meetings that take place behind closed doors (see 
also Whiteley and Winyard, 1987). Despite receiving anecdotal evidence about the nature of 
campaigner-policymaker relations, it was difficult to elicit such information from campaigners 
ǁho, adheƌiŶg to the ͚ƌules of the gaŵe͛ ǁeƌe keeŶ to pƌoteĐt theiƌ status as iŶsideƌs. What 
was clear, however, was that several individuals had worked extremely closely with the 
government from the late 1990s and during the formulation of the Corston Report in 2007, 
whether they chose to divulge such information or not. While work of this nature is shrouded 
in secrecy, it is possible to deduce a fairly clear picture of the types of activities that 
campaigners undertake.   
Interviews revealed that the everyday lobbying activities of penal reformers had 
ĐhaŶged ǀeƌǇ little siŶĐe the ͚platoŶiĐ guaƌdiaŶs͛ ;Loadeƌ, ϮϬϬϲͿ opeƌated iŶ the Đoƌƌidoƌs of 
power over half a century ago. Consistent with their insider status, it is clear that campaigners 
had regular contact with Department officials, were on the regular list of consultees and often 
received advance warning of government policy proposals and announcements. While some 
campaigners believed that they had a considerable stake in the policy process, others were 
more realistic about their position. ConsisteŶt ǁith GƌaŶt͛s ;ϭϵϴϵͿ tǇpologǇ, aŶd iŶ additioŶ to 
the aĐtiǀities of ͚high pƌofile iŶsideƌs͛ outliŶed aďoǀe, iŶteƌǀieǁs ƌeǀealed the eǆisteŶĐe of ͚loǁ 
pƌofile iŶsideƌs͛ ǁho ǁished to push foƌ poliĐǇ ĐhaŶge iŶ the pƌiǀate ĐoŶfiŶes of WestŵiŶsteƌ 
and Whitehall. Interviews also revealed that other campaigners opeƌated as ͚pƌisoŶeƌs͛, aŶd 
felt that engaging in media work could jeopardise their funding channels. Whatever their 
status, it is clear that strategies to influence change by traditional, private methods remain the 
main focus for penal reformers. This may come as a surprise to those commentators that 
purport media work as the most important strategy in contemporary campaign efforts, but it 
is clear that communicative strategies will only be effective when supported by journalists. 
Viewed as mundane and lacking newsǁoƌthiŶess, those ĐaŵpaigŶiŶg to ƌefoƌŵ ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal 
policy consequently pursue the majority of their strategies in private.  
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WorkiŶg ͚UŶder the ‘adar͛ 
A central focus of this study is to question whether the news media constitutes a distinct stage 
or pivot in the penal policymaking process or if there are times when it is, or would ideally be, 
bypassed. Hilton et al., have argued that lobbying is at its most effective when it has been 
combined with strategies that enrol a mass audience (2013: 145). Yet this strategy may not 
apply to the relatively unpopular and un-ŶeǁsǁoƌthǇ ͚lesseƌ soĐial pƌoďleŵ͛ ;HilgaƌtŶeƌ aŶd 
Bosk, ϭϵϴϴͿ of ǁoŵeŶ͛s iŵpƌisoŶŵeŶt ǁheƌe ŵedia outlets haǀe ofteŶ shoǁŶ theŵselǀes to 
ďe a ͚ŶoŶ-ĐoŵplaiŶt paƌtŶeƌ͛ ;HiltoŶ et al., 2013). Operating as insiders, most campaigners 
confirmed that private strategies and traditional lobbying were their main strategic focus. 
Campaigner J confirmed that her oƌgaŶisatioŶ ǁoƌked ĐoŵpletelǇ ͞ďehiŶd the sĐeŶes͟, and 
that the lack of media coverage was a strategic decision (although resources also played a part). 
Heƌ aiŵ ǁas to ͞influence decision makers behind closed dooƌs. We͛ƌe tƌǇiŶg to iŶflueŶĐe the 
prisons and the Home Office and NOMS, the MinistƌǇ of JustiĐe, the UKBA, MPs͟. Campaigner 
D had a siŵilaƌ foĐus oŶ WestŵiŶsteƌ; ͞ǁe͛ƌe ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ tƌǇiŶg to iŶflueŶĐe poliĐǇŵakeƌs aŶd 
stƌategiĐ thiŶkeƌs, ǁe͛ƌe Ŷot ƌeallǇ iŶ the public awareness or the public influencing, although 
ǁe do kŶoǁ that͛s got to ďe doŶe, ǁe doŶ͛t see it as us that͛s goiŶg to do it͟. Campaigner A 
explained that ͞soŵetiŵes Ǉou doŶ͛t ǁaŶt high pƌofile ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶs; Ǉou ǁant to do it in a 
diffeƌeŶt ǁaǇ͟. Confirming her insider status, Campaigner H explained that her organisation 
had ͞a number of friends, really a lot, in the civil seƌǀiĐe. ‘ight fƌoŵ top to ďottoŵ͟. Describing 
her formal relationship with the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt she eǆplaiŶed that ͞we have a meeting with the 
MiŶisteƌ eǀeƌǇ thƌee ŵoŶths…foƌ aďout teŶ Ǉeaƌs…ǁhoeǀeƌ͛s the pƌisoŶ͛s MiŶisteƌ. AŶd 
oĐĐasioŶallǇ it͛s a Ŷeǁ MiŶisteƌ ǁho saǇs ͚ǁhǇ aƌe ǁe ŵeetiŶg?͛, ďut aĐtuallǇ it͛s useful foƌ 
theŵ too. NoďodǇ͛s ƌefused, ǁe just haǀe that as aŶ aƌƌaŶgeŵeŶt͟. Outlining his previous 
experience working in the Ministry of Justice, Campaigner G confirmed that private lobbying 
ǁas, ͞the realitǇ that I saǁ oŶ a dailǇ ďasis͟. He explained that ͞ǁith the ǁoŵeŶ͛s poliĐǇ side, 
I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ if it͛s ďeĐause of peƌhaps the niche nature that its seen as, actually makes that 
method of communication easier, so that you can do more informal briefs rather than huge 
puďliĐ aǁaƌeŶess ĐaŵpaigŶs͟. Stressing the need for campaigners to pursue close working 
relationships within goverŶŵeŶt he ďelieǀed that ͞the relationships which have been built 
fƌoŵ ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐeŶtƌes oƌ ĐaŵpaigŶs, diƌeĐtlǇ pluggiŶg iŶto ĐeŶtƌal goǀeƌŶŵent officials, is 
ƌeallǇ stƌoŶg͟. 
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Other campaigners expressed frustration regarding access, an issue that was perhaps 
influenced by their perceived lower status and exacerbated by changing staff in the Ministry of 
Justice. Campaigner E eǆplaiŶed that ͞the larger organisations have an open door through the 
MinistƌǇ of JustiĐe, up to goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͟. “he ďelieǀed that ͞there is no relationship with the 
Ministry of Justice in that way anymore. There is a token person who sits there who has not a 
Đlue aďout ǁhat͛s goiŶg oŶ. We haǀe a ŵeetiŶg, ďut it goes Ŷoǁheƌe͟. For several campaigners 
seeking to influence in this way (either through choice or because they did not have the 
resources to work publicly), the lack of formal strategy emanating from the Department was a 
growing frustration. Campaigner E was, however, clear that the outward, more punitive 
rhetoric pursued by the Justice Secretary did not always match the private conversations with 
civil serǀaŶts, aŶd that offiĐials ǁeƌe ͞not laĐkiŶg iŶ ĐoŵpassioŶ, totallǇ͟. Signalling a possible 
change in strategy among campaigners that had previously enjoyed close personal 
relationships within Westminster and Whitehall under New Labour, Campaigner E explained 
that she had ͞always traditionally been of the view that what we did behind the scenes would 
haǀe a ďiggeƌ iŵpaĐt, aŶd that aŶǇthiŶg aƌouŶd ŵedia ǁas faŶtastiĐ... ďut it ǁasŶ͛t ŶeĐessary 
to actually make change. My view most definitely has changed over the last couple of years 
because [of] the ĐhaŶge iŶ attitude͟.  
 
Reform by Stealth? 
Some campaigners ǁaŶted to go eǀeŶ fuƌtheƌ, hoǁeǀeƌ, aŶd adǀoĐated ͚ƌefoƌŵ ďǇ stealth͛; a 
concept that aims to exclude public information and involvement from the policy process 
eŶtiƌelǇ. WheŶ asked ǁhat she thought aďout ͚selliŶg͛ the poliĐǇ of ǁoŵeŶ͛s deĐaƌĐeƌatioŶ to 
the public (through whatever discourse preferred), Campaigner O ƌeplied, ͞why do you have 
to sell it? Who knows about women in prison, who would notice? So if they arranged it so there 
were fewer women in prison, who would know? You and me and Juliet Lyon19͟.  Reminiscent 
of the Post-Waƌ ͚platoŶiĐ guaƌdiaŶs͛ ;Loadeƌ, ϮϬϬϲͿ, aŶd eŶĐapsulated ďǇ GƌeeŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϵͿ 
ŶotioŶ of ͚Ƌuiet high-ƌoadiŶg͛, heƌ ǀieǁs eŶtail the iŶĐoŶspiĐuous puƌsuit of pƌogƌessiǀe aiŵs 
insulated from public scrutiny as much as possible. Such work is pursued on the assumption 
that the public would never approve of such adjustments were they exposed to public view 
(Green, 2009: 529). To Campaigner D ͚ƌefoƌŵ ďǇ stealth͛ ǁas ͞the only show in town at the 
                                                          
19 Current Director of the Prison Reform Trust 
122 
 
moment, because the politicians are so anti the idea of going public on some of the messages 
that they need to go public on. So therefore I think its policy change by stealth, but at the 
moment, theǇ͛ƌe Ŷot eǀeŶ ďuǇiŶg iŶto that͟. Several other campaigners agreed with stealth 
sentiments. Campaigner A agƌeed that ͞you could do a lot by stealth. You could close a lot of 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s pƌisoŶs doǁŶ; Ǉou Đould ŵake it Ƌuite diffiĐult foƌ the Đouƌts to seŶd theŵ to pƌisoŶ. 
You Đould do Ƌuite a lot like that, aŶd the ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐeŶtƌes theŵselves have been done by 
stealth͟. Campaigner B ďelieǀed the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt should ͞just get oŶ ǁith it. AŶd doŶ͛t saǇ 
aŶǇthiŶg uŶtil Ǉou͛ǀe got soŵethiŶg positiǀe to tell, ďut doŶ͛t ƌisk ďeiŶg thƌoǁŶ off Đouƌse ďǇ 
unfortunate ill-educated media reportiŶg͟.  
Others, however, took a different view. Campaigner I aƌgued that ͚ƌefoƌŵ ďǇ stealth͛ 
͞uŶdeƌestiŵates the puďliĐ, and that once given adequate information, many members of the 
puďliĐ ǁould ďe ͚ďƌoadlǇ suppoƌtiǀe of ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐeŶtƌes͟.  This perspective is consistent with 
that of Roberts, who believed that attempts to insulate the criminal justice system from a 
ŵisiŶfoƌŵed puďliĐ aƌe Ŷoǁ seeŶ as ͚isolatioŶist, elitist aŶd eǀeŶ uŶdeŵoĐƌatiĐ͛ ;ϮϬϬϴͿ. It 
siŵilaƌlǇ liŶks to the ǁoƌk of GƌeeŶ ;ϮϬϬϵ:ϱϮϵͿ, ǁho has ƌefeƌƌed to ͚the follǇ of doiŶg good by 
stealth͛, aŶd that ďǇ keepiŶg poliĐǇ ƌefoƌŵ aǁaǇ fƌoŵ the puďliĐ glaƌe ;if eǀeŶ foƌ the ͚ƌight͛ 
reasons), it does not allow attitudes to be challenged, and hopefully, improved. Drawing on his 
previous experience in the Ministry of Justice, Campaigner G eǆplaiŶed that ͞ to a certain extent 
that͛s hoǁ it has ďeeŶ doŶe. That͛s the ƌealitǇ ƌeallǇ͟. He did, hoǁeǀeƌ, go oŶ to ĐautioŶ that 
͞I͛ŵ Ŷot suƌe ǁhetheƌ Đoǀeƌt ŵethods aƌe the ďest ǁaǇ of doiŶg ďusiŶess͟. As warned by 
GƌeeŶ, ͚Ƌuiet high-ƌoadiŶg͛ eŶtails high risks because the legitimacy of the criminal justice 
system could be called into question once such poliĐies aƌe eǆposed͛ ;ϮϬϬϵͿ. While it is 
uŶdouďtedlǇ tƌue that ǁoƌkiŶg iŶ this ǁaǇ Đƌeates ͚the spaĐe aŶd Đoǀeƌ foƌ the adŵiŶistƌatiǀe 
delivery of ŵoƌe ŵodeƌate poliĐǇ aŶd ǁoƌkaďle outĐoŵes͛ ;Loadeƌ, ϮϬϭϬ: ϯϲϭͿ, Loadeƌ has 
ĐoŶĐeded that ͚stealth͛ stƌategies aƌe ͚a ƌiskǇ eŶteƌpƌise ƌiddled ǁith ͚ďeaƌ tƌaps͛ aŶd the 
constant fear of scandalous exposure (2010: 361). 
 
WoŵeŶ͛s PeŶal PoliĐy oŶ the Agenda 
In contrast to years of fruitless claimsmaking, agenda-setting can often be influenced by a 
͚tƌiggeƌ eǀeŶt͛ ;DeaƌiŶg aŶd ‘ogeƌs, ϭϵϵϲ: ϳϴͿ, aŶd iŶ the Đase of ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ the 
series of deaths in custody between 2003-4 provided campaigner with that watershed moment 
aŶd the MiŶistƌǇ of JustiĐe ǁith its ͚poliĐǇ ǁiŶdoǁ͛ ;KiŶgdoŶ, ϭϵϴϰͿ. While ŵedia atteŶtioŶ 
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surrounding the suicides could be considered extremely small in the overall context of social 
problems, it certainly pervaded public consciousness to a greater level than had previously 
been the case20. Campaigners were acutely aware of the importance of getting the issue onto 
the poliĐǇ ageŶda ;thƌough puďliĐ oƌ pƌiǀate stƌategiesͿ, Ǉet iŶ the Đase of this ͚lesseƌ soĐial 
pƌoďleŵ͛ ;HilgaƌtŶeƌ and Bosk, 1988), the major issue seemed to be keeping it there.  
Campaigner B explaiŶed that despite aŶ iŶitial ͞ďoost͟ from the newly-elected Labour 
government, the Prison Inspectorate report of HMP Holloway in 1997 lacked momentum, 
ďeĐause ͞frankly the iŶteƌest ǁasŶ͛t theƌe aŵoŶgst the jouƌŶalists eǆĐept ǁheŶ theƌe ǁas a 
seŶsatioŶal Đase I͛ŵ afƌaid͟. CoŶsisteŶt ǁith DoǁŶs͛ ͚issue atteŶtioŶ ĐǇĐle͛ ;ϭϵϳϮ), Campaigner 
D explained that ͞JeaŶ CoƌstoŶ͛s ƌepoƌt eǆposed soŵethiŶg theǇ ĐouldŶ͛t igŶoƌe, so theǇ then 
as government identified a pot of money and a Ministeƌ, aŶd all the ƌest folloǁed͟. Yet after 
the initial shock, ͞you get a two year funding package where they throw money at it, and they 
hope it͛s goiŶg to go aǁaǇ. AŶd that͛s ǁhat ǁe͛ǀe seeŶ. AŶd so siŶĐe that, ǁe͛ǀe ďeeŶ 
struggling to keep it oŶ the ageŶda͟. “he ĐoŶĐluded that ͞ each time it shakes them up and they 
do somethiŶg, Ǉou ŵake a ďit of pƌogƌess͟, ďeĐause oŶĐe a pƌoďleŵ has ͚aƌƌiǀed͛, soŵe foƌŵ 
of governmental response will always be necessary – even if the aim is a redefinition of the 
problem to make it disappear (Stringer and Richardson, 1980: 27). Campaigner E expressed 
siŵilaƌ fƌustƌatioŶ ǁith the ĐuƌƌeŶt status of ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ oŶ the ageŶda, aŶd 
ĐoŶsisteŶt ǁith CoƌĐoƌaŶ͛s ;ϮϬϭϬͿ aŶalogǇ of peŶal pƌogƌess foƌ ǁoŵeŶ as ͚ sŶakes aŶd laddeƌs, 
she desĐƌiďed the situatioŶ as ͞one step foƌǁaƌd aŶd tǁo steps ďaĐk͟. Highlighting the 
importance of political ideology for policy change, she explained that; 
 
͞So we had the Corston Report, fantastic. Some fantastic recommendations, an amount 
of money was put in by the previous government, new projects were set up, there was 
enthusiasm to move forward and change and reduce the numbers of women in prison... 
Then we have a change in government and it just staƌts stƌidiŶg ďaĐkǁaƌds. It͛s like ǁe 
ŵake tǁo steps foƌǁaƌd, lots of ƌeseaƌĐh Đoŵes out, aŶd eǀeƌǇoŶe goes ͚ǁoǁ Ǉes, 
ďƌilliaŶt͛. AŶd theŶ stop. AŶd theŶ go ďaĐk a ďit… Hoǁ ŵaŶǇ times can the same thing 
ďe said?͟ 
                                                          
20 “ee foƌ eǆaŵple: ͚“uiĐide leǀels iŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s pƌisoŶs soaƌ͛ The Observer ϯ JaŶuaƌǇ ϮϬϬϰ; ͚WoŵeŶ pƌisoŶ suiĐides 
hit ƌeĐoƌd͛ BBC News 6 January 2004; ͚“haŵe of “tǇal PƌisoŶ͛ Manchester Evening News 13 August 2004  
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Such frustrations emerged as a major theme of this study. Conducted shortly after the election 
of the Coalition government, it became clear that many campaigners were adjusting to the 
new political arrangements and coming to terms with the stalling of post-Corston progress.  
  
 
vi. Conclusion 
 
This wide-ranging chapter has highlighted a variety of pertinent areas relating to policy and 
research, including: the use of the news media by campaigners, the different strategies of 
information management utilised by such actors and the importance of private lobbying 
activities. Acutely aware of the policy environment within which they operate, campaigners 
have called for politicians to take more responsibility for educating the public on matters of 
criminal justice and penal policy. Yet in the current political climate politicians (of all 
persuasions) are less willing to talk in terms of rehabilitation and more likely to adopt punitive 
rhetoric. This punitive climate creates obstacles for penal reformers working to reduce the 
prison population and has implications for the likely success of certain framing strategies.  
Highlighting the theoretical utility of framing theory to contemporary understandings 
of lobbying for penal reform, this chapter has demonstrated how the continued use of gender-
stereotypes and the more rigid form of templates (see Kitzinger, 2000) by journalists is 
perceived as a key barrier to progressive policy change. The news values articulated by Galtung 
and Ruge in the 1960s, and latterly developed by Chibnall (1977) and Jewkes (2004) remain 
key to analysing journalistic behaviour in the field of criminal justice. While many campaigners 
were aware that the messages they sought to publicise were not deemed newsworthy by 
journalists, it is interesting that this did not result in a universal change of behaviour or a 
fundamental rethink of their public messages. Those choosing to pursue more right-leaning 
discourse consequently operate in the minority. This chapter has highlighted that the PR 
strategies employed by penal reformers operating in this territory have changed very little 
siŶĐe “ĐhlesiŶgeƌ aŶd Tuŵďeƌ͛s empirical investigation into criminal justice source-media 
relations in the 1990s.  
MĐCoŵďs͛ ;ϮϬϭϰͿ theoƌetiĐal ĐoŶĐeptualisatioŶ of the ŵedia ͚oŶioŶ͛ is also of use to 
illustrate the obstacles experienced by penal reformers working in this domain. With limited 
capacity to penetrate the media agenda (and often framing stories at a considerable 
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ideological distance to those working for the right-leaning press), it is easy to understand why 
ŵaŶǇ ƌefoƌŵeƌs haǀe ďeĐoŵe ͚dispossessed͛ ;Best, ϮϬϭϯͿ aŶd pƌefeƌ to puƌsue theiƌ stƌategies 
out of the ŵedia spotlight. AdoptiŶg the ŵethods of ͚iŶsideƌ Đlaiŵsŵakeƌs͛ (Best, 2013), their 
actions are reminiscent of the Post-Waƌ eƌa of the ͚platoŶiĐ guaƌdiaŶs͛ ;Loadeƌ, ϮϬϬϲͿ. 
Highlighting once more how little their communicative strategies have changed alongside 
developments in the political and media spheres, some campaigners have even called for 
gƌeateƌ ͚ƌefoƌŵ ďǇ stealth͛. Such a strategy, that seeks to bypass the media in its entirety, was 
populaƌ aŵoŶg ŵaŶǇ ĐaŵpaigŶeƌs ǁhose eǆpeƌieŶĐe of the poliĐǇŵakiŶg ͚ƌealitǇ͛ ǁas that, 
although by no means always the case, reform often occurs out of the media (and therefore 
public) spotlight (Loader, 2010). Contributing to understandings of the penal policy process, it 
would therefore seeŵ that Best͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ ŵodel of ͚iŶsideƌ ĐlaiŵsŵakiŶg͛ is ďest plaĐed to 
describe the activities of penal reform campaigners operating in this area. Although general 
matters relating to criminal justice policy are routinely debated in the news media, the 
preferred mode of communication among campaigners is an insider process that, in general, 
bypasses media outlets. In seeking to further unravel crime-media relations in the field of 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ, the following chapter will explore the interpretations of journalists 
operating in this domain.  
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6. Newsmaking 
 
 
i. Introduction 
 
This studǇ has aĐkŶoǁledged that iŶ ouƌ ͚ŵass-ŵediated ƌealitǇ͛ (Nimmo and Combs, 1983), 
meaning is socially constructed through a process that is often dominated by the news media 
(Johnson-Cartee, 2005: 4). While it is clear that the mass media can, and often do, play a role 
in policymaking (Soroka et al., ϮϬϭϮͿ, ͚the way that media and policymakers interact bears 
ƌelatiǀelǇ feǁ aĐadeŵiĐ footpƌiŶts͛ ;“ilǀeƌŵaŶ, ϮϬϭϮ: ϱ; Doppelt, ϭϵϵϰ; although see 
Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994; Davis, 2000). As highlighted in chapter two, early studies of the 
policy process highlighted the importance of the fourth estate and its ability to focus attention 
oŶ a paƌtiĐulaƌ soĐial pƌoďleŵ. DoǁŶs ;ϭϵϳϮͿ Đatalogued the ŵedia͛s ĐƌuĐial iŵpoƌtaŶĐe iŶ the 
͚issue atteŶtioŶ ĐǇĐle͛, ǁith KiŶgdoŶ ;ϭϵϴϰͿ siŵilaƌlǇ ǀieǁiŶg ͚issue atteŶtiǀeŶess͛ thƌough the 
news media as a critical precursor to policy change. Later work by McCombs (1981), Cobb and 
Elder (1983) and Kennamer (1994) pointed to the agenda-setting function of the news media 
and its pivotal role in the policymaking process. While debate persists about the extent to 
which mass media set the agenda (see McQuail, 1987) or directly influence the decisions of 
poliĐǇŵakeƌs, it is hoǁeǀeƌ ŵostlǇ agƌeed that ͚ďǇ highlightiŶg paƌtiĐulaƌ aspeĐts of the 
information stream, the media may help to set the toŶe foƌ suďseƋueŶt poliĐǇ aĐtioŶ͛ ;JoŶes 
and Wolfe, 2010: 19). As a focusing partner in the process of agenda-ďuildiŶg theƌe is ͚aŶ 
important role for the media in determining which issues are important and when, both for 
the puďliĐ aŶd foƌ poliĐǇŵakeƌs͛ ;Soroka et al., ϮϬϭϮ: ϮϬϲͿ. “o ǁhile the ŵedia ͚ŵaǇ Ŷot ďe 
successful much of the time in telling people what to think, it is stunningly successful in telling 
its ƌeadeƌs ǁhat to thiŶk aďout͛ ;CoheŶ, ϭϵϲϯ: ϭϯͿ.  
The news media are able to sustain attention to particular problems, such as that of 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s offeŶdiŶg aŶd iŵpƌisoŶŵeŶt, dƌaǁiŶg atteŶtioŶ to plaǇeƌs iŶ the poliĐǇ pƌoĐess, aŶd 
in so doing aiding, abetting or hindering their cause (Soroka et al., 2012). While the previous 
chapter explored the viewpoints of penal reform campaigners, this chapter will examine the 
same phenomena from the perspective of journalists. Focusing on the role of newsmaking in 
the penal policy process, this chapter will consider the framing techniques adopted by 
journalists and examine the extent to which campaigners are able to influence the media 
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ageŶda ;see MĐCoŵďs ;ϮϬϭϰͿ. IŶ ĐoŶsideƌatioŶs of the ŵedia as a ͚ŶoŶ-ĐoŵpliaŶt paƌtŶeƌ͛ 
(Hilton et al., 2013), it will shine a spotlight on the little-known nature of relations between 
penal reformers as sources and crime and home affairs journalists as gatekeepers (see 
Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994). Incorporating the viewpoints of ten journalists (including two 
former journalists) working on crime news and home affairs, part two will set out their various 
perceptions of newsworthiness, news values and public opinion. Part three will explore their 
understandings of women offenders (including the framing techniques they employ when 
writing such stories) and part four will investigate the level and nature of contact they have 
with campaigners as news sources. Part fiǀe ǁill outliŶe jouƌŶalists͛ views on the media 
strategies employed by campaigners and part six will outline some areas of possible 
improvement. Part seven will conclude with a consideration of the above points in relation to 
theoretical understandings.  
 
 
ii. Making Crime News 
 
News Values, Newsworthiness and the Negative 
This chapter does not intend to repeat the theoretical foundations laid out earlier, except to 
remind that the news is a manufactured product. Newsworthiness is based on something 
paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ ͚audaĐious, ǀioleŶt oƌ Ŷoǀel͛ ;Gƌeeƌ, ϮϬϭϬ: ϱ03; see Chibnall, 1977) and jouƌŶalists͛ 
decisions regarding newsworthiness are informed by their sense of news values (Greer, 2010: 
502). The more events satisfy news values, the more likely they will be registered as news 
(Galtung and Ruge, 1981: 60), yet only a tiny fraction of events, criminal or otherwise, are 
deemed sufficiently newsworthy to merit media attention (Greer, 2013: 150). That media 
professionals often struggle to articulate their news values is well documented, and 
conversations with journalists were consistent with such findings.  
WheŶ asked the faĐtoƌs that ĐoŶstituted a ͚good͛ Đƌiŵe stoƌǇ, JouƌŶalist A ;ǁoƌkiŶg foƌ 
a right-leaning mid-sheet Ŷeǁspapeƌ aŶd desĐƌiďiŶg hiŵself as a ͚haĐk͛Ϳ, ďelieǀed the aŶsǁeƌ 
was siŵple. ‘eĐeiǀiŶg iŶfoƌŵatioŶ ͞from the police, from people who ring up sometimes, and 
ĐoŶtaĐts͛ he ďelieǀed that he Đould ͚usuallǇ tell. It ǁill hit ŵe iŶ the faĐe aŶd I think my god 
[that͛s a stoƌǇ]͟. When probed furtheƌ, he ǁeŶt oŶ to adŵit that ͞it͛s pƌoďaďlǇ Ŷot siŵple. I 
doŶ͛t kŶoǁ ŵǇ deĐisioŶ-ŵakiŶg pƌoĐess. It͛s just ƌeallǇ if it͛s a good stoƌǇ oƌ Ŷot͟. Consistent 
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ǁith ChiďŶall͛s ;ϭϵϳϳͿ iŵpeƌatiǀes of ͚ titillatioŶ͛ aŶd ͚ seŶsatioŶ͛, he eǆplaiŶed that ͞ I͛ŵ Ŷot suƌe 
juiĐǇ is the ƌight ǁoƌd… To put it ďluŶtlǇ I suppose Ǉou talk aďout: is it a good murder or not? 
If it͛s a gƌuesoŵe Đƌiŵe Ǉou ǁaŶt a head oƌ soŵethiŶg͟. Journalist B, also working for a right-
leaning mid-sheet newspaper, was critical of penal reform campaigners who consistently relied 
on the saŵe ƌhetoƌiĐ aŶd ǁas Đleaƌ that ͞if you want a good story, you need to have something 
ŵoƌe suďtle thaŶ just saǇiŶg ͚ǁe͛ƌe loĐkiŶg too ŵaŶǇ people up͛… What is so oƌigiŶal aŶd so 
new about that? ... The aƌguŵeŶts aƌe ǀeƌǇ faŵiliaƌ͟. While Journalist C (working in 
broadcasting) believed it was his role to ͞put things out there straightforwardly, honestly, and 
not get sǁaǇed [ďǇ puďliĐ opiŶioŶ]͟, he ǁas at the saŵe tiŵe ͞there to make stories 
iŶteƌestiŶg, aŶd a stoƌǇ ǁhiĐh saǇs that soŵe pƌisoŶeƌs haǀe got ǀideo ĐoŶsoles oƌ ǁhateǀeƌ… 
that story is goiŶg to haǀe ƌesoŶaŶĐe ǁith soŵe people. Theƌefoƌe that͛s going to be given 
ŵoƌe pƌoŵiŶeŶĐe͟. Research by Schlesinger and Tumber revealed a belief among journalists 
that ƌeadeƌs ǁeƌe fed up ǁith ͚eǀeƌǇdaǇ ŵuƌdeƌs͛ ;ϭϵϵϰ: ϭϰϱͿ, aŶd JouƌŶalist A ĐoŶfiƌŵed that 
he was ͞alǁaǇs lookiŶg foƌ soŵethiŶg that is uŶusual aŶd out of the oƌdiŶaƌǇ…. “o Ŷot the 
ordinary boring crimes if you like, domestic violence cases where husbands kill wives or wives 
kill husďaŶds͟. Journalist A went on to highlight the news value of ͚ĐeleďƌitǇ͛ aŶd eǆplained that 
it ǁas alǁaǇs good to ͞throw in a celebrity if you like oƌ soŵeoŶe ǁho͛s ǁell kŶoǁŶ͟. He went 
on to describe the 1999 murder of Ŷeǁs pƌeseŶteƌ Jill DaŶdo as ͞one of the most 
extraordinarilǇ high pƌofile stoƌies, ŵuƌdeƌs͟ that he had ever reported on.  
It has been argued that the claimsmaking battle is now largely won or lost in the media 
(see Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; McCombs, 2014; Hilton et al., 2013) and those 
ĐaŵpaigŶiŶg foƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal ƌefoƌŵ ŵust theƌefoƌe ƌelǇ, to a certain extent at least, on 
favourable news coverage of their issue. Yet during the interview process it become clear that 
certain crime and home affairs journalists (none of them female) did not view the rise in the 
female prison population as a problem that Ŷeeded to ďe ͚ƌesolǀed͛. CoŶsisteŶt ǁith 
“ĐhlesiŶgeƌ aŶd Tuŵďeƌ͛s asseƌtioŶ that ƌefoƌŵ of the peŶal sǇsteŵ is ǀieǁed as haǀiŶg little 
audience or readership appeal among journalists (1994: ϭϰϵͿ, JouƌŶalist A stated that ͞as a 
general view, I think people aƌeŶ͛t geŶeƌallǇ iŶteƌested [iŶ pƌisoŶs aŶd peŶal ƌefoƌŵ], aŶd are 
slightlǇ tuƌŶed off ďǇ it͟. JouƌŶalist B siŵilaƌlǇ ƋuestioŶed ͞is anyone ever interested in penal 
reform? Do we even need to reform? Is theƌe a sigŶifiĐaŶt pƌoďleŵ?͟ 
As well as confirming the news values required for crime stories, conversations with 
jouƌŶalists also highlighted that ͚the Ŷegatiǀe is ŵoƌe ŶeǁsǁoƌthǇ thaŶ the positiǀe͛ ;MĐNaiƌ, 
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2009: 41). The media are routinely criticised for ignoring positive projects and developments 
from criminal justice agencies (Marsh and Melville, 2014: 216), and journalists were asked if it 
was more difficult to place positive stories about prison, crime or criminal justice in their 
respective newspapers. Former Journalist D (who had previously worked for a left-leaning 
broadsheet newspaper) explained that negative stories were far easier to place and recalled 
that ͞someone once said there was more truth in advertising columns than news columns, 
because in advertising columns planes take off and land. Whereas in the news columns planes 
doŶ͛t take off theǇ oŶlǇ Đƌash͟. Former Journalist D described how Lord Rothermere, the 
founder of the Daily Mail wished for the newspaper to have a ͞dailǇ hate͟, aŶd ďelieǀed that 
͞wheŶ Ǉou ƌead it it͛s still theƌe͟. Having worked in the industry for several decades he believed 
that ͞the ǁoƌst thiŶg of all is this Ŷegatiǀe ƌepoƌtiŶg aŶd it͛s Ŷo ǁoŶdeƌ that people ďeĐoŵe 
disillusioned with government when newspapers concentrate on the negative not the 
positiǀe͟. Journalist B ďelieǀed that his papeƌ had ͞been trying in general to be more upbeat, 
positiǀe͟, but, consistent with the news values outliŶed aďoǀe, ǁeŶt oŶ to ƋuestioŶ ͞what are 
these stoƌies?... if it͛s just [aŶ] oƌdiŶaƌǇ ĐƌiŵiŶal offeŶdeƌ [that] goes thƌough [their] sentence, 
doesŶ͛t ƌeoffeŶd, how inteƌestiŶg is that?͟ Journalist F (working for a left-leaning broadsheet 
newspaper) confirmed that despite his best efforts to place stories about successful initiatives 
it ǁas ͞much easier to get negative stories in. Positive stories about prisons are few and far 
ďetǁeeŶ͟. Journalist G (again, working for a left-leaning broadsheet newspaper) explained that 
penal reform campaigners Ŷeeded to uŶdeƌstaŶd that ͞crime is a generally negative 
eǆpeƌieŶĐe͟ for many members of the public and that media coverage was therefore bound to 
reflect this.  
 
Crime News and Public Opinion 
Empirical work by Chibnall (1977) and Hall et al. (1978) in the 1970s went some way to 
uncovering the way in which the media shaped public knowledge (Pratt, 2007). Like the 
͚platoŶiĐ guaƌdiaŶs͛ eǆeƌĐisiŶg ĐoŶtƌol oǀeƌ Post-War penal policy development, so too did the 
͚ŵedia guaƌdiaŶs͛ iŵpose theiƌ oǁŶ standards and values on the release of information to the 
public (Pratt, 2007). As highlighted in chapter two, subsequent developments in media 
ownership, the proliferation of news outlets and the politicisation of law and order has meant 
that journalists now operate in an entirely different landscape. Due in part to commercial 
pressures, it is widely acknowledged that crime reporting is now more explicitly based on what 
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is deemed to be of interest to the public, namely things that are particularly unusual. 
͚JouƌŶalists͛ Ŷeǁs ǀalues lead theŵ to pƌeseŶt puďliĐ issues ǁithiŶ ĐeƌtaiŶ fƌaŵes… that help 
define the fund of ideas aǀailaďle to ĐitizeŶs͛ ;PƌiĐe aŶd TeǁksďuƌǇ, ϭϵϵϳ: ϭϳϳ, eŵphasis addedͿ 
and, as highlighted above, some journalists working on crime and home affairs believe the 
public to display a generally punitive stance when it comes to issues of law and order. Tapping 
iŶto suĐh ͚ďeliefs͛, populist ƌhetoƌiĐ espoused ďǇ ĐeƌtaiŶ jouƌŶalists ͚speaks to the ǁaǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh 
criminals and prisoners are thought to have been favoured at the expense of crime victims and 
the law-aďidiŶg puďliĐ͛ ;Pƌatt, ϮϬϬϳ: ϭϮͿ. It is iŶ this ǁaǇ that suĐh jouƌŶalists, opeƌatiŶg as 
supposed ͚aƌďiteƌs͛ of puďliĐ opiŶioŶ aƌe aďle to eǆaĐeƌďate the peŶal pƌoďleŵ. Of seƌious 
concern for penal reform campaigners is that previous possibilities for informed public opinion 
are often greatly diminished (Pratt, 2007: 67) as public knowledge about societal problems can 
ďeĐoŵe ͚effeĐtiǀelǇ iŵpoǀeƌished͛ ;ChiďŶall, ϭϵϴϭ: ϴϳͿ.  
JouƌŶalists͛ ďeliefs and assumptions tend to reflect the culture within which they are 
working (McNair, 2009: 66), and some journalists, predominantly those working for right-
leaning newspapers, understood public opinion to be punitive. Journalist A, for example, 
believed that ͞most surveys would show that the public think that more people need to be in 
prison, people get off too lightly, and so on. That͛s the ďulk opiŶioŶ͟. JouƌŶalist B ƋuestioŶed 
͞this aƌguŵeŶt [that] ͚theƌe͛s too ŵaŶǇ people iŶ pƌisoŶ͛. “aǇs ǁho? It͛s oŶe of these received 
wisdoms agaiŶst a ĐeƌtaiŶ gƌoup of people͟. Consistent with the populist rhetoric of his right-
leaning newspaper, Journalist B was Đleaƌ that his stoƌies ǁeƌe ͞not [just] about people getting 
peƌks, ďut ŵoƌe that… theƌe aƌe ǀiĐtiŵs out there. What aƌe ǁe goiŶg to do aďout it?͟ 
While such viewpoints were articulated by those working for right-leaning newspapers, 
there was widespread recognition among those working for the left-leaning news media that 
penal reform campaigners faced difficulties working with certain sections of the press. 
Journalist H (working for a left-leaning broadsheet ŶeǁspapeƌͿ eǆplaiŶed that ͞the public care 
a lot aďout ǁhat goes oŶ iŶ pƌisoŶs… [ďut that] theƌe aƌe soŵe [puŶitiǀe] people, theiƌ ǀieǁs 
are articulated verǇ stƌoŶglǇ ďǇ soŵe Ŷeǁspapeƌs͟. Describing what he saw as the contested 
natuƌe of puďliĐ opiŶioŶ aŶd that ͞actually when you talk to people, theƌe͛s a ǁide ƌaŶge of 
ǀieǁs͟, he highlighted ͞this peƌĐeptioŶ that theƌe͛s oŶe ǀieǁ out there which is, you know, 
͚lock them up and thƌoǁ aǁaǇ the keǇ, I doŶ͛t Đaƌe͛. But actually it͛s Ŷot as siŵple as that at 
all͟. Consistent with Hilton et al.͛s ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of the ŵedia as a ͚ŶoŶ-ĐoŵpliaŶt paƌtŶeƌ͛ ;ϮϬϭϯ: 
16ϭͿ, JouƌŶalist C adŵitted that ͞some [campaigners] do struggle to get their voices heard in 
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the ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ ŵedia, paƌtlǇ ďeĐause theƌe͛s a ƌesistaŶĐe aŵoŶg soŵe iŶ the ŵedia to the 
liberal ideas they have, the Howard League and the Prison Reform Trust͟. Journalist F believed 
that puďliĐ ͞opinions are formed by what they read and what they hear, and of course the 
tabloids demonise prisoners. When you talk to people directly, [you] get a good reaction. I 
think the public by-and-large are okay, but they get fed this diet aŶd theǇ ƌeaĐt aĐĐoƌdiŶglǇ͟. 
Journalist H siŵilaƌlǇ agƌeed that ͞if you ask the public a sensible question you often get a 
sensible answer; ask them a loaded one, which is what politicians generally do, and you get 
knee-jeƌk puŶitiǀe ƌespoŶses͟. Journalist F went even further and argued that pƌisoŶs ͞seƌǀe a 
puƌpose foƌ politiĐiaŶs͟ as members of the publiĐ haǀe aŶ outlet oŶ ǁhiĐh to ͞vent their spleen 
oŶ uŶdesiƌaďles…[takiŶg] the pƌessuƌe aǁaǇ fƌoŵ the politiĐiaŶs͟. Adopting the role of a 
campaigner, he ǀieǁed it as his ͞ ŵissioŶ͟ to influence public opinion and contest the dominant 
media-Đƌiŵe paƌadigŵ, ƋuestioŶiŶg ͞how many people pass [HMP] Pentonville every day? But 
for all they know what goes on in theƌe, it ŵaǇ as ǁell ďe Tiŵďuktu͟.  
By not viewing the issue as a problem, it is clear that certain journalists are able to ensure 
that ͚laƌge segŵeŶts of the soĐial ǁoƌld aƌe sǇsteŵatiĐallǇ eǆĐluded fƌoŵ ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ aŶd 
disĐussioŶ iŶ the ŵedia͛ ;ChiďŶall, ϭϵϴϭ: ϴϳͿ. Depending on their ideological persuasion, 
journalists are unwilling (or unable) to create the climate for wholesale reform, and further still 
may work to inhibit this process. Given the struggles experienced by those journalists 
sympathetic to reform, such empirical evidence supports the classification of this issue as a 
͚lesseƌ soĐial pƌoďleŵ͛ ;HilgaƌtŶeƌ and Bosk, 1988).  
 
 
iii. Portraying Women Offenders  
 
Of on-going concern for penal reform campaigners is that news media publications have the 
power to distort as well as inform (Indermaur and Hough, 2002; see Jewkes, 2004; Jones and 
Wardle, 2010; Kitzinger, 2000). As highlighted earlier in this study, feminist scholars have 
argued that gender inequalities are reproduced in a patriarchal media industry (Jewkes, 2004: 
ϮϬͿ, ǁheƌe audieŶĐes aƌe positioŶed aĐĐoƌdiŶg to the ͚idealised͛ role of the female (Boyd 
Barrett, 2007: 99). Common-sense assumptions about gender roles for men and women are 
reflected in the way the media report crime and criminals and their use of these stereotypical 
views of women (Marsh and Melville, 2014: 89). Stereotyping enables journalists to frame 
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ŵessages ͚ǁith the least aŵouŶt of lost ŵotioŶ͛, aŶd ƌeĐeiǀeƌs ͚to ĐoŵpƌeheŶd ǁhat is ďeiŶg 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐated ǁith eƋual speed aŶd faĐilitǇ͛ ;O͛Haƌa, ϭϵϲϭ: ϭϵϰͿ. CaŵpaigŶeƌs expressed 
concern that stereotypical media representations of women offenders continued to act as 
͚ŵeŶtal pigeoŶ-holes͛ ;DǇeƌ, ϭϵϵϯͿ foƌ politiĐiaŶs aŶd the puďliĐ alike, pƌeseŶtiŶg a ŵajoƌ 
ďaƌƌieƌ to poliĐǇ ƌefoƌŵ. This seĐtioŶ ǁill ĐƌitiĐallǇ assess jouƌŶalists͛ thoughts oŶ geŶdeƌ ƌole 
expectations and the newsworthiness of women offenders in crime news. It will conclude with 
a consideration of high-pƌofile ǁoŵeŶ offeŶdeƌs as ͚ŵedia teŵplates͛ ;KitziŶgeƌ, ϮϬϬϬͿ.  
 
The Newsworthiness of Women Offenders 
This study has demonstrated that the subject of routine female offending, from a news 
perspective at least, is considered mundane, and does not satisfy the news values of novelty, 
titillation and drama (see Chibnall, 1977). Even those journalists who were sympathetic to 
reform and working for the left-leaning quality press struggled to get stories into their 
newspapers, recognising that the subject was of little interest to editors (Journalist F and 
Journalist I, for example). Journalists routinely criticised campaigners for repeating the same 
messages, the result being that their key issues became diluted and were no longer interesting 
or distinctive. Stories about ǁoŵeŶ ǁeƌe ĐƌitiƋued foƌ ďeiŶg ͞ dull aŶd dƌǇ͟ by Journalist A (who 
worked for a right-leaning mid-sheet), while Journalist J (working for a right-leaning mid-sheet 
aŶd sǇŵpathetiĐ to ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal ƌefoƌŵͿ adŵitted that campaigners needed to give their 
stoƌies ŵoƌe ͞ƌah-ƌah skiƌt͟. Yet while routine female offending was not considered 
newsworthy, cases involving violent offending were considered to be at the other end of the 
spectrum.  
Despite some journalists demonstrating an understanding of the wider problem of 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s offeŶdiŶg aŶd iŵpƌisoŶŵeŶt, all agƌeed that the suďjeĐt ǁas Ŷot ŶeǁsǁoƌthǇ. 
Sporadic issues would undoubtedly receive higher levels of coverage (such as the former 
practice of shackling women offenders in labour), yet this was comparatively little compared 
to the coverage received by other societal ills. Journalist G (working for a left-leaning 
broadsheet newspaper) believed that that it ǁas still possiďle to ƌead ͞a 1,000 word feature 
aďout ǁoŵeŶ iŶ pƌisoŶ͟, although this was likely to be in ͞the Guardian, and not the Mail, the 
Telegraph, probably not even the Tiŵes͟. Former Journalist E (who had previously worked in 
broadcasting) belieǀed that despite the geŶeƌal ͞understanding that there are huge numbers 
of women iŶ pƌisoŶ ǁho shouldŶ͛t ďe theƌe, the issues suƌƌouŶdiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s offeŶdiŶg get 
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subsumed in this general obsession with public proteĐtioŶ aŶd haƌdliŶe peŶal poliĐǇ͟. 
Journalist H (working for a left-leaniŶg ďƌoadsheetͿ ǁas Đleaƌ that ͞women offenders are not 
seen as victims where they should be; most women in jail have had bigger crimes done to them 
thaŶ theǇ haǀe doŶe to otheƌs͟. Interpersonal violent crimes are clearly more dramatic and 
titillating than non-violent crimes (Greer, 2010: 503), and Former Journalist E saw little 
͞sepaƌatiŶg out that ŶiŶetǇ pet ĐeŶt of ǁoŵeŶ iŶ pƌisoŶ aƌe theƌe foƌ pƌopeƌtǇ offeŶĐes… theƌe 
isŶ͛t uŶfoƌtuŶatelǇ ŵuĐh iŶteƌest͟. Voicing frustrations about her struggles to place stories into 
her own left-leaning broadsheet newspapeƌ, JouƌŶalist I ƌeĐalled that ͞ǁoŵeŶ͛s ŵagaziŶes 
used to be very interested in women in pƌisoŶ aŶd the issues aƌouŶd it͟, ďut she Đould Ŷot 
͞remember the last time I saǁ [aŶ aƌtiĐle iŶ oŶe]͟.  
Highlighting the news value of simplification, and the tendeŶĐǇ of ͚the populaƌ ŵedia… 
to construct an on-going narrative which its readership caŶ slip oŶ like a faǀouƌite Đoat͛ 
(Silverman, 2012: 37), Former Journalist E believed that a ŵajoƌ issue ǁas that it ǁas ͞difficult 
to represent certain stories like womeŶ ĐuttiŶg theŵselǀes͟ in the mainstream media because 
͞theǇ͛ƌe stoƌies that take a lot of ŶuaŶĐiŶg… theǇ͛ƌe haƌd to ƌepƌeseŶt iŶ Ŷeǁs stoƌies. AŶd I 
thiŶk that͛s oŶe ƌeason why you do get a lot of stereotyping shorthand. I think the mainstream 
media does like to deal with thiŶgs that it ĐaŶ put iŶ a ďoǆ͟. He believed that opinion-forming 
taďloid ͞papers like the Sun are absolutely brilliant at encapsulating something in two hundred 
words. But of course all the ŶuaŶĐes just go out the ǁiŶdoǁ͟. This had obvious implications for 
the portƌaǇal of feŵale Đƌiŵe, aŶd ǁas ͞why the criminal justice system is hard to portray in 
anything otheƌ thaŶ ďlaĐk aŶd ǁhite teƌŵs͟.  
While ͚ƌoutiŶe͛ Đases of feŵale offeŶdiŶg did Ŷot satisfǇ the jouƌŶalistiĐ ǀalues of 
dƌaŵatizatioŶ, titillatioŶ aŶd ŶoǀeltǇ ;ChiďŶall, ϭϵϳϳͿ, stoƌies iŶǀolǀiŶg ǀioleŶt ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
offending were at the other end of the spectrum. Journalist A believed that women offenders 
received comparatiǀelǇ ǁoƌse Đoǀeƌage thaŶ ŵeŶ ͞ďeĐause it͛s uŶusual. It͛s fasĐiŶatiŶg ǁheŶ 
Ǉou get a ǁoŵaŶ ǁho has Đoŵŵitted a paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ ǀioleŶt Đƌiŵe like Fƌed West͛s ǁife, ‘ose. 
So I think it is the kiŶd of uŶusual aspeĐt͟. Journalist A admitted that ǁoŵeŶ offeŶdeƌs ͞make 
good headliŶes… Ǉou Đould haǀe ͚ďlaĐk ǁidoǁ͛ oƌ soŵethiŶg like that͟. Journalist C (working 
in broadcastingͿ siŵilaƌlǇ agƌeed that ŵedia ͞treatment is a bit diffeƌeŶt ďeĐause it͛s ŵoƌe 
uŶusual͟. 
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Gender Role Expectations  
Opinion was divided about the comparative reporting of male and female offenders, although 
the ǀast ŵajoƌitǇ of jouƌŶalists ďelieǀed that ǁoŵeŶ ͚had it ǁoƌse͛. Foƌŵeƌ JouƌŶalist E 
admitted that expectations about respeĐtaďle feŵale ďehaǀiouƌ ǁeŶt ͞back to the 19th 
century, and I think that attitude towards women is still theƌe as aŶ uŶdeƌĐuƌƌeŶt͟. Journalist 
G ďelieǀed it ǁas ͞haƌd to judge͟, ďut uŶdeƌstood that ͞the women that you read about in the 
tabloid press commit particular types of crimes. The front page of the Sun yesterday was about 
a ŵotheƌ gettiŶg dƌuŶk ǁith heƌ eleǀeŶ Ǉeaƌ old soŶ. Noǁ I thiŶk if that had ďeeŶ ͚fatheƌ dƌiŶks 
ǁith eleǀeŶ Ǉeaƌ old soŶ͛, it ǁouldŶ͛t haǀe ŵade the fƌoŶt page… I doŶ͛t eǀeŶ kŶoǁ if it would 
haǀe ŵade the iŶside͟. He ďelieǀed suĐh Đoǀeƌage ͞tells you more about gender expectations 
thaŶ Đƌiŵe… I kŶoǁ a lot of it is a seŶse of a feŵale ŵoƌal Đode aŶd ǁhat people eǆpeĐt of 
ǁoŵeŶ… aŶd so if soŵethiŶg jaƌs ǁith ouƌ geŶdeƌ eǆpeĐtatioŶs I ĐaŶ see ǁhǇ aŶ editoƌ ǁould 
think that was more of a stoƌǇ͟.  
Other journalists, predominantly, although not exclusively, female, were unequivocal 
in their responses. Journalist I believed that it ǁas ďeĐause ǁoŵeŶ offeŶdeƌs ͞defǇ the 
steƌeotǇpes͟. Journalist F (working for a left-leaning broadsheet newspaper) similarly agreed 
that ͞people thiŶk that ǁoŵeŶ shouldŶ͛t [Đoŵŵit Đƌiŵes]. People thiŶk that ǁoŵeŶ haǀe a 
plaĐe iŶ soĐietǇ aŶd theǇ shouldŶ͛t step out of that plaĐe. AŶd Ǉes theǇ do get a haƌdeƌ tiŵe, 
ǁithout a shadoǁ of a douďt͟. JouƌŶalist J ǁas Đleaƌ that ͞people seem to think somehow 
ǁoŵeŶ shouldŶ͛t do stuff like this. Theƌefoƌe if theǇ do, that͛s teƌƌiďlǇ aǁful. Wheƌeas if a ďloke 
does it, ǁell hello, he͛s just doŶe it͟. JouƌŶalist H suŵŵaƌised the ͞greater shock when a 
woman commits a high-profile offence than wheŶ a ŵaŶ Đoŵŵits the saŵe Đƌiŵe͟. He 
believed there was: 
 
 ͞An ambivalence in British society towards women offenders; on the one hand, there 
is still an old-fashioned sense of expecting a higher standard of behaviour from 
ǁoŵeŶ…; oŶ the other hand there is a sense, post feminism, that women should be 
treated with equal severity with men when they have offended. The combination of 
these two means that theǇ aƌe tƌeated ǁoƌse oŶ ďalaŶĐe͟. 
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Media Templates 
While jouƌŶalists ĐoŶfiƌŵed that the ǀast ŵajoƌitǇ of stoƌies aďout ͚oƌdiŶaƌǇ͛ ǁoŵeŶ offeŶdeƌs 
ǁeƌe uŶlikelǇ to ŵake the Ŷeǁs, foƌ those ͚stƌikiŶg͛ Đases that did exhibit newsworthiness, 
comparisons were often drawn with the most high-profile offenders. In their empirical study 
of journalistic behaviour, Protess et al. ;ϭϵϵϭͿ aƌgued that ŵost jouƌŶalists look to fit a ͚piĐtuƌe 
fƌaŵe͛ aƌouŶd the ĐoŶteǆt of theiƌ stoƌǇ aŶd seek to ideŶtifǇ otheƌ siŵilaƌ Đases, histoƌiĐal oƌ 
otherwise to place it with (see also ͚Ŷeǁs paĐkagiŶg͛ EƌiĐsoŶ, BaƌaŶek aŶd ChaŶ, 1991). By 
producing stories within established frames and templates, or what Ericson, Baranek and Chan 
;ϭϵϴϳͿ Đalled the ͚ǀoĐaďulaƌǇ of pƌeĐedeŶts͛, jouƌŶalists ǁield ĐoŶsideƌaďle poǁer over penal 
reform campaigners and the messages they seek to promote. As highlighted ďǇ D͛Cƌuze aŶd 
Jackson (2009), it is those very few violent crimes committed by women that remain in the 
minds of the public, their legacies have become what Kitzinger has laďelled as ͚teŵplates͛, 
serving as ͚ƌhetoƌiĐal shoƌthaŶd͛ (2000: 61) to help new audiences understand the occurrence 
of female crime (see also Birch, 1993; Jones and Wardle, 2010).  
When asked their views on women offenders, some journalists (working for right-leaning 
newspapers) framed their responses using the eŶtƌeŶĐhed ͚teŵplates͛ of ‘ose West aŶd MǇƌa 
Hindley. It is Đleaƌ that a jouƌŶalist͛s peƌsoŶal iŶteƌest iŶ aŶǇ giǀeŶ pƌoďleŵ affeĐts the 
ideological issue frame (i.e. punitive or rehabilitative) and rhetorical language that they are 
likely to pursue. Former Journalist D (who had worked for a left-leaning broadsheet) expressed 
frustration with suĐh pƌaĐtiĐes aŶd the ĐoŶstaŶt ͞obsession with serious women offeŶdeƌs͟. 
He believed that the journalistic instinct to portray all ǁoŵeŶ as ͞eǀil, i.e. MǇƌa HiŶdleǇ͟ ǁas 
aŶ ͞absuƌd aŶd a ǀeƌǇ daŶgeƌous ĐoŶĐept͟.  While some journalists (working for the right-
leaning media) were happy to draw on comparisons with the most high-profile offenders, 
Journalist I was similarly unhappy with the constant use of populist stories. As far as she was 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶed, ͞the stories that get onto the press are dictated by prevailing urban myths like 
women are becoming more violent, or young women are beĐoŵiŶg ŵoƌe like ǇouŶg ŵeŶ͟, 
working hard to challenge suĐh ŵǇths ǁas ͞very difficult… although Ǉou keep oŶ tƌǇiŶg͟. It is 
clear that the continued tendency for some journalists (mainly working for the agenda-setting, 
right-leaning newspapers) to rely on stereotypical and negative templates makes the task of 
pursuing competing rhetoric for other journalists (mainly working for left-leaning broadsheets) 
and campaigners all the more challenging.  
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iv. Campaigners aŶd the Neǁs ͚OŶioŶ͛ 
 
As a consequence of the growth in the scope of crime reporting, there are now many more 
potential sources that specialist journalists have to cultivate (Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994: 
160). While the main source for those working on crime and home affairs undoubtedly remains 
the police closely followed by government department press offices, the pool of potential 
sources includes an ever-growing array of pressure groups and individual experts (Schlesinger 
aŶd Tuŵďeƌ, ϭϵϵϰ: ϭϲϬͿ. It goes ǁithout saǇiŶg that jouƌŶalists͛ ƌelatioŶships ǁith theiƌ souƌĐes 
are varied, and, (often from their own experience of working as media professionals) some 
souƌĐes aƌe iŶeǀitaďlǇ ͚ŵoƌe ƌeliaďle, aĐĐuƌate aŶd aǁaƌe of the ŵedia͛s Ŷeeds͛ ;“ĐhlesiŶgeƌ 
aŶd Tuŵďeƌ, ϭϵϵϰ: ϭϲϲͿ. HaǀiŶg suŵŵaƌised jouƌŶalists͛ ĐoŶfliĐtiŶg ǀieǁpoiŶts oŶ puďliĐ 
opinion and women offenders, this section will consider MĐCoŵďs͛ ;ϮϬϭϰͿ ŵetaphoƌiĐal 
͚oŶioŶ͛ of souƌĐe aĐĐess to eǆploƌe the journalist-campaigner relationship in more detail.  
 
Relations with Campaigners 
The journalists interviewed for this study painted a picture of mixed relations with penal reform 
campaigners. Journalist B (working for a right-leaning mid-sheet) adŵitted that he didŶ͛t haǀe 
a ͞ďad͟ relationship with the penal reform network, ďut eƋuallǇ Ŷot ͞a huge oŶe͟. The onus 
for building relations fell squarely at the door of those wanting to secure media coverage, and 
he didn͛t feel that ĐaŵpaigŶeƌs ŵade ͞a gƌeat deal of effoƌt͟. Cleaƌ that ͞if anyone comes and 
says to me will you meet and talk about this then I will do͟, he adŵitted that ͞if there was 
somebody I kneǁ iŶ those soƌts of oƌgaŶisatioŶs that ǁould tell ŵe… thiŶgs, theŶ of Đouƌse I 
would talk to them because it ǁould ďe useful, ďut theǇ doŶ͛t͟. Journalist B went on to explain 
that given the issues that interested his puďliĐatioŶ͛s ƌeadeƌship, ͞it͛s Ŷot alǁays the sort of 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ that͛s goiŶg to ďe that useful to ŵe, ƌeallǇ͟. As the issue of penal reform was not 
considered a particular conĐeƌŶ foƌ his Ŷeǁspapeƌ, he ǁas ͞Ŷot suƌe off the top of ŵǇ head͟ 
how campaigners could expect to receive greater coverage. Journalist A (also working for a 
right-leaning mid-sheet) similaƌlǇ adŵitted that he didŶ͛t ͞tend to deal with them 
[campaigners] ǀeƌǇ ŵuĐh͟, although he ǁeŶt oŶ to eǆplaiŶ that he ͞ probably should have more 
dealiŶgs ǁith theŵ aĐtuallǇ, thaŶ I do… Although I get a lot of pƌess ƌeleases fƌoŵ theŵ͟. 
Although fewer in number, other journalists (three or four) enjoyed closer relationships with 
penal reform campaigners (mainly, although not exclusively, those working for left-leaning 
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newspapers). Journalist J (working for a right-leaning mid-sheet), for example, had a very good 
working relationship with an organisation and recalled that a campaigner had counter-
intuitively seconded her onto her policy taskfoƌĐe ͞because she thought it would be quite 
useful to have someone from a newspaper group that was potentially quite aggressive and 
Ƌuite ĐhalleŶgiŶg͟. Journalist I (working for a left-leaning broadsheet) sat on a board of trustees 
for a national campaign organisation.  
 
Campaigners as Sources: In and Out of Favour 
In the face of declining editorial resources, journalists have developed an increased 
depeŶdeŶĐǇ oŶ the ͚iŶfoƌŵatioŶ suďsidies͛ ;GaŶdǇ, ϭϵϴϬͿ supplied ďǇ souƌĐes ;Daǀis, ϮϬϬϬ: 
ϰϰͿ. BǇ pƌoǀidiŶg a ĐoŶsisteŶt supplǇ of suĐh ͚suďsidies͛ ;ĐoŵpƌisiŶg of news stories and 
ƌeseaƌĐhͿ to jouƌŶalists, ͚ŶoŶ-offiĐial͛ souƌĐes such as penal reform campaigners can work to 
establish themselves in media discourses as legitimate sources (Davis, 2000: 44). Research by 
Schlesinger and Tumber (1994; see also Schlesinger, Tumber and Murdock, 1991) recorded 
examples of criminal justice pressure groups developing sophisticated media strategies, which 
ideŶtified theŵ as ͚authoƌitatiǀe͛ souƌĐes iŶ theiƌ suďjeĐt aƌeas ;iŶ Daǀis, ϮϬϬϬ: ϱϬͿ. Although 
it is the case that certain campaigners haǀe ďeeŶ aďle to ƌaise theŵselǀes up the ͚hieƌaƌĐhǇ of 
ĐƌediďilitǇ͛ ;BeĐkeƌ, ϭϵϲϳͿ, it is iŵpoƌtaŶt to ƌeŵeŵďeƌ that the ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ field of peŶal 
policy is highly political. Criminal justice sources (the police, the probation service, penal 
reformers and civil liberties organisations) have consequently found themselves in and out of 
favour depending on the political administration of the time.  
When questioned about the status of penal reform campaigners as new sources, both 
former journalists took the opportunity to document the changing nature of media access. 
Former Journalist E (who previously worked in broadcasting) discussed the demise of penal 
reformers ǁho had ͞captured the old Labour party, certainly in the 1980s and eaƌlǇ ϭϵϵϬs͟. He 
saǁ that ͞ after 2001 [their relations with government and officials] gradually began to dissipate 
undeƌ a ŵuĐh tougheƌ Đƌiŵe ageŶda͟. CoŵpaƌiŶg hiŵself to a ͚ŵedia guaƌdiaŶ͛, Foƌŵeƌ 
Journalist D (who had previously worked for a left-leaning broadsheet) believed that despite 
changing ƌelatioŶs ǁith goǀeƌŶŵeŶt aŶd ͞giǀeŶ the Cold Waƌ that theǇ͛ƌe iŶ, theǇ͛ǀe suƌǀiǀed 
iŶĐƌediďlǇ ǁell, theǇ͛ƌe ŵoƌe iŵpoƌtaŶt Ŷoǁ thaŶ iŶ the old daǇs ǁheŶ ǁe agƌeed it ǁas too 
serious an issue to become a political oŶe͟. It became clear, therefore, that campaigners͛ 
access to media outlets is dynamic, with the topic of penal reform moving in and out of political 
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fashion depending on the government of the time. Questioning the impact of reform strategies 
oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s penal policy, Formeƌ JouƌŶalist E felt Đleaƌ that ĐaŵpaigŶeƌs͛ ͞influence on the 
ageŶda has ďeeŶ… ŵaƌgiŶal foƌ Ƌuite a loŶg tiŵe͟, with one primary reason being their limited 
access to the news media.  
While Former Journalist D did not feel that there was a problem with campaigner access 
to the ŵedia ageŶda, ͞[although] you would have thought so, with the media pumping up the 
penal populism, spuƌƌed oŶ ďǇ the politiĐiaŶs͟, his views were in the minority. Journalist F 
(working for a left-leaning broadsheet ŶeǁspapeƌͿ adŵitted that ͞there are stock people to go 
to ǁheŶ Ǉou ǁƌite a stoƌǇ. NoƌŵallǇ oŶ a pƌisoŶ thiŶg… Ǉou ǁould go to the Howard League, 
to the Prison Reform Trust͟. JouƌŶalist B oĐĐasioŶallǇ used ͚iŶfoƌŵatioŶ suďsidies͛ pƌoǀided ďǇ 
campaigners ͞which might help when theƌe aƌeŶ͛t offiĐial oŶes aƌouŶd͟ although he admitted 
that such information was not as trusted. It is clear that campaigners lookiŶg to puƌsue ͚puďliĐ 
ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶs͛ ŵust ďe aďle to deal ǁith the ŵedia ;“ĐhlesiŶgeƌ aŶd Tuŵďeƌ, 1994: 169), yet 
those who are resource-poor lack this crucial opportunity to make advantageous contacts 
(Palmer, 2000: 53; see also Gandy, 1982; Goldenberg, 1975). Journalist C (working in 
broadcasting) saw a major barrier to access as one of resources, and that ͞it͛s paƌtlǇ ďeĐause 
theǇ͛ƌe sŵall opeƌatioŶs aŶd doŶ͛t haǀe huge ŵedia teaŵs͟. Despite recognising this issue, 
campaigners without adequate resources were of no use to journalists and received little 
sympathy.  
Most journalists agreed that media coverage for penal reform campaigners was 
generally quite bad. JouƌŶalist B adŵitted that ͞they pƌoďaďlǇ do [get loǁ Đoǀeƌage]͟, but 
ĐoŶfiƌŵiŶg the status of ǁoŵeŶ͛s iŵpƌisoŶŵeŶt as a ͚lesseƌ soĐial pƌoďleŵ͛ ;HilgaƌtŶeƌ aŶd 
Bosk, ϭϵϴϴͿ, ǁeŶt oŶ to ƋuestioŶ ͞what should theǇ ďe gettiŶg?͟ Journalist C admitted that he 
ǁas ͞always a bit resistant to pressure groups and campaign groups because they tend to say 
the same thing in different ways over and over again. And so you see the email and you press 
the delete button ďeĐause it͛s Ŷot ƌeallǇ telliŶg Ǉou ǀeƌǇ ŵuĐh Ŷeǁ͟. Despite this view he stated 
that his attitude could ďe ĐouŶteƌpƌoduĐtiǀe ďeĐause ͞you should always be aware that they 
do sometimes come up with something that is iŶteƌestiŶg oƌ ǁoƌth ĐoǀeƌiŶg͟. Differentiating 
between news outlets, the general consensus among journalists was that campaigners did 
͞struggle a bit with soŵe of the ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ ŵedia͟, but that newspapers such as the Guardian 
were likely to afford them more time and access. Former Journalist E ďelieǀed that ͞penal 
reform groups have no trouble whatsoever getting stuff in the Observer and the Guardian and 
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the left-leaŶiŶg papeƌs͟, ďut that theǇ had ͞fantastic trouble getting stuff in the Mail and those 
papers that do still influence the policy ageŶda͟. Coverage in the agenda-setting news media 
was deemed vital for those campaigners that wished to influence the policy agenda. While it is 
Đleaƌ that topiĐs suĐh as ǁoŵeŶ͛s iŵpƌisoŶŵeŶt aŶd peŶal ƌefoƌŵ aƌe ŵoƌe pƌeǀaleŶt iŶ the 
left-leaning quality press (although by no means receiving the levels of coverage that other 
journalists may perceive), journalists working on such publications were not always successful 
iŶ gettiŶg suĐh stoƌies pƌiŶted. Those jouƌŶalists ĐleaƌlǇ ͚ ǁedded͛ to the ageŶda still had to fight 
their own battles. Working against the dominant crime-media paradigm to pursue his own 
counter-messages, Journalist F (working for a left-leaning broadsheet publication) described 
his joď as ͞a ŵissioŶ ǁithout a douďt, ďeĐause theƌe͛s so much wroŶg ǁith the sǇsteŵ͟. 
While journalists are often referred to as putting their trust in official sources and 
documents such as those emanating from the government (see Protess et al., 1991: 207), like 
͚iŶfoƌŵatioŶ suďsidies͛ ;GaŶdǇ, 1980) provided by campaigners, information from the Ministry 
of Justice was not always judged as credible. JouƌŶalist B eǆplaiŶed that ͞if Ǉou͛ƌe lookiŶg foƌ 
faĐts aŶd figuƌes Ǉou͛ƌe goiŶg to go to offiĐial souƌĐes i.e. goǀeƌŶŵeŶt depaƌtŵeŶts ďeĐause 
that͛s ǁheƌe there are official statistiĐs͟. Yet those journalists working (or had previously 
worked) for left-leaŶiŶg puďliĐatioŶs ǁeƌe faƌ ŵoƌe ĐǇŶiĐal aďout ͚offiĐial͛ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ. 
Journalist G was clear that when critical stories about prisons or criminal justice policy 
emerged, DepaƌtŵeŶt pƌess offiĐials ͞become defensive and start misleadiŶg Ǉou. “o Ǉou ĐaŶ͛t 
tƌust theŵ͟. Journalist F ǁas eƋuallǇ Đleaƌ that ͞ never have I trusted a government press office, 
and never would. They see their role to present obstacles to what you want to find. So they 
will obstruct aŶd oďfusĐate, that͛s theiƌ joď͟. Due to the investigative nature of his reporting 
Journalist F admitted that the Departmental press offiĐials ͞despise ŵe, theǇ ƌeallǇ do͟ and 
this made finding relevant information increasingly difficult. Former Journalist D believed that 
ĐoŶtaĐtiŶg the DepaƌtŵeŶt ͞just ƌaised ŵoƌe ƋuestioŶs͟ and it was therefore better to use 
contacts in the civil service who, while not permitted to liaise directly with journalists, were 
often more helpful with press inquiries.  
The ǀieǁpoiŶts deďated iŶ this seĐtioŶ pƌoǀide fuƌtheƌ eǀideŶĐe to suppoƌt Best͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ 
ŵodel of ͚iŶsideƌ ĐlaiŵsŵakiŶg͛ as aŶ aĐĐuƌate desĐƌiptioŶ of ĐaŵpaigŶ stƌategies iŶ this policy 
domain. IŶ aŶd out of faǀouƌ ;ƌesolutelǇ ͚out͛ as faƌ as the ƌight-leaning agenda-setting 
journalists were concerned), and operating on the periphery of the media agenda (see 
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McCombs, 2014), penal reform campaigners are consequently unable to pursue media 
coverage as a stand-alone policy strategy, even if they wish to.  
 
 
v. Critiquing Campaigners 
 
Interviews revealed that journalists believed most campaigners were lacking in a basic 
understanding of the news production process. Initially discussing their views on stealth 
strategies, this section will also highlight their calls for campaigners to develop a greater 
understanding of the news production process.  
 
Reform by Stealth 
Despite adŵittiŶg that ǁoŵeŶ offeŶdeƌs teŶded to ͚get it ǁoƌse͛ iŶ teƌŵs of media coverage, 
seven out of ten journalists were clear that this should not deter campaigners in their 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatiǀe stƌategies. Opposed to Best͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ ŵodel of ͚iŶsideƌ ĐlaiŵsŵakiŶg͛, the 
͞siŶgle tƌaĐk͟ approach of private lobbying was deemed as unviable by many journalists who 
believed that greater opportunities for poliĐǇ ĐhaŶge ǁeƌe the ƌesult of ͞finding as many 
platfoƌŵs [as Ǉou ĐaŶ]͟ ;JouƌŶalist GͿ. Journalist G (working for a left-leaning broadsheet) was 
͞staggeƌed͟ that some campaigners ǀieǁed ͞exempting yourself from discussion as an 
effeĐtiǀe tool of loďďǇiŶg͟, while Former Journalist E (who had worked in broadcasting) saw it 
as ͞ĐoŵpletelǇ ŵad… ŶothiŶg eǀeƌ ĐhaŶges that ǁaǇ. The oŶlǇ ƌeasoŶ ǁhǇ MiŶisteƌs eǀeƌ do 
aŶǇthiŶg is ďeĐause theǇ͛ƌe embaƌƌassed ďǇ puďliĐ opiŶioŶ͟. Former Journalist E did not see it 
as ͞possible in this 24 hour mediated age, and neitheƌ do I thiŶk it͛s desiƌaďle͟. He ǁeŶt oŶ to 
stƌess that ͞the idea that you can do cosy little deals that are going to stick, have lots of 
meetings and lots of promises which never amount to anything, which civil servants and their 
political masters are very good at giǀiŶg, I thiŶk is pie iŶ the skǇ͟. Journalist J (working for a 
right-leaning mid-sheet) was clear that despite often unhelpful media depictions of women 
offeŶdeƌs, ͞you cannot close your doors to the media, because we influence what goes on, 
hugelǇ͟. While Journalist F (working for a left-leaning broadsheet) believed that campaigners 
speŶt ͞too much time courtiŶg the ŵedia͟, he was at the saŵe tiŵe Đleaƌ that ͞the media can, 
aŶd do iŶ soŵe Đases, plaǇ aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt ƌole… ǁe haǀe to let people kŶoǁ ǁhat goes oŶ. AŶd 
the only way we can do it ƌeallǇ is thƌough the ŵedia͟. While he believed that campaigners 
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ǁould ͞do better by getting oŶ ͚ƌefoƌŵiŶg͛͟, ofteŶ eŶdiŶg ͞up in bed with the people who they 
ĐƌitiĐise͟, he adŵitted that ͞you need ŵedia liŶks͟. Journalist A (working for a right-leaning 
mid-sheet) felt that the increasing foĐus oŶ stealth stƌategies ǁas ͞slightly worrying because I 
ĐaŶ see the legitiŵaĐǇ foƌ doiŶg that. I ĐaŶ see ǁhǇ that͛s happeŶiŶg… I ĐaŶ see hoǁ people 
ǁould staƌt to ďǇpass the ŵedia͟. 
It is noteworthy that three journalists (all working for, or having worked for, left-leaning 
publications) were sympathetic to stealth strategies. One believed that penal reform 
campaigners should abandon media work altogether, while the others believed that it should 
be of less focus than traditional forms of lobbying. Consistent with the comments of 
campaigners who believed the media aŶd puďliĐ to ďe geŶeƌallǇ ͚uŶiŶteƌested͛ iŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
penal reform, Former Journalist D (who had worked for a left-leaning broadsheet) concluded 
that ͞Ǉou ĐaŶ do thiŶgs [ďǇ stealth] foƌ ǁoŵeŶ ďeĐause theǇ [ŵost puďliĐatioŶs] ǁoŶ͛t regard 
it as Ŷeǁs͟. Tapping into the penal populism debate, Journalist H (working for a left-leaning 
broadsheetͿ siŵilaƌlǇ agƌeed that ͞given the high octane nature of coverage it would make 
sense for reformers to press for change at a policy level rather than through the media. Many 
prison governors seem to be far more sympathetic to a reform agenda than populist politicians 
aŶd the ŵedia aƌe͟. He believed his Đolleagues iŶ the ŵedia to ďe ͞a trivialising and 
sensationalising influence on the debate on criminal justice, by and laƌge͟ and that 
campaigners should Ŷot ͞expect much suppoƌt fƌoŵ the ŵedia foƌ this͟.  
“oŵe jouƌŶalists appƌeĐiated that deĐisioŶs aďout ͚ǁhetheƌ to go puďliĐ͛ depeŶded oŶ 
the strategies of individual campaigners. Journalist F understood that working by stealth 
͞might be a tactic that they want to build up slowly with Ministers and officials rather than 
have this [public] thiŶg aŶd theŶ it ĐaŶ ďaĐkfiƌe͟. Journalist C (working in broadcasting) agreed 
that some campaigners may prefer to pursue change through the ͞ŵeetiŶg͟ appƌoaĐh, 
ďeĐause ͞it depeŶds ǁhat Ǉou͛ƌe aiŵiŶg foƌ͟. While dismissing reform by stealth as 
͞ƌidiĐulous͟, Journalist G was similarly clear that constantly chasing the media was equally 
unimpressive. He did not belieǀe that those ͞people who are constantly on the television or on 
the airwaves have the same authority as those who choose more carefully. I think you have to 
think about your profile and youƌ platfoƌŵ aŶd ǁhat suits Ǉou͟.  
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Press Releases and the News Production Process 
The main critique levelled at campaigners was their general ignorance of journalistic practices. 
Journalists were clear that if such actors wanted to be treated seriously as sources, they 
needed to develop a better understanding of how newsmakers operated and make themselves 
ŵoƌe ƌeadilǇ aǀailaďle to the iŶeǀitaďle ͚ǁhiŵs͛ of the Ŷeǁs pƌoduĐtioŶ pƌoĐess. 
Most journalists were clear that the sending out of numerous press releases was not 
an effective strategy for campaigners trying to get media attention. Journalist G admitted that 
he deleted ͞them without eveŶ ƌeadiŶg theŵ. Neǀeƌ ƌead theŵ͟. Former Journalist E was 
siŵilaƌlǇ Đleaƌ that ͞just banging out a press release is more or less like banging your head 
agaiŶst a ďƌiĐk ǁall͟. He went on to explain that campaigners Ŷeeded to uŶdeƌstaŶd that ͞the 
ŶatioŶal ŵedia aƌe ďoŵďaƌded ǁith stoƌies eǀeƌǇ daǇ, theǇ͛ƌe Ŷot just sittiŶg theƌe ǁaitiŶg foƌ 
Ǉouƌ paƌtiĐulaƌ issue to pop up oŶ theiƌ desk… Ǉou͛ǀe got to ǁoƌk haƌd to get iŶteƌest͟. 
Journalist A adŵitted that ͞one tends to kind of dismiss theŵ [pƌess ƌeleases], Ǉou kŶoǁ͟, 
ďefoƌe ĐoŶĐediŶg that ͞you ignore [them] at your peril because you can find good stories in 
what you think aƌe faiƌlǇ ďaŶal pƌess ƌeleases͟. Journalist A felt that most press releases he 
ƌeĐeiǀed ǁeƌe ͞really dull, very tedious. I often think they could try and be much more 
iŶteƌestiŶg. I doŶ͛t thiŶk it͛s ouƌ fault all of the tiŵe, I thiŶk it͛s the ǁaǇ thiŶgs aƌe pƌeseŶted to 
us. I do get stuff fƌoŵ [X], aŶd I͛ŵ Ŷot suƌe if I͛ǀe ƌead a press release from theŵ foƌ ages͟.  
It has ďeeŶ aƌgued that the ͚pƌiŵaƌǇ defiŶeƌ͛ status of offiĐial souƌĐes is stƌuĐtuƌallǇ 
determined by the routine practices of media professionals (Davis, 2000: 47; see also Hall et 
al., 1978; Golding and Middleton, 1982) and this was confirmed in conversations with 
journalists. Those campaigners wishing to improve media coverage needed to understand the 
parameters within which their targeted recipients were operating. Discussing the general lack 
of understanding about the news production process among lobbyists, Former Journalist E 
adŵitted that he ǁas ĐoŶstaŶtlǇ ͞aŵazed hoǁ theǇ thiŶk͟. Journalist B (working for a right-
leaning mid-sheet) voiced a repeated cƌitiĐisŵ that ĐaŵpaigŶeƌs ǁeƌe ͞ too slow moving. If they 
are organisations where you have to ring up and it takes forever, then you thiŶk [I͛ŵ Ŷot goiŶg 
to] ďotheƌ͟. JouƌŶalist B ǁas Đleaƌ that ͞if you have to check that everybody in the hierarchy is 
happǇ, theŶ usuallǇ Ǉou͛ll ŵiss out͟. Journalist B revealed that he had ͞ people from high profile 
oƌgaŶisatioŶs seŶdiŶg soŵethiŶg [saǇiŶg] ͚I ǁoŶdeƌ if I ŵight ďe aďle to get this iŶ todaǇ͛s 
papeƌ?͛ You thiŶk ǁhat the hell aƌe Ǉou doiŶg? If Ǉou͛d ƌuŶg ŵe [eaƌlieƌ] I ǁould haǀe ďeeŶ 
iŶteƌested. AŶd I͛ŵ Ŷot [just] talkiŶg aďout loǁ leǀel staff at ĐƌiŵiŶal justiĐe oƌgaŶisatioŶs͟. He 
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eǆplaiŶed that ͞ ǁheŶ people saǇ ͚ ǁhǇ doŶ͛t thiŶgs get iŶ?͛ a lot of it͛s doǁŶ to teĐhŶiĐal thiŶgs͟ 
such as copy space and deadlines. Press officers at the larger campaigning organisations were 
also heavily criticised for their lack of understanding about the news production process. 
JouƌŶalist C ďelieǀed that ͞ pƌess offiĐeƌs… aƌe ƌeallǇ ďad. If it͛s a ĐaŵpaigŶ gƌoup theŶ Ǉou haǀe 
to douďle ĐheĐk stuff, Ǉou doŶ͛t kŶoǁ if it͛s got soŵe soƌt of ďias͟. Journalist F admitted that 
he ͞shuddeƌed͟ when he was contacted by Đlaiŵsŵakeƌs opeƌatiŶg as the ͞Head of Coŵŵs͟.  
 
 
vi. Frame Alignment Processes 
 
Although fairly scathing about the media strategies of penal reform campaigners, journalists 
outlined a number of areas that might improve their media presence. A major critique was the 
need for more newsworthy stories that would be of greater interest to readers. While 
journalists were not particularly interested in policy proposals, they were however interested 
in individual cases. All journalists believed that campaigners needed to make a greater use of 
case studies and become more willing to provide them with improved access to former 
offenders who were prepared to talk. Journalists also described the need to cultivate greater 
collaborative working relations. Those journalists working for right-leaning publications 
believed that penal reform campaigners needed to make far more effort developing 
relationships, and even those working for the left-leaning press believed this to be a judicious 
stƌategǇ. BǇ siŵplǇ taƌgetiŶg those theǇ peƌĐeiǀed to ďe ͚ethiĐal͛ ǁoƌkiŶg foƌ the left-leaning 
press, all journalists agreed that campaigners were simply preaching to the converted. 
Journalists also believed that campaigners (of varying prominence) had very little 
understanding of the news production process, with most lacking a basic understanding of the 
practical constraints within which they operated. Better acquainting themselves with 
journalistic routines, pressures and whims was also considered a route to improved coverage. 
Reflected in the title, this section will consider the above themes in relation to Snow et al.͛s 
(1986) processes of strategic frame alignment. 
 
Greater Use of Case Studies 
It is well documented that crime news privileges the experiences of ordinary people, 
particularly victims, over expert accounts (Pratt, 2007: 67). Put simply, journalists are less likely 
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to ďe iŶteƌested iŶ the poliĐǇ pƌoďleŵ of ǁoŵeŶ͛s iŵpƌisoŶŵeŶt thaŶ theǇ aƌe iŶdiǀidual 
offenders. While campaigners are understandably protective of those they represent, this 
evidently works in direct opposition to the newsworthy requirements of journalists. Journalist 
A (working for a right-leaning mid-sheet) encapsulated the viewpoints of many of his 
colleagues when he admitted that ͞theƌe Đould ďe ďetteƌ stoƌies͟. Journalist I (working for a 
left-leaning broadsheet) similarly believed that campaigners Ŷeeded ͞to look more at 
iŶdiǀidual stoƌies aŶd Đases, that͛s alǁaǇs ďeeŶ oŶe of the failiŶgs…. I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ if theǇ͛ƌe ǀeƌǇ 
adept at doiŶg that͟. She believed that campaigners needed to provide media with more 
͞examples of woŵeŶ ǁho shouldŶ͛t ďe iŶ pƌisoŶ͟ ďeĐause ͞you have to sell these thiŶgs͟. 
Journalist J (working for a right-leaning mid-sheet) also agƌeed foƌ the Ŷeed to haǀe ͞a good 
stoƌǇ, ďeĐause it͛s so dƌeadful, aŶd it ǁould ďe iŶteƌestiŶg. You kŶoǁ, she just stole fƌoŵ Maƌks 
and Spencer͛s to keep heƌ kid oŶ the ƌails, a paiƌ of tƌaiŶeƌs, aŶd theŶ she topped heƌself [iŶ 
prison]. Too awful, but that would be the headline-gƌaďďiŶg oŶe͟. Journalist B (working for a 
right-leaning mid-sheetͿ ǁas Đleaƌ that ͞it͛s the Đases that ofteŶ highlight the flaws in the 
poliĐǇ… if theǇ ƌeallǇ ǁaŶt to highlight [a] pƌoďleŵ theǇ Ŷeed to Đoŵe up ǁith a stoŶkiŶg good 
case and give us access and tell us about this individual. That͛s ǁhat theǇ Ŷeed to do͟. However 
as highlighted in chapter five, campaigners are often unwilling to do this, preferring to talk in 
terms of policy and not personality. Yet it is here they may be making a tactical omission. 
Implicit in the above responses is that a greater use of case studies, portrayed through 
processes of strategic frame alignment (Snow et al., ϭϵϴϲͿ ǁould ŵake the issue of ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
offending and imprisonment more readily comprehensible to the general public.  
 
Targeting a Wider Range of Publications 
Palmer (2000: 56), in his discussion of successful media strategies, has argued that one route 
to success for sources is to tailor their information to particular news values. This is a key 
campaigning consideration. While some penal reformers clearly prefer to work with their 
͚fƌieŶds͛ oŶ the left-leaning quality press, others described their preparedness to engage in a 
process of frame extension (Snow et al., 1986) and target those newspapers that have 
traditionally been hostile to issues of penal reform. Such viewpoints are consistent with those 
of Garland, who has argued that penal reform campaigners must address themselves directly 
to popular (punitive) feelings if they intend to produce real change (1990: 62; see also Ryan, 
2008). Such a strategy was mooted by journalists as one route to improved coverage.  
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Journalist C (working in broadcasting) was critical of the tendency to only focus on relations 
ǁith ͞sǇŵpathetiĐ͟ journalists and media outlets, believing that such campaigners ǁeƌe ͞just 
pƌeaĐhiŶg to the ĐoŶǀeƌted͟. As far as he was concerned, campaigners were simplǇ ͞getting 
the same coverage from the same people ǁho agƌee ǁith Ǉouƌ ǀieǁ͟ and not making crucial 
policy traction. Former Journalist E (who used to work in broadcasting) believed that 
campaigners ǁoƌkiŶg ǁith ͞the Guardian and the Observer and Independent͟ had ͞aŶ opeŶ 
dooƌ͟ ďut that the ƌeal task ǁas ͞to engage [with others], you need to convince people who 
aƌe ŶatuƌallǇ hostile͟. Tapping into the concept of frame extension (Snow et al., 1986), Former 
Journalist E ďelieǀed that theƌe ǁas ͞a view from the outside that the Mail and the Telegraph 
have a kind of monolithic vieǁ oŶ these soĐial poliĐǇ issues͟, ďut that ͞it is possible to dent it, 
but it takes a ďit of tiŵe aŶd effoƌt͟. Former Journalist E went on to question whether 
campaigners ǁeƌe ͞Đleǀeƌ eŶough… Đute eŶough iŶ thiŶkiŶg aďout hoǁ theǇ get stoƌies iŶto 
say, the Mail. I would choose the Mail because better or worse, the Mail has really influenced 
the policy agenda oǀeƌ the last tǁeŶtǇ Ǉeaƌs oƌ so͟.  
Consistent with the widely articulated viewpoint that it is the punitive strand that 
currently dominates political thinking, several journalists highlighted the need for campaigners 
to focus their efforts on the right-leaning, agenda-setting publications. Former Journalist E was 
clear that ͞the pieces that really count are the pieces for the Mail on Sunday, not for the 
Observer or the Guardian. You ĐaŶ ǁƌite a huŶdƌed pieĐes foƌ theŵ aŶd theƌe͛s Ŷo impact 
ǁhatsoeǀeƌ͟. Journalist C was clear that campaigners ŵust Ŷot ͞neglect [the] core supporters, 
the Guardian, the Independent, Ǉou͛ǀe got to keep theŵ oŶ side͟, ďut adŵitted that ͞of course 
you [also] have to write for the Times, the Mail and the Telegraph͟. Journalist J believed that 
campaigners could tƌǇ to get ŵoƌe stoƌies iŶto ͞[the Daily Mail͛s] ͚You͛ ŵagaziŶe [ďeĐause] 
they are quite good at presenting women reinventing themselves. AŶd I thiŶk that͛s a 
possiďilitǇ͟, while Journalist F (working for a left-leaning broadsheet) similarly agreed that 
campaigners Ŷeeded to taƌget ͞people like the Mail or the Sun͟. Believing that arguments 
about prison reform needed to be framed in economic terms, Journalist F argued that 
managerial rhetoric would be a successful claimsmaking strategy and that campaigners should 
͞talk thƌough theiƌ poĐkets͟.  
It is clear that even in telling familiar stories journalists look for fresh angles (Protess et al., 
1991: 123). Implicitly advocating a process of frame bridging (Snow et al., 1986), Journalist B 
was clear that if campaigners Đould ͞find a way of bringing something forward in a different 
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ǁaǇ͟, his newspaper might be more interested in covering such issues. Former Journalist E also 
highlighted the need for campaigners to ͞hang your agenda off the back of something that you 
know is something of current interest. Like gangs or whatever, you can get issues to do with 
masculinity and crime or womeŶ as ǀiĐtiŵs of Đƌiŵe oŶ gaŶgs͟. Consistent with the Snow et 
al.͛s aďoǀe ĐoŶĐept, he ǁeŶt oŶ to stƌess that ͞there are ways of kind of piggybacking on issues 
that are really topical, and getting your paƌtiĐulaƌ foĐus iŶto the ŵedia͟.  
 
Greater Personal Engagement 
Snow et al.͛s ;ϭϵϴϲͿ stƌategies of fƌaŵe aligŶŵeŶt aƌe eƋuallǇ ƌeleǀaŶt ǁheŶ deďatiŶg personal 
ƌelatioŶs; saǀǀǇ Đlaiŵsŵakeƌs aƌe aďle to get jouƌŶalists ͚oŶ ďoaƌd͛ aŶd suppoƌtiǀe of theiƌ 
agenda for change. Yet a critique routinely levelled at penal reform campaigners was that many 
siŵplǇ ͚didŶ͛t ďotheƌ͛ to Đultiǀate ƌelatioŶs ǁith jouƌŶalists. While it is understandable that 
campaigners with little resources and knowledge may struggle in this enterprise, such 
criticisms related to campaigners of all experience and public prominence. Journalist B recalled 
that despite ďeiŶg ͞in the job siǆ Ǉeaƌs͟ he had never been approached by a certain prominent 
campaigner: ͞she͛s ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ Ŷeǀeƌ ƌuŶg ŵe up aŶd said ͚oh let͛s haǀe a Đup of Đoffee oƌ 
ǁhateǀeƌ͛, aŶd aĐtuallǇ ǁe Đould haǀe a talk… AŶd ǁheŶ Ǉou talk Ǉou ĐaŶ saǇ look, ͚if Ǉou 
approach [the story] this way or that way maybe theƌe͛s soŵe ǁaǇ ǁe ĐaŶ get theƌe͛͟. 
Appreciating that ĐultiǀatiŶg ƌelatioŶs ǁas a ͞loŶg ďuild up͟ requiring sustained effort, 
Journalist F adŵitted that he didŶ͛t ͞ see ŵuĐh eǀideŶĐe͟ of campaigners engaging in this work. 
Former Journalist D (who had previously worked in broadcasting) was clear about the need for 
͞one to one communication. But ŵake suƌe the stoƌǇ is ƌight͟. Reiterating that simply emailing 
oƌ ͞just pƌessiŶg the seŶd ďuttoŶ͟ is not an effective strategy, Journalist C believed that 
campaigners could do more to build personal relatioŶs. ‘eĐalliŶg that he ǁas oŶĐe ͞sent a 
mock electronic tag in the post by a pressure group years ago to make some point about 
taggiŶg… I ƌeŵeŵďeƌ thiŶkiŶg ͚oh that͛s iŶteƌestiŶg͛ aŶd Ǉou did read the press release and 
did paǇ atteŶtioŶ͟. Journalist C believed that campaigners Đould peƌhaps ͞get all the hoŵe 
affaiƌs ĐoƌƌespoŶdeŶts iŶ foƌ a ďƌiefiŶg… talk aďout oŶe oƌ tǁo issues aŶd ideas aŶd tell theŵ 
ǁhat͛s happeŶiŶg iŶ pƌisoŶ… I͛ŵ Ŷot saǇiŶg ǁe͛d all Đoŵe, ďut Ǉou ŵight get thƌee oƌ fouƌ͟. 
JouƌŶalist I felt that as the ŶatioŶal ŵedia ǁeƌe geŶeƌallǇ hostile to the pƌoďleŵ of ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
imprisonment, campaigners should ďe ͞honing in on those fƌeelaŶĐeƌs ǁho aƌe sǇŵpathetiĐ͟ 
aŶd ͞invite theŵ iŶ͟.  
147 
 
Interviews revealed that some journalists clearly enjoyed close relations with campaigners and 
had deǀeloped aŶ iŶsideƌs͛ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of ǁoŵeŶ͛s iŵpƌisoŶŵeŶt, deŵoŶstƌatiŶg ǁhat 
Palŵeƌ has ƌefeƌƌed to as ĐhaƌaĐteƌistiĐs of ͚aďsoƌptioŶ͛ ;ϮϬϬϬ: ϱϰͿ. “eǀeƌal journalists had 
experience of visiting prisons, and it was clear that, for some, this had changed their 
perceptions of offenders and the prison regiŵe. JouƌŶalist J adŵitted that ͞it completely does 
change your view. It changes your thinking͟. As a consequence of prison visits and involvement 
with a campaign oƌgaŶisatioŶ she eǆplaiŶed that ͞ǁe [the Ŷeǁspapeƌ] had, aŶd ǁe͛ƌe just 
aďout to haǀe agaiŶ, a ǇouŶg ǁoŵaŶ ǁho͛s ďeeŶ iŶ pƌisoŶ Đoŵe to do soŵe ǁoƌk eǆpeƌieŶĐe 
with us. And I just think that͛s ǁhat ǁe should ďe doiŶg͟. JouƌŶalist F ǁas Đleaƌ that ͞to visit a 
ǁoŵaŶ͛s pƌisoŶ is just hoƌƌeŶdous. MutilatioŶ, sĐaƌs… ǁoŵeŶ settiŶg fiƌe to theiƌ haiƌ. Aǁful, 
awful things. I ŵeaŶ it ǁould ďƌeak Ǉouƌ heaƌt͟. Former Journalist D recalled that he worked 
oŶ a ͞wonderful TV documentary for Man Alive years ago on [HMP] Bullwood Hall which was 
aŶ eǇe opeŶeƌ…The iŶteƌǀieǁs ǁith the ǁoŵeŶ ǁeƌe aŵaziŶg͟. While such experiences clearly 
had aŶ iŵpaĐt oŶ soŵe jouƌŶalists͛ peƌĐeptioŶs of pƌisoŶs aŶd the ĐƌiŵiŶal justiĐe sǇstem, 
others were less convinced. When asked what he thought about the campaign strategy of 
takiŶg his Đolleagues iŶto pƌisoŶs foƌ the puƌposes of ͚eduĐatioŶ͛, JouƌŶalist B felt this ǁas 
͞Ŷaïǀe, iŶ a seŶse͟. He desĐƌiďed hoǁ he had ͞been in prisons, and the thought of being in a 
pƌisoŶ Đell… I thiŶk it ǁould ďe hoƌƌeŶdous͟. Tapping into punitive rhetoric, he felt that his 
ƌepoƌtiŶg ǁas ͞Ŷot iŶ the slightest͟ influenced ďǇ this eǆpeƌieŶĐe, ďeĐause ͞people have a 
ĐhoiĐe doŶ͛t theǇ?͟ 
 
Using Social Media 
While some journalists believed that campaigners could take more control of the information 
they released by increased use of social media (bypassing sections of the traditional print 
ŵedia that aĐted as a ͚ŶoŶ-ĐoŵpliaŶt paƌtŶeƌ͛ ;HiltoŶ et al., 2013)), others expressed concern 
at the increasing use of new media technologies. Former Journalist E believed that 
campaigners could regain total control of the iŶfoƌŵatioŶ theǇ ƌeleased ďǇ ͞undermin[ing] 
offiĐial disĐouƌse͟. Journalist G (working for a left-leaning broadsheet) similarly admitted that 
whereas ǁoƌkiŶg iŶ this ǁaǇ ƌeƋuiƌes ͞a ĐoŵpletelǇ diffeƌeŶt appƌoaĐh… the diǀidends are 
ƌeallǇ huge poteŶtiallǇ͟.  
Other journalists, understandably, did not see this direct approach being as beneficial. 
Journalist C questioŶed ͞how influential they [social media] are. Most people overstate the 
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influence. Huge numbers of people get their news from TV. The Today programme is still very 
influential in the morŶiŶg. FƌoŶt pages of the papeƌs͟. Former Journalist E similarly admitted 
that ǁhile ͞the old certainties about how you deal with the media probably have gone off 
ďoaƌd… I still thiŶk that the Daily Mail [is still hugely influential]. So however much talk goes 
iŶto soĐial ŵedia… oŶe editoƌial iŶ the Daily Mail can have a lot ŵoƌe iŵpaĐt͟. As well as 
questioning the potential influence of social media, other journalists expressed professional 
concern. Feeling threatened by the fast developments in media technology, Journalist A 
(working for a right-leaning mid-sheet) felt that the Ŷeǁs ŵedia had ͞fuŶdaŵeŶtallǇ͟ changed 
in the last thƌee Ǉeaƌs aŶd that ͞old style media has just disintegrated into the twitter world 
and Facebook world, and everyone commenting fƌeelǇ left, ƌight aŶd ĐeŶtƌe͟. Acknowledging 
a diminishing of his gatekeeping capacity, Journalist A likened developments in social media to 
aŶ ͞out-of-ĐoŶtƌol tƌaiŶ, ǁe͛ƌe all ĐliŶgiŶg oŶ to it aŶd ǁe doŶ͛t kŶoǁ ǁheƌe it͛s goiŶg to go͟. 
While interviews revealed that some campaigners were also wary of this medium, it is clear 
that the technology-enabled potential to undermine official discourse constitutes an attractive 
proposition. A point of contention, for now at least, is the extent to which such media are able 
to exert the same level of agenda-setting dominance as the right-leaning newspapers. 
 
 
vii. Conclusion 
 
Adopting the approach utilised by Schlesinger and Tumber in their empirical study of source-
media relations in the 1990s, this chapter has examined the under-researched nature of 
relations between penal reform campaigners as sources and journalists as gatekeepers. As 
outlined in the methodology, while the previous chapter debated evidence gathered from the 
majority of campaigners operating in this area, this chapter contains the views of a mere 
snapshot of crime and home affairs journalists. While is not possible to make generalisations 
from this limited participant pool, it is possible to draw out several major themes as they relate 
to developing theoretical understandings.  
The findings from this chapter are consistent with “ĐhlesiŶgeƌ aŶd Tuŵďeƌ͛s studǇ 
conducted over twenty years ago. Journalists confirmed that media strategies employed by 
penal reformers have developed very little over this time period, and that such actors enjoy 
fairly limited relations in this area. Continuing to rely, for the most part, on traditional penal 
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reform messages, journalists were clear that campaigners operate on the periphery of the 
metaphorical ŵedia ͚oŶioŶ͛ ;MĐCombs, 2014) as marginalised news sources. Journalists 
working across the political spectrum questioned the level of coverage that campaigners 
should naturally expect to receive for what they understood to be a niche area of public policy. 
Those working for right-leaning newspapers did not ǀieǁ the ͚iŶfoƌŵatioŶ suďsidies͛ ;GaŶs, 
1980) produced by campaigners as particularly useful, while those sympathetic to the reform 
agenda similarly questioned their utility. It is clear, therefore, that certain penal reform 
messages act as a barrier to media coverage, certainly as far as journalists are concerned. In 
articulating such viewpoints, journalists debated the requirement to satisfy the key news 
values (such as novelty, personalisation and conservative ideology), developed by Galtung and 
Ruge (1965), Chibnall (1977) and Jewkes (2004). Such news values, together with an 
understanding of what constitutes newsworthiness, remain key to understanding jouƌŶalists͛ 
news framing behaviour.  
The importance of framing theory to understanding the social construction of news was 
also eǀideŶt iŶ jouƌŶalists͛ disĐussioŶs of ǁoŵeŶ offeŶdeƌs. Journalists operating across the 
spectrum confirmed the continued use of gender-stereotypes, with many working for the 
right-leaning newspapers articulating their views through what one journalist described as 
͞pƌeǀailiŶg uƌďaŶ ŵǇths͟. KitziŶgeƌ͛s ;ϮϬϬϬͿ ƌelated, ďut faƌ ŵoƌe ƌigid ĐoŶĐept of media 
͚teŵplates͛ also helps to explain the continued tendency for some journalists to refer to the 
most high-profile historic cases, unable (or unwilling) to provide readers with more nuanced 
understandings of female criminality.  
In contrast to the views of penal reform campaigners, most journalists believed that 
they worked to set the political agenda, or certainly helped to set the tone for policy action 
(see McCombs, 2014; Jones and Wolfe, 2010; Soroka et al., 2012). The key sticking point, in 
this policy domain at least, is that many of them did not view the subject as one that warranted 
high profile campaigning or regular media exposure. Yet despite this, they believed that 
campaigners needed to work far harder to gain coverage through the development of 
improved framing strategies, together with a greater focus on building relations with news 
professionals. They were clear, however, that such actions would not necessarily result in 
improved coverage, and the general consensus was that access to the media agenda was 
unlikely to change.   
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It is, however, important to caveat this conclusion with an important point. Despite accusations 
from journalists that campaigners had no appreciation of the news production process, 
evidence suggests that this is not entirely the case. As highlighted in the previous chapter, 
some campaigners described their choice not to play the media ͚gaŵe͛, eitheƌ thƌough ŵoƌal 
dilemmas or due to negative past experiences. Empirical evidence therefore points to 
something of a stalemate when it comes to campaigning aŶd ŶeǁsŵakiŶg iŶ the ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
penal policy sphere, a situation that will be revisited in chapter eight. The following chapter 
will explore the final area of empirical focus, that of policymaking. 
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7. Policymaking 
 
 
i. Introduction 
 
As highlighted throughout this study, those policymakers entrusted with the justice brief are 
faced with a particularly daunting task. The competing constructions of policy problems, 
political elections (and changing political philosophies), the symbolic dimension of crime and 
the ever-pƌeseŶt thƌeat of ͚puŶitiǀe͛ puďliĐ opiŶioŶ ;Isŵaili, ϮϬϬϲͿ ŵeaŶs that ͚the 
deǀelopŵeŶt of ĐoheƌeŶt ĐƌiŵiŶal justiĐe poliĐǇ is a sigŶifiĐaŶt ĐhalleŶge͛ ;Isŵaili, ϮϬϬϲ: ϮϲϭͿ. 
In terms of agenda-setting, it is important to remember that policy emanating from the state 
;the ͚ iŶstitutioŶal͛ ageŶdaͿ ǁill alǁaǇs take pƌeĐedeŶĐe oǀeƌ the ͚ sǇsteŵiĐ͛ ageŶda of ideas ͚ out 
theƌe͛ iŶ the politiĐal sǇsteŵ ;suĐh as the aƌƌaǇ of Đlaiŵs ŵade ďǇ peŶal ƌefoƌŵeƌsͿ. As Đhapteƌ 
five discussed, the ultimate ambition of claimsmakers is to influence the institutional agenda 
(Dorey, 2005: 36) and in doing so, the decisions of key policy players. Focusing on that process, 
this chapter will advance theoretical understandings through its empirical analysis of the core 
executive, and will explore the relative importance policymakers place on, and indeed how 
they work with, penal reform campaigners. Shining a spotlight on policymakers in the Ministry 
of Justice (hereafter referred to as the Department21), it seeks to learn more about the role of 
Ministers, senior civil servants and other key players in the penal policy process.  
In considerations of political ideology and the policy agenda, the importance of Ministerial 
leadeƌship foƌ poliĐǇ ĐhaŶge aŶd goǀeƌŶŵeŶt use of the Ŷeǁs ŵedia as a poliĐǇ ͚tool͛, this 
chapter will simultaneously assess the agenda-setting role of campaigners from the 
perspectives of policymakers, and the extent to which their strategies have adapted in a 
changing political climate. In investigating the strategies that policymakers consider to be most 
influential, it will uncover the private nature of negotiating aŶd ǁhat goes oŶ ͚ďehiŶd Đlosed 
dooƌs͛. Part tǁo ǁill ďƌieflǇ ƌeǀisit theoƌetiĐal uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs of the ͚Đoƌe eǆeĐutiǀe͛ aŶd 
government policymaking. Part thƌee ǁill eǆploƌe poliĐǇŵakeƌs͛ ǀieǁs oŶ the status of 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s penal reform, differentiating betweeŶ the ͚sǇsteŵiĐ͛ aŶd ͚iŶstitutioŶal͛ agendas. Part 
four will focus on Departmental newsmaking, and the news framing activities of policy officials. 
                                                          
21 ͚DepaƌtŵeŶt͛ ƌefeƌs to the Hoŵe OffiĐe uŶtil ϮϬϬϳ ǁheŶ ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ foƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s penal policy moved to the 
newly-formed Ministry of Justice (under the same officials).  
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Part fiǀe ǁill disĐuss poliĐǇŵakeƌs͛ ǀieǁs oŶ the diffeƌeŶt lobbying strategies employed by 
campaigners seeking to influence the agenda. With interviews conducted shortly after a 
change in government, part six will explore the relationship between political ideology and 
policymaking and will discuss the changing nature of relations between policymakers and 
campaigners. Part seven will conclude with a brief summary of the above points in relation to 
the theoretical framework. 
 
 
ii. The Core Executive in Context 
 
‘hodes ǀieǁed the Đoƌe eǆeĐutiǀe as ͚the heaƌt of the ŵaĐhiŶe͛, ĐoǀeƌiŶg ͚all of those 
organisations and procedures which co-oƌdiŶate ĐeŶtƌal goǀeƌŶŵeŶt poliĐies͛ ;ϭϵϵϱ: ϭϮͿ. To 
this list “ŵith lateƌ added goǀeƌŶŵeŶt depaƌtŵeŶts, ǁhiĐh he ǀieǁed as ͚the Đoƌe poliĐǇ 
ŵakiŶg uŶits ǁithiŶ ĐeŶtƌal goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛ ;ϭϵϵϵ: ϱͿ, headed ďǇ MiŶisteƌs ǁho aƌe ͚keǇ aĐtoƌs 
within institutions of the Đoƌe eǆeĐutiǀe͛ ;ϭϵϵϵ: ϱͿ. This chapter on the dynamics of institutional 
policymaking will also shine a spotlight on the complex relationship between Ministerial 
hierarchy and bureaucratic expertise. MiŶisteƌs haǀe ďeeŶ desĐƌiďed ͚ŵedieǀal ďaƌoŶs… 
pƌesid[iŶg] oǀeƌ theiƌ oǁŶ, soŵetiŵes ǀast, poliĐǇ teƌƌitoƌǇ͛ ;NoƌtoŶ, ϮϬ00: 116-117); they are 
often responsible for an extremely wide remit that ranges from political to diplomatic work, 
and policy development is just one aspect of the role (Rhodes, 2011: 54). Some Ministers are 
certainly more proactive or visionary than others (Rhodes, 2011) and individual personality 
plays an important role in the policymaking process. While it would be fair to say that all 
Ministerial participants in this studǇ desĐƌiďed theiƌ aĐtioŶs oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ as 
͚pƌoaĐtiǀe͛, iŶteƌǀieǁs ƌeǀealed a ǀaƌiatioŶ iŶ pƌaĐtiĐe.  
In theory, Ministers are responsible for policy and officials are responsible for 
administration. In practice however it is very difficult to see where and if there is a clear division 
between those two concepts (Barton and Johns, 2013:65, emphasis added). The convention is 
that ͚ adǀiseƌs adǀise, MiŶisteƌs deĐide͛ ;DoƌeǇ, ϮϬϬϱ: ϳϭͿ, aŶd ǁhilst theƌe is tƌuth in this adage, 
literature suggests that it oversimplifies the reality of often very blurred relations. Page and 
Jenkins have argued that Ministers need civil servants to develop and maintain policy, not 
simply for advice on how to do it (2005: 2). It is therefore the civil servants, and not the elected 
politicians, who make the majority of policy (Barton and Johns, 2013). While governments have 
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manifestos, departments also have preferred policies and trusted stakeholders (Rhodes, 2011: 
62) such as the penal reform campaigners that constitute the focus of this study. Rhodes has 
argued that the tensions between governments and departments are a common characteristic 
of decision making (2011: 63), although others have described the norm as a more reciprocal 
͚ƌesouƌĐe depeŶdeŶt͛ ƌelatioŶship (Dorey, 2005; see Figure 9 below). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Resource Exchange and Interdependency (Dorey, 2005: 72)  
 
 
As this chapter will reveal, the existence of very experienced former practitioners-turned-civil 
seƌǀaŶts iŶ the ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal field ŵeaŶs that the bona fide aŶalǇsis of ͚ ǁho said ǁhat͛ duƌiŶg 
the timeframe under review (the period 1997-2012) remains a grey area: if they did not initiate 
or devise policy, certain senior officials undoubtedly had a major hand in its development. 
Campaigner D described the political climate under the Labour government as one in which 
͞the staƌs ǁeƌe aligŶed͟, and that is reflected in the empirical evidence of shared ideologies, 
political alignment and objectives of politicians and senior civil servants in the Home Office and 
Ministry of Justice during this time. As highlighted towards the end of the chapter, this 
consensual policymaking harmony was disrupted following the election of the Conservative-
led Coalition in May 2010, leading to increased Ministerial-Department tensions.  
One further contextual factor to consider is the concept of governance in relation to 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ. GoǀeƌŶiŶg thƌough a ͚Ŷeǆus of ĐoŶtƌaĐts͛ ;Wƌight ϭϵϵϰ: ϭϮϳͿ, state 
power is now distributed among various private, voluntary and charitable organisations in the 
field of penal policy and crime control. It is well known that large private corporations such as 
Contextual Factors: 
Departmental interests, economic situation, political circumstances
Ministers' resources: 
Access to Cabinet
Access to media
Alternative sources of advice
Authority 
Political legitimacy
Civil servants' resources:
Anonymity
Experience
Knowledge and expertise
Permanence
Whitehall network
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G4S and Serco provide national security services, but smaller organisations such as WoŵeŶ͛s 
Breakout and Women in Prison (part-funded by the government) also provide a variety of 
services for women offenders. Contractual involvement in policy implementation provides 
organisations with more authority and legitimacy and offers further evidence of the 
iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ ͚ďluƌƌed ďouŶdaƌies of the state͛. Boundaries in penal policy have recently blurred 
even further under the Transforming Rehabilitation arrangements with the formation of the 
privately-run Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) and their involvement with existing 
charities operating in this area.  
 
 
iii. WoŵeŶ͛s PeŶal PoliĐǇ oŶ the AgeŶda 
  
The Systemic Agenda: Claimsmaking Progress? 
Modern policymakers share the political sphere with a proliferation of pressure groups that 
have a stake in criminal justice policy, and want to shape the policy process in favour of their 
vision and preferred outcomes (Hobbs and Hamerton, 2014: 2). Network analysts have argued 
that policy often emerges as a result of pressure or influence from networks, either from direct 
lobbying or behind-the-scenes negotiations, even if the formal authorisation comes from 
elected politicians (John, 2012: 57). While chapter five explored the various attempts of 
campaigners to reform ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ, this Đhapteƌ pƌoǀides a ĐƌitiĐal aŶalǇsis of theiƌ 
efforts from the top down.  
All former Ministers viewed penal reform campaigners as having relatively little power, 
iŶflueŶĐe oƌ iŵpaĐt oŶ the poliĐǇ ageŶda. IŶstead ;aŶd iŶ diƌeĐt ĐoŶtƌast to Maƌsh aŶd ‘hodes͛ 
(1992) assertions), they believed that it was their own interest and commitment that acted as 
the crucial driver for policy change. While recognising the existence of the long-standing 
external ŵoŵeŶtuŵ foƌ ĐhaŶge, aŶd that ͞for many years before [the Corston] report, there 
had ďeeŶ a ǀieǁ fƌoŵ ĐaŵpaigŶeƌs outside that ǁoŵeŶ shouldŶ͛t ďe tƌeated iŶ the saŵe ǁaǇ 
as ŵeŶ iŶ pƌisoŶ͟, Former Ministeƌ A ďelieǀed that ͞the lobby outside for many years had 
pursued that agenda but hadŶ͛t paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ suĐĐeeded͟. Former Minister B similarly stated 
that ͞the loďďǇ outside… didŶ͛t haǀe that ŵuĐh iŶflueŶĐe͟, aŶd ĐoŶsisteŶt ǁith KiŶgdoŶ͛s 
(1984) requirement for a time-speĐifiĐ ͚poliĐǇ ǁiŶdoǁ͛ to kiĐk staƌt the pƌocess of reform, 
ĐoŶfiƌŵed that ͞ the iŵpetus foƌ JeaŶ͛s [CoƌstoŶ] ƌepoƌt ǁas a Ŷuŵďeƌ of suiĐides iŶ a paƌtiĐulaƌ 
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prison, that ǁas ǁhat fiŶallǇ ŵade it happeŶ͟. Challenging the network thesis advocated by 
Rhodes (1997), Politician C went even further and dismissed the agenda-setting function of 
campaigners altogetheƌ, ĐoŶĐludiŶg that ͞the stars that were aligned were nothing to do with 
aŶǇ ĐaŵpaigŶiŶg oƌgaŶisatioŶ͟. While such a viewpoint may be a slight overstatement, it is 
clear that campaigners͛ peƌĐeiǀed aĐĐess to the ͚ Đoƌƌidoƌs of poǁeƌ͛ ǁas considered differently 
by policymakers.  
 
The Institutional Agenda: The Need for Political Leadership 
Notwithstanding the many different solutions provided by claimsmakers, all public policy 
change has to be developed on the basis of explicit Ministerial approval (Page and Jenkins, 
2005: 108). Interviews with policymakers certainly supports this assertion. Yet it is important 
to note that the embryonic years of ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ deǀelopŵeŶt saǁ ďaƌƌieƌs within 
government itself. As highlighted by Rock, only a small number of officials can devote 
themselves to a specific area of policy, particularly in its early stages when the area may not 
have received much in the way of departmental recognition and resources (1995: 3). Providing 
oral evidence to the 2013 Justice Select Committee inquiry on Women Offenders, former civil 
seƌǀaŶt Liz Hogaƌth adŵitted that ͚however hard we worked with [other] civil servants, the 
geŶeƌal ƌespoŶse at the tiŵe ǁas ͚ǁoŵeŶ aƌe oŶlǇ fiǀe peƌ ĐeŶt of the pƌisoŶ populatioŶ; ǁe 
ŵust foĐus oŶ the laƌgeƌ Ŷuŵďeƌs͛. It ǁas a ƌeal ďattle to get atteŶtioŶ͛ ;ϮϬϭϯ: ϭϮͿ. CoŶfiƌŵiŶg 
its status as a ͚lesseƌ soĐial pƌoďleŵ͛ ;HilgaƌtŶeƌ aŶd Bosk, ϭ988), she stressed that despite the 
suďseƋueŶt MiŶisteƌial atteŶtioŶ aŶd alloĐatioŶ of fuŶdiŶg, ͚ theƌe is still the issue that the small 
Ŷuŵďeƌs of ǁoŵeŶ ĐaŶ ďe seeŶ as ďeiŶg pƌoďleŵatiĐ… iŶ teƌŵs of poliĐǇ͛ ;ϮϬϭϯ: EǀϳͿ. Such a 
viewpoint corresponds with notioŶs of ͚geŶeƌalitǇ͛ iŶ puďliĐ poliĐǇ, aŶd that goǀeƌŶŵeŶt 
concern for an issue is widened only when it affects (or could affect) a great number of people 
(Solesbury, 1976). 
As far as policymakers were concerned, it was the political desire to drive the policy 
agenda (and not the decades of campaigning) that constituted the crucial precursor to reform. 
Despite her specialist expertise, Former Civil SeƌǀaŶt D ĐoŶfiƌŵed the Ŷeed foƌ ͞politicians 
helpiŶg offiĐials, ďeĐause… had ǁe tƌied goiŶg to MiŶisteƌs [ǁith our own ideas] they would 
haǀe just said ͚hoǁ daƌe Ǉou, Ǉou aƌe Điǀil seƌǀaŶts, off Ǉou go͛͟. Recalling the long-standing 
frustration among civil servants about the lack of political will, Former Minister E explained 
that offiĐials ͞had been thirsting for someone to come along to dƌiǀe [theiƌ ideas foƌǁaƌd]͟. 
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Underlining the importance of synergy in policy deǀelopŵeŶt she ƌeĐalled that ͞we had a 
Minister who believed it and wanted to deliver it, we had a very well-honed team, and we had 
a number of people iŶ otheƌ depaƌtŵeŶts… ǁho ǁeƌe ǁilliŶg to Đoŵe ǁith us͟. Acknowledging 
the amount of research (academic and campaign-based) already undertaken, Politician C 
descriďed the MiŶisteƌial desiƌe to ͞do a practical piece of work, drawing on all that research, 
and makiŶg ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶs foƌ ĐhaŶge͟. HighlightiŶg the Đleaƌ eǆisteŶĐe of a ͚poliĐǇ 
ǁiŶdoǁ͛, Foƌŵeƌ MiŶisteƌ E ƌeĐalled that ͞we had this one moment and we just had to go for 
it͟. BaƌoŶess CoƌstoŶ͛s ƌepoƌt ǁas suďseƋueŶtlǇ puďlished iŶ ϮϬϬϳ iŶ the afteƌmath of the 
suiĐides oŶ the feŵale estate. FolloǁiŶg the ƌepoƌt͛s puďliĐatioŶ Maƌia Eagle MP ǁas giǀeŶ the 
post of ͚MiŶisteƌial ChaŵpioŶ͛ foƌ ǁoŵeŶ iŶ the ĐƌiŵiŶal justiĐe sǇsteŵ aŶd pƌoǀided ǁith the 
authority to drive the Corston reforms forward.  
Interviews revealed a great deal of collaborative working between Ministers and civil 
servants during this time, and many highlighted the special nature of this synergy. Former 
Minister E described a blurring of Ministerial-offiĐial ƌelatioŶs as ͞people trust[ed] eaĐh otheƌ͛s 
judgeŵeŶt… ǁe ǁould ďƌaiŶstoƌŵ͟. Providing evidence to the Justice Select Committee 
former civil servant Liz Hogaƌth siŵilaƌlǇ ƌeŵeŵďeƌed the ͚very exciting, vibrant way of 
working, because what we had was Maria Eagle, with an inter-Ministerial group, and all those 
MiŶisteƌs fƌoŵ aĐƌoss the pieĐe… all sittiŶg ƌouŶd a taďle͛ ;ϮϬϭϯ: ϭϮͿ. “tƌessiŶg the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe 
of this ͚ĐƌitiĐal ŵass͛ of ǁoŵeŶ MiŶisteƌs, BaƌoŶess CoƌstoŶ eǆplaiŶed to the Coŵŵittee that: 
 
͚Theƌe ǁas Haƌƌiet HaƌŵaŶ aŶd Baƌďaƌa Follett, who were pushing the equalities 
ageŶda. IŶ the Hoŵe OffiĐe ǁe had BaƌoŶess “ĐotlaŶd, Veƌa Baiƌd… aŶd FioŶa 
MaĐtaggaƌt. TheŶ… ǁheŶ this ageŶda got uŶdeƌǁaǇ, Maƌia Eagle ǁas giǀeŶ the joď of 
Ministerial Champion. Having that critical mass of women who instinctively understood 
ǁhat this ǁas aďout ǁas aďsolutelǇ ĐƌuĐial, iŶ ŵǇ opiŶioŶ͛ ;ϮϬϭϯ: EǀϭͿ. 
 
BaƌoŶess CoƌstoŶ ǁas Đleaƌ that Maƌia Eagle͛s politiĐal leadeƌship ǁas ͚ĐƌuĐial͛, as ͚theƌe has 
to be somebody who can drive that agenda within Whitehall. That, to me, is a prerequisite. 
CeƌtaiŶlǇ, Maƌia Eagle did that ǁheŶ she ǁas a MiŶisteƌ͛ ;ϮϬϭϯ: EǀϰͿ. DeŵoŶstƌatiŶg heƌ Đleaƌ 
agenda-setting credentials (Marsh, Richards and Smith, 2001), Former Minister B was clear 
that poliĐǇ ĐhaŶge ǁas Ŷot aďout ͞outside loďďǇiŶg ŵakiŶg Ǉou do soŵethiŶg… the ƌeasoŶ 
why everything happened was because those of us who were Ministers in the department 
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deĐided it ǁas goiŶg to happeŶ͟. It is clear that those policymakers (former Ministers, 
politicians and former civil servants) interviewed for this study placed great stress on the 
importance of political will as the crucial driver for policy change. The following section will 
examine the extent to which they valued and utilised the news media as a policymaking tool.  
 
 
iv. Departmental Newsmaking 
 
Media Stereotypes 
Much like the experiences of campaigners, policymakers described a similar picture of either 
extreme difficulty in achieving media coverage or strong feelings about the sensationalised 
distortion of facts when stories were reported, with seemingly little in the way of balanced 
reporting. Former Minister F ďelieǀed that jouƌŶalists ǁeƌe ͞much more interested in bad 
stoƌies thaŶ good͟, while Foƌŵeƌ MiŶisteƌ B ĐoŶfiƌŵed that ͞ŵedia ǁeƌeŶ͛t that iŶteƌested… 
often what I was doing would be referred to, but there wasn͛t a ďig ŵedia headliŶe gƌaďďeƌ͟. 
Otheƌ poliĐǇŵakeƌs highlighted jouƌŶalists͛ distoƌted iŶteƌest iŶ the salaĐious aspeĐts of 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s offeŶdiŶg. PolitiĐiaŶ C ďelieǀed that ͞generally I think the media like to do this Bad 
Girls thiŶg͟. Such tendencies had clear implications for those leading on the criminal justice 
brief.  
In general terms policymakers rely on the news media to prioritise information and to 
disseminate public opinion (Soroka et al., 2012: 205; see also Walgrave and van Aelst, 2006: 
100). However, empirical evidence confirmed that like campaigners, policymakers believed 
that the Ŷeǁs ŵedia ofteŶ aĐted as a ͚ŶoŶ-ĐoŵpliaŶt paƌtŶeƌ͛ ;HiltoŶ et al., 2013) in the 
process of policy reform, with journalists often framing stories in an unfavourable or unhelpful 
way. Politician C recollected that on one occasion she explained to journalists that while she 
favoured a policy of deĐaƌĐeƌatioŶ, she did Ŷot ͞believe that no women should ever be in 
pƌisoŶ… AŶd I said ͚foƌ eǆaŵple, ‘oseŵaƌǇ West should ďe iŶ pƌisoŶ͛͟. Expressing anger at the 
subsequent media Đoǀeƌage, she ƌeĐalled that ͞published in one of the red top newspapers 
the folloǁiŶg daǇ [ǁas] ͚this ǁoŵaŶ has ƌeĐoŵŵeŶded that ‘oseŵaƌǇ West should ďe iŶ a 
nice little home in GlouĐesteƌ aŶd do heƌ oǁŶ shoppiŶg͛͟. Exhibiting the tendencies of a 
͚dispossessed Đlaiŵsŵakeƌ͛ ;Best, ϮϬϭϯͿ, aŶd ƌetƌeŶĐhiŶg fƌoŵ future media work, she 
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ƋuestioŶed ͞I ask Ǉou, ǁhǇ do Ǉou ďotheƌ theŶ? You just thiŶk theƌe͛s Ŷo poiŶt iŶ talkiŶg to 
these people ďeĐause it͛s Ŷot aŶ aǀeŶue that Ǉou ĐaŶ use͟.  
Consistent with the findings of Rhodes (2011: 197), the civil servants in the Department 
who came into contact with journalists also held a generally poor opinion of the news media. 
‘eǀealiŶg that ͞when we got [media] interest theǇ ǁeƌeŶ͛t lookiŶg foƌ solutioŶs͟, Former Civil 
Servant G recalled an occasion when the Department was approached by a media production 
ĐoŵpaŶǇ. HaǀiŶg aĐĐoŵpaŶied ƌeseaƌĐheƌs to a ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐeŶtƌe, she ƌeŵeŵďeƌed the 
voyeuristic respoŶse fƌoŵ the ŵaŶageƌ that theǇ ͞want[ed] to go into a prisoŶ… to see mother 
aŶd ďaďǇ uŶits͟. HighlightiŶg the disĐoŶŶeĐt ďetǁeeŶ the DepaƌtŵeŶt͛s poliĐǇ iŶitiatiǀes aŶd 
the journalistic requirement for newsworthy stories, she believed that journalists simply 
ǁeƌeŶ͛t iŶteƌested iŶ the positiǀe Ŷeǁs stoƌies, aŶd that ͞they want to see women locked up 
with their babies and theiƌ pƌaŵs aŶd all the ƌest of it͟. “tƌessiŶg that ͞we tried to be proactive 
aďout it… I said ǁe͛ll let Ǉou Đoŵe iŶto a ŵotheƌ aŶd ďaďǇ uŶit if you go to a community 
ĐeŶtƌe͟, and consistent with the experiences of campaigners, she confirmed that achieving 
ŵedia Đoǀeƌage ǁas ͞ƌeallǇ diffiĐult͟. As far as she was concerned, many journalists were only 
interested in ͞ŵotheƌ aŶd ďaďǇ͟ stoƌies ďeĐause ͞it͛s ǀoǇeuƌistiĐ, it͛s dƌaŵatiĐ, aŶd theǇ 
[areŶ͛t] iŶteƌested iŶ alteƌŶatiǀes͟. Former Civil Servant D was similarly clear that despite the 
DepaƌtŵeŶt͛s pƌoaĐtiǀe stƌategies to seĐuƌe iŶfoƌŵatiǀe Đoǀeƌage, jouƌŶalists ǁoƌkiŶg foƌ the 
right-leaniŶg pƌess ƌelied oŶ ŵedia ͚teŵplates͛ ;KitziŶgeƌ, ϮϬϬϬͿ to foĐus oŶ ͞the Myra Hindley 
oƌ… the ‘ose West, oƌ its ǁoŵeŶ haǀiŶg HalloǁeeŶ paƌties͟… IŶ the Sun. In the Mail. Better 
written, but in the Telegraph͟.  
In highlighting their frustrations, all policymakers were agreed that a major issue was 
the lack of interest and understanding among journalists. Former Minister B believed that 
jouƌŶalists ͞ǁouldŶ͛t ŶeĐessaƌilǇ uŶdeƌstaŶd the distiŶĐtioŶ between men and women in 
pƌisoŶ͟, and that when responsible stories were published, that this ǁas ofteŶ doǁŶ to ͞a 
single partiĐulaƌ peƌsoŶ takiŶg aŶ iŶteƌest͟. The need for journalists to understand and 
appƌeĐiate the pƌoďleŵ of ǁoŵeŶ͛s offeŶdiŶg aŶd iŵpƌisoŶŵeŶt ǁas deeŵed aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt 
faĐtoƌ iŶ aĐhieǀiŶg the ͚ƌight͛ ŵedia Đoǀerage although, like campaigners, many policymakers 
seeŵed to haǀe giǀeŶ up oŶ tƌǇiŶg to ĐhaŶge ͚the iŶeǀitaďle͛. Like campaigners adopting a 
strategy of insider claimsmaking (Best, 2013), Ministers preferred to pursue their strategies 
out of the media spotlight. 
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Ministers: Under the Radar  
Politicians of all denominations are well known for courting media attention, and while Rhodes 
(along with other political and armchair commentators) has argued that Ministers welcome 
theiƌ puďliĐ ͚ǀisiďilitǇ͛ ;ϮϬϭϭ: ϭϬϲͿ, MiŶisteƌs opeƌatiŶg iŶ this poliĐy domain were less keen to 
engage in such work. Highlighting the omnipresence of contemporary news media, McNair has 
aƌgued that ͚Ŷo elite gƌoup, of ǁhateǀeƌ ideologiĐal positioŶ, aŶd hoǁeǀeƌ fiƌŵlǇ aŶĐhoƌed iŶ 
the corridors of power, is insulated from jouƌŶalists͛ pƌoďiŶgs͛ ;ϮϬϬϯ: ϱϰϵ; see also ThoŵpsoŶ, 
2005). During the interview process it became clear that due to the nature of the brief 
(whether in the Ministry of Justice or Home Office), coverage was almost always related to 
͚ďad Ŷeǁs͛ aŶd ŵedia eǆposure was consequently viewed with extreme caution. Consistent 
with the viewpoints of many campaigners, the lack of Ministerial interest stemmed from either 
a genuine belief that media coverage was of little importance, or that receiving media coverage 
was generally a negative experience (and therefore to be avoided in the main). Former Minister 
A viewed coveƌage foƌ the CoƌstoŶ ageŶda as ͞seĐoŶdaƌǇ͟, while Former Minister C agreed 
that it ǁas ͞Ŷot iŵpoƌtaŶt͟. Formeƌ MiŶisteƌ C siŵplǇ ǁaŶted to ͞get on with the poliĐǇ… 
without having to worry about fighting off the Sun and the Mail͟.  
When relaying their anxieties, some former Ministers described the pressure of their 
accountability for justice-ƌelated ͚gaffes͛. Using a cricket analogy to illustrate his relationship 
with the media, Former MiŶisteƌ F eǆplaiŶed that he ǁas ͞at the back with the bat in my hand, 
aŶd Ǉou͛ƌe despeƌatelǇ tƌǇiŶg to ŵake suƌe that the Daily Mail doesŶ͛t take Ǉouƌ ǁiĐkets away, 
ďasiĐallǇ͟. He went on to desĐƌiďe that he ǁas alǁaǇs ͞worried about when the wicket is taken 
out ďǇ soŵeďodǇ else… the Daily Mail, the Telegraph, the right wing media are much more 
diffiĐult to deal ǁith͟. Former Ministers were acutely aware that crime news stories sold 
newspapers, yet they were also aware that in this policy domain the agenda-setting 
puďliĐatioŶs ofteŶ aĐted as ͚ŶoŶ-ĐoŵpliaŶt paƌtŶeƌs͛ ;HiltoŶ et al., 2013). Former Minister F 
eǆplaiŶed that he ǁould ͞wake up every morning where there would be something in the top 
five items of the news that I was responsible for. So basically if I was on the media, then broadly 
speaking, I would only be on because soŵethiŶg ďad had happeŶed͟. WheŶ faĐed ǁith ͞bad 
pƌess͟ Former Minister A admitted that he ǁould ͞ƌuŶ foƌ Đoǀeƌ͟, while Former Minister F was 
clear that ͞eǀeŶ if I tƌied to put iŶ soŵethiŶg positiǀe, Ǉou͛d Ŷeǀeƌ get it thƌough the Ŷoise… 
So an ideal daǇ is Ŷot to ďe iŶ the ŵedia͟. It became clear, therefore, that contrary to popular 
160 
 
perception, Former Ministers (or certainly those working on the Justice brief) did not routinely 
court media attention and preferred to pursue their objectives outside of the spotlight. 
 
Civil Servants: Negotiating the Press Office 
The ultimate responsibility for achieving media coverage falls at the door of civil servants, who 
are understandably sensitive to the nature of reporting on government policy (Zetter, 2008: 
94). As in other departments, civil servants were constrained by their need to work through 
theiƌ Đolleagues iŶ the pƌess offiĐe ;iŶ this iŶstaŶĐe the ͚pƌisoŶs desk͛Ϳ, Ǉet iŶteƌǀieǁs ƌeǀealed 
a picture of uneasy relations. As far as those working on policy were concerned, press officials, 
operating with journalistic news values, seemed to have difficulty understanding that the 
implementation of the Corston agenda would not result in an immediate drop in the female 
prison population. Former Civil Servant D believed that the ǁoŵeŶ͛s poliĐǇ uŶit ǁas ͞seen as 
a ďit pƌoďleŵatiĐ as ǁe ĐouldŶ͛t Đoŵe up ǁith the ŵagiĐ ďullet that ǁould saǇ ͚ǁe͛ǀe doŶe 
faŶtastiĐ͛͟. “he ƌeĐalled that ͞ ǁe͛d get soŵeoŶe [fƌoŵ the pƌess offiĐe] saǇiŶg ͚ ǁe ǁaŶt a good 
Ŷeǁs stoƌǇ… haǀe Ǉou tuƌŶed it aƌouŶd Ǉet͛͟? The agenda of the press office was consequently 
often at odds with that of the policy team, especially when it came to the desire to publicise 
short term gains (such as the drop in suicides) on the female estate. Former Civil Servant D 
ƌeĐalled that ͞we managed to contain that, but we came under a huge amount of pressure͟. 
Dissatisfied that the majority of Departmental media coverage was restricted to the same 
liďeƌal Ŷeǁspapeƌs, ͞a ĐoŶǀeƌted audieŶĐe͟, Former Civil Servant D highlighted the lack of 
dǇŶaŵisŵ aŵoŶg pƌess offiĐials: ͞these people, your department media, have to be very very 
saǀǀǇ… aŶd theƌe ǁas ŶoŶe of that disĐussioŶ͟. Frustrating for those working on policy was 
that pƌess offiĐials speŶt ͞theiƌ ǁhole liǀes ŵiǆiŶg ǁith the ŵedia… aŶd theǇ͛ƌe kiddiŶg 
themselves like theǇ͛ƌe ƌuŶŶiŶg this huge papeƌ͟.  
Despite such critique, Former Civil Servant D did however recognise the pressure that 
press officeƌs ǁeƌe uŶdeƌ, eǆplaiŶiŶg that ͞ it ŵust ďe a hugelǇ haƌd joď ďeĐause theǇ͛ƌe gettiŶg 
ďatteƌed ďǇ politiĐiaŶs saǇiŶg ͚Ǉou haǀeŶ͛t got ŵe the ƌight photo oppoƌtuŶitǇ͛. With Maria 
Eagle, she͛d pop up all oǀeƌ the ĐouŶtƌǇ at ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐeŶtƌes, she͛d get ƌeallǇ disappoiŶted͟ 
because her visits were not covered in the national news media. Due to the bureaucratic 
organisation of the civil service, those working on policy were not permitted to engage with 
the media, whatever their previous background or personal relationships. Acknowledging that 
campaigners worked surreptitiously with the Department to float new policies in the media (of 
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focus in the following section), she confiƌŵed that pƌess offiĐials ͞would have been very 
pleased that other people͟ (rather than Ministers or civil servants) engaged in work of this 
nature.  
 
Framing Women Offenders 
‘eƋuiƌed to ͞go out aŶd get a good Đase studǇ of a ǁoŵaŶ ǁho͛s ďeeŶ a suĐĐess͟, Former Civil 
Servant D recalled that policy officials had to deal with a laƌge aŵouŶt of ͞ haŶdliŶg stuff͟. While 
the majority of the ƌeaĐtiǀe ͚haŶdliŶg͛ ǁoƌk ǁas ͞aďout ĐoǀeƌiŶg MiŶisteƌs͛ ďaĐks, ŵakiŶg suƌe 
the right message is being given out oŶ poliĐǇ͟, proactive work involved the strategic framing 
of women as a vulnerable offender population. Like campaigners, policymakers engaged in 
their own tactics to subtly work against the dominant (punitive) media discourse. For those 
ǁoƌkiŶg oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ ;pƌe- and post- Corston), a major challenge was to craft 
women offendeƌs as diffeƌeŶt fƌoŵ theiƌ ŵale ĐouŶteƌpaƌts, ǁhile adheƌiŶg to Neǁ Laďouƌ͛s 
͚tough oŶ Đƌiŵe͛ ageŶda.  
WoƌkiŶg agaiŶst the doŵiŶaŶt ŵedia steƌeotǇpes to puƌsue a ͚ĐouŶteƌ defiŶiŶg͛ 
humanitarian agenda, Former Civil Servant D ĐoŶĐeded that the DepaƌtŵeŶt ͞tried to 
counteract [punitive coverage] by doing the special case about [the] vulnerable women side, 
by almost playing that ŵoƌe thaŶ ǁe should haǀe had to͟. As the problem ascended the policy 
ageŶda ;aŶd duƌiŶg the height of the ͚ poliĐǇ ǁiŶdoǁ͛ iŶ the ŵid-ϮϬϬϬ͛sͿ ͞ there was an element 
of thiŶkiŶg if ǁe doŶ͛t ďadge ǁoŵeŶ, theŶ ǁho Đaƌes, theǇ͛ll [MiŶisteƌs/the puďliĐ] igŶoƌe it. 
So that was a conscious response to do that͟. Former Civil Servant D explained that the 
DepaƌtŵeŶt ͞spent so much money on media oppoƌtuŶities ǁith ǁoŵeŶ͟ using ex-offenders 
as a ŵedia tool:  ͞ Ǉou get ǁoŵeŶ ďeaƌiŶg theiƌ souls: ͚ I ǁas a ŵess, aŶd Ŷoǁ I͛ŵ saǀed ďeĐause 
of this ǁoŶdeƌful pƌojeĐt͛… the [DepaƌtŵeŶtal] ŵedia folk ǁould Đoŵe to us… saǇiŶg ͚haŶdle, 
keep the good news stories goiŶg thƌough͛͟. Expressing an element of regret about the nature 
of this framing stƌategǇ, she ĐoŶfessed that ͞ what we had done [was to] put an acceptable face 
oŶ these ǀulŶeƌaďle ǁoŵeŶ ǁho ǁeƌe ŵotheƌs... It had that effeĐt to saǇ theǇ͛ƌe Ŷot the ŶastǇ, 
hoƌƌiďle… theǇ͛ƌe Ŷot ‘oseŵaƌǇ West, foƌget heƌ, she͛s so aloŶe͟. Attempts to shape public 
opinion were also highlighted by the use of polling during this period. Former Civil Servant D 
adŵitted that ͞Ǉou ĐaŶ ŵould the puďliĐ ǀieǁ… it͛s a ďit MaĐhiaǀellian because if you ask the 
ƌight ƋuestioŶ, I͛ŵ suƌe Ǉou͛ll get the aŶsǁeƌ…. TheŶ Ǉou͛ǀe got the eǀideŶĐe ďase aŶd that͛s 
got to ďe theƌe allegedlǇ, aŶd theŶ Ǉou͛ƌe oŶ a ƌoll͟.  
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NotǁithstaŶdiŶg the DepaƌtŵeŶt͛s oǁŶ ͚ĐouŶteƌ defiŶiŶg͛ ageŶda, this seĐtioŶ has highlighted 
that government media strategies were less important than originally envisaged. While 
commentary routinely focuses on politicians and their courting of media attention, interviews 
revealed that former Justice Ministers preferred to work away from the media glare. Reasons 
for this varied between Ministers, with two viewing media coverage as less important than 
͚gettiŶg the joď doŶe͛ aŶd oŶe adŵittiŶg that it ǁas due to the pƌoďleŵatiĐ Ŷatuƌe of the ďƌief. 
While policy officials (and press staff in particular) continued to pursue media coverage, they 
were, like campaigners, ofteŶ uŶsuĐĐessful iŶ theiƌ effoƌts. The DepaƌtŵeŶt͛s ĐoŶtiŶued 
stƌuggles add fuƌtheƌ ǁeight to the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of ͚ŶeǁsǁoƌthǇ͛ stoƌies foƌ ŵedia Đoǀeƌage, 
whatever the position of the souƌĐe oŶ the ŵetaphoƌiĐal ŵedia ͚oŶioŶ͛ ;MĐCoŵďs, ϮϬϭϰͿ. The 
following section will examine the views of policymakers on the different lobbying strategies 
(both public and private) employed by penal reformers.  
 
 
v. Lobbying for Reform 
 
Public Activities 
 
When asked their views on the media strategies of campaigners, opinion was split among 
poliĐǇŵakeƌs. While soŵe highlighted eǆaŵples of ͚saǀǀǇ͛ ŵedia ǁoƌk aŶd aƌeas of 
collaboration, others deemed it ineffective, unnecessary or even a nuisance.  
 
Media Work as Ineffective or Unnecessary 
Claimsmakers, feeling that their voices are not being heard by government, may sometimes 
resort to media tactics when they believe that private reassurances have not translated into 
action (Zetter, 2008: 91). Employing such leverage does, however, carry an element of risk, as 
politicians, especially Ministers, can be irritated when they choose to pursue their rhetoric 
through the media (Zetter, 2008: 91). Former Minister A acknowledged that campaigners were 
͞ďouŶd to use the ŵedia͟ ǁheŶ the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt ǁas ͞doing something that is not what they 
perceive to be their interests, and taking policy in a direction they doŶ͛t like͟. Yet despite this 
understanding, Former Minister A viewed a great deal of media work as an irritation and 
questioŶed ǁhǇ suĐh aĐtoƌs ǁould ͞ďotheƌ͟ with the media if they were happy with the 
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direction of policy progress. Expressing a warning that campaigners had ͞a judgment to make 
about whether to go to ǁaƌ ǁith a MiŶisteƌ oƌ Ŷot͟, this type of behaviour was viewed as one 
way that such actors could potentially jeopardise their insider status.  
Former Civil Servant D, describing the different tactics used by claimsmakers, explained 
that while some preferred to work collaboratively with government, otheƌs ǁeƌe ͞much more 
oǀeƌt aŶd ǁould diss us puďliĐlǇ͟. It is clear that lobbying strategies are more likely to succeed 
when Ministers are broadly sympathetic towards their aims or goals (Heywood, 2008: 145). 
Former Minister F confirmed that campaigners Ŷeeded to uŶdeƌstaŶd ǁhetheƌ ͞the Minister 
is basically sympathetic and trying to have the same set of poliĐǇ oďjeĐtiǀes as theǇ do͟. Based 
on this understanding, he believed that savvy campaigners had to ͞take a reality a check on 
hoǁ ŵuĐh… theǇ Ŷeed to exerĐise leǀeƌage oǀeƌ the MiŶisteƌ͟ in public. Competing media 
strategies affected policymaking decisions in different ways, with Former Civil Servant G 
adŵittiŶg that soŵe taĐtiĐs ǁeƌe ͞ŵoƌe effeĐtiǀe thaŶ otheƌs͟. Other policymakers simply 
deemed media work as unnecessary. Highlighting the issue of resources, Politician C believed 
that ͞if Ǉou͛ƌe a little oƌgaŶisatioŶ aŶd Ǉou haǀeŶ͛t got a laƌge ďudget, do Ǉou ǁaŶt to speŶd 
all your time firefighting the media or do you want to get into prisons and help ǁoŵeŶ?͟ 
 
Being Savvy  
Despite such viewpoints, other policymakers viewed media work as an important strategic tool 
and took the opportunity to highlight examples of effective campaigning. Former Minister F 
appreciated that those loďďǇiŶg goǀeƌŶŵeŶt ͞need to get atteŶtioŶ to affeĐt ĐhaŶge͟, while 
Former Ministeƌ A aĐkŶoǁledged the iŵpoƌtaŶt ͞ƌole foƌ ŵedia eŶgageŵeŶt, ďeĐause that͛s 
how you create the environment in whiĐh people aƌe ŵakiŶg deĐisioŶs͟.  
Highlighting the communicative strategies of one organisation, Former Civil Servant D 
was impressed by its attempts at strategic frame alignment (Snow et al., ϭϵϴϲͿ iŶ ͞getting 
[aƌtiĐles iŶto] ǁoŵeŶ͛s ŵagaziŶes, gettiŶg suƌǀeǇs aŶd [ƌeadeƌs theŶ] saǇiŶg ͚oh Ŷo I ǁouldŶ͛t 
put that ǁoŵaŶ iŶ ĐustodǇ͛͟. Praised for employing similar alignment strategies to the 
DepaƌtŵeŶt, she adŵitted ͞if you present women in a certain way, the women readership in 
paƌtiĐulaƌ ǁill saǇ ͚gosh I͛ŵ Ƌuite siŵilaƌ to that͛… aŶd theǇ͛ll go foƌ it͟. Campaigning work with 
those who were not deeŵed ͚the usual suspeĐts͛ ǁas siŵilaƌlǇ ǀieǁed ǁith adŵiƌatioŶ. 
‘eĐalliŶg oŶe oƌgaŶisatioŶ͛s Đollaďoƌatiǀe ǁoƌk ǁith the WoŵeŶ͛s IŶstitute, Foƌŵeƌ Civil 
“eƌǀaŶt D highlighted that ͞Ǉou͛ƌe a sĐƌeaŵiŶg feŵiŶist if Ǉou͛ƌe goiŶg oŶ aďout ǁoŵeŶ 
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offenders, but this was the WI, you kŶoǁ, ĐlassiĐ jaŵ aŶd Jeƌusaleŵ͟. Foƌŵeƌ Ciǀil “eƌǀaŶt D 
͞could alǁaǇs tell ǁho ǁas ďehiŶd͟ new articles, even when there was no explicit mention of 
the organisation, aŶd this ǁas ǀieǁed as ďoth ͚saǀǀǇ͛ aŶd kŶoǁiŶg hoǁ to plaǇ the gaŵe. 
Taking on responsibility to educate journalists was also viewed as particularly helpful. Civil 
Servant D recalled that one campaigner ͞ǁeŶt iŶto pƌisoŶs ǁith the ŵedia… aŶd theǇ had the 
shoĐk goiŶg iŶ, it͛s a Ŷightŵaƌe͟.  
 
Working Collaboratively 
Despite the array of criticisms, interviews did however reveal evidence of collaborative working 
between the Department and campaigners, where the latter pursued media work on behalf of 
the former. Ministers wishing to pursue a particular policy routinely seek wider support in 
order to imbue it with greater legitimacy and credibility (Dorey, 2005: 36) and one way of doing 
this is through public presentations and media. Former MiŶisteƌ F ŶeatlǇ eǆplaiŶed that ͞I ĐaŶ͛t 
just walk on the plank and step off. So part of that was [for claimsmakers] to try and help 
pƌepaƌe the gƌouŶd͟. Former Ministeƌ A siŵilaƌlǇ adŵitted that ͞ we might gently wink at them; 
we might need a media campaign in order to advance a positioŶ that ŵight ĐoŵŵoŶlǇ ďe held͟. 
Empirical evidence revealed that inside actors helped to float new ideas in the news media. 
Former Ciǀil “eƌǀaŶt G ƌeĐalled that ͞Juliet LǇoŶ did aƌtiĐles. FƌaŶĐes Cƌook did aƌtiĐles… That͛s 
ǁheƌe ǁe got the tƌaĐtioŶ͟. As far as she was concerned such campaigners ͞did the 
government a lot of favours because it is verǇ ǀeƌǇ haƌd to get aŶǇ iŶteƌest͟. In further evidence 
of collaborative work, both Ministers and civil seƌǀaŶts ǁould ƌoutiŶelǇ kŶoǁ ͞ǁhat ǁas 
ĐoŵiŶg out͟ as many campaigners sent advance warning of press releases and policy 
documents. Alluding to reformist sympathies within the Department, Former Minister F was 
relaxed about such conteŶt ͞because at the end of the day, although there may be a gap 
between us, the direction of travel ǁill ďe the ƌight oŶe to go iŶ͟. 
 
Private Activities 
 
For those engaged in policy analysis, uncovering the truth in the British political system, which 
ĐaŶ ďe ͚ďƌoadlǇ ĐhaƌaĐteƌised as Đlosed, elitist aŶd seĐƌetiǀe͛ ;KaǀaŶagh et al., 2006: 425), is an 
extremely difficult task. Hogwood stated in 1987 that: 
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͚We should Ŷot ĐoŶfuse the puďliĐ pƌoŵiŶeŶĐe of politiĐal aĐtiǀities ǁith the iŶteŶsitǇ 
of goǀeƌŶŵeŶt ĐoŶĐeƌŶ… ŵuĐh of the ŵost iŵpoƌtaŶt disĐussioŶ aďout shapiŶg puďliĐ 
poliĐǇ iŶ BƌitaiŶ takes plaĐe iŶ pƌiǀate͛ ;ϭϵϴϳ: ϭͿ.  
 
In attempts to learn more about the strategies employed by penal reform claimsmakers 
opeƌatiŶg as a poliĐǇ Ŷetǁoƌk, uŶĐoǀeƌiŶg ǁhat goes oŶ ͚ďehiŶd Đlosed dooƌs͛ is therefore of 
crucial importance. Empirical evidence revealed that it was the more traditional private 
lobbying strategies that remained of upŵost iŵpoƌtaŶĐe iŶ the field of ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ. 
CoŶsisteŶt ǁith Best͛s ŵodel of ͚ iŶsideƌ ĐlaiŵsŵakiŶg͛ ;ϮϬϭϯͿ aŶd Loadeƌ͛s ͚platoŶiĐ guaƌdiaŶs͛ 
(2006), policymakers viewed private relations, meetings and advice as far more important than 
media work. Ministers and civil servants placed a great deal of importance on the issue of trust 
and information was routinely shared among key campaigners. Civil servants worked 
particularly closely with campaigners, desĐƌiďiŶg theŵ as ͚ĐƌitiĐal fƌieŶds͛, aŶd ǀaluiŶg theiƌ 
input in the policy process. While dismissed to a certain extent by Ministers, it was through 
these relationships that many of the ideas of the smaller organisations were able to influence 
policy development. As reflected in chapter five, campaigners͛ ƌetiĐeŶĐe to disĐuss the pƌiǀate 
aspeĐts of theiƌ stƌategies aŶd the Ŷatuƌe of theiƌ ƌelatioŶships ǁithiŶ the ͚Đoƌƌidoƌs of poǁeƌ͛ 
adds further confirmation to their insider status. As the characteristics expected of an insider 
include discretion, responsibility and confidentiality (Kavanagh et al., 2006: 424; see also 
Maloney, Jordan and McLaughlin, 1994: 20), it is clear to see why they were unprepared to 
jeopardise this position. It was the policymakers, therefore, who were able to provide more 
descriptive accounts about this private aspect of the policy process. Discussions focused on the 
importance of building trust, the claimsmaking hierarchy and the existence of blurred 
boundaries. 
 
Building Relationships and the Importance of Trust 
In the policymaking world, personal character and reputation count (Rock, 1995: 4).  The 
relations that develop between institutionalised interests and governments are therefore of 
crucial importance to the policymaking process (Ismaili, 2006: 265). Having key campaigners 
͞oŶ side͟ was considered vital by Former Minister F who believed that the Department needed 
͞to deal ǁith theŵ͟ and not discount their views as unimportant. Campaigners had an ever-
scrutinising eye on activities in Parliament, and Foƌŵeƌ MiŶisteƌ F eǆplaiŶed that ͞if I stand up 
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aŶd saǇ X iŶ the House of CoŵŵoŶs, theŶ I͛ŵ goiŶg to get a ƌeaĐtioŶ fƌoŵ these oƌgaŶisatioŶs͟. 
A reaĐtioŶ Đould ďe aŶǇthiŶg fƌoŵ ͞absolutely dreadful Minister through to: very much want 
to help Ǉou͟. To try to avoid negative media reaction it was therefore important to involve key 
campaigners in advance of stateŵeŶts oƌ aŶŶouŶĐeŵeŶts ͞to tell theŵ ǁhat ǁe ǁeƌe doiŶg͟. 
Former Minister F stressed his desire to work collaboratively with campaigners, explaining that 
although ͞ they knocked on the door, I also ǁaŶted to hug theŵ Đlose͟. In hugging campaigners 
͚Đlose͛ theƌe ǁas less of a ĐhaŶĐe that theǇ ǁould speak ŶegatiǀelǇ iŶ puďliĐ. Foƌŵeƌ Ciǀil 
Servant G was similarly clear that ͞FƌaŶĐes Cƌook aŶd Juliet LǇoŶ. I͛d ƌatheƌ haǀe theŵ theƌe 
[on side] thaŶ heĐkliŶg ŵe fƌoŵ the audieŶĐe͟.  
Governments often turn to pressure groups for pertinent opinion, specialist data and 
analysis (Keefe and Ogul, 1964: 367; also Maloney, Jordan and McLaughlin, 1994: 36). This 
reciprocal relationship was confirmed by Former Minister F who wanted access their 
͞expertise͟ ǁhile at the saŵe tiŵe gettiŶg ͞them to understaŶd ǁhat ǁe ǁeƌe tƌǇiŶg to do͟. 
It is clear that some considered the sharing of expertise and resources as important. Former 
Civil Servant D recalled that one former Ministeƌ ;EͿ ǁould saǇ thiŶgs like ͞can someone get 
Juliet Lyon to come in and see me, this is iŵpoƌtaŶt, ǁe Ŷeed to ďe pushiŶg͟. Campaigner 
expertise was also viewed as pƌoǀidiŶg legitiŵaĐǇ to ͞help persuade [other gatekeeping] 
offiĐials͟. Policy officials in the Department needed little persuasion as they too were operating 
closely with campaigners (albeit through different channels). Close relations had been forged 
with certain campaigners and Former Ciǀil “eƌǀaŶt D eǆplaiŶed that ͞nothing we did in the 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s poliĐǇ uŶit ǁould haǀe happeŶed ǁithout the ĐƌitiĐal fƌieŶds͟. Former Civil Servant D 
revealed that one campaigner ͞would talk to me when things were going on. I would never ask 
heƌ ͚ǁell ǁho aƌe Ǉou goiŶg to ďe talkiŶg to?͛ ďut iŵpliĐit iŶ that, Ǉou Đould tƌust͟. This 
symbiotic relationship, together with an inside understanding about what the government was 
trying to achieve meant that, on the whole, campaigners refrained from engaging in critical 
media work, preferring to operate in close collaboration with the Department in the 
deǀelopŵeŶt of ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ.  
 
The Claimsmaking Hierarchy 
While literature continues to point to the important role of pressure groups in the policy 
process, Rhodes, in his most recent empirical study of British government has conceded that 
the network approach to policymaking may not be as pluralist as previously assumed. Rhodes 
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fouŶd that MiŶisteƌs ǀieǁed suĐh gƌoups as just ͚oŶe of seǀeƌal ďalls that had to ďe juggled͛ 
(2011: 235), and empirical evidence gathered during this study supports his renewed 
assertions. While most former Ministers (from across the political spectrum) viewed penal 
reform campaigners as marginal players, some ǁished to ͞ hug theŵ Đlose͟, making use of their 
information and expertise. Yet despite the existence of a clear hierarchy, it would be fair to say 
that, given the niche nature of this area of public policy, most campaigners were afforded a 
͚seat at the taďle͛ duƌiŶg keǇ poliĐǇ disĐussioŶs. 
The ďasiĐ aiŵ of iŶsideƌ gƌoups is to ͚estaďlish a ĐoŶsultatiǀe ƌelatioŶship ǁheƌeďǇ theiƌ 
views on particular legislative proposals will be sought prior to the crystallisation of the 
goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s positioŶ͛ ;GƌaŶt, ϭϵϳϴ: ϮͿ. IŶ teƌŵs of ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ the ͚ĐoŶsultatiǀe 
ƌelatioŶship͛ ďetǁeeŶ the Department and campaigners manifested itself in a great many 
ŵeetiŶgs aŶd ƌouŶdtaďle disĐussioŶs. CoŶfiƌŵiŶg MaloŶeǇ, JoƌdaŶ aŶd MĐLaughliŶ͛s asseƌtioŶ 
that the state accepts as insiders only those with which it is predisposed to agree (1994: 22), 
Former Minister F recalled that he was happy to engage with campaigners ďeĐause ͞virtually 
all of the lobby groups who were eŶgagiŶg ǁith us ǁeƌe suppoƌtiǀe͟. Former Minister A was 
siŵilaƌlǇ ͞Ƌuite happǇ to haǀe ƌegulaƌ ĐoŶtaĐt… ďeĐause oŶ the ǁhole theǇ ǁeƌe oŶ side ǁith 
what I was trying to do͟. Former Minister A explaiŶed that it ǁas his ƌole to ͞try and corral 
[campaigners] into groups to give them some discipline in how they get theiƌ ŵessage aĐƌoss͟. 
He was impressed that certain campaigners had doŶe this autoŵatiĐallǇ aŶd that ͞the Corston 
Coalition has brought together people interested in ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐƌiŵiŶal justiĐe issues͟, for 
example. The Department also had responsibility for organising campaigners into groups which 
ǁould ŵeet ͞aŶŶuallǇ, ďiaŶŶuallǇ, ƋuaƌteƌlǇ͟. Many of the campaigners attended these 
meetings, and as Foƌŵeƌ MiŶisteƌ A Ƌuipped, ͞Ǉou͛ƌe ĐoŶstaŶtlǇ ŵeetiŶg theŵ oŶ the ĐiƌĐuit͟. 
There is of course a crucial distiŶĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ŵeetiŶg oŶ the ͚ĐiƌĐuit͛ aŶd eŶjoǇiŶg ƌegulaƌ 
Ministerial access.  
As highlighted iŶ Đhapteƌ fiǀe, it is Đleaƌ that ͚soŵe gƌoups aĐhieǀe highlǇ effeĐtiǀe 
access almost automatically, whereas it is denied to others in spite of their most vigorous 
effoƌts͛ ;TƌuŵaŶ, ϭϵϱϭ: ϯϮϭͿ. “ĐhattsŶeideƌ͛s histoƌiĐ distiŶĐtioŶ of the ͚diffeƌeŶtiated Ŷatuƌe 
of aĐĐess͛ ;ϭϵϯϱͿ ǁas ĐoŶfiƌŵed ďǇ foƌŵeƌ MiŶisteƌs aŶd Điǀil seƌǀaŶts, ǁho, ďased oŶ theiƌ 
historic legacies as much as their current leadership, enjoyed closer relations with some 
campaigners than others. Former Minister F explained that he used to meet regularly with 
͞Juliet LǇoŶ, FƌaŶĐes Cƌook… We ǁould haǀe foƌŵal oŶe to oŶe ŵeetiŶgs ǁheƌe theǇ ǁould 
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ƌaise issues that ĐoŶĐeƌŶed theŵ… TheǇ ǁould tƌǇ to get an understanding of where I was 
tƌǇiŶg to get to͟. Former Ministeƌ A ĐoŶfiƌŵed that the ŵoƌe ͞prominent͟ gƌoups iŶ the field 
͞such as the Prison Reform Trust and the Howard League and their two heads will have more 
ƌegulaƌ ŵeetiŶgs͟. Other, less high-profile campaigners ǁould ĐoŶǀeƌselǇ haǀe to ͞work quite 
haƌd [foƌ a ŵeetiŶg] ďeĐause theǇ͛ƌe Ƌuite sŵall aŶd theƌe͛s oŶlǇ a liŵited aŵouŶt of tiŵe͟. 
Revealing his high level of dependence on civil servants, Former Minister A explained that he 
regularly delegated this work to seŶioƌ offiĐials so theǇ ǁould ͞manage those relationships for 
you. So while they may not have been meeting me, theǇ͛ƌe ŵeetiŶg ǁith the offiĐials͟.  
 
Blurred Boundaries 
In addition to collaborative media work, interviews revealed evidence of collaboration in 
private. While it is clear that most of the campaigners were involved in policy consultation, it 
would seem that certain key players yielded more influence than others (Maloney, Jordan and 
McLaughlin, 1994: 19). Some campaigners ǁeƌe iŶǀited iŶ oƌ ͚ hugged Đlose͛ ďǇ the DepaƌtŵeŶt 
as it tried to make use of their knowledge (Maloney, Jordan and McLaughlin, 1994: 21) and in 
the case of the CorstoŶ IŶdepeŶdeŶt FuŶder͛s CoalitioŶ (CIFC), due to its substantial financial 
resources. IŶ ͚ďuǇiŶg iŶ͛ eǆteƌŶal eǆpeƌtise, DepaƌtŵeŶt poliĐǇ ƌesulted iŶ eǀeŶ fuƌtheƌ ďluƌƌed 
boundaries between the core executive and the voluntary and charitable sector. 
The existence of blurred boundaries in the policymaking process was highlighted by 
Nettle in ϭϵϲϱ ǁheŶ he suggested that the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt ͚teŶded to dƌaǁ iŶ ĐhoseŶ iŶdiǀiduals 
and groups from the periphery, absorbing them while preserving their outward shell of 
autoŶoŵǇ aŶd iŶdepeŶdeŶĐe͛ ;ϭϵϲϱ: ϮϮͿ. EŵpiƌiĐal eǀideŶĐe suggested that this ǁas ǀeƌǇ 
muĐh the Đase iŶ the spheƌe of ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ, Ǉet poliĐǇŵakeƌs ƌeĐogŶised that 
independence (or perceived independence) was an important consideration for campaigners. 
Former Ciǀil “eƌǀaŶt D adŵitted that ͞I doŶ͛t thiŶk aŶǇoŶe kŶeǁ hoǁ ŵuĐh [ǁe]… ǁeƌe 
ǁoƌkiŶg ǁith the pƌessuƌe gƌoups. I doŶ͛t thiŶk these folk ǁould haǀe ǁaŶted the ǁoƌld to 
know how closely they were working with us. Because it Đould daŵage theiƌ ƌeputatioŶ͟. The 
issue of ďeiŶg ͚iŶ ďed͛ ǁith goǀeƌŶŵeŶt ǁas highlighted ďǇ Foƌŵeƌ MiŶister A who believed 
that keǇ plaǇeƌs ͞ha[d] to ďe… if the Howard League decided to go off and say the world is 
ĐoŵiŶg to aŶ eŶd aŶd the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt is dƌeadful theŶ theǇ͛ǀe destƌoǇed the ƌelatioŶship ǁith 
their main partner. So it would be quite heavy for them to do that͟. It is widely recognised that 
in having a cosy relationship with those in power, campaigners might feel pressured to water 
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doǁŶ deŵaŶds aŶd stifle ĐƌitiĐisŵ so as to aǀoid upsettiŶg ͚fƌieŶds iŶ high plaĐes͛ ;WhiteleǇ 
and Winyard, 1987: 10; see also Kavanagh et al., 2006). One policymaker believed that several 
campaigners had been incorporated. Former Civil Servant D, for example felt that the insider 
status of one campaigner made it difficult for her to be critical of government, as she was 
incƌeasiŶglǇ ͞comproŵised ďǇ heƌ positioŶ, iŶ a ǁaǇ͟. Such a viewpoint is consistent with 
CaƌleŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϮͿ ŶotioŶ of ͚ĐaƌĐeƌal ĐlaǁďaĐk͛, aŶd that iŶ that aĐĐeptiŶg poliĐies to iŵpƌoǀe 
(rather than remove) prison conditions, reformers simply help those in power to re-legitimise 
pƌisoŶ as the ͚Ŷoƌŵal͛ foƌ puŶishŵeŶt foƌ ǁoŵeŶ offeŶdeƌs. 
Interviews also revealed that some working relationships with campaigners were more 
transparent than others. Former Civil ServaŶt D ĐoŶfiƌŵed that theƌe ǁeƌe ͞lots of private 
ŵeetiŶgs. I doŶ͛t thiŶk it is plaǇed out so ŵuĐh iŶ the ŵedia… theƌe͛s lots of covert stuff that 
goes oŶ͟. Unbeknown to members of the general puďliĐ, the DepaƌtŵeŶt ͞paid for one post in 
[the] Fawcett [Society] to give us that outside view. So we were in a sense saying, look steer 
us͟. Acknowledging that campaigners Đould soŵetiŵes ͞oǀeƌstep the ŵaƌk͟, Former Civil 
Servant D recalled that having become used to a regular seat at key meetings in the 
Department, one campaigner ͞twice came to a media group at the Home Office and she was 
aĐtuallǇ asked to leaǀe. BeĐause theǇ said ǁell Ǉou͛ƌe a pƌessuƌe gƌoup, ǁill Ǉou go͟? Such cosy, 
insider relations were to change following the election of the Coalition government in May 
2010.  
 
 
vi. Political Ideology and Policy: Changing Relations with Campaigners 
 
This study adds weight to the argument that politics and policy are almost inseparable (Barton 
and Johns, 2013: 36), with clear implications for agenda-setting. Penal reform is typically 
viewed as a left-wing concern and this is evidenced by the ideological common ground shared 
ďǇ those ǁoƌkiŶg oŶ the ǁoŵeŶ͛s ageŶda uŶdeƌ the Neǁ Laďouƌ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt. FolloǁiŶg the 
election of the Conservative-led Coalition, empirical evidence revealed that the Department 
ǀieǁed ǁoŵeŶ͛s offeŶdiŶg as a ͚lesseƌ soĐial pƌoďleŵ͛ ;HilgaƌtŶeƌ aŶd Bosk, ϭϵϴϴͿ. “uĐh a 
change in direction had immediate implications for its status on the policy agenda. While the 
ŵaiŶ foĐus of this studǇ is oŶ the deǀelopŵeŶt of ǁoŵeŶ͛s penal policy under New Labour 
(including the ͚poliĐǇ ǁiŶdoǁ͛ ;KiŶgdoŶ, ϭϵϴϰͿ that pƌeĐeded the ͚CoƌstoŶ ƌefoƌŵs͛Ϳ, 
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interviews took place following the election of the Conservative-led Coalition government. As 
the eleĐtioŶ ǁas to haǀe iŵpoƌtaŶt ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes foƌ the status of ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal policy on 
the policy agenda, the penultimate section of this chapter will briefly document the changing 
nature of relations between campaigners and policymakers. 
͚The politiĐal poǁeƌ of pƌessuƌe gƌoups… depeŶds ŵoƌe oŶ the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s 
perceptions of theŵ thaŶ aŶǇ oďjeĐtiǀe poǁeƌ that theǇ ŵight haǀe͛ ;“ŵith, ϭϵϵϬ: ϮϭϬ, 
emphasis added) and at the time of fieldwork, campaigners were anxiously awaiting their role 
in the CoalitioŶ͛s loŶg-aǁaited ͚Strategy͛ foƌ ǁoŵeŶ offeŶdeƌs. HaǀiŶg eŶjoǇed Đlose, 
consultative relations under the previous administration, campaigners were also faced with 
the task of building relationships with a new team of Ministers. The lack of a comprehensive 
policy direction was proving frustrating for many, who could neither support nor oppose 
objectives that had yet to be published. Certain campaigners were endeavouring to work with 
the Department until it became clear that the agenda was not going in their preferred 
direction. Former Civil Servant D understood that campaigners could only hold the government 
to aĐĐouŶt ͞if the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s got a stƌategǇ. If theǇ͛ƌe Ŷot saǇiŶg ǁhat theǇ͛ƌe doiŶg, hoǁ 
do Ǉou theŶ aĐt as a taskfoƌĐe?͟ Debating whether previous strategies would work under the 
new political administration, Former Civil “eƌǀaŶt D ƋuestioŶed ͞if [X] retains her normal 
approach which is softly, softly, talk nicely to Ministers, there is a growing feeling in the face of 
ŶothiŶg that it͛s Ŷot goiŶg to haǀe aŶǇ iŵpaĐt. That aĐtuallǇ Ǉou͛ǀe got to start hitting really 
haƌd͟. Highlighting the need to change insider strategies, Former Civil Servant D believed that 
͞if Ǉou͛ǀe ďeeŶ tƌǇiŶg foƌ all these Ǉeaƌs aŶd Ŷot gettiŶg ŵuĐh of a ĐhiŶk, Ǉou͛ǀe got to [try a 
diffeƌeŶt appƌoaĐh]͟.  
The difficulty for campaigners and civil servants alike was that women offenders were 
not seen as a priority by the new Justice Ministers, and therefore not in need of a separate 
stƌategǇ. While aĐkŶoǁledgiŶg that the ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal ƌefoƌŵ Ŷetǁoƌk ǁas effeĐtiǀe, Foƌŵeƌ 
Minister A believed that it was also ͞way overrepƌeseŶted, pƌisoŶeƌ foƌ pƌisoŶeƌ͟. Recalling an 
eaƌlǇ ŵeetiŶg ǁith the ǁoŵeŶ͛s poliĐǇ gƌoup he ǁas shoĐked to fiŶd ͞twenty officials at the 
taďle. It ǁas Ƌuite eǆtƌaoƌdiŶaƌǇ͟. VieǁiŶg the issue as a ͚lesseƌ soĐial pƌoďleŵ͛ ;Hilgartner and 
Bosk, ϭϵϴϴͿ, he ͞didŶ͛t oďjeĐt to the Đase ďeiŶg ŵade, [ďut] oďjeĐted to the MiŶistry of Justice 
ƌespoŶse to it͟. MiŶisteƌial pƌioƌities sooŶ affeĐted offiĐials iŶ the DepaƌtŵeŶt. The ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
policy unit was disbanded, with Former Minister A confirming that he cut the number of those 
ǁoƌkiŶg oŶ the poliĐǇ: ͞because it was unbelievable the focus of the last government, in this 
171 
 
oŶe sŵall aƌea͟. The Ŷeǁ JustiĐe teaŵ did Ŷot feel the Ŷeed foƌ a dediĐated ͚MiŶisteƌial 
Champion for WoŵeŶ͛, a ĐoŶĐeƌŶ foƌ ĐaŵpaigŶeƌs who were anxious not to lose any precious 
political momentum they had gained. Recognising their frustrations, Former Minister A 
stƌessed that he ǁas ͞more concerned aďout gettiŶg oŶ ǁith the joď͟. Appreciating this 
͚paĐkagiŶg͛ issue, his downfall in hindsight ͞was that I expected others, media included, to 
understand that what I ǁas doiŶg ǁas the ƌight thiŶg͟.  
Yet it was not only campaigners that were concerned with penal progress for women. In 
July 2012 the Justice Select Committee announced its decision to hold an inquiry on Women 
Offenders. Five years after the publication of the Corston Report, its aim was to review progress 
aŶd eǆaŵiŶe the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s ĐuƌƌeŶt stƌategǇ foƌ ǁoŵeŶ iŶ the ĐƌiŵiŶal justiĐe sǇsteŵ. 
Signalling a change in outward focus at least, Helen Grant MP was appointed as a Justice 
Minister following the Cabinet reshuffle that September. With specific responsibility for 
women offenders, campaigners believed that Grant would place immediate focus on the 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s ageŶda, Ǉet it ǁas Ŷot uŶtil giving oral evidence to the inquiry in March 2013 that a 
shoƌt ďƌiefiŶg papeƌ oŶ the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s ďƌoad poliĐǇ oďjeĐtiǀes ǁas pƌoduĐed. AdŵittiŶg that 
it ǁas ŵoƌe of a ͚holdiŶg stƌategǇ͛, GƌaŶt ƌefuted aĐĐusatioŶs that the CoƌstoŶ ƌefoƌŵs had 
stalled undeƌ the CoalitioŶ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt. WheŶ asked ǁhǇ theƌe ǁas Ŷo ͚ ĐƌitiĐal ŵass of ǁoŵeŶ 
MiŶisteƌs͛ ǁoƌkiŶg oŶ the ageŶda ;as had ďeeŶ the Đase iŶ the pƌeǀious goǀeƌŶŵeŶtͿ, she 
aŶŶouŶĐed that a Ŷeǁ adǀisoƌǇ ďoaƌd ǁould fulfil this ƌole. “igŶalliŶg the DepaƌtŵeŶt͛s desire 
to work with campaigners she aŶtiĐipated ͚ŵeŵďeƌship fƌoŵ ĐƌiŵiŶal justiĐe paƌtŶeƌs aŶd 
stakeholdeƌs ďut also fƌoŵ otheƌ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt ŵiŶisteƌs aŶd offiĐials͛ ;ϮϬϭϯ: EǀϱϰͿ. As 
documented in chapter three, respoŶsiďilitǇ foƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ suďseƋuently 
eǆpeƌieŶĐed a gaŵe of ͚ŵusiĐal Đhaiƌs͛. GƌaŶt ǁas shuffled fƌoŵ heƌ ƌole iŶ OĐtoďeƌ ϮϬϭϯ aŶd 
replaced with Liberal Democrat, Lord Tom McNally. FolloǁiŶg MĐNallǇ͛s ŵoǀe to the Youth 
Justice Board in early 2014 responsibility for women in the justice system fell at the door of 
Liberal Democrat, Simon Hughes MP. The recent election of May 2015 has resulted in 
Conservative Caroline Dinenage MP now assuming responsibility for the role. While the 
renewal in focus for women (certainly in the last half of the previous government) was viewed 
as a step forward by many campaigners, penal progress for women is still best analogised as 
CoƌĐoƌaŶ͛s up-and-doǁŶ jouƌŶeǇ of ͚sŶakes aŶd laddeƌs͛ ;ϮϬϭϬͿ. 
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vii. Conclusion 
 
Drawing the views of different actors operating in the Ministry of Justice together for the first 
time, this chapter is an important contribution to developing understandings of penal 
policymaking and the role of organised interests in this process. Interviews confirmed that all 
former Ministers (from across the political spectrum) did not consider pressure from 
campaigners or coverage in the media as important precursors for policy change in this 
domain. In stark contrast to literature documenting the agenda-setting power of networks 
(Marsh and Rhodes, 1992; John, 2012), Ministers did not view penal reformers as exerting any 
agenda-setting influence whatsoever. Consistent with the standpoint of Jordan and Cairney 
(2013), evidence would therefore support the practical application of the Westminster model, 
in the eyes of penal policymakers at least. Yet while Ministers did not place any great 
importance on their relations with penal reform campaigners, it would be erroneous to 
conclude that such actors do not play a role in policymaking. On the list of official consultees, 
and holding regular meetings with officials, it is in this way that campaigners are able to feed 
into the policy process. During the New Labour administration it was clear that some 
campaigners enjoyed extremely close working relations with policy officials in the Department, 
taking part in negotiations to which they would not routinely be privy. Such a blurring of 
boundaries was reconfigured following the election of the Coalition government when more 
formal relations were restored. In underlining the crucial influence of politics on the policy 
agenda this chapter has evidenced that while viewed as a serious policy problem by the New 
Laďouƌ adŵiŶistƌatioŶ, the saŵe issue ǁas doǁŶgƌaded to a ͚lesseƌ soĐial pƌoďleŵ͛ ;HilgaƌtŶeƌ 
and Bosk, 1988) by the Coalition. It remains to be seen how the newly-elected Conservative 
government will develop ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ.  
In addition, those former Ministers interviewed for this study also viewed the news 
ŵedia͛s ageŶda-setting power as limited. Citing it either as unnecessary to the agenda or just 
plain destructive, they preferred to pursue their strategies away from the media glare. Despite 
such viewpoints, it is clear that the Department did engage in news framing activities, certainly 
in the run-up to the Corston agenda. The attempts to influence public opinion on this matter 
(using humanitarian discourse) were clearly limited, and it would seem that in this domain at 
least, policymakers face similar struggles to penal reform campaigners. Information about 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ ǁas not routinely picked up by journalists, and news media were 
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considered as dominating the major topics of discussion in the penal sphere, often in a negative 
way.  
As a consequence of the above, use of the news media by campaigners was considered 
an irritation by Ministers who preferred to discuss key issues in private. Empirical evidence 
oŶĐe agaiŶ suppoƌts Best͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ ŵodel of ͚iŶsideƌ ĐlaiŵsŵakiŶg͛ as the ŵost aĐĐuƌate 
description of policymaking in this domain (see also Grant, 2004). In so doing, it is possible to 
draw similarities with the Post-Waƌ ͚platoŶiĐ guaƌdiaŶs͛ ;Loadeƌ, ϮϬϬϲͿ that operated in the 
corridors of power half a century ago. In light of such evidence, and in synthesising the key 
themes presented in all three empirical chapters, the following chapter will debate future 
pƌospeĐts foƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal reform campaigners.  
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8. Future PƌospeĐts foƌ WoŵeŶ͛s PeŶal ‘efoƌŵ 
 
 
i. Introduction 
 
This study has researched and evidenced the multi-faceted nature of contemporary penal 
policymaking. In so doing, it adds weight to the importance of recognising the number of 
complexities inherent in the social problems process (Best, 2013): the political culture and 
dominant ideology of the time (acting as an enabler or inhibitor to policy change); the official, 
iŶstitutioŶal ageŶda aŶd it͛s ͚ĐaƌƌǇiŶg ĐapaĐities͛ ;HilgaƌtŶeƌ aŶd Bosk, ϭϵϴϴͿ; the fƌaŵiŶg and 
;ƌeͿĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ of poliĐǇ pƌoďleŵs aŶd the oŵŶipƌeseŶt ͚thƌeat͛ of Ŷegatiǀe puďliĐ opiŶioŶ. 
Taking such complexities into account, this chapter will discuss the multifarious interplay 
between penal reformers, journalists and policymakers at the crime-media nexus. This study 
has, for the first time, shed light on the particular difficulties experienced by those campaigning 
to ƌefoƌŵ ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ. IŶ ĐƌitiĐallǇ aŶalǇsiŶg suĐh diffiĐulties aŶd ƌelatiŶg theŵ to 
developing understandings of the policy process, this chapter will address the theoretical 
building blocks in reverse order. Tackling each stage this way will enable the various barriers to 
policy reform to be deliberated before a more focused analysis of claimsmaking strategies can 
take place.  
While many political commentators (see Rhodes, 2007; Ryan, Savage and Wall, 2001; 
Richardson, 2000) continue to highlight the agenda-setting dominance of networks, evidence 
gathered during this study questions some of these assertions. Considering the agenda-setting 
power of campaigners, part two will revisit the Westminster and governance models in its 
analysis of penal policymaking. Agenda-setting theory will also be considered in part three, 
where the role of the news media in the process of policy reform will be debated. Part four will 
ƌeǀisit Loadeƌ͛s ;ϮϬϬϲͿ ĐoŶĐept of the ͚platoŶiĐ guaƌdiaŶs͛ in its analysis of the lobbying 
strategies employed by contemporary penal reformers. Arguing that it is Best͛s (2013) model 
of ͚iŶsideƌ ĐlaiŵsŵakiŶg͛ that ŵost accurately describes this aspect of penal policymaking, it 
will consider the prospects for those working this way. Having outlined the various barriers to 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal ƌefoƌŵ eŵaŶatiŶg fƌoŵ the poliĐǇŵakiŶg and newsmaking spheres, part five 
will synthesise Snow et al.͛s ;ϭϵϴϲͿ ĐoŶĐept of stƌategiĐ issue fƌaŵiŶg ǁith ‘utheƌfoƌd͛s ;ϭϵϵϯͿ 
competing penal ideologies, in order to outline a number of practical campaigning suggestions. 
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Taking the above findings into account, part six will discuss future avenues foƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal 
reformers. Part seven will conclude with a brief synopsis of the main points. 
 
 
ii. Policymaking Prospects 
 
Campaigners and the Policy Agenda 
Following the work of Rhodes (1997; 2007), Ryan et al., (2001) and Richardson (2000), this 
investigation into the claimsmaking strategies employed by the penal reform network 
employed a pluralist, network-focused approach from the outset. The network thesis is widely 
supported in political science and policymaking literature, with analysts arguing that policy 
often emerges as a result of pressure or influence from networks, even if formal authorisation 
comes from politicians (John, 2012: 57; see also Richardson and Jordan, 1979; Rhodes, 1997, 
2007). However, empirical evidence gathered during this study challenges the universal 
application of this approach. It is important to stress the limited generalisations that can be 
made from a case study of this size (focusing on a niche area of public policy), yet the admission 
from all former Justice Ministers that they considered penal reform campaigners as holding 
little power, influence or impact on the policy agenda was surprising. Such viewpoints were 
highlighted in the previous chapteƌ ďǇ PolitiĐiaŶ C iŶ heƌ ĐoŶfiƌŵatioŶ that ͞the stars that were 
aligned were nothing to do with aŶǇ ĐaŵpaigŶiŶg oƌgaŶisatioŶ͟. This statement, indicative of 
the viewpoints of the former Justice Ministers that participated in this research, exposed that, 
contrary to contemporary understandings, penal pressure groups (whether acting as insiders 
or otherwise) may not have as much leverage on the policy process as originally assumed. 
Furthermore, Ministerial participants (including the very influential Politician C) acted with 
bemusement when questioned about the role of penal reformers in the policy process at all.  
Despite the decades of campaigning on this issue, it was clear that they considered the 
impetus for reform as the series of suicides in HMP Styal in the mid-2000s. One former Minister 
explained that government attention was already foĐused oŶ this issue due to the ͞ĐƌitiĐal 
ŵass͟ of female Ministers operating in and around the justice and equalities briefs. It was the 
action of these women  (operating as part of the institutional agenda) that was deemed crucial 
to ascendanĐe of ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ to the top of the poliĐǇ ageŶda. GiǀeŶ the doŵiŶaŶĐe 
of the network approach in the policymaking literature and the perceived nature of collegiate 
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relations among this extremely small group of female policy actors, such viewpoints were 
unexpected. While it is perfectly understandable that some policymakers might wish to play 
down the influence of outside forces, those former Justice Ministers interviewed for this study 
(from across the political spectrum) afforded no agenda-setting credit to the work of the penal 
reform network at all. What is all the more surprising is that two of the former Justice Ministers 
;aŶd PolitiĐiaŶ CͿ ĐoŶstituted the ͚ĐƌitiĐal ŵass͛ of keǇ plaǇeƌs in operation at the height of the 
Corston agenda (and were politically aligned to the viewpoints of campaigners). Empirical 
eǀideŶĐe theƌefoƌe suppoƌts ‘hodes͛ ŵoƌe ƌeĐeŶt adŵissioŶs that ͚poliĐǇ Ŷetǁoƌks aŶd theiƌ 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶs [ǁeƌe ǀieǁed as] oŶe of the seǀeƌal ďalls that had to ďe juggled͛ ;ϮϬϭϭ: ϮϯϱͿ ďǇ 
Ministers, and that the network approach might not be as pluralist as previously assumed 
(2011: 135). Given the nature of insider relations and the previous level of collaborative work, 
this is another interesting finding. One straightforward answer to the above viewpoints is that 
unlike other lobbyists (such as those working in the banking sector, for example), penal reform 
campaigners have no leverage on the government, and cannot threaten the loss of revenue or 
hundreds of jobs. Instead, they campaign on an issue of limited political interest, and are left 
to react to changing government agendas.  
While former Ministers may have viewed penal reformers as exerting no agenda-
setting dominance on the policy process, their opinions were somewhat clouded by the 
viewpoints of former civil servants who had worked with such actors. Given the niche nature 
of ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ, there were very limited numbers of officials working in the Criminal 
JustiĐe WoŵeŶ͛s PoliĐy UŶit, even at the height of the Corston-era. The three former officials 
(two of them having held senior or management positions) that participated in this research 
therefore constituted a large percentage of the participant pool available. Their experiences, 
documented for the first time, were crucial in enabling the advancement of theoretical 
understandings of the policy process in this domain. Former civil servants operated in the 
middle territory, acting as arbiters between Ministerial demands and campaigner pressure. 
Given Ministerial time constraints, it was they that had the majority of contact with penal 
reformers. As such, they were perfectly poised to understand the diverging viewpoints and 
strategies of both sets of political actors. While their experience of everyday policymaking 
exposed an approach that was top-down (confirming the agenda-setting power of former 
Justice Ministers), all three former civil servants referred to their important relations with 
ĐaŵpaigŶeƌs, desĐƌiďed as theiƌ ͞critiĐal fƌieŶds͟. While perhaps not having the agenda-setting 
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dominance that some commentators would expect (and therefore contradicting the 
viewpoints of John (2012) above), penal reformers did have access to the corridors of power 
(even if this was meeting officials rather than Ministers), were on the list of official consultees, 
and as revealed by Former Minister F, did have the ultimate recourse of seeking critical media 
coverage if they so desired. Viewed this way, it would be wrong to denounce the agenda-
setting credentials of penal reformers entirely, but it is also important to stress the restricted 
nature of their influence. Such findings, while limited, plug into wider considerations of 
government policymaking, and in particular the universal application of the network thesis.  
Deliberating the utility of the network approach leads to a consideration of the theory 
to which it is diametrically opposed. The Westminster model ƌefeƌs to ͚ top-down, government-
knows-ďest poliĐǇŵakiŶg iŶ ǁhiĐh… MiŶisteƌs ŵake tough ĐhoiĐes uŶeŶĐuŵďeƌed ďǇ the Ŷeed 
to compromise and Ŷegotiate ǁith aĐtoƌs outside goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛ ;CaiƌŶeǇ, ϮϬϭϮ: ϭͿ. 
CoŶseƋueŶtlǇ, as CaiƌŶeǇ eǆplaiŶs, ͚ĐoŶsultatioŶ ǁith ͚pƌessuƌe paƌtiĐipaŶts͛… is ŵiŶiŵised͛ 
(2012: 1). All former Ministers interviewed for this research believed that they were 
responsible for determining the direction of policy, whatever their individual role in the 
process. Although coming from divergent ideological persuasions, their viewpoints, taken 
together, could point to the continued dominance of the Westminster Model as the most 
accurate description of policymaking in this domain. It is of course natural that high profile 
public figures might think this way, and almost impossible to quantify the levels of influence 
that penal reform campaigners are able (or have been able) to exert on government 
policymaking. This contribution to interpretive political science, with a focus on how political 
actors interpret their own social world, has therefore confirmed that the policy process is 
viewed differently by actors operating in the same, small policy network.  
Outright support for the Westminster Model is controversial. Cairney, for example, has 
argued that the ͚ŵusĐulaƌ iŵage͛ of the WestŵiŶsteƌ ŵodel ƌefleĐts aŶd ƌeiŶfoƌĐes a skeǁed 
image and faulty uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of the ͚Bƌitish poliĐǇ stǇle͛ ;ϮϬϭϮ: ϮͿ. ‘eĐogŶisiŶg the ͚eŶduƌiŶg 
ĐoŶfliĐt͛ of iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ the WestŵiŶsteƌ Model aŶd policy network approaches, 
Jordan and Cairney (2013), have also stressed the outdated nature of this traditional approach 
(replaced by contemporary understandings of governance). While this statement, empirically 
tested in other policy domains, may have been accepted at the outset, evidence gathered 
during this study points to a more nuanced understanding of the penal policy process. In 
attempts to provide a level of theoretical rigor, Jordan and Cairney (2013) have warned that 
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policy scholars should ƌejeĐt the ͚appealiŶg Đoŵpƌoŵise͛ of adoptiŶg paƌts of ďoth ŵodels. Yet 
the reality may not be that straightforward. It is clear that the Westminster model remains 
dominant in the eyes of politicians and some sections of the media (2013: 234); campaigners 
were also keen to stress their limited agenda-setting credentials (or at least talk them down). 
It would be wrong, however, to state that in this domain the contemporary penal policy 
laŶdsĐape Đould ďe adeƋuatelǇ desĐƌiďed usiŶg eitheƌ ŵodel. At ƌisk of adoptiŶg the ͚appealiŶg 
Đoŵpƌoŵise͛ ǁaƌŶed agaiŶst ďǇ JoƌdaŶ aŶd CaiƌŶeǇ, eŵpiƌiĐal eǀideŶĐe gatheƌed duƌiŶg this 
study points to a more synthesised approach. This approach, while confirming Ministerial 
dominance and the limited agenda-setting power of penal reform campaigners, 
simultaneously highlights the inability of the traditional model to adequately describe the 
contemporary system of governance. The level of involvement of campaigners in the 
administration of criminal justice policy cannot be denied. All campaigners were considered 
insiders and most enjoyed (to a greater or lesser extent) relations with the Department. Given 
that some (not necessarily the larger, resource-rich organisations) have contractual 
involvement in policy implementation (running offender services for women, for example), 
they are imbued with more legitimacy than would otherwise be the case. This situation 
provides further evidence of the increasingly blurred boundaries of the state, (blurred further 
still with the implementation of the Community Rehabilitation Companies, themselves a mix 
of third sector and private), and it brings an unhelpful opacity to those wishing to find black 
and white distinctions in this particular policy domain. Although noted over thirty years ago, 
WhiteleǇ aŶd WiŶǇaƌd͛s ĐoŶĐlusioŶ that Ŷetǁoƌk plaǇeƌs ǁeƌe ͚iŶflueŶtial ƌatheƌ thaŶ 
poǁeƌful͛ ;ϭϵϴϯ: ϮϮͿ ƌeŵaiŶs a more accurate description of the position of penal reformers 
in the penal policy process. 
 
 
iii. Newsmaking Prospects 
 
Campaigners and the Media Agenda 
According to media-ĐeŶtƌiĐ aĐĐouŶts of the poliĐǇ pƌoĐess, jouƌŶalists͛ reporting of 
claimsmakers is fundamental, allowing their issues to reach a broader audience of the public, 
the policymaking elite and other interested specialists. McCombs (2014: 132) has argued that 
the media agenda is shaped by three major elements: major sources, other news organisations 
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aŶd jouƌŶalists͛ Ŷoƌŵs aŶd tƌaditioŶs. If the suďjeĐt ŵatteƌ is aďle to satisfǇ these iŶteƌliŶked 
elements then it is likely that claimsmakers will receive agreeable coverage. Yet in order for 
stories to be covered in the news media, they need to have satisfied a variety of newsworthy 
credentials. These credentials, outlined by Chibnall in 1977, and later updated by Jewkes 
(2004), include dramatization, titillation and novelty, and are fundamental precursors to news 
coveƌage. This studǇ has highlighted that as the suďjeĐt of ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ ƌefoƌŵ is Ŷot 
(and never has been) considered newsworthy by journalists, low levels of news coverage are 
to ďe eǆpeĐted. While the eaƌlǇ aŵalgaŵatioŶ of stage thƌee of Best͛s ;ϮϬϭ3) original natural 
histoƌǇ ŵodel ;that of ͚puďliĐ ƌeaĐtioŶ͛Ϳ iŶto the Ŷeǁ building block of ͚ŶeǁsŵakiŶg͛ ;iŶĐludiŶg 
the filtering of public outrage) retained theoretical space for public involvement, empirical 
evidence soon confirmed that in this policy doŵaiŶ at least, theƌe is eǆtƌeŵelǇ little ͚outƌage͛ 
to filteƌ. ‘elatiǀelǇ feǁ ŵeŵďeƌs of the puďliĐ aƌe aǁaƌe of the issues suƌƌouŶdiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
offending, and there are certainly no widespread calls to reduce the female prison population. 
As highlighted in chapter three, while the suicides in HMP Styal did garner a larger amount of 
coverage than the issue would normally receive, this still pales in comparison to the levels 
afforded to other policy problems. With newspapers acting as a thermometer for public 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶ, eŵpiƌiĐal eǀideŶĐe ĐoŶfiƌŵs the status of this issue as a ͚lesseƌ soĐial pƌoďleŵ͛ 
(Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988).  
JouƌŶalists͛ interest in this subject – and consequent framing behaviour - is an 
important consideration in itself. Believing it was their role to reflect public opinion, those 
working for left-leaning newspapers were keen to foster a reasoned debate (albeit an 
extremely limited one), while those working for right-leaning newspapers adopted a more 
punitive stance, drawing on stereotypical representations of female offenders and framing 
new cases of feŵale offeŶdiŶg usiŶg eŶtƌeŶĐhed ŵedia ͚templates͛ ;KitziŶgeƌ, ϮϬϬϬͿ. Distorted 
and unhelpful coverage, in the right-leaning press at least, meant that many journalists had 
assumed the role of ͚ ŶoŶ-ĐoŵpliaŶt paƌtŶeƌ͛ ;HiltoŶ et al., 2013) working to further marginalise 
traditional penal reform messages. With an ideological stance running at a considerable 
distance to that of the peŶal ƌefoƌŵ loďďǇ, theǇ ďelieǀed it ǁas the ͚ĐouŶteƌ-defiŶiŶg͛ ageŶda 
of campaigners that ran contrary to the wishes of the general population (who do not support 
widespread decarceration for women offenders). Consistent with the findings of Schlesinger 
and Tumber (1994), evidence revealed in chapter six confirmed that penal reformers are not 
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major news souƌĐes aŶd opeƌate oŶ the peƌipheƌǇ of the ŵetaphoƌiĐal ŵedia ͚oŶioŶ͛ 
(McCombs, 2014) with extremely limited (if any) influence on the media agenda.  
What confuses this conclusion is that individual cases of violent female offending 
(constituting an extremely small and unrepresentative section) are considered extremely 
newsworthy, due to their rarity and the gender-role expectations that they break. Viewed this 
way, the issue of female offending is therefore framed as un-newsworthy or extremely 
newsworthy, depending on the specific details of the case. Operating as marginalised media 
players in the main, campaigners are left to react to sensationalist and distorted media 
coverage, and it is understandable that several choose not to engage in this work. Having taken 
paƌt iŶ puŶitiǀe puďliĐ deďates aďout ͚sĐaŶdalous͛ Đases ;ǁith theiƌ oǁŶ ageŶda ŵaƌgiŶalisedͿ, 
interviews revealed that some campaigners had ďeĐoŵe ͚dispossessed͛ ;Best, ϮϬϭϯͿ, giǀiŶg up 
on media coverage altogether and viewing private, insider strategies as the only viable pathway 
to ƌefoƌŵ. Yet ǁhetheƌ ͚dispossessed͛ oƌ siŵplǇ disheaƌteŶed, ŵedia Đoǀeƌage ǁas ǀieǁed as 
a secondary concern by choice. The results of this study therefore run counter to the media-
ĐeŶtƌiĐ aĐĐouŶts of the poliĐǇ pƌoĐess ;iŶ additioŶ to Best͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ Ŷatuƌal histoƌǇ ŵodel of the 
social problems process see also Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; McCombs, 2014; Kennamer, 
1994; Dearing and Rogers, 1996) and the viewpoints of Hilton et al. (2013: 145) who have 
argued that political lobbying is at its most effective when actors bypass the traditional 
(Westminster) arena. While media work may be crucial in other policy domains, it is important 
to keep in mind the emotionally-charged nature of penal policymaking that distinguishes it 
from other lobbies. As highlighted at the beginning of this study in a quote from the Chairman 
of the Howard League for Penal Reform in the ϭϵϳϬs, ͚theƌe is a daŶgeƌ iŶ a pƌessuƌe gƌoup iŶ 
the peŶal field ďƌoadeŶiŶg its appeal to the puďliĐ… peŶal ƌefoƌŵ does Ŷot iŶstiŶĐtiǀelǇ stƌike 
a sǇŵpathetiĐ Đhoƌd ǁith laƌge Ŷuŵďeƌs of the puďliĐ͛ ;iŶ Bloŵ Coopeƌ, ϭϵϳϳ: 7). With the 
agenda-setting press pursuing issue frames that are at odds with the traditional messages of 
penal reform campaigners ;suppoƌtiŶg Jeǁkes͛ ;ϮϬϬϰͿ Ŷeǁs ǀalue of the ƌight-wing consensus), 
certain news outlets are able act as inhibitors to progressive penal policy change. Driving this 
issue further underground, it is easy to see why some campaigners have resorted to using more 
traditional methods.  
Empirical evidence therefore revealed the existence of a framing stalemate between 
the news imperatives (and general lack of interest) of many journalists (mainly, although not 
exclusively, those working for right-leaning newspapers) and the issues of concern to penal 
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reformers. Presenting a clear obstacle to news coverage, several campaigners deliberately 
chose to pursue their objectives out of the media spotlight entirely. While it is noteworthy that 
three journalists (working for, or having worked for, left-leaning newspapers) were 
sympathetic to private strategies, it is iŵpoƌtaŶt to ĐoŶsideƌ that siŶĐe the ͚platoŶiĐ guaƌdiaŶs͛ 
operated in the corridors of power over half a century ago, the public sphere has experienced 
a paradigm shift. In the 24-ϳ ͚ŵass-ŵediated ƌealitǇ͛ ;Niŵŵo aŶd Coŵďs, ϭϵϴϯͿ, ŵeaŶiŶg is 
socially constructed through a process often dominated by the mass media (Johnson-Cartee, 
2005: 4). Those operating behind closed doors consequently leave themselves open to 
widespread critique for their potentially undemocratic dealings (see Green, 2009; Loader, 
2010).  
Having highlighted the viewpoints of both journalists and policymakers, and the limited 
ability of penal reformers to influence either the media or policy agendas, it is important to 
stress that future prospects need not be dismal. While recognising the limited utility of media 
work, campaigners have much to benefit from higher levels of media coverage (if only greater 
political legitimacy), albeit in a limited capacity. In operating through greater numbers of 
channels, they are also able to refute accusations of undemocratic dealings. So while perhaps 
a secondary consideration, developing a better understanding of the news production process 
is an important undertaking. As neatly summarised by Solomon:  
 
͚If those ǁho ǁoƌk iŶ the ĐƌiŵiŶal justiĐe seĐtoƌ ǁaŶt to use the ŵedia to ĐoŶǀeǇ theiƌ 
messages more effectively they must begin to understand why it is prone to distort the 
facts and exaggerate. It is also vital to recognise the social and political environment 
that the media operates in. Only then will organisations be able to realise the 
limitations of using the media, that it is naïve to expect newspapers and broadcasters 
to be responsible conduits of information, and to develop more effective 
communication strategies͛ ;ϮϬϬϱ: ϯϱ, eŵphasis addedͿ.  
 
Developing a greater understanding of framing theory (and doing this in line with key news 
values) is therefore key. Focusing on the importance of rhetoric in the claimsmaking process, 
the following section will argue that through engaging in a reflexive practice of strategic frame 
alignment (Snow et al., 1986), campaigners will be better placed to influence public debate on 
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matters of penal policy. In so doing, they may improve their agenda-setting credentials in both 
the newsmaking and policymaking spheres.  
 
 
iv. Claimsmaking Prospects 
 
FraŵiŶg WoŵeŶ͛s PeŶal ‘eforŵ 
In seeking to uncover the penal reform rhetoric that is most likely to resonate with 
policymakers and journalists, this section will synthesise Snow et al.͛s ;ϭϵϴϲͿ Đƌiteƌia foƌ 
adaptive framing with the dominant penal philosophies identified by Rutherford (1993) and 
latterly Mills and Roberts (2011, 2012). It is the first time that Snow et al.͛s model, developed 
in the American political sciences, will be considered in conjunction with penal reform 
philosophies as they relate to women offenders.  
HeaǀilǇ iŶflueŶĐed ďǇ Best͛s ;ϭϵϴϳ, ϮϬϭϯͿ ƌeseaƌĐh oŶ soĐial pƌoďleŵs, Đlaiŵsŵakeƌs aŶd 
the policy agenda, this research adds further weight to the importance of rhetoric in the 
policymaking process. Snow et al. (1986) argued that while choice of language is important, so 
too is the social psychological way that it is presented. In developing their rhetorical strategies, 
political actors must therefore consider a range of adaptiǀe justifiĐatioŶs oƌ ͚fƌaŵe aligŶŵeŶt 
pƌoĐesses͛ ;ƌelatiŶg to Best͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of the warrants stage in the formulation of 
claims). Snow et al. defiŶed fƌaŵe aligŶŵeŶt as the degƌee to ǁhiĐh iŶdiǀiduals͛ iŶteƌests aŶd 
belief systems match those of the claimsmaking actors. If following the advice of Snow et al., 
penal reform campaigners must think more strategically about the target recipients of their 
messages. They are able to do this via a number of ways: 
 
- Frame bridging, the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally 
unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem (1986: 467). 
- Frame amplification, the clarification and invigoration of an interpretative frame (1986: 
469). 
- Frame extension, extending the boundaries of the original frame so that it encompasses 
interests and points of view that are incidental to its primary objective of considerable 
salience to potential adherents (1986: 472). 
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- Frame transformation, ǁheƌe eƌƌoŶeous ďeliefs oƌ ͚ŵisfƌaŵiŶgs͛ ŵust ďe ƌefƌaŵed in 
order to garner support (1986: 473). 
 
While it is important to consider that campaigners may already operate such processes in 
varying degrees and at different points, it is possible to identify evidence of several actors 
adopting the above techniques. At the time of fieldwork (2011-2012), and in the months prior 
to the JustiĐe “eleĐt Coŵŵittee͛s IŶƋuiƌǇ oŶ ͚Women Offenders͛, the March 2013 publication 
of the CoalitioŶ͛s eight-page ͚Strategic Objectives for Female Offenders͛ and the subsequent 
foƌŵatioŶ of the WoŵeŶ͛s Advisory Board, many campaigners began to publicly voice 
frustration about the stalling of the Corston agenda and the lack of government interest in 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal ƌefoƌŵ. Describing processes of strategic frame alignment, Campaigner F 
outliŶed atteŵpts to ͞ƌeĐoŶŶeĐt͟ ŵessages ǁith ͞the ǀalues of ŵiddle EŶglaŶd͟, ǁhile 
͞find[ing] a way of reconnecting penal reform with values that people would go, actually I 
suppoƌt that͟. Otheƌs also ďelieǀed that the adoption of new framing strategies would improve 
their lobbying potential. Aware that the previously open door to the corridors of power had 
somewhat closed, Campaigner E eǆplaiŶed that ͞it͛s alŵost like the ǁaǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh ǁe͛ƌe doiŶg 
it, isŶ͛t the way to be doing it anymore, because its falling on deaf eaƌs, it͛s Ŷot ďeiŶg heaƌd͟. 
Engaged in a process of frame extension, Campaigner E recognised that there were others, 
unconnected to the penal reform network, who held mutual ideological positions. Participating 
in collaborative work or aligning with other social movements (or policy networks) was 
consequently viewed as a more strategic way of operating in the wider field of social justice. 
Operating on the fringes of the media agenda and campaigning foƌ a ͚lesseƌ soĐial pƌoďleŵ͛ 
(Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988), such a strategy encourages campaigners to spin their original 
messages so that they could be relevant in other policy domains (such as welfare and health), 
for example.  
As highlighted by Best (2013: 45), adaptable claimsmakers in the social problems 
marketplace routinely enter into a process of re-framing, revising their rhetoric until they 
develop a persuasive argument. It is here that penal reform campaigners might benefit from a 
review of Rutheƌfoƌd͛s ;ϭϵϵϯͿ ͚ǁoƌkiŶg Đƌedos͛ foƌ peŶal ideologǇ: puŶitiǀe, effiĐieŶĐǇ fiƌst aŶd 
ƌefoƌŵatiǀe. ‘utheƌfoƌd aƌgued that the ͚puŶitiǀe͛ philosophǇ ;ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ doŵiŶatiŶg politiĐal 
disĐouƌseͿ iŶĐludes a ͚ poǁeƌfullǇ held dislike aŶd ŵoƌal ĐoŶdeŵŶatioŶ of offeŶdeƌs͛ ;ϭϵϵϯ: ϭϭͿ; 
the philosophǇ of ͚effiĐieŶĐǇ͛ foĐuses oŶ ͚sŵooth ŵaŶageŵeŶt ƌatheƌ thaŶ… ŵoƌal ŵissioŶ͛ 
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;ϭϵϵϯ: ϭϯͿ; aŶd the philosophǇ of ͚ƌefoƌŵ͛ ĐeŶtƌes oŶ a ͚ŵiŶiŵalist ǀieǁ of ĐƌiŵiŶal justiĐe 
iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶ͛ ;ϭϵϵϯ: ϭϴͿ. IŶ loĐatiŶg offeŶdiŶg ǁithiŶ the wider remit of social justice and social 
policy, it is the last philosophy that is arguably the most ideologically aligned to the majority of 
penal reform campaigners yet it is undoubtedly the most risky strategy in the current political 
climate. When ĐoŶsideƌiŶg ‘utheƌfoƌd͛s ideologies iŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of peŶal ƌefoƌŵ, it is pƌudeŶt 
to reflect alongside more contemporary research conducted by Mills and Roberts (2011, 2012). 
Mills and Roberts similarly identified the above ideologies in their review of penal reform 
strategies: 
 
- Crime fighting, ǁheƌe it is aƌgued that the Đƌiŵe ͚pƌoďleŵ͛ ĐaŶ ďe ďetteƌ addƌessed ďǇ 
another criminal justice intervention than prison;  
- Managerialist, where dispassionate arguments about the financial wastage of prison 
are made; and 
- Humanitarian, where the human costs of the high prison population are emphasised, 
along with arguments about the vulnerability of sub-populations such as women and 
children (Mills and Roberts, 2012: 9).  
 
Considered with reference to the frame alignment processes discussed above, such ideologies 
provide a useful basis for the investigation of competing penal reform discourse as it relates to 
women.  
 
Frame 1: Punitive or Crime Fighting Discourse  
Punitive discourse involves tapping into the ͚tough oŶ criŵe͛ ƌhetoƌiĐ. Those ĐaŵpaigŶeƌs 
seeking to use punitive discourse as a strategy to increase community sentences for women 
are required to successfully articulate that such disposals are a more effective method of 
payback involving more effort and commitment than a short term prison sentence. Viewed 
through this frame, the punitive nature of community sentences is emphasised, along with 
eǀideŶĐe that theǇ aƌe Ŷot the ͚ soft͛ optioŶ that theǇ aƌe ǁidelǇ peƌĐeiǀed to ďe. OŶe peƌsisteŶt 
issue is that the public have little awareness of community sentences or how they actually work 
and this is clearly an area for further investigation. While imprisonment is widely understood 
(through the very nature of custodial establishments) alternatives to custody are complex and 
wide-ranging (Russell, 2005: 32). Those campaigners successfully tapping into punitive 
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discourse must abandon their desire to pursue humanitarian claims altogether to focus on the 
rhetoric of reparation, payback and responsibility (Russell, 2005: 33). Keen to stress that tough 
oƌ ͚Đƌiŵe fightiŶg͛ stƌategies ǁeƌe the ŵost effeĐtiǀe ǁith poliĐǇŵakers and newsmakers, 
Campaigner N expressed frustration with colleagues. As far as she was concerned, others 
Ŷeeded to ͞stop this constant focus on women as viĐtiŵs… the laŶguage that soŵe people use 
is ǀeƌǇ alieŶatiŶg aŶd iŶappƌopƌiate… if Ǉou ǁaŶt to ďƌiŶg the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt ǁith Ǉou, aŶd the 
media, there has to be a better balance. And constantly wheeling out women to tell their 
dreadful stoƌies doesŶ͛t alǁaǇs ǁoƌk͟. For those adopting this rhetoric, being savvy meant 
eŵploǇiŶg ͞a ŵessagiŶg stƌuĐtuƌe that doesŶ͛t just iƌƌitate aŶd aŶŶoǇ the people Ǉou aƌe 
aĐtuallǇ tƌǇiŶg to get oŶ ďoaƌd͟.  
Perhaps not as explicit, other campaigners alluded to the benefits of adopting such 
ƌhetoƌiĐ. CoŶsisteŶt ǁith Altheide aŶd CoǇle͛s ;ϮϬϬϲͿ ĐoŶĐept of ͚sŵaƌt oŶ Đƌiŵe͛, CaŵpaigŶeƌ 
N desĐƌiďed heƌ desiƌe to ǁoƌk ǁith those ǁho ǁeƌe Ŷot ĐoŶsideƌed the ͚usual suspeĐts͛, foƌ 
example. Using advocates not already branded as reformers and filteƌiŶg ͚sŵaƌt͛, ĐoŵŵoŶ-
seŶse aĐĐouŶts thƌough the ͚tough oŶ Đƌiŵe͛ pƌopositioŶ is saǀǀǇ ǁaǇ of iŶflueŶĐiŶg the 
aĐĐepted disĐouƌse oŶ peŶal poliĐǇ ;Altheide aŶd CoǇle, ϮϬϬϲͿ. IŶ ďǇpassiŶg the ͚ usual suspeĐts͛ 
to campaign in collaboration with police and prison officers, right-wing journalists and 
politicians, campaigners are able to enter new territory. A further benefit of the punitive 
strategy is that it fits with the current political climate, and indeed taps into (or could tap into) 
the concept of penal punitivism. Penal punitivism, although thriving on public misconceptions 
about crime, has a strong commitment to victims. The rising prominence of the victim, and the 
symbolic nature of contemporary media accounts is of vital consideration to campaigners who 
aƌe ofteŶ, uŶhelpfullǇ, ďƌaŶded as ͚pƌo-offeŶdeƌ͛ aŶd theƌefoƌe ͚aŶti-ǀiĐtiŵ͛. IŶ filteƌiŶg 
aĐĐouŶts thƌough the ͚tough oŶ Đƌiŵe͛ ƌhetoƌiĐ, ĐaŵpaigŶeƌs do not jar with the above 
concerns.  
 
Frame 2: Efficiency or Managerialist Discourse 
EffiĐieŶĐǇ oƌ ŵaŶageƌialist disĐouƌse, laďelled ďǇ Gƌiŵshaǁ as a ͚ŵediatiŶg teƌŵ͛ ;ϮϬϬϰ: ϮͿ, 
seeks to provide dispassionate arguments about the financial cost of prison, and that money 
spent on short custodial sentences could be more effectively spent elsewhere (Mills and 
Roberts, 2012: 9). Those advocating such rhetoric believe in the importance of pragmatic, 
common sense arguments and seek to remove emotion from discussions of offending and 
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punishment. Less popular with campaigners, this strategy was advocated by a former civil 
servant and a journalist working for a left-leaning broadsheet. They believed that a judicious 
way forward was one that focused on economic considerations about the financial waste of 
imprisoning large numbers of non-violent women. The 2008 report from the new economics 
foundation (nef) was touted as a major influence for this strategy. One of various studies that 
included a cost-benefit analysis, ͚UŶloĐkiŶg Value͛ aimed to provide a dispassionate, financial 
argument for the increased use of ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ alteƌŶatiǀes. While ǀieǁed ĐƌitiĐallǇ ďǇ 
some for its un-transparent methodology, the report argued that for every pound invested in 
alternatives to prison, £14 worth of social value is generated to women and their children, 
victims and society over ten years, and that the long term value of these benefits is in excess 
of £100 million over a decade (2008: 4). Former Civil Servant D was exasperated that more had 
not been done to champion the conclusions of the ƌeseaƌĐh, as it hadŶ͛t ͞even gathered dust 
oŶ the shelǀes Ǉet͟. Managerial rhetoric was also supported by Journalist F who believed that 
campaigners would make more progress in the right-ǁiŶg pƌess if theǇ ͞made the economic 
aƌguŵeŶt, ďeĐause theǇ͛ll uŶdeƌstaŶd it… talk thƌough theiƌ poĐkets͟. IŶ ͚plaǇiŶg the TƌeasuƌǇ 
Đaƌd͛ ;ϮϬϭϬ: ϯϲϭͿ, Loadeƌ aƌgued that such a campaigning stƌategǇ ͚speaks to a laŶguage 
people uŶdeƌstaŶd͛ ;ϮϬϭϬ: ϯϲϭͿ. While this aƌguŵeŶt laudaďlǇ aiŵs to ƌeŵoǀe eŵotioŶ fƌoŵ 
criminal justice discourse, Loader reminds us that its success depends on citizens coming to 
the conversation as taxpayers rather than victims, or potential victims (2010: 361). As 
highlighted above, in the current political climate this is an important claimsmaking 
consideration. Yet while it is clear that campaigners do rely on managerialist rhetoric (a simple 
review of their websites supports this), this strategy was not volunteered as a standalone 
campaigning method. 
 
Frame 3: Reformative or Humanitarian Discourse 
In contrast to punitive and managerialist rhetoric, reformative or humanitarian discourse 
highlights the human costs of the high prison population and the inability of the criminal justice 
system to successfully rehabilitate vast numbers of offenders (Mills and Roberts, 2012: 9). It 
also stresses the inappropriateness of custody for the most vulnerable populations such as 
women and children (Mills and Roberts, 2012: 9). Given the nature of the subject matter, it is 
this discourse that is the most ideologically aligned to the penal reform network as a whole. 
Yet of particular interest is that in their research on reform sector strategies, Mills and Roberts 
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concluded that humanitarian discourse was not viewed as a universally viable rhetoric by 
campaigners. Providing various reasons for this resistance, Mills and Roberts explained that 
campaigners did not view such a strategy as possible or feasible, that it was politically 
unpalatable (given the current political administration) and that it could undermine their work 
to influence the policymaking process (2012: 29). Furthermore, campaigners feared that 
pursuing overtly social justice discourse could dilute the influence of the penal reform sector 
by entering the unchartered territories of welfare, social services and health etc. (2012: 29). 
Mills aŶd ‘oďeƌts theƌefoƌe deteƌŵiŶed that ͚puƌsuiŶg aŶ ageŶda at a ĐoŶsideƌaďle distaŶĐe 
fƌoŵ the ĐuƌƌeŶt poliĐǇ ageŶda… is uŶlikelǇ to ďe ĐoŶsideƌed feasiďle oƌ desiƌaďle ďǇ all those 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶed aďout high pƌisoŶ Ŷuŵďeƌs͛ ;ϮϬϭϮ: ϮϵͿ. That is ďeĐause ͚failuƌe to talk tough oŶ 
Đƌiŵe [has ďeĐoŵe] akiŶ to politiĐal suiĐide͛ ;NeǁďuƌŶ aŶd JoŶes, 2005: 74), and, as 
CaŵpaigŶeƌ D ĐoŶfiƌŵed: ͞the policymakers are frightened to death of what will come onto 
the papers if they are seen to take an unequal appƌoaĐh oƌ a soft appƌoaĐh͟. Again, as with 
economic arguments, humanitarian discourse offers little to those victimised by, or anxious 
about, crime (Loader, 2010: 357). Instead, it asks society to adopt an open-minded and 
progressive attitude to offending. Victims often feel angry and let down by a criminal justice 
system that they believe favours the rights of the offender over their own, and such accounts 
are becoming increasingly public. Those pursuing overtly humanitarian discourse adopt the 
riskiest political strategy.  
While such considerations help explain the resistance of actors to rely on such rhetoric, 
in direct contrast to the conclusions articulated by Mills and Roberts, there is limited evidence 
to suggest that some campaigners are already pursuing (or keen to pursue) overtly 
humanitarian or social justice rhetoric. As highlighted at the beginning of this section, 
poliĐǇŵakiŶg is ofteŶ Đaƌƌied out iŶ seǀeƌal ͚ǀeŶues͛, aŶd theƌe ŵaǇ ďe iŶĐeŶtiǀes to aďaŶdoŶ 
one restricted network in the seaƌĐh foƌ otheƌ ǁaǇs to ͚shift͛ the disĐussioŶ ;‘iĐhaƌdsoŶ, ϮϬϬϬ: 
ϭϬϭϭ; see also BauŵgaƌtŶeƌ aŶd JoŶes͛ ;ϭϵϵϯͿ ĐoŶĐept of ǀeŶue shoppiŶgͿ. UŶlike otheƌ 
messaging structures that aim to work within the dominant media-crime paradigm, social 
justiĐe disĐouƌse seeks to eǆploƌe the ǁideƌ soĐial pƌoďleŵ of ǁoŵeŶ͛s offeŶdiŶg aŶd 
imprisonment. Highlighting issues of social disadvantage and exclusion, welfare, 
unemployment, health and education, this standpoint provides a more holistic account of 
offending behaviour. Keen to move the conversation from its emphasis on penal solutions for 
social pƌoďleŵs, CaŵpaigŶeƌ E eǆplaiŶed that ͞if you take away the criminality it gets heard, 
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it͛s a soĐial justiĐe issue͟. Describing a process of frame extension (Snow et al., 1986), she 
discussed work in other policy domains (such as health and welfare), rather than a continued 
focus on the traditional penal reform network (although this remained the main forum for her 
work). Such campaigners ďelieǀed that as faƌ as ǁoŵeŶ͛s offeŶdiŶg aŶd iŵpƌisoŶŵeŶt ǁas 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶed, laƌge Ŷuŵďeƌs of the puďliĐ ͚got it͛ aŶd ǁeƌe Ŷot ͚tuƌŶed off͛ ;as aƌtiĐulated ďǇ oŶe 
journalist) by social justice messages. Highlighting the empirical research that consistently finds 
people less punitive than the media or politicians maintain (see Roberts et al., 2003), and 
pointing to previous polls that purported to demonstrate public backing for increased 
community alternatives for women, such campaigners believed there would be support for a 
greater feminist agenda. In providing evidence to substantiate their claims, several cited the 
2007 SmartJustice (ICM) poll conducted by the Prison Reform Trust. With just over 1000 
respondents, and one of the very few polls ever specifically conducted on public opinion and 
women offenders, the results determined that the majority of respondents (86 per cent) 
supported community alternatives for women (along with an element of community payback). 
While this quantifiable evidence suggests there is public support for alternatives to prison for 
women, this is clearly an area in need of further investigation and revision, especially if 
campaigners wish to rely on such evidence to substantiate future strategies. The truth is that 
there is extremely limited understanding about how the public view female offending and the 
punishments that they would support, and until more research is conducted it is important to 
caveat such claims. 
 
The Importance of Framing 
It is easy to see why sĐholaƌs haǀe aƌgued that ͚fƌaŵiŶg deĐisioŶs aƌe peƌhaps the ŵost 
iŵpoƌtaŶt stƌategiĐ ĐhoiĐes ŵade iŶ a puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs effoƌt͛ ;HallahaŶ, ϭϵϵϵ: ϮϮϰͿ, aŶd that 
͚ǁhiĐh fƌaŵe to spoŶsoƌ, hoǁ to spoŶsoƌ it, aŶd hoǁ to eǆpaŶd its appeal͛ ;PaŶ aŶd KosiĐki, 
2001: 39) is a crucial consideration. While this section has highlighted the different framing 
strategies employed by several penal reform campaigners, it noteworthy that conversations 
about the importance of framing (and the framing methods) were in the rarity. The majority of 
campaigners, while perhaps alluding to their strategies implicitly, did not articulate their views 
in such language. It is clear, however, that those campaigners wishing to pursue public 
conversations have two main options: transforming their messages into rhetoric that is more 
likely to resonate with right-leaning news publications, politicians and a large portion of the 
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general public or transforming their messages into a replacement discourse. Snow and Benford 
argued that frame transformations are more likely to succeed when they have resonance with 
the puďliĐ, eǀokiŶg that ǁhiĐh is ͚alƌeadǇ ďelieǀed, ǀalued aŶd ƌespeĐted͛ ;ϭϵϴϴ, iŶ JohŶsoŶ-
Cartee, 2005: 249; also see Gramsci, 1971). Consequently, and as argued by Terkildsen and 
“ĐhŶell, ͚iŶteƌest gƌoups ǁho ǁish to ŵoďilise ďƌoad suppoƌt ǁould do ǁell to paĐkage theiƌ 
issues to appeal to the ŵost ĐoŵŵoŶlǇ held soĐietal ǀalues͛ ;ϭϵϵϳ: ϴϵϯͿ. BǇ puƌsuiŶg eitheƌ 
͚puŶitiǀe͛ oƌ ͚ŵaŶageƌial͛ ƌhetoƌiĐ, it is Đlear that penal reform campaigners would be aligning 
theiƌ oƌigiŶal Đlaiŵs iŶto those that ŵaǇ ďe ŵoƌe ǁidelǇ aĐĐepted ďǇ ͚ŵiddle EŶglaŶd͛. “uĐh a 
strategy was advocated by Lucie Russell, former Director of the SmartJustice public opinion 
ĐaŵpaigŶ, ǁho ƌeĐalled that ͚aƌguŵeŶts aďout ŵoŶeǇ ;ŵaŶageƌialist disĐouƌseͿ held little 
sway as did arguments defending human rights of offenders (humanitarian discourse). Most 
people… did Ŷot Đaƌe hoǁ ŵaŶǇ people ǁeƌe iŶ pƌisoŶ͛ ;2005: 32; see also Garland, 1990: 62). 
Evidence suggests that, however regrettable, strategies that rely solely on humanitarian 
rhetoric are likely to have the least influence. It is however important to remember that in 
adopting a punitive or managerialist strategy, campaigners are simply giving themselves a 
greater chance of achieving humanitarian outcomes. The issue is simply one of packaging.  
This conclusion is not to state that overtly humanitarian discourse has no chance of 
campaign success. There is a clear requirement for campaigners to espouse such language in 
the continued disruption of the taken for granted understandings of offenders and punishment 
(Mills and Roberts, 2012: 30). Furthermore, while the possibility of operating in alternative 
policy domains (such as welfare, health and social services) is an intriguing one, the concept of 
venue shopping (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993) has not yet been empirically tested in this 
policy domain. In order to assess the viability of humanitarian rhetoric there is a clear need for 
more focused research in this area. Such research could explore how social justice messages 
are interpreted by the public and those deemed unsympathetic to the cause, such as right-
wing journalists and politicians, for example.  
 
 
v. Wheƌe Neǆt foƌ WoŵeŶ͛s PeŶal ‘efoƌŵ? 
 
That ƌefoƌŵ of ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ has ďeeŶ Đaught up iŶ the puŶitiǀe ŵoŵeŶtuŵ is ǁidelǇ 
acknowledged (see Gelsthorpe and Morris, 2002). Despite the best efforts of those working in 
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this area, the female prison populatioŶ has Ŷot suďstaŶtiallǇ falleŶ, aŶd ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ, 
despite aŶ offiĐial ͚stƌategǇ͛, has Ŷot ďeŶefitted fƌoŵ the ǁholesale ĐhaŶges that Baroness 
Corston and others have advocated. While there may be several explanations for this stalling, 
the main reasons identified in this research relate to politics, ideology and finance. This study 
has argued that the dominant values about crime and criminal justice, widely articulated by 
right-wing politicians and media outlets, often run counter to the progressive messages that 
penal reform campaigners seek to publicly articulate.  
The complex penal landscape within which campaigners operate is evidenced by the 
ideologically-opposed meeting of the gendered-humanitarian approach (advocated by the 
penal reform network, policy officials and some politicians) with the punitive approach 
(advocated by a large section of the political elite, the overarching political discourse espoused 
by the current Secretary of State for Justice and the Home Secretary and right-leaning media 
outlets). Gelsthorpe (2004), Seal and Phoenix (2011) and Player (2014) are among those that 
have deliberated this challenging paradox. Player has argued that the current dichotomy serves 
as a less visible, although fundamental, impediment to a policy domain that has also 
experienced practical (i.e. financial) setbacks (Player, 2014: 290). In highlighting that the 
different forms of rhetoric are not equal, Player has argued that distributive justice 
(incorporating social justice and humanitarian responses to crime) is subordinated by other, 
more politically dominant expressions which rest on principles of desert and public protection 
(2014: 280). The unequal weight placed on these competing considerations has clear 
consequences for the effective realisation of the Corston agenda (Player, 2014: 284). Corston, 
iŶ heƌ ƌespoŶse to the CoalitioŶ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s ͚Breaking the Cycle͛ consultation of 2011 argued 
that ͚ƌeduĐiŶg the Ŷuŵďeƌ of ǁoŵeŶ iŶ ĐustodǇ ǁould ďe ǁelĐoŵed ďǇ the puďliĐ aŶd 
suppoƌted iŶ the ŵedia͛ ;ϮϬϭϭ: ϯͿ, Ǉet it is Đleaƌ the ƌealitǇ is faƌ ŵoƌe Đoŵpleǆ. The ĐoŵpetiŶg 
principles and objectives surrounding policy in this area result in a plethora of mixed public 
messages and add further weight to the contested nature of public opinion on matters of penal 
policy. This study argues that campaigners must adopt a clearer and more unified standpoint 
if they wish to better influence newsmakers, policymakers and the public. While the public face 
of penal reform shifts depending on the audience and context (Mills and Roberts, 2011: 39), it 
ŵust ďe ĐoŶĐluded that ͚tough oŶ Đƌiŵe͛ disĐouƌse is ŵost likelǇ to ďe suĐĐessful iŶ the ĐuƌƌeŶt 
political climate. Given the unequal weighting of this dominant frame (highlighted by Player 
(2014)), this strategy, while perhaps uncomfortable reading, makes logical sense and is 
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supported by empirical evidence. Similar progress may be made by those pursuing 
‘utheƌfoƌd͛s ;ϭϵϵϯͿ seĐoŶd optioŶ, that of puttiŶg ͚ effiĐieŶĐǇ fiƌst͛. DuƌiŶg this tiŵe of austerity 
(and with the Prison Service budget unlikely to rise at any time in the near future), penal reform 
campaigners ŵaǇ ŵake pƌogƌess ;aĐƌoss all politiĐal peƌsuasioŶsͿ if theǇ seek to plaǇ ͚the 
TƌeasuƌǇ Đaƌd͛ ;Loadeƌ, ϮϬϭϬ: ϯϲϭͿ aŶd ĐoŶtiŶue to highlight the financial wastage of sending 
so many non-violent female offenders to custody when far cheaper community alternatives 
would be more effective. Consistent with research already undertaken (Mills and Roberts, 
2011, 2012; see also Russell, 2005), this study adds further weight the likely gains available to 
those pursuing either of the rhetorical strategies outlined above, or a combination of both.  
Highlighted throughout this study, and as reminded by Hobbs and Hamerton, the decision 
of whether (or not) to criminalise a behaviour, and to apply a social welfare or a criminal justice 
solution is ultimately a political one (2014: 51). As Player highlights, the distribution of 
resources as a reaction to social harm rather than criminal risk will require a redefinition of the 
political identity of the offender (2014: 289, emphasis added) together with an encouragement 
of the discourse of social inclusion. This change is unlikely to come anytime soon. With penal 
provisions given precedence over social problems (Hudson, 1993), those campaigners 
determined to pursue social justice or humanitarian messages are undoubtedly faced with a 
tougher challenge. For social justice messages to stand any chance of success in the current 
climate it is clear that campaigners must successfully articulate the need for a greater 
understanding and recognition of social inequality; that not everyone begins their life with 
eƋual life ĐhaŶĐes, aŶd that soĐietǇ has ďeeŶ ͚faiƌeƌ͛ to soŵe ĐitizeŶs ŵoƌe thaŶ otheƌs. Theƌe 
is, of course, a role foƌ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt heƌe, Ǉet Ŷot siŶĐe Neǁ Laďouƌ͛s “oĐial EǆĐlusioŶ UŶit 
(which ran from 1997 until it was abolished in 2010, latterly renamed the Social Exclusion Task 
Force) has the issue of inequality received equal status in government (replaced by a current 
foĐus oŶ ͚tƌouďled faŵilies͛Ϳ. Theƌe is aŶ eduĐatioŶal ƌole foƌ the ageŶda-setting press too, 
although this again seems like too large a hurdle to surmount (in the case of the right-leaning 
newspapers, at least). The dominant, punitive trend shows little sign of abating and it is also 
uncertain if an alternative government would award the issue the equal status that it previously 
enjoyed. The Transforming Rehabilitation agenda does, however, signal an element of change 
and renewed opportunity. While it is difficult at this stage to accurately predict how it will 
impact women in the criminal justice system, it is the profit-seeking Community Rehabilitation 
Companies (CRCs) that now have ownership of the vast majority of women offenders serving 
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community sentences or post-release from custody. Legally required by the government to 
made adequate provision for female-only activities, it is not yet known how such requirements 
are likely to be interpreted in practice (and how geographical provision will differ). Concern has 
already been voiced from academics and practitioners alike about the likely quantitative 
measurements for desistance and how these will work for women, whose progress are so often 
measured using so-Đalled ͚softeƌ͛ ŵeasuƌes ;see Gelsthoƌpe and Hedderman, 2012; Gomm, 
2013). How penal reform campaigners react to the changes in probation and continue 
negotiate the changing political and economic environments will be monitored with interest. 
 
 
vi. Conclusion 
 
In drawing the interdisciplinary strands of the study together this chapter has reflected on 
developing understandings of contemporary penal policymaking and the ability of penal 
reform campaigners to influence this process. Debating key challenges in unison with existing 
theoretical understandings, it cast renewed light on this under-researched area. With limited 
influence in the corridors of power, this study has also highlighted the limitations of media 
work for penal reform campaigners. Although a regrettable situation, it is clear that a critical 
reflection on this situation will enable progressive reformers to develop improved strategies 
for the future. Viewing the policy process through a social constructionist perspective, this 
study has utilised key concepts associated with mediatisation (and in particular framing theory) 
to better understand the communicative actions of key actors operating in this policy domain. 
It is clear that the current level of competing discourse on the issue does little to push the 
poliĐǇ pƌoďleŵ of ǁoŵeŶ͛s offeŶding and imprisonment onto the public agenda. Drawing on 
Snow et al.͛s ;ϭϵϴϲͿ soĐial psǇĐhologiĐal fƌaŵe aligŶŵeŶt pƌoĐesses in conjunction with 
Rutherfoƌd͛s ;ϭϵϵϯͿ peŶal ideologies, this studǇ seeks to provoke debate among the penal 
reform network on issues of framing strategy. In so doing, all campaigners could be better 
positioned to influence policymakers, journalists and the general public.  
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9. Conclusion 
 
 
i. Introduction 
 
This interdisciplinary research examined the little-known interrelationship between penal 
reform campaigners, journalists and policymakers at the crime-media nexus. With a specific 
foĐus oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ, it sought to uŶĐoǀeƌ hoǁ ƌefoƌŵ stƌategies haǀe deǀeloped 
under changing governments and the news media spotlight. As outlined at the outset, there 
remains a lack of empirical understanding of the constraints that penal policy actors operate 
uŶdeƌ, aŶd ĐoŶseƋueŶtlǇ the ͚ŵessiŶess of ƌeal ǁoƌld deĐisioŶ-making remains largely 
uŶkŶoǁŶ͛ ;Isŵaili, ϮϬϬϲ: ϮϱϳͿ. ThiƌtǇ Ǉeaƌs ago, Solomon (1981: 5) called for more accounts of 
criminal justice policymaking, so that we are better able to understand the constraints on the 
process, the degree to which different actors are able to influence the process, and the 
important role of politics. The first study of its nature, this research has contributed to 
deǀelopiŶg uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs of the aďoǀe aƌeas as theǇ ƌelate to ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ. 
Questioning existing theoretical assumptions and uncovering new empirical ground, this final 
chapter will outline the various contributions to theory, methods and empirical understanding, 
as well as highlighting several important areas for further research.  
Revisiting the major theoretical frameworks, part two will outline the contributions to 
criminology, political science, media and communications and feminist methodology. 
Incorporating some of the key themes from the previous chapter, part three will highlight the 
practical uses of this research for campaigners, journalists and policymakers operating in this 
domain. Finally, part four will outline several pertinent areas for future research.  
 
 
ii. Contribution to Theory, Methods and Empirical Understanding 
 
Researching Penal Claimsmaking 
This study has cast further light on the relatively under-researched penal reform movement in 
England and Wales. Penal reform campaigners made clear political gains during the 1970s, 
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1980s and early 1990s (especially in the area of youth custody), yet the punitive momentum 
from the mid-1990s onwards has meant that successive governments have been reluctant to 
Ǉield to pƌessuƌe eǆeƌted ďǇ those ǁishiŶg to ͚iŵpƌoǀe͛ ĐoŶditioŶs foƌ offeŶdeƌs ;Hoďďs aŶd 
Hamerton, 2014: 6). Penal reformers, and the subject of penal reform, have consequently 
found themselves out of political fashion and as increasingly marginalised players in a climate 
that talks increasingly tough on crime. Notwithstanding contributions by Ryan (1983, 2008; see 
also Ryan, Savage and Wall, 2001) and Wilson (2001), there has been very little research 
conducted in this area, with almost nothing focusing on strategies. Moreover, in shining a 
spotlight on the stƌategies eŵploǇed ďǇ those ĐaŵpaigŶiŶg to ƌefoƌŵ ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ, 
this study is the first of its kind. Constituting an extremely niche area of government policy, 
affecting a relatively small number of offenders, there are only a handful of lobbyists and 
specialists operating in this policy domain. Although marginalised, the penal reform movement 
has an important place on the penal policy landscape, aiming to provide a critical voice (or 
conscience) to the strategies employed by successive governments. It is therefore important 
to learn more about how campaigners operate and seek to negotiate the developing political 
landscape.  
Evidence revealed that penal reform campaigners pursue similar strategies to their 
predecessors operating fifty years ago. Private lobbying was deemed the most important and 
most effective way of achieving their goals, with media work viewed as a secondary concern. 
Yet giǀeŶ the status of this issue as a ͚lesseƌ soĐial pƌoďleŵ͛ ;HilgaƌtŶer and Bosk, 1988), those 
ĐaŵpaigŶiŶg to ƌaise the pƌofile of ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ ƌefoƌŵ ŵust ǁoƌk eǆtƌeŵelǇ haƌd to 
keep the issue alive and in public consciousness. Given the suďjeĐtiǀe Ŷatuƌe of ͚pƌoďleŵs͛, 
theiƌ ĐaŵpaigŶs ofteŶ ĐoŶstitute little ŵoƌe thaŶ ͚ĐoŶĐeƌŶs͛ ;Best, ϮϬϭϯ: ϯϭϵͿ, and concern for 
those in prison is unlikely to form a universal public issue. In this instance rhetoric is key, and 
those continuing to rely on traditional reformist discourse may find it more challenging to gain 
wider support for their policies. In investigating the various strategies that penal reformers use 
to aĐhieǀe theiƌ oďjeĐtiǀes, this studǇ has dƌaǁŶ oŶ the ǁoƌkiŶg philosophies oƌ ͚Đƌedos͛ 
desĐƌiďed ďǇ ‘utheƌfoƌd ;ϭϵϵϯͿ; puŶitiǀe, ͚effiĐieŶĐǇ fiƌst͛ aŶd ƌefoƌŵatiǀe. AddiŶg a geŶdeƌed 
perspective to research already conducted by Mills and Roberts (2011, 2012), it has highlighted 
the three overarching modes of discourse relied on by those campaigning in this area. Sensitive 
to diverging viewpoints, empirical evidence points to the key lobbying tactic of using punitive 
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rhetoric (to achieve humanitarian goals). Reflecting on penal reform discourse is clearly an 
issue requiring further investigation.  
 
Researching Penal Newsmaking 
As highlighted by Silverman (2012), studies of the media-policy nexus are under-researched 
(see also Walgrave and Van Aelst, ϮϬϬϲͿ. With a speĐifiĐ foĐus oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ, this 
studǇ aiŵed to uŶƌaǀel ͚ the iŶteƌliŶkiŶg ƌelatioŶships ďetǁeeŶ the ŵedia aŶd poliĐǇŵakeƌs aŶd 
shapeƌs aŶd the iŵpaĐt oŶ ĐƌiŵiŶal justiĐe͛ ;“ilǀeƌŵaŶ, ϮϬϭϮ: ϭͿ. Viewing such interactions 
through the social constructionist paradigm, it explored the media politics of criminal justice 
through two aspects of mediatisation in particular; agenda-setting and news framing.  
Focusing on the impact of language and ideas on the policy process, it is clear that 
jouƌŶalists͛ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs of theiƌ soĐial ǁoƌld (manifested through key news values) have an 
important impact on what can, and cannot, be considered as a pressing policy problem. Indeed, 
the production of knowledge by crime reporters has a key impact on public opinion on such 
matters. Adopting different frames to discuss the same phenomenon (in this case issues 
relating to female offending and imprisonment), it is easy to understand why there exists 
something of a stalemate between the news values and source strategies of some journalists, 
campaigners and policymakers. The competing interpretations do little to influence the public 
ageŶda iŶ a ŵeaŶiŶgful ŵaŶŶeƌ, aŶd it is easǇ to see ǁhǇ the topiĐ of ǁoŵeŶ͛s offeŶdiŶg aŶd 
imprisonment remains a marginal public issue.  
While Hilton et al. (2013) have made the common sense assumption that political 
organisations are more likely to make traction if they pursue their campaigns via the media 
(see also Hobbs and Hamerton, 2014), this study has investigated media tactics from the 
perspectives of campaigners themselves. Penal reformers expressed repeated frustration 
about levels of news coverage, and interviews with journalists (operating across the spectrum) 
revealed that they had little interest in the topic (see Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994). Drawing 
oŶ MĐCoŵďs͛ ;ϮϬϭϰͿ ŵetaphoƌiĐal ͚oŶioŶ͛ of the ŵedia ageŶda, it is Đlear that campaigners 
operate as marginalised news sources, yet strategies have changed very little over the past 
twenty years. Relying, for the most part, on traditional penal reform messages, it is clear that 
such strategies do little to encourage support from certain sections of the right-leaning, 
agenda-setting media. The tendency for such newspapers to faŶ the ͚hot͛ flaŵes of Đƌiminal 
justice (whether for commercial or political gain) does little to encourage more reasoned and 
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enlightened debate and has the worrying effect of encouragiŶg ͚dispossessed͛ ĐaŵpaigŶeƌs 
and policymakers to operate underground. It would seem that the media politics of criminal 
justiĐe, as ƌeseaƌĐhed ďǇ “ĐhlesiŶgeƌ aŶd Tuŵďeƌ oǀeƌ tǁeŶtǇ Ǉeaƌs ago, haǀe ďeĐoŵe ͚hotteƌ͛ 
still.  
It is clear, therefore, that the most sensationalist issue frames adopted by journalists 
are able to obstruct the business of progressive penal policy reform. It goes without saying that 
elected politicians are unlikely to pursue policies that are deemed politically unpopular 
(whatever their private beliefs) or unfavourable in the right-leaning media, and this goes some 
way to explaining the current flow of policies emanating from the Ministry of Justice. Hogwood 
stated iŶ ϭϵϴϳ that ͚ŵuĐh of the ŵost iŵpoƌtaŶt disĐussioŶ aďout shapiŶg puďliĐ poliĐǇ iŶ 
Britain takes place in private͛ ;ϭϵϴϳ: ϭͿ, aŶd it ǁould seeŵ that, foƌ the ŵaŶǇ ƌeasons discussed 
thƌoughout this studǇ, the ͚Ŷuts aŶd ďolts͛ of peŶal poliĐǇŵakiŶg haǀe ĐhaŶged ǀeƌǇ little iŶ 
over half a century. While substantial blame must lay at the door of certain newspaper 
headquarters, how to successfully negotiate this obstacle continues to preoccupy academics, 
political commentators and campaigners alike. It is clear that framing theory is of paramount 
utility for those studying the crime-media nexus. Providing the conceptual tools to gain insight 
into the discursive strategies adopted by all policy players, it also has the ability to synthesise 
the distinct concepts developed in both the media and political sciences under the 
constructionist paradigm.  
 
Researching Penal Policymaking 
As outlined at the outset, criminologists have tended to focus their research efforts on the 
effects of policies rather than their origins while political science has largely neglected the field 
of crime control (Ismaili, 2006: 255). This study joins a growing body of scholarship that aims 
to bridge that gap (see for example John, 2012; Jones and Newburn, 2002; Barton and Johns, 
ϮϬϭϯ; Hoďďs aŶd HaŵeƌtoŶ, ϮϬϭϰͿ. “hiŶiŶg a spotlight oŶ the ĐoŵpleǆitǇ of the ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal 
policy process, it exposed the different perspectives of key actors operating in this domain: the 
competing array of campaigners, journalists and policymakers and their different ideologies 
aŶd ageŶdas. ‘efleĐtiŶg oŶ “oloŵoŶ͛s ;ϭϵϴϭͿ Đƌiteƌia, this studǇ ideŶtified the ǀaƌietǇ of 
different actoƌs ǁishiŶg to ŵake aŶ iŵpaĐt oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ aŶd the degree to which 
they are able achieve their strategic goals. Forming a point of empirical focus, evidence 
revealed that although operating as government insiders, penal reform campaigners have 
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limited agenda-setting power in both the political and media domains. The impact of politics 
on the policy process provided another important theme. In attempts to track the changing 
status of ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ oŶ the ageŶda, it is iŵpossiďle to igŶoƌe the diverging political 
philosophies of suĐĐessiǀe goǀeƌŶŵeŶt adŵiŶistƌatioŶs. As a ĐoŶseƋueŶĐe, ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal 
policy has fluctuated in importance, evidenced most recently by the stalling of the Corston 
agenda following the election of the Conservative-led Coalition government in May 2010. 
Finally, this study evidenced the number of constraints to ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ that take the 
form of various economic, political and ideological barriers. Operating at different levels and 
at different times these include: the government in power, the carrying capacities of the 
institutional agenda, the dominant right-wing ideology of the press, the (re)construction of 
policy problems, the influence of public opinion and restrictions on public spending. While 
certain restrictions are undoubtedly more influential than others, the constraints of politics 
(i.e. a lack of political will to radically reform the status quo) are currently married to the 
economic situation (there is limited money to fund policy changes, even if they were 
supported) to provide the dominant barriers to radical reform.  
This studǇ aŶalǇsed ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ deǀelopment through the distinct building 
blocks of claimsmaking, newsmaking and policymaking. While contemporary accounts argue 
that claims must pass through the newsmaking stage to reach policymakers and the public (a 
logical assumption in our 24-7 mass-mediated reality (Nimmo and Combs, 1983)), empirical 
evidence gathered during this study casts doubt on their universal application. Pursuing media 
coverage remains a universal claimsmaking tactic, but media-centric models are only relevant 
if claimsmakers are afforded access to news publications. Given the everyday challenges that 
penal reformers face (as marginal policy and media actors), it may be more beneficial for them 
to adopt the strategy of ͚iŶsideƌ ĐlaiŵsŵakiŶg͛ desĐƌiďed ďǇ Best ;2013). In stopping short of 
ƌadiĐal ͚ƌefoƌŵ ďǇ stealth͛ oƌ haƌkiŶg ďaĐk to the ďǇgoŶe ƌoŵaŶĐe of ϭϵϲϬ͛s poliĐǇŵakiŶg, the 
ŵethod of ͚iŶsideƌ ĐlaiŵsŵakiŶg͛ still allows space for media work, albeit in a limited capacity.  
In seeking to uncover more about the role of penal reform campaigners in the policy 
process, empirical evidence also questioned the dominant network approach. It is clear that 
modern policymakers share the political sphere with a proliferation of different groups that 
have a stake in criminal justice policy (Hobbs and Hamerton, 2014: 2), but, following Solomon 
(1981), it is crucial to uncover the extent to which they are able to influence the institutional 
agenda. Like many studies of contemporary policymaking, this research adopted the network 
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thesis, yet consistent with the recent findings of Rhodes (2011), it has argued that this may not 
be as pluralist as previously assumed. While not advocating a return to the Westminster model, 
it stressed the inability to adopt the black and white distinctions advocated by Jordan and 
Cairney (2013). It is also important to stress that this study did not investigate the criminal 
justice network in its entirety. If conversations with former Ministers and officials had included 
their viewpoints on the police, prison and probation lobbies (and private companies such as 
G4S and Serco) then the network thesis may have been strengthened instead of weakened. 
Such assertions are impossible to state. What it is possible to conclude, however, is that unable 
to exert significant leverage on the government, penal reform campaigners have limited 
agenda-setting power. In terms of the wider criminal justice landscape (dominated by punitive 
ideology), they are left to operate on the margins.  
 
Researching Policy Elites 
This study makes a clear contribution to feminist methodology. Combining both elite and 
geŶdeƌ studies, this ƌeseaƌĐh atteŵpted to eǆploƌe poliĐǇ deǀelopŵeŶt thƌough ͚the pƌisŵ of 
the poliĐǇ Ŷetǁoƌk͛ ;Duke, ϮϬϬϮ: ϰϭͿ. AdoptiŶg a ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶist staŶĐe, it placed great 
importance on understanding the competing viewpoints and personal interpretations of the 
different actors in this particular policy domain. Documenting the previously unpublished 
experiences of those actors working on this niche area of government policy, and consistent 
with the stance adopted by Rhodes (2011) in his recent study of Everyday Life in British 
Government, this study is also a contribution to interpretive political science. There is a clear 
need for more studies of this nature if social scientists are to gain a better understanding of 
the complexities inherent to contemporary policymaking. 
Yet as highlighted in chapter four, there is a paucity of literature available to guide those 
researching up in the field of criminal justice. This study has aimed to add to the small yet 
growing body of literature by offering a critical reflection on matters of gendered power and 
partisanship, an issue on which criminology has remained largely silent. The fieldwork process 
in particular can be fraught with uncertainties and reflexive accounts show that it is possible 
for criminologists to open a window on areas that in other research contexts would be 
concealed from awareness (Finlay, 2002b: 541). This study has argued that through engaging 
in reflective practice, criminologists (and indeed all those studying politicians and policy actors) 
will be better positioned to scrutinise the sometimes unsettled nature of power dynamics in 
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research encounters involving policy elites. Contributing to discussions of power, this study has 
highlighted the sometimes complex power symmetry that emerges when researching female 
elites in this field. It has been argued that the traditional feminist conception of power can be 
reversed in such circumstances, and it is easy to understand why some may argue this to be 
the case. Yet this is not always so, as my own research encounters attest. It may therefore be 
sensible to adopt a post-structural conception (see Smith, 2006) to the analysis of power in the 
interview setting, especially for those who are researching participants who are simultaneously 
an elite and a woman. Researching the political elite is similarly filled with ambiguity, with 
fieldwork and data collection turning into a highly political process. A decision was also made 
to self-censor and anonymise all research participants, and this is a crucial consideration for 
those researching public figures. There is a clear requirement for the publication of more 
practical research guidance on the experiences of those researching up in the social sciences, 
and certainly within the field of criminology.  
 
Advancing Feminist Criminology 
Feminist criminology is by its nature a political endeavour. Often concerned with levels of 
female victimisation, feminist criminologists also focus on female deviance and offending. As 
this studǇ has highlighted, ĐoŶĐeƌŶs aďout ǁoŵeŶ͛s tƌeatŵeŶt iŶ the ĐƌiŵiŶal justiĐe sǇsteŵ 
are not new. Yet while there has been plenty of commentary on the direction of successive 
government policies, there have been less, if any, attempts to theorise the policy process. 
Fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, ǁhile theƌe aƌe ĐouŶtless aĐĐouŶts of ǁoŵeŶ͛s pooƌ tƌeatŵeŶt iŶ the ŵedia, this 
area has also received less theoretical attention. Aiming to fill some of the above gaps, this 
studǇ adds a diffeƌeŶt peƌspeĐtiǀe to disĐussioŶs aďout ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ ƌefoƌŵ. It is Đleaƌ 
that many criminologists of a feminist orientation have worked collaboratively with several of 
the campaigners that contributed to this research, yet there have been limited accounts of 
such endeavours. Providing practical tips to those working in this area must be a crucial 
endeavour for policy-focused academics, especially in light of the limited influence that 
academic criminology has on the penal policy process. Learning more about the ways in which 
lobbyists (those with open channels to government, in whatever capacity) are able to influence 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ is oŶe ǁaǇ that ĐƌiŵiŶologists aƌe aďle to iŶflueŶĐe the poliĐǇ pƌoĐess. 
The mutual benefits to both parties are considerable.  
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Highlighting the circumstances surrounding female offending once again, this study has 
stressed that equality in criminal justice policy does not have to mean identical treatment to 
men. Women in the criminal justice system are subjected to host of particular challenges, and 
it is equality of outcome that must dictate discussions of appropriate punishment. The 
government acknowledged this in the Equality Act 2006, yet such viewpoints have not 
successfully permeated public opinion. While there are promising signs that the public are not 
as punitive as some argue, it would be wrong to state that there is no level of resistance here. 
Thinking carefully about the messages most likely to resonate with the public is a key 
claimsmaking tactic, and one that feminist criminology should consider in more detail.  
 
 
iii. Practical Utility 
 
By no means an afterthought, it is important to highlight the important contribution that 
academic criminology can make to the policy process (see Chancer and McLaughlin, 2007; 
Faulkner and Burnett, 2012; Loader and Sparks, 2011b). Formulated during a career in politics, 
this research was approached from a policy-focused standpoint. From the outset it had the 
explicit intention of providing practical information to those engaged in penal reform campaign 
stƌategies, as ǁell as the ǁideƌ Ŷetǁoƌk of aĐtoƌs ǁoƌkiŶg oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ. DuƌiŶg the 
fieldwork process it became clear that many campaigners would benefit on a practical level 
from some of the findings, and as the research developed so too did the desire to provide a 
separate working toolkit for interested penal reformers. As highlighted by Waldron, engaging 
with policy actors can be a mutually beneficial exercise once researchers are able to develop a 
reĐogŶitioŶ of the ͚ ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes of politiĐs͛ ;ϭϵϵϵ: ϭϬϲͿ. Yet theƌe is also a Ŷeed foƌ aĐadeŵiĐs 
to remain pragmatic. Developed with an understanding of such circumstances, the practical 
suggestions outlined below seek to work within the inevitable political and economic 
constraints.  
 
Campaigners 
The practical utility of this study for penal reform campaigners is obvious. Approached from a 
claimsmaking perspective, it explored the array of political and communicative challenges 
faced by penal reformers, but simultaneously sought to provide areas for realistic 
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improvement. The fact that it exposed their position as peripheral policy and media players 
may come as no surprise to campaigners. Although articulated in different ways, campaigners 
were aware that they had limited agenda-setting power and were campaigning on an issue 
that was of limited interest to the general public. Reflecting on their collective position, this 
study has advocated several ways for enhanced impact in the media and policy spheres. The 
points below summarise key areas for consideration:  
 
- GiǀeŶ that the status of ǁoŵeŶ͛s offeŶdiŶg aŶd iŵpƌisoŶŵeŶt is a ͚lesseƌ soĐial 
pƌoďleŵ͛ ;HilgaƌtŶeƌ aŶd Bosk, ϭϵϴϴͿ ǁith a liŵited Ŷuŵďeƌ of adǀoĐates, those 
working on this area have an important duty to keep the issue salient in the political 
and public spheres.  
- While the ĐuƌƌeŶt oďstaĐles to ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal poliĐǇ reform include penal populism, 
government resistance and distorted media poƌtƌaǇals, ͚ƌefoƌŵ ďǇ stealth͛, hoǁeǀeƌ 
tempting, does not provide the answer. Although a laudable ambition, unlike Norway, 
a Bƌitish ǀeƌsioŶ of K‘OM siŵplǇ ǁouldŶ͛t ǁoƌk in the UK.  
- Media work must not be discounted in its entirety, but can be treated as a secondary 
concern (a 75%/25% balance, for example). Receiving higher levels of media coverage 
can improve political legitimacy, and this may constitute the sole objective for some. 
Either way, in this 24/7 multi-mediated world there is a clear requirement to work 
publicly, in some capacity at least.  
- Making greater use of social media to undermine official discourse is an important 
consideration. Although it brings its own risks, this is a communicative medium that 
should be explored in more detail.  
- Pursuing claims in unison would strengthen their political and media influence.  
- In attempts to influence the policy and media agendas there is a danger in relying on 
overtly humanitarian rhetoric. While work needs to consider the long-term 
achievement of interpretive change (Best, 1987: 115), there is a more pressing need to 
think about the short term strategy.  
- Thinking tactically about messaging structure is therefore key. The scatter-gun 
approach to lobbying is not working, and more consideration could be placed on choice 
of language. While regrettable, this study has evidenced that progress is more likely to 
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be made in the media sphere, the policy sphere and the public sphere if messages for 
women are framed using more right-wing rhetoric.  
- Focusing more purposefully on the right-leaning press, and reaching out to relevant 
journalists, there also needs to be a greater use more case studies. Stories about policy 
(whether supportive or critical of current direction) have limited newsworthiness, if any 
at all. While there is understandable concern about protecting women offenders, it is 
equally important to give them a voice. Providing journalists with more news friendly 
packages, and tapping into the dominant (while perhaps erroneous) understandings 
about crime could result in greater levels of coverage.  
- It is important to remember that the reliance on more punitive rhetoric is simply a 
packaging issue, but a strategy that may better result in humanitarian outcomes. 
Working collectively, it is time to reinvigorate public perceptions of penal reform.  
 
Policymakers 
Highlighted throughout this study, there are a number of practical policymaking issues worthy 
of consideration by Department officials in particular: 
 
- The lack of clear strategy emanating from the Department in the first half of the 
Coalition government is regrettable. Reflecting the change in ideological focus, it 
allowed the green shoots of penal progress for women to stall. Echoing the concerns 
of campaigners, it also led the House of Commons Justice Select Committee to 
investigate this matter and publish a fairly damning critique. While progress over recent 
years is to be applauded, the recent election has seen another Minister awarded 
responsibility for this brief. In negotiating this Ministerial merry-go-round, those few 
officials working in this area must not lose important time.  
- While former Ministers did not see media coverage as particularly important for the 
agenda, it is clear that this cannot be avoided altogether. Baroness Corston, in her 2007 
revieǁ aƌgued that ͚eduĐatiŶg the puďliĐ ŵust ďe aŶ iŶtegƌal paƌt of the stƌategǇ 
ƌelatiŶg to ǁoŵeŶ͛ ;ϮϬϬϳ: ϭϭͿ. This statement highlights the clear role for government 
in terms of public education, but the current mixed messages emanating from the 
Department do little to untangle public opinion on this complex matter. Without a clear 
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mandate one way or the other, policymakers are prevented from pursuing 
revolutionised strategies.  
- Like campaigners, the Department would benefit from reflecting on the major public 
messages that it wishes to pursue. The gender-humanitarian package pursued by policy 
officials runs counter to the punitive package advocated by the current Secretary of 
State. With ideologically opposed messages emanating from the same Department, 
public understandings are confused further. Department officials, of whatever personal 
ideologǇ, ǁould ďeŶefit fƌoŵ ĐoŶsideƌiŶg ǁhetheƌ a sǇŶthesisiŶg ǁith ͚tough͛ laŶguage 
would help legitimise their desired (humanitarian) result.  
- Although perhaps viewed differently by policy officials, it is important not to discount 
the agenda-settiŶg iŶflueŶĐe of the ǁoŵeŶ͛s peŶal ƌefoƌŵ Ŷetǁoƌk altogetheƌ. 
UŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg that the MiŶistƌǇ of JustiĐe goǀeƌŶs ͚thƌough a Ŷeǆus of ĐoŶtƌaĐts͛ 
(Wright, 1994: 127), it is important to ŵaiŶtaiŶ Đlose ƌelatioŶs ǁith the aƌƌaǇ of ͚ĐƌitiĐal 
fƌieŶds͛, ǁho ĐoŶstitute a supportive and accommodating  policy network.  
 
Journalists 
It ǁould ďe uŶƌealistiĐ to Đall foƌ jouƌŶalists to eŶgage iŶ ŵoƌe ͚ďalaŶĐed͛ ƌepoƌtiŶg oŶ the 
subject of penal policy or criminal justice. While journalists do carry a level of responsibility to 
provide sensible reporting, those working for the right-wing newspapers are unlikely to change 
their stance on crime anytime soon. Furthermore, in seeking better relations, journalists 
believe that it is campaigners who need to make the lions-share of effort. While recognising a 
level of resistance, it is possible to work within these boundaries to identify several areas of 
practical improvement:  
 
- While acknowledging that journalists operate under extreme pressure and within 
explicit timescales, it would be helpful if they were responsive to attempts made by 
campaigners to become more media savvy.  
- Such responses could include giving advice on news framing and explaining why 
traditional methods of communication (such as press releases) are not interesting or 
helpful. Simply ignoring press releases does little to help both parties. Campaigners 
continue to waste precious time and journalists keep pressing the ͚delete͛ ďuttoŶ. If 
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campaigners were able to better understood the constituent elements of a news story, 
they could be of more use to journalists by providing news friendly packages. 
- While acknowledging that it is difficult to place stories about this issue into their own 
left-leaning newspapers, there is a role for sympathetic journalists to provide greater 
levels of strategic advice. Some campaigners have closer working relations with those 
͚ethiĐal͛ jouƌŶalists, Ǉet it is Ŷot Đleaƌ if theǇ aƌe ďenefitting from the practical 
information that such journalists are in a position to provide. 
- Finally, it is important to remember that campaigners now have other options available 
to theŵ. OpeƌatiŶg ouƌ Ϯϰ/ϳ ͚ŵass-ŵediated ƌealitǇ͛ ;Niŵŵo and Combs, 1983), 
journalists are no longer the information gatekeepers they once were. Campaigners 
have the ability to undermine official discourse and increasing opportunities to spread 
their messages using social media. Unable to receive news coverage via the traditional 
channels it is easy to see why they would choose to work this way. Furthermore, while 
this study does not advocate wholescale ͚ƌefoƌŵ ďǇ stealth͛, it is ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ a ǀalid 
strategy for those who have lost patience with irresponsible journalism. Journalists 
ignore this at their peril.  
 
 
iv. Avenues for Future Research 
 
This research has uncovered several areas for future investigation relating to women offenders 
and public, political and judicial attitudes.  
As highlighted in the previous chapter, in seeking to further examine what approaches 
ĐoŶŶeĐt peŶal ƌefoƌŵ ǁith ͚the people͛ it is Đleaƌ that theƌe is a pƌessiŶg Ŷeed foƌ ŵoƌe 
empirical research on public opinion as it relates to women offenders. Small-scale polls have 
been conducted, but there is a clear requirement to update empirical knowledge in this area. 
The Prison Reform Trust in 2007 (under the auspices of SmartJustice) commissioned one of the 
very few polls ever conducted in this area. With just over 1000 respondents, the results 
determined that the majority of respondents (86 per cent) supported community alternatives 
for women (along with an element of community payback). While this quantifiable evidence 
suggests there is public support for alternatives to prison for women, this is clearly an area in 
need of further investigation and revision, especially if campaigners and government officials 
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wish to rely on such evidence to substantiate future strategies. Furthermore, and as 
highlighted by Russell (2005), the public possess limited knowledge on community sentences, 
and empirical research is required to ascertain how such disposals are viewed in general. Such 
results would be beneficial for future campaign strategies. 
There is also a need to investigate how the three working philosophies of punishment 
(punitive, efficiency, humanitarian) are interpreted by those decision makers who are naturally 
hostile to the cause, and in particular the army of backbench politicians, political 
commentators and right-wing journalists. Learning more about the rhetoric that is most likely 
to resonate with them would be a useful exercise for those working in and around the penal 
field. Hoǁ, foƌ eǆaŵple, do suĐh iŶdiǀiduals iŶteƌpƌet the teƌŵ ͚soĐial justiĐe͛, aŶd ǁhat does 
(or could) humanitarianism in penal policy mean to them? While not the original intention of 
this study, the way that policy actors seek to negotiate the punitive/feminist paradox became 
an interesting point of reflection. While an issue that has been debated in criminology, it has 
not yet included the perspectives of different policy actors. Understanding more about how 
such actors attempt to negotiate the penal paradox is a natural follow-up to this study. 
Those seeking to pursue humanitarian messages would also benefit from developing a 
greater understanding of the viewpoints of magistrates on women offenders. Whether they 
are likely to admit it or not, magistrates are not immune from political pressures and media 
coverage. If an increase in community penalties for women is to be achieved, then what factors 
would magistrates wish to see built into sentences if they are to stand up to judicial and 
(crucially) public scrutiny?  
This contribution to policymaking has highlighted the need for more investigations of 
this nature so that criminologists are able to better understand the complex dynamics of the 
penal policy process. The penal lobby remains an under-researched topic, and there is a need 
to explore its influence on the policy process in greater detail. Future work could focus on the 
poliĐe, pƌisoŶ aŶd pƌoďatioŶ loďďies, as ǁell as the ǀiĐtiŵs͛ ŵoǀeŵeŶt, foƌ eǆaŵple. UtilisiŶg a 
similar method to this study, the different framing structures used in attempts to influence the 
policy process could be explored.  
Finally, it is clear that criminology requires more reflexive methodological accounts 
from those who are researching at the vibrant intersection of policy, politics and criminology. 
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Appendix 
 
Interview schedules developed and augmented as the research proceeded. The interview 
questions below provide a broad outline of topics covered.  
 
 
Interview Questions: Campaigners 
- What lobbying strategies do you employ to affect change? How much focus do you 
place on (i) the Ministry of Justice, (ii) Parliamentarians, (iii) the media?  
- Do you feel a requirement to educate the public on matters of criminal justice policy? 
- Do you have any specific strategies to try and gain media coverage? 
- If you engage in media work, who would you say are your main targets? 
- Do you struggle to get media coverage, or is low coverage a reflection of your decision 
to engage in private work?  
- Do you respond to all media requests? 
- How do you feel about media coverage of women offenders? 
- Does media coverage (negative or otherwise) affect your campaigning strategies?  
 
 
Interview Questions: Journalists 
- Talk me through your decision-making process when deciding what stories to cover. 
- Do you feel a responsibility to keep the public informed on developments and reforms 
in criminal justice?  
- What sort of relationships do you have with penal reform organisations? Do you think 
their campaign strategies are effective?  
- Do you think such organisations struggle to get coverage? If so, why? 
- Given the sometimes negative climate within which penal reformers work do you think 
there is an argument for them to bypass the media and work privately?  
- Do you feel that women offenders get more of a hard time in the press?  
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Interview Questions: Policymakers 
- Do you think that private lobbying remains the most important avenue for influence, 
or do you feel there is an important role for the media?  
- Did you have close relations with penal reform campaigners? How often would you 
meet such individuals or organisations?  
- Did you feel that the penal reform network had an influence on your decisions?  
- Can you recall any particularly effective lobbying strategies, either public or private?  
- Some campaigners have said that they pursued media coverage to get your attention. 
Was such work important to you? 
- In terms of Department media coverage, was it hard to get journalists interested in the 
policies you wished to pursue? Did you ever find media work obstructive on this issue?  
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